


RHETORIC AND RENEWAL IN THE LATIN WEST 1100-1540

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN O. WARD



EDITED BY
CONSTANT J. MEWS, CARY J. NEDERMAN,
RODNEY M. THOMSON

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The book series *Disputatio* continues the tradition, established by the predecessor journal of the same name, of publishing interdisciplinary



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RHETORIC AND RENEWAL IN THE LATIN WEST 1100-1540 ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN O. WARD

The essays in this volume, presented in honour of John O. Ward, explore the role of rhetoric in promoting reform and renewal in the Latin West from Peter Abelard (1079-1142) to Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540). Ward, who has taught for many years at the University of Sydney, has been an influential and creative force in medieval and renaissance studies both in Australia and internationally. This volume opens with a personal memoir and bibliography of Ward's publications, as well as an overview of the study of medieval rhetoric. The first of the three sections, 'Abelard and Rhetoric', relates Abelard's rhetoric to his logic, his theology, and his relationship to Heloise. A second section, 'Voices of Reform', considers various writers (William of Malmesbury, John of Salisbury, Richard FitzNigel, and William of Ockham) who bring rhetorical techniques to bear upon analysis of social conditions. A third section, 'Rhetoric in Transition', deals with the evolution of rhetorical theory between the late fourteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The volume will be of interest not just to specialists in rhetoric, but to all concerned with issues of reform and renewal in European culture during the period 1100-1540.

Contributors: Martin Camargo, Rita Copeland, Virginia Cox, Karin Margareta Fredborg, Constant J. Mews, Peter von Moos, James J. Murphy, Cary J. Nederman, Juanita Feros Ruys, John Scott, Nancy S. Struever, Rodney M. Thomson, and Michael Winterbottom.

Cover adapted from the image of *Rhetorica*
taken from the *Hortus Deliciarum*

ISBN 2-503-51340-9



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VOLUME 2

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and Rodney M. Thomson



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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Rhetoric and renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540 : essays in honour of
John O. Ward. – (Disputatio ; 2)

1.Abelard, Peter, 1079-1142 – Criticism and interpretation

2.Rhetoric, Medieval 3.Literature, Medieval – History and criticism

I.Mews, Constant J. II.Nederman, Cary J. III.Thomson, Rodney M.
(Rodney Malcolm), 1946- IV.Ward, John O., 1940-

808'.0094'0902

ISBN 2503513409

© 2003, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium

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D/2003/0095/38

ISBN 2-503-51340-9

Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.

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Preface and Acknowledgements

This volume pays tribute to the enormous contribution of John O. Ward as a teacher, scholar, and friend to many people both within Australia and overseas, who have been touched in one way or another by his great generosity, learning, and insight. It would have been possible to create a number of different volumes to celebrate his achievement, calling on the contribution of many students and friends who could have written on a wide range of topics, to mark the extent of his influence upon them. This volume picks up just one theme that John O. Ward has made very much his own, the theory and practice of rhetoric in the Latin West from the beginning of the twelfth to the early sixteenth century. While John O. Ward's interests are immensely wide, as his bibliography and the personal memoir of Rodney M. Thomson make clear, we have decided to restrict the range of papers in this volume to a single theme of particular interest to him, rhetoric and renewal in the Latin West from the High Middle Ages to the Renaissance.

After an initial survey by Martin Camargo of contemporary presentations of rhetoric in the medieval period, the essays chosen for this volume fall into three major spheres, each of which presents an aspect of John O. Ward's intellectual interest. Ward has always been fascinated by the contribution of both Peter Abelard and Heloise to the theory and practice of rhetoric. We thus considered it appropriate to bring together papers by Constant J. Mews, Karin Margareta Fredborg, Peter von Moos, and Juanita Feros Ruys under the broad heading of 'Abelard and Rhetoric'. Rodney M. Thomson, Michael Winterbottom, Cary J. Nederman and John Scott contribute essays on a series of Englishmen, each of whom is distinguished by a vivid and often critical insight into the political and educational structures of their day. William of Malmesbury, John of Salisbury, Richard FitzNigel, and William of Ockham each mirror some aspect of John O. Ward's persona, whether as chronicler of times past, as an intellectual committed to the affairs of the body politic, or as a critic of educational and ecclesiastical bureaucracy. In their own way, each of them articulates a voice urging cultural renewal. The final section brings together scholars who work on another field of John's interests, rhetoric in a time of social and political change, namely during the late medieval and renaissance periods. Rita Copeland, Virginia Cox, James Jerome (Jerry) Murphy, and Nancy S. Struever all comment

in one way or another on how rhetoric was placed at the service of a community, whether in a Latin or in a vernacular context. As an educator, Juan Luis Vives embodies values that John O. Ward has continued to instill in our own day.

There are many people whom we have to thank. Dr Simon Forde, a frequent visitor to the meetings of the Australian and New Zealand Association for Medieval and Early Modern Studies (to which John O. Ward has himself made such a contribution) has given keen commitment to the project from an early stage. We are grateful to the Board of Disputatio for including the volume within their series. Monash University, the University of Tasmania, and Texas A&M University have made it possible for the editors to realize this project. Assistance with the compilation of the Bibliography of John O. Ward's publications was given by Lesley Sutherland, and with the translation of the article of Peter von Moos by Ralf Stammberger, of the Hugo von Sankt Viktor Institut, Frankfurt. Maryna Mews has helped with proof-reading and copy-editing the final text. Medieval studies is an international endeavour, as the contributors to this volume testify. Through his friends scattered across the globe, John O. Ward has played a major part in keeping the republic of letters truly alive.

Constant J. Mews, Monash University


Cary J. Nederman, Texas A&M University

Rodney M. Thomson, University of Tasmania

Abbreviations

<i>Ad Her</i>	<i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i>
AHDLMA	<i>Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge</i>
BGPTMA	Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters
BNCF	Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze
BnF	Bibliothèque nationale de France
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis (Turnhout: Brepols, 1966–)
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954–)
<i>Ciceronian Rhetoric</i>	John O. Ward, <i>Ciceronian Rhetoric in Treatise, Scholion and Commentary</i> . Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental, 58 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995)
CIMAGL	<i>Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin</i> (Copenhagen)
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1866–)
<i>De inv</i>	Cicero, <i>De inventione</i>
PL	<i>Patrologiae Cursus Completus</i> , Series Latina, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paris: Garnier, 1844–64)

Exordium



John O. Ward

John O. Ward: A Personal Memoir

RODNEY M. THOMSON

To describe and appreciate John Oastler Ward's character and academic achievement in a few words is a delightful but by no means easy task. One is confronted by a larger-than-life, complex and immensely engaging personality: on the one hand quintessentially Australian, moulded by his Melbourne upbringing and early education, and by his long residence in inner-suburban Sydney. On the other hand, John is also a citizen of the world, gregarious and cosmopolitan, a constant traveller across many lands, a familiar figure in libraries and at conferences from North America to England, from Finland to Italy. He is a humanist, but with a 'larrikin' streak; a 'Renaissance man'—and of course many of the real Renaissance men were both humanists and larrikins—with an astonishingly wide range of interests, pursued passionately and often simultaneously. Most unusually, he is committed at once to the academic enterprise and to his local community, to the ideal of detached, objective scholarly research, but also to influencing and improving the urban environment about him. Some of this range of qualities and interests is visible in his extensive and variegated Bibliography, in which we have deliberately included his non-academic writings. But even this is little more than the tip of the iceberg; much of John O. Ward, even merely of his scholarly contribution, is not manifested, or manifestable, in written form.

Between 1970 and 1972 I held an Assistant Lectureship in the History Department of Sydney University; it was my first academic job, and John was my boss, himself only a couple of years into his own Lectureship. They were heady days, in which we both taught a large first-year course covering European history from the fall of the Roman Empire until the thirteenth century. It was not long before one became aware of John's prodigious energy and enthusiasm for knowledge and its communication. Vast, multilingual reading-lists were compiled. Many hours were spent at the typewriter and Gestetner creating handouts which were often translations of original sources, with introduction and commentary. On hindsight, we must have inflicted serious information overload on the poor students, but I do not recall any

complaints. One reason for this was undoubtedly John's capacity to communicate his own enthusiasm and to generate it in others, so that they performed beyond their normal capacities. Above all this was, and is, manifested in his lecturing style; each delivery a performance in the best sense of the word: clearly structured, erudite and serious on the one hand, but also entertaining in the constant flow of over-the-top rhetorical devices: wit, *exaggeratio*, ham-acting, all delivered with tremendous force and bravura. And then there were, between classes and the constant manufacturing of teaching-aids, the intense and enlightening discussions of problems in the history of twelfth-century Europe, often ignited by John's reading of the latest monograph or abstruse source. Finally, there were the fascinating glimpses of John's 'extra-curricular' self: his avid photographic pursuit of the last running Australian steam locomotives, his participation in protest-marches such as the Black Moratorium, and, after the examination marking was finished one year, repairing downtown to watch the newly released film—that wonderful sendup of stereotypical Australian larrikinism—'The Adventures of Barrie MacKenzie'.

This vignette of John at the beginning of his career introduces three themes which I shall now pursue in more detail: his commitment to teaching, the significance of his scholarly achievement, and his 'other interests', without consideration of which the man and the scholar can scarcely be understood.

The Teacher

John himself would probably approve of his work as a teacher being treated first, such is the importance he has given to it in his career, expending more time on his teaching, and on individual students than anyone I have ever met. It would be fair to characterize John as a 'guru',¹ one who is often found seated among a group of students dispensing wisdom or listening to their concerns, whether in his own office or at a university watering-hole. Like God, in these situations, John's rain falls on the just and unjust; he spends as much time and attention on the 'time-wasters'² as on the diligent and obviously excellent. Over three decades he has devised and taught a wide variety of courses, some broad, some specialized, some on particular themes such as humanism, witchcraft, heresy, gender, and the Crusades. Almost as much intellectual ingenuity goes into the structure and content of some of these courses as into John's published work. This is no accident, for a glance at his Bibliography will indicate the considerable symbiosis between his teaching and scholarly output.³

¹ See the novel by Catherine Jinks, *An Evening with the Messiah* (Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin Books, 1996), based, so rumour has it, upon John and his 'circle'.

² As in Angus Wilson, *Anglo-Saxon Attitudes* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1956), pp. 39, 397.

³ See, for example, Bibliography items 1972–88, 1993a, 1997a.

Ideas generated in designing and teaching a course, interests developed by John and one or more of his senior students, are sometimes reflected in publications by himself singly, or co-operatively. In this way John has given enormous impetus to the scholarly development of his honours and graduate students in particular, not least through promoting publication of their research.⁴

The Scholar

It would be hard for any single scholar to assess John's contributions both to his specialist field, and to the very many other areas to which he has addressed his mind. All the contributors to this volume, and many more beside, know of his significant place in the history of Latin rhetoric from Antiquity to the Renaissance. He is one of a small group of leading scholars in that field. His achievement has been to demonstrate the importance of the tradition and its relevance to other aspects of intellectual and social life, especially vis-à-vis the scholasticism of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and its continuity, especially from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. But although he has ranged across the whole of this extensive chronological field, the 'Renaissance of the Twelfth Century' has always held a special place for him within the wider canvas. Here John's work has illuminated not only the intellectual scene,⁵ but, in work strongly influenced by Georges Duby and the *Annales* school, the interconnections between religious reform, power politics and social unrest, as played out for example in the amazing account of Hugh of Poitiers' Vézelay Chronicle.⁶

A prominent characteristic of John's writing is the high proportion of it which is, or which contains illuminating commentary on primary source material. I think that John would agree that the roots of this approach lie a long way back, in the influence of that extraordinary teacher at Melbourne University, who introduced us both as undergraduates to the study of medieval history, Marion (Molly) Gibbs († 1999). This approach was powerfully reinforced by his time at Toronto, in the late 1960s, under the influence of Fathers Häring and O'Donnell. From Molly Gibbs came the idea of intense engagement and critical interrogation of the sources; from Toronto came the panoply of *Hilfswissenschaft* which lies behind his doctorate, completed there, on the tradition of commentary on the *De inventione* and *Ad Herennium*. The

⁴ See Ward's Introduction to *Worshipping Women* (1997a), a volume containing a number of distinguished honours dissertations that he supervised, as well as his numerous contributions to *Studium: The Record of the Sydney Medieval and Renaissance Group* (1972–88), a journal in which many of his students and colleagues published important studies and translations of medieval texts.

⁵ 1972a (an article that attracted the attention of the late R. W. Hunt), 1979a, 1990a, 1996a.

⁶ 1992a, 1999b–c.

doctorate, with its valuable detailed codicological descriptions of hundreds of manuscripts, many in uncatalogued and scarcely accessible collections, is much admired and has been frequently consulted. It has so far remained unpublished, although a substantial portion of it has appeared in the guise of the important monograph *Ciceronian Rhetoric*.⁷ Yet, while John is very much a practitioner of the tradition of textual scholarship he refers to (double-edgedly) as 'Wissenschaft',⁸ he is, even more, a believer in the power of ideas and the imagination. And indeed, his scholarship is also characterized by the brilliance and fecundity of his own ideas. It is, truth to say, both a strength and weakness. As the great length of many of John's articles hints, his engaging tendency is to try and cram all of his ideas on a given subject into the one piece of writing. Sometimes this is at the expense of a clearly-articulated structure; sometimes it is regardless of whether they are fully thought through and supported, or merely brilliant but unsubstantiated jeux d'esprit. It is not to be expected that all of John's ideas should be of equal solidity, but it is probably true that they are generally worth consideration and that they always act as stimuli to further thought about a given topic.

A quick perusal of John's Bibliography will reveal some surprising facts. There are few monographs but many articles, conference papers, and a prodigious number of reviews of books (over sixty). In fact, John has always needed a connection with other persons—whether by way of collaboration, invitation, or stimulus—in order to write. In this respect, an important part has been played in his career as an academic writer by some of the contributors to this volume, notably Jerry Murphy.

The 'Renaissance Man'

John is much more than an 'academic' man, and in some ways something other than. No one is less fitted than he for a role in academic bureaucracy or for climbing the greasy pole of academic promotion. If his formal career scarcely reflects his brilliance and international standing, this has to be said, bluntly but affectionately, to have been his own fault. Several years ago, on being shown his list of publications, another contributor to this volume, Michael Winterbottom, asked how it was that such a man hadn't had a chair long before. The answer is that John, performer, guru, alderman and mayor, nonetheless has no personal ambition whatsoever, and within the university context has never troubled to develop any self-promotional strategy, or to cultivate a 'safe' or conventional self-image that might have led to a role as a senior academic administrator. Mover and shaker, protestor and policy-maker in the

⁷ 1995a.

⁸ The 'W' always pronounced by JOW as the 'W' in 'Weller' (compare Charles Dickens, *Pickwick Papers*, Chapter 34: 'Quite right too, Samivel; quite right. Put it down a we, my Lord, put it down a we'). John's pronunciation of German can be execrable, memorably for example, 'Leihezwang' as 'Lie-heads-wang', accent upon the second syllable.

outside world, within the university John is the unconventional ironist, shrewd and critical observer, the never bitter, but humorous utterer of unpalatable truths. And with this is connected another paradox: the man who can fulminate, in language colourful but predominantly blue, against the baseness of his fellow man, whether in the political or academic sphere, is also the kindest and least guileful of individuals, incapable of malicious act or motive, and with a deep attachment to his wife Gail and their children.

Outside of academe, he is deeply interested in music, especially Mozart, and in opera in general. Among his earliest publications are those which show his long-held concern for travel by public transport, preferably by train (he is still an apologist for steam!) or tram (the Melbourne background again).⁹ Although he has from time to time possessed cars, he has always treated them with a degree of disdain (hence, at one stage, the VW repainted using a brush). It was, one imagines, this combination of fervent interest in an important public issue and his active left-wing politics, that led him for a lengthy period into local government, including four years as mayor of Ashfield in Sydney. For many of us, knowing John's distaste for bureaucracy and hopeless disregard of rules, regulations and procedures, this was a surprising metamorphosis, and surprising that it was so successful. It will be long, one gathers, before Ashfield's more prominent citizens forget John's two memorable mayoral balls, the first medieval, the second (of course) renaissance, including period costume, food and entertainment. Probably all contributors to this volume, and many of its readers, will know that John himself is a great performer and impresario, whether chairing, speaking or interjecting at an academic conference, or playing Beelzebub, in scarlet body-suit, in a mystery play in the Great Hall of Sydney University (unforgettably witnessed by several of us).

We hope that John will accept this book as a token of the affection and esteem in which he is held by so many of the international community of medieval scholarship. The theme that we eventually selected, and which is described in the title of this book, represents our attempt to encapsulate at least two of John's core interests. They happen to have been treated by him in close interrelationship, and they are the ones in which he has perhaps made his own most distinguished contribution: the tradition of classical rhetoric, and the theme of an on-going 'renaissance' in European history from the twelfth to the early sixteenth century.

⁹ 1970b, 1972b, 1982a.

A Bibliography of John O. Ward

COMPILED BY RODNEY M. THOMSON AND CONSTANT J. MEWS

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- 1969b 'The *Constitutio Negotialis* in Ancient Latin Rhetorical Theory', *Prudentia*, 1, 29–48.
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- 1970b and A. C. Ward, 'The Tramways of Melbourne', *Headlights*, 32, nos 7–8, July / August, 1–24.
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- 1972a 'The Date of the Commentary on Cicero's *De Inventione* by Thierry of Chartres (ca 1095–1160?) and the Cornifician Attack on the Liberal Arts', *Viator*, 3, 219–73.
- 1972b *Along the Line in Tasmania Book 2: Private Lines* (Canberra, A.C.T.: Traction Publications). Reprinted 1983.
- 1972–88 almost continuously Editor of *Studium: The Record of the Sydney Medieval and Renaissance Group*, nos 1–18. John O. Ward contributed a number of items to this journal, for example a long review of V. H. Green's *Medieval Civilization in Western Europe* (1973c), a shorter version of which appeared in *Teaching History* December (1972), 28;

- annotated translations of documents relating to Vézelay (1975c, subsequently 1992e) and to the commune of Laon (1977c), a review of Penny Gold's PhD thesis (1979d), as well as editing other major primary texts relating to heresy (1986c).
- 1973a Review article of *The Cambridge History of the Bible*, II, ed. by G. W. H. Lampe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), *Journal of Religious History*, 7, 264–70.
- 1973b 'Historical Archaeology and the Railway Age', *Australian Society for Historical Archaeology Newsletter*, 3, 5–10.
- 1973c Review of V. H. H. Green, *Medieval Civilization in Western Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, 1971), *Studium: The Record of the Sydney Medieval and Renaissance Group*, 5, 1–6.
- 1973–76 Contributions to the *Newsletter of the Ashfield and District Historical Society*: no. 3: 'Graveyard Recording Project'; no. 4: 'Notes to Accompany a Talk to the Ashfield and District Historical Society on Victorian Architecture in the Area'; no. 6: 'Random Reminiscences, 1'; no. 7: 'The Houses and Streets of Summer Hill: A Chronicle of the Settlement of a Suburb'; no. 9: 'A Preliminary Survey of Victorian and Queen Anne Buildings in Summer Hill'; 'Notes on Books, Archives and other Research Materials in the Possession of the Society or its Members or likely to be of Interest to the Society, 1 *The Life of Quong Tart or How a Foreigner Succeeded in a British Community*, compiled and edited by Mrs Q. Tart 1911'; no. 10: 'Notes on Books etc., 2 *The Memoirs of Mark Hammond*' Part 1; no. 11: 'Notes on Books etc., 2 *The Memoirs of Mark Hammond*' Part 2; no. 14: 'Notes on Books etc., 2, *The Memoirs of Mark Hammond*' Part 3; no. 16: 'Two Comments on the Role of the Local Historical Society: Local Historical Society and the Schools, the Role of Local Councils in the Preservation of Historical Sources'; no. 27: 'History Teachers Association of NSW, Conference on "The Local Area" Sydney University, March 1976, Report'.
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- 1975c ‘Twelfth Century Social Unrest: The Vézelay Charter of 1137, a Case of Unsuccessful Arbitration’, *Studium: The Record of the Sydney Medieval and Renaissance Group*, 7, 1–9.
- 1977a *Learning by Enquiry Project*, for NSW Secondary Schools (Sydney: Holt Saunders = Holt, Rinehart and Winston): 1 Topic Book [*The Middle Ages*]; 5 Aspect Books [*The Conflict of Faith and Fact*; *The Crusades: Cold War and Hot*; *Towns and Revolution in the Middle Ages*; *Magic and Witchcraft in the Middle Ages*; *Science, Machines and Technology in the Middle Ages*], chart, 42 slides & guide, 1 tape cassette & guide, 11 transparencies & guide, teacher’s manual.
- 1977b ‘Classical Rhetoric and the Writing of History in Medieval and Renaissance Culture’, in *European History and its Historians*, ed. by F. McGregor and N. Wright (Adelaide: University Union Press), pp. 1–10.
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- 1978b Summer Hill North Historical Walk: extensive tour notes and photographic material compiled (with Nora Peek).
- 1978c Review of E. Randolph Daniel, *The Franciscan Concept of Mission in the High Middle Ages* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975), *Journal of Religious History*, 10, 97–98.
- 1979a ‘Gothic Architecture, Universities and the Decline of the Humanities in Twelfth-Century Europe’, in *Principalities, Powers and Estates: Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Government and Society*, ed. by Leighton O. Frappell (Adelaide: University Union Press), pp. 65–75.
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- 1979d 'Penny Gold, "Image and Reality: Women in Twelfth-Century France" (Diss. Stanford, 1977): An Unauthorised Summary and Occasional Comment', *Studium: The Record of the Sydney Medieval and Renaissance Group*, 11, 1–8.
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Defining Medieval Rhetoric

MARTIN CAMARGO

Medievalists who study the history of rhetoric often have found themselves defending the importance, if not establishing the existence, of their subject.¹ For most historians of rhetoric, the European Middle Ages have been what the American Middle West is for most airline passengers: 'fly-over country'. Courses that survey the Western rhetorical tradition and, until recently, the texts used in teaching such courses, have tended to ignore the medieval period.² Those who do pause to survey medieval rhetoric typically do so from the perspective of classical rhetoric, especially as defined in the canonical triad of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *De oratore*, and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*. Measured by that standard, medieval rhetoric has seemed to traditional historians of rhetoric, deviant, diminished, fragmented, or even absent altogether. In elevating a select few ancient

¹ A briefer version of this paper was read in the session 'Defining the Middle Ages as an Object of Study' at the annual meeting of the Medieval Academy of America, Austin, Texas, April 2000. I wish to thank John O. Ward for commenting insightfully on a draft of the expanded essay and for not pressing me to reveal where it was to be published and so spoil the surprise.

² What is probably the anthology most widely used in courses that survey the history of rhetoric, *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present*, ed. by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1990; 2nd edn, 2001), does include a section on 'Medieval Rhetoric'. In the first edition, ninety-five pages were devoted to medieval (pp. 365–460), three hundred and forty-six to classical, and one hundred and seventy-two to Renaissance rhetoric, while in the second edition, the page counts were one hundred and twenty-two (pp. 429–551), four hundred and eleven, and two hundred and thirty-five, respectively. The gain of twenty-seven pages in the second edition is due chiefly to the inclusion of excerpts from Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova*, but also to the shifting of the (somewhat augmented) material by Christine de Pizan from the section on 'Renaissance Rhetoric', where it had been placed in the first edition. The proportion of the entire collection that is devoted to medieval rhetoric (7.5%) remained unchanged.

treatises to canonical status as embodying the timeless essence of authentic rhetoric, such historians are of course following the path of those Renaissance humanists who, due to their philological orientation and their determination to restore rhetoric to its rightful prominence as a curricular subject, first constructed the long period between classical antiquity and their own modernity as intellectually alien. Medieval rhetoric thus metonymically figures the 'middleness' of the Middle Ages because it has been defined by what it is not—the 'true', 'authentic', or 'primary' rhetoric that was lost in the collapse of classical culture and recovered in the Renaissance.

My intent here is not to argue that medieval rhetoric is better than the version of classical rhetoric revived by Renaissance humanists or even that it has the same virtues that post-medieval scholars have assigned to classical rhetoric. Rather, I wish to call into question the impulse to identify a timeless essence of rhetoric based on the nostalgic longing for a unified discipline that never existed as such. Although medieval rhetoric was different in many respects from classical rhetoric, they are alike in that throughout its recorded history the scope of rhetoric always has exceeded the limits imposed on it by efforts at definition. In practice, classical rhetoric, like medieval rhetoric, encompassed both oral and written discourse and permeated a broader range of social practices than those enumerated in the treatises devoted specifically to the discipline itself. Beyond this continuity at the level of rhetorical practice, the distinctiveness of the break between medieval and classical rhetorical theory probably has been exaggerated, at least in part, paradoxically, because medieval rhetoricians preferred to study, excerpt, and adapt the theoretical works of their classical predecessors rather than compose their own syntheses of rhetorical theory. As much as anything else, the relative absence of new, comprehensive theoretical treatises on rhetoric during the Middle Ages has been responsible for the long-standing view that medieval rhetoric represented both a decisive break from what had preceded it and a phase in the history of rhetoric that must be regarded as something between decadence and hiatus.³

The constricted view of medieval rhetoric is evident in the earliest scholarship on the subject. Research on medieval rhetoric as a distinct field of study, at least for scholars writing in English, had its origins in the 1920s. Overviews of medieval rhetoric had appeared somewhat earlier, most notably the chapter on rhetoric in Paul Abelson's *The Seven Liberal Arts, A Study in Mediæval Culture*, first published in

³ The best survey of the 'comprehensive manuals/treatises' composed during the Middle Ages is Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, esp. pp. 80–82, 124–29, and 192–98. Such treatises were most numerous in the last of the three chronological periods that Ward surveys, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, especially in Italy. More recently, Ward has observed that 'the Ciceronian rhetorical commentary tradition remained a vital and ongoing one, because the art itself was so quintessentially Graeco-Roman, and the authority of Cicero was so powerful. Not until George of Trebizond were contemporaries confident enough to really attempt definitive replacement treatises'. 'Introduction', *The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval Commentary Tradition*, ed. by Virginia Cox and John O. Ward (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

1906, and Louis J. Paetow's *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric*, published in 1910.⁴ These were brief accounts, however, and did relatively little to shape the direction of future scholarship. More influential, indeed arguably the foundational texts of the field, were two books published on opposite sides of the Atlantic within a few years of each other: Edmond Faral's *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle*, published in 1924, and Charles Sears Baldwin's *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*, published in 1928.⁵ Although only Baldwin's book claims to provide a comprehensive picture of medieval rhetoric, Faral's editions and analyses of the major medieval 'arts of poetry' served as its essential complement. Had Faral's book not appeared, Baldwin's book probably would have taken a different shape. The plethora of studies that drew on the texts that Faral made available helped ensure that Baldwin's conception of medieval rhetoric prevailed for several generations. Thanks to Baldwin and Faral, medieval rhetoric came to be seen above all as an adjunct to the study of medieval poetry—in other words, as a subject best studied by literature professors.⁶

Like other early students of the subject, Baldwin took what could be called a reductionist view of medieval rhetoric. While Abelson, Paetow, and Charles Homer Haskins reduced medieval rhetoric to *ars dictaminis*, instruction in composing model letters and documents, Baldwin reduced it to instruction in the techniques of stylistic elaboration and ornamentation, which is particularly prominent in the type of textbook that Faral edited and analyzed.⁷ Baldwin is quite explicit and emphatic on this point: 'Medieval rhetoric was generally a lore of style. Here *rhetorica* tended to

⁴ Paul Abelson, *The Seven Liberal Arts, A Study in Mediæval Culture* (New York: Columbia University, 1906), pp. 52–71; Louis J. Paetow, *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric*, University of Illinois Studies 3.7 (Urbana–Champaign: University Press, 1910), pp. 67–91.

⁵ Edmond Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et XIIIe siècle: recherches et documents sur la technique littéraire du moyen âge*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études 238 (Paris: Champion, 1924); Charles Sears Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Representative Works* (New York: Macmillan, 1928; repr. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1959).

⁶ A scant two years after Faral's book appeared, John M. Manly had initiated what quickly developed into a steady stream of Chaucer studies grounded in 'medieval rhetoric', chiefly Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova*, with his 'Chaucer and the Rhetoricians', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 12 (1926), 95–113. A good overview of this scholarship, with bibliography, is provided by Robert O. Payne, 'Chaucer and the Art of Rhetoric', in *Companion to Chaucer Studies*, ed. by Beryl Rowland, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 42–64.

⁷ Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927; repr. New York: Meridian Books, 1963), pp. 138–50. See also his *Studies in Mediæval Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929; repr. New York, 1965), pp. 1–35, 124–47, and 170–92.

coincide with that school study of Latin poetry which was a recognized function of *grammatica*. The constant quotation of Horace's "Ars poetica" is one of the signs of the merging of poetic with rhetoric' (p. ix). What he calls the 'true conception' of rhetoric, by contrast, is the ancient theory that is 'eminent in a few cardinal texts long recognized as representative' (p. vii). What those 'representative' texts were he makes clear not only in the book from which I have been quoting, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*, but also in his earlier book, whose title—*Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic*—unmistakably indicates a complementary relationship to the sequel.⁸ While Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *De oratore*, and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* represent for Baldwin the authentic ancient theory, the 'false conception' of rhetoric inherited by the Middle Ages derives from the presumably unrepresentative texts of sophistic rhetoric, which 'practically reduces rhetoric to style' (p. 7).

There is no shortage of medieval testimony that seems to confirm Baldwin's equation of medieval rhetoric with stylistic ornament, especially from medieval poets. To cite a well known example from the late fourteenth century, here is Chaucer's Franklin, as he protests his ignorance of rhetoric (even as he employs the rhetorical figure *traductio*):

But, sires, by cause I am a burel man,
At my bigynnyng first I yow biseche,
Have me excused of my rude speche.
I lerned never rethorik, certeyn.
Thyng that I speke, it moot be bare and pleyn.
I sleep nevere on the Mount of Pernaso,
Ne lerned Marcus Tullius Scithero.
Colours ne knowe I none, withouten drede,
But swiche colours as growen in the mede,
Or elles swich as men dye or peynte.
Colours of rethoryk been to queynte;
My spirit feeleth noght of swich mateere.⁹

To the unlearned ('burel') Franklin, Cicero is at best a name and rhetoric is the flowery, painted speech he deems more appropriate to the present occasion than his own 'rude', 'bare', and 'plain' speech. Whether or not we are to take the Franklin's modesty at face value, he is clearly expressing the 'man in the street's' conception of rhetoric, which is not much different from the popular conception of rhetoric in the twenty-first century.

⁸ Charles Sears Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: Macmillan, 1924; repr. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1959).

⁹ *Canterbury Tales*, V. 716–27, *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. by Larry Benson and others 3rd edn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), p. 178.

A second example, from Alan of Lille's Latin poem *Anticlaudianus* (early 1180s), is more revealing. Alan's initial description of rhetoric, the third of Phronesis's seven handmaidens, includes all five of the classical canons but stresses the function of embellishment (Book III, lines 137–271), while a subsequent, briefer evocation of rhetoric focuses exclusively on that function (Book VII, lines 270–84).¹⁰ The context again suggests that the emphasis is strategic. Since each passage forms part of a sequence and follows immediately upon descriptions of the closely related and partially overlapping verbal arts of grammar and dialectic, Alan naturally highlights the feature that most clearly distinguishes rhetoric from its sister arts, especially dialectic, which shares rhetoric's concern with argumentation. Particularly in the second, more compressed summary, rhetoric as stylistic ornament functions as a convenient synecdoche for rhetoric as a whole.

His categorical pronouncements notwithstanding, in actuality Baldwin does not believe that medieval rhetoric is only about style, any more than Chaucer or Alan of Lille did. After all, not only does he devote separate chapters to 'Dictamen' and 'Preaching', but he also considers each of them a legitimate extension of 'true' rhetoric, *dictamen* because it concerns itself with composition and preaching because it is a form of oral persuasion. By minimizing his treatment of formal textbooks of the *ars dictaminis* and the *ars praedicandi* and emphasizing the achievements of individual letter writers and preachers, such as John of Salisbury and Bernard of Clairvaux, Baldwin endeavours to disguise the contradiction at the heart of his account. He struggles to preserve the sharp contrast between a full and authentic ancient rhetoric and a reduced and false medieval rhetoric, even as his own evidence works against him.

Despite such contradictions, Baldwin's remained the standard survey of medieval rhetoric for nearly half a century, until James J. Murphy's *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* redefined the field in 1974.¹¹ Even today, the 'arts of poetry' or, as Douglas Kelly more accurately styles them, the 'arts of poetry and prose', continue to be the most studied genre of medieval rhetoric.¹² While hundreds of *artes dictandi* and *artes praedicandi* remain unprinted and only a small fraction of those that have received modern editions have also been translated into English, the handful of treatises that deal explicitly with poetic composition, by Matthew of Vendôme,

¹⁰ Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus*, ed. by R. Bossuat (Paris: Vrin, 1955), pp. 93–97, 165; *Anticlaudianus or The Good and Perfect Man*, trans. by James J. Sheridan (Toronto: PIMS, 1973), pp. 96–103, 181–82. It is possible but by no means certain that Alan of Lille is the 'Magister Alanus' who wrote one of the most successful medieval commentaries on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. On this attribution, see Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 154.

¹¹ James J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974).

¹² Douglas Kelly, *The Arts of Poetry and Prose*, *Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental*, 59 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991).

Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Gervase of Melkley, John of Garland, Eberhard the German, and Matthias of Linköping, have each received at least one modern edition and at least one English translation. The only exception is the anonymous *Tria sunt*, until recently thought to be Geoffrey of Vinsauf's longer version of his *Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi* (the shorter version of which was edited by Faral), and I am currently working to fill that gap.¹³

The long-prevailing view that medieval rhetoric was all about style and was virtually indistinguishable from a decadent poetics must have helped to prevent the one major overview that appeared between Baldwin's and Murphy's from having the impact it deserved, though the notoriously difficult language of Richard McKeon's 1942 article 'Rhetoric in the Middle Ages' bears at least some of the responsibility for its neglect.¹⁴ As I will show later, this landmark essay was still being seriously misappropriated as recently as 1988, and its full implications have only begun to be realized in the abundant scholarship on medieval rhetoric that has appeared since that time.

Murphy's book, by contrast, put an end to the most extreme reductionist histories of medieval rhetoric. Its structure mirrors that of Baldwin's survey, with an opening chapter on ancient rhetoric, followed by a chapter on St Augustine, a survey of developments during the early Middle Ages, and separate chapters on the *ars poetriae*, the *ars dictaminis*, and the *ars praedicandi*; but Murphy's survey provides a much richer, more balanced image of medieval rhetoric than Baldwin's. Not the least of Murphy's contributions was to show that the Middle Ages was heir to several distinct ancient rhetorical traditions, among them the sophistic, all of which had in common a preceptive function. Besides revealing a more complex set of continuities between classical and medieval rhetoric, Murphy refined Baldwin's account of the three distinctively medieval rhetorical genres by paying as careful attention to the arts of letter writing and preaching as to the arts of poetry. For the *ars dictaminis*, this closer scrutiny consisted of cataloguing treatises that had never been studied as well as synthesizing a considerable amount of specialized scholarship, most of it in languages other than English and much of it available to Baldwin but apparently not used by him. While Murphy's chapter on the *ars dictaminis* filled out the details of a story that had only been sketched before, his chapter on the *ars praedicandi* was the first systematic history of that rhetorical genre and remains today the single most authoritative study of the *ars praedicandi*.¹⁵

¹³ On the *Tria sunt*, see Martin Camargo, 'Tria sunt: The Long and the Short of Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi*', *Speculum*, 74 (1999), 935–55. Bibliographical references for the editions and English translations of the arts of poetry and prose are provided on pp. 935–36 n. 2.

¹⁴ Richard McKeon, 'Rhetoric in the Middle Ages', *Speculum*, 17 (1942), 1–32; repr. in *Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery*, edited and with an introduction by Mark Backman (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1987), pp. 121–66.

¹⁵ Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, pp. 269–355. A valuable complement to Murphy's

Together, the three genre chapters documented the evolution, the variety, and the content of medieval instruction in rhetoric with unprecedented thoroughness, suggesting in the process seemingly unlimited possibilities for future research.

After Murphy's *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, it was no longer possible to dismiss medieval rhetoric as merely stylistic ornament or merely letter writing. In its focus on the distinctively medieval, pragmatic applications of classical rhetoric, however, Murphy's landmark book licensed a broader sort of reductionism that represented medieval rhetoric as consisting essentially of three 'arts'—the *ars dictaminis*, *ars poetriae*, and *ars praedicandi*—as embodied in the textbooks used to teach them.¹⁶ The most conspicuous element missing from the picture Murphy drew was the continuous tradition of study and commentary on the Ciceronian rhetorics, an element that has since been illuminated through the efforts of scholars such as Karin Margareta Fredborg and John O. Ward. Perhaps in part because the standard view continued to de-emphasize theory in favor of praxis, medieval rhetoric as Murphy conceived it was not immediately accepted into the mainstream as one stage in the continuous development of the Western rhetorical tradition rather than as a deviation from its true course. Instead, historians of rhetoric hit upon different, more sophisticated ways in which to perpetuate the construction of medieval rhetoric as the Other in opposition to which modern rhetoric has defined itself since the Renaissance.

The most subtle of these new directions was the one taken by George Kennedy in his *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, first published in 1980 and reissued in a revised and enlarged edition in 1999.¹⁷ Avoiding the obviously value-laden terms employed by Baldwin, Kennedy distinguishes between 'primary' and 'secondary' rhetoric rather than the 'true' and 'false' conceptions of rhetoric. Moreover, Kennedy recognizes a historical tendency within rhetoric to shift from the primary to the secondary variety, a process he dubs 'letteraturizzazione'. 'It has been a persistent characteristic of rhetoric in almost every stage of its history to move from primary to secondary forms,' says Kennedy, that is 'to shift focus from persuasion to narration, from civic to personal contexts, and from speech to literature, including poetry' (2nd edn, p. 3). Thus, for Kennedy, nearly all medieval rhetoric turns out to be secondary rhetoric, though it is worth noting that he has made this conclusion much less explicit in the second

chapter is Marianne G. Briscoe, *Artes praedicandi*, *Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental*, 61 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), Part 1, pp. 9–76.

¹⁶ This impression is reinforced in the anthologies used to teach the history of rhetoric, such as *The Rhetorical Tradition*, ed. by Bizzell and Herzberg (see n. 2, above) and *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts*, ed. by James J. Murphy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

¹⁷ George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980; 2nd edn, revised and enlarged, 1999).

edition.

Considerably more hostile to medieval rhetoric, despite his repeated assurances of his admiration for medieval culture, is Brian Vickers, who devotes a chapter to what he calls 'Medieval Fragmentation' in his 1988 book *In Defence of Rhetoric*.¹⁸ Like Baldwin, whom he quotes with approval, Vickers judges medieval rhetoric defective to the extent that it differs from classical rhetoric, which, again like Baldwin, he wants to equate with a few canonical texts. In his view, the varieties of medieval rhetoric 'are all fragments of the genuine classical tradition whose true function was lost on medieval writers. It is as if they have an imperfect copy of the rules of a game such as cricket or bridge that they have never seen played, but are trying to reconstruct' (p. 238). 'Deprived by the vicissitudes of history of the greater part of classical rhetoric,' says Vickers, 'medieval rhetoricians were faced with a tradition fragmented on two levels, text and context' (p. 244). By the 'greater part of classical rhetoric', Vickers appears to mean Cicero's *De oratore* and the full text of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, since he had earlier declared that 'had they been known these two works would have preserved a much wider conception of rhetoric's social and political role' (p. 216). What the medieval rhetoricians lacked or lost, their successors in the Renaissance eventually rediscovered and used to reconnect the fragments, as Vickers describes in his next chapter, which he calls 'Renaissance Reintegration' (pp. 254–93).

Vickers's argument rests on several faulty assumptions, which though widely shared are seldom illustrated so clearly. First and most obvious is the assumption that only ignorance can account for the developments in rhetoric during the Middle Ages. This amounts to characterizing medieval rhetoricians as failed philologists who would have shared the goals of the Renaissance humanists if only they had enjoyed the same advantages. However, since the 'missing' texts were preserved during the Middle Ages—if they had not been they would not have been available for rediscovery by scholars in the Renaissance—it seems more reasonable to conclude that they were not used by medieval rhetoricians because they were not considered as useful as other ancient texts. Vickers himself admits that *De oratore* and *Institutio oratoria* were neglected already in late antiquity: indeed, there is no evidence that either work ever rivaled the technical rhetorics *De inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium* in their influence on the teaching and practice of rhetoric before the Renaissance.

A related fallacy is that any use of ancient rhetorics in contexts different from those of their origins is misuse. Although medieval rhetorical precepts clearly derived from ancient rhetoric, often, though not always, they just as clearly served different ends. Vickers recognizes as much but nonetheless seeks—and naturally fails to find—the coherence of medieval rhetoric in terms set by ancient rather than medieval culture. Medieval builders re-used Roman stones, but that surely does not

¹⁸ Brian Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 214–53.

mean that we must view the cathedrals into which they were incorporated as failed, partial, or fragmentary Roman temples. Moreover, to pursue the analogy, if Renaissance builders did strive to recreate the temples, what they produced could only be an idealized image and never the thing itself. Renaissance rhetoric was no more classical rhetoric than Poggio's or Salutati's Florence was Cicero's or Quintilian's Rome.

The most fundamental fallacy underlying Vickers's account is the one that I addressed at the beginning of this essay, namely, that there was in fact one authentic ancient rhetoric to be recovered. Only the power of this illusion can explain Vickers's repeated invocation of Richard McKeon's 1942 article to support his thesis that during the Middle Ages 'true rhetoric' broke apart, as theory was divorced from practice and the proper subject matter of rhetoric was abandoned in favor of 'verbal forms'. While much of McKeon's argument is obscure, it is clear enough that he does not regard the protean quality of medieval rhetoric as an aberration or a falling away from classical integrity. Indeed, he begins his essay by criticizing precisely the sort of history that Vickers wants to write. Even though rhetoric has taken multiple forms at every stage of its existence, McKeon observes, 'rhetoric is treated as a simple verbal discipline, in histories which touch upon it, as the art of speaking well, applied either as it was in Rome to forensic oratory and associated with the interpretation of the laws or, more frequently, applied as it was in the Renaissance to the interpretation and use of the works of orators and poets, and associated with or even indistinguishable from poetic and literary criticism. The history of rhetoric as it has been written since the Renaissance is therefore in part the distressing record of the obtuseness of writers who failed to study the classics and to apply rhetoric to literature, and in part the monotonous enumeration of doctrines, or preferably sentences, repeated from Cicero or commentators on Cicero. Scholarly labours have reconstructed only a brief and equivocal history for rhetoric during the Middle Ages' (p. 1). In the introduction to his 1987 collection of McKeon's essays on rhetoric, Mark Backman spells out the contrast between McKeon's view and that of scholars such as Baldwin and Vickers: 'McKeon's history of rhetoric, in stark contrast to this traditional history, does not have as its subject an art confined by fixed form, content, or terminology. Rhetoric is an art that lacks a unique subject matter but can only be understood in the context of specific uses and ends. This conception liberates the historical analysis of rhetoric from classically determined functions and forms' (pp. xii-xiii). As Backman goes on to say, 'McKeon's perception of rhetoric can be most vividly traced in the Middle Ages' (p. xiii). In other words, for McKeon, the medieval history of rhetoric is the paradigm for the entire history of rhetoric. Ironically, Vickers has used McKeon in precisely the way he accuses the medieval rhetoricians of using their ancient sources. Indeed, one could say that Vickers is even more 'guilty', since he forces borrowed fragments to support a conclusion not only different from but diametrically opposed to that of his source, considered as a whole.

McKeon's goal is to demonstrate that Ciceronian rhetoric permeated the intellectual culture of the Middle Ages just as it did that of the Renaissance. His

procedure is to trace the ways in which rhetoric ‘decisively determined or strongly influenced’ three ‘distinct lines of intellectual development’—the tradition of the rhetoricians, the tradition of philosophers and theologians, and the tradition of logic (p. 4)—across the four chronological periods that mark shifts in the relationship among those traditions during the Middle Ages (1. up to the end of the tenth century; 2. from the late-tenth to the mid-twelfth century; 3. from the late-twelfth to the late-thirteenth century; 4. from the late-thirteenth century to the end of the Middle Ages). The issues that defined the three traditions he studies, moreover, ‘were not technical questions which were discussed by a few learned men, but distinctions which entered into all parts of mediaeval culture. Christianity had grown up in the environment of a culture which was preponderantly rhetorical’ (p. 11). In other words, according to McKeon, the episteme of medieval Christianity was fundamentally rhetorical. Behind its densely detailed argument and confusing organization, McKeon’s article is consistent in emphasizing the breadth of medieval rhetoric (only two out of thirty-two pages are devoted to the three ‘arts’ that are the main focus of Murphy’s book) and its continuity with classical rhetoric.¹⁹ His coverage of the ‘tradition of the

¹⁹ The organization of McKeon’s article (n. 14 above) creates confusion because its basis shifts between the three traditions and the four chronological periods and because the numbered sections do not always match the subdivisions of the topics being discussed in the way the reader expects. Below I have outlined what I take to be the article’s structure:

Introduction: critique of previous histories of medieval rhetoric (pp. 1–3)

[section I] Ciceronian rhetoric ‘decisively determined or strongly influenced’ three ‘distinct lines of intellectual development during the Middle Ages’ (p. 4):

A. tradition of rhetoricians (pp. 4–5)

B. tradition of philosophers and theologians (pp. 5–7)

C. tradition of logic (pp. 7–11), divided into four periods:

1. up to s. x^{ex} (encyclopedists)

2. s. x^{ex}–s. xii² (Old Logic)

3. s. xii²–s. xiii^{ex} (New Logic)

4. s. xiii^{ex}–end of Middle Ages (scholastic *summulae*)

[section II] The episteme of medieval Christianity is fundamentally rhetorical, but the relationship among the three traditions is configured differently in each chronological period (on p. 13, he repeats the chronological scheme first supplied on pp. 7–8):

1. up to s. x^{ex}: rhetoric defined by types of questions rather than by concerns of orator (pp. 13–15)

[section III] 2. s. x^{ex}–s. xii^{med}: rhetoric develops along three lines:

a. rhetoric was subordinated to logic (pp. 15–19)

[section IV] b. rhetoric shaped theology (pp. 19–22)

i. exegesis (Augustine et al) (pp. 19–21)

ii. scholastic method (pp. 21–22)

rhetoricians', in particular, was limited by the state of the scholarship in 1942, but the evidence for widespread study of the Ciceronian rhetorics that has emerged since he wrote has confirmed his basic thesis.

The best of the copious scholarship on medieval rhetoric published since 1990 is much more faithful to McKeon's intent, whether it dissolves the artificially sharp distinction that has been drawn between ancient and medieval rhetoric (and between medieval and Renaissance rhetoric) or looks beyond the traditional conception of rhetoric as merely a verbal art or a body of transmitted texts and precepts to see it as what McKeon calls an 'architectonic productive art' that takes various forms to meet various and ever-changing needs.²⁰ Marjorie Curry Woods, for example, questions the very premises of prevailing definitions of ancient rhetoric, arguing that, when looked at as a whole, ancient rhetorical practice conformed more closely to medieval rhetorical practice than to the models that previous scholars have derived from studying a few canonical texts. If what has been called 'secondary rhetoric' has always been more prevalent than so-called 'primary rhetoric', and if, as Woods maintains, school exercises and letters have been the rule and formal orations the exception, then medieval rhetoric (not to mention contemporary rhetoric) is closer to the centre than it is to the periphery of rhetoric's history in Western culture.²¹

3. s. xii^{ex}–s. xiii^{ex}: methodological differences between Aristotelians and Augustinians (i.e., Platonists) determine 13th-cent. developments in traditions a. and b. (pp. 23–25); respectively illustrated by

i. Aquinas (pp. 23–24)

ii. Bonaventure (pp. 24–25)

[section V] (2–3) c. Rhetoric was concerned with actions or words (pp. 25–29)—took form of textbooks (pp. 27–29):

i. *ars dictaminis* (from forensic rhetoric)

ii. *ars praedicandi* (from deliberative rhetoric)

iii. *ars poetriae* (from epideictic rhetoric)

[section VI] 4. s. xiii^{ex}–Renaissance (pp. 29–32)

²⁰ See Richard McKeon, 'The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age: Architectonic Productive Arts', in *The Prospect of Rhetoric*, ed. by Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 44–63; repr. in *Rhetoric*, ed. by Backman, pp. 1–24 (from which I quote). In this essay, McKeon links Roman/Ciceronian with Renaissance rhetoric, not because they shared a unified set of methods or a common subject matter but rather because, in his view, 'during the Roman Republic and the Renaissance' rhetoric 'was enlarged in its operation, using an extended form of the rhetorical device "amplification," to become a productive or poetic art, an art of making in all phases of human activity' (p. 2). Although Renaissance rhetoricians shared Cicero's goal of reuniting eloquence and wisdom, he goes on to argue, their efforts produced a different subject matter from Cicero's (p. 8).

²¹ Marjorie Curry Woods, 'The Teaching of Writing in Medieval Europe', in *A Short*

John O. Ward re-examines the manuscript record to collect evidence that the medieval understanding and use of Ciceronian rhetoric were more like than unlike those of antiquity and that the real break with the past came with the self-conscious antiquarianism of Renaissance philology.²² Ward refutes the assumptions of traditional histories that the medieval scribes who persisted in copying the *De inventione* and the ancient commentaries on it, not to mention composing new commentaries, glosses, and synopses of it, were like the latter-day monks in Walter Miller's post-atomic fable *A Canticle for Leibowitz*, who cherished and reproduced an architect's blueprints without having any idea of their original function.²³ In his immensely learned study of those materials, published in 1995, Ward comes to the opposite conclusion: 'the authors of the rhetorical treatises and glosses are addressing the real and contemporary needs of their audiences rather than purveying anachronistic information in an antiquarian fashion,' he says. 'There is too little regularity and repetition from gloss to gloss or treatise to treatise for us to suppose anything other than a real audience with real communication needs'.²⁴ Like a good forensic rhetorician, Ward grounds his case for medieval pragmatism in probability, throwing the burden of proof on the sceptics: if the ancient rhetorics were irrelevant and useless to medieval people, then why did so many of them expend so much time, not to mention precious writing materials, in copying and glossing them?

Recent work, for example that of Virginia Cox and Thomas Haye, shows that the many uses to which classical rhetorical theory was put during the Middle Ages included precisely the type of oral disputation that Kennedy terms 'primary rhetoric'.²⁵ Such research indicates that in the Middle Ages, as in antiquity, rhetoric was applied both to oral and to written discourse, and was used to discover probable truth as well as to transmit doctrine, to persuade as well as to impress. If the bulk of the scholarship has focused on rhetoric applied to writing, that is due at least in some measure to the limitations of the manuscript record. Aside from sermons, actual speeches were not likely to be written down and collected, and in the rare cases when they were transcribed, they were edited for publication in the same way that collected sermons generally were.

History of Writing Instruction from Ancient Greece to Twentieth-Century America, ed. by James J. Murphy (Davis: Hermagoras Press, 1990), pp. 77–94.

²² John O. Ward, 'Quintilian and the Rhetorical Revolution of the Middle Ages', *Rhetorica*, 13 (1995), 231–84. Also see Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

²³ Walter M. Miller, Jr, *A Canticle for Leibowitz* (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1959).

²⁴ John O. Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 270.

²⁵ Virginia Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy, 1260–1350', *Rhetorica*, 17 (1999), 239–88; Thomas Haye, *Oratio: Mittelalterliche Redekunst in lateinischer Sprache*, *Mittelalterliche Studien und Texte*, 27 (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

Continuities of a different sort emerge from Rita Copeland's work on translation, which reminds us that the boundary between grammar and rhetoric was no less permeable in antiquity than it was in the Middle Ages. In the act of translation, textual interpretation, traditionally the province of grammar, cannot be separated from textual production, traditionally the province of rhetoric. Even Quintilian, one of the more jealous guardians of rhetoric's disciplinary borders, was unable to maintain a clear separation between the domains of the grammarian and the rhetorician when it came to the crucial pedagogical role of imitation and translation.²⁶

The boundary between medieval rhetoric and humanist rhetoric also is more permeable than some would allow, a fact that becomes clear in the recent scholarship that focuses on the diversity of humanist rhetoric itself. P. O. Kristeller long ago demonstrated that the earliest humanists tended to be professional *dictatores*, an insight that Ronald Witt has refined and elaborated in a series of important studies, culminating in his recent book, *'In the Footsteps of the Ancients': The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni*.²⁷ While insisting on the real and practical differences between medieval Latin and the classicizing Latin that for him defines Italian humanism, Witt carefully details the lengthy period, lasting the better part of two centuries, during which medieval rhetoric, in particular the *ars dictaminis*, co-existed with imitation of the Latin classics before classical models came to dominate in all areas of teaching and practice. Along similar lines, Virginia Cox has noted 'the enduring tension within Italian humanistic culture between a civic and political conception of the role of rhetoric, associated particularly with republican contexts and reflecting a continuity with medieval tradition, and a newer, literary-philological conception, more in tune with the relatively depoliticized cultural traditions that had developed within seignorial regimes'.²⁸ The overlapping between medieval rhetoric and classicizing humanist rhetoric, I would add, is not limited to Italy: in a letter probably written in 1489, Erasmus cited Geoffrey of Vinsauf alongside the great rhetoricians of antiquity: 'But why should I attempt to include the whole world in a small map, as it were—to embrace the entire science of rhetoric and its rules within the compass of a short letter? [...] You know your Cicero, your Quintilian, your Horace, your Geoffrey of Vinsauf.'²⁹

²⁶ Rita Copeland, *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²⁷ Ronald G. Witt, *'In the Footsteps of the Ancients': The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni* (Leiden: Brill, 2000). Kristeller originally stated his thesis in 'Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance', *Byzantion*, 17 (1944–1945), 346–74.

²⁸ Virginia Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric in Late-Medieval Italy', forthcoming in *The Rhetoric of Cicero*, ed. by Cox and Ward.

²⁹ *The Collected Works of Erasmus*, I: *The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 1 to 141, 1484 to 1500*, trans. by R. A. B. Mynors and D. F. S. Thomson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 27. Translated from *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, ed.

Other scholars have extended McKeon's project by documenting the pervasive influence of rhetoric in areas of medieval culture besides formal training in the verbal arts. Mary Carruthers has studied the relationship between memory as the fourth canon of rhetoric and other medieval conceptions of memory in two important books, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (1990), and *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (1998), while in her *Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval Drama* (1992), Jody Enders assigns a crucial role to delivery, the fifth canon of rhetoric, in the emergence and development of medieval drama.³⁰ Growing numbers of revisionist historiographers have gone still farther, using broader, more inclusive conceptions of rhetoric to re-define medieval rhetoric and reassess its position within the Western rhetorical tradition as a whole. Cheryl Glenn's work on the rhetoric of medieval women writers, in particular the English mystics Julian of Norwich and Margery Kempe, is a good case in point.³¹

All of these exciting new directions in the research confirm the essential insight of McKeon's seminal article: 'if rhetoric is defined in terms of a single subject matter—such as style, or literature, or discourse—it has no history during the Middle Ages' (p. 32). By abandoning the narrow conception of rhetoric underlying traditional histories, we do more than free medieval rhetoric from its status as the Other and allow it to have a legitimate history of its own: we also make it possible to tell the full story of ancient and modern rhetoric.

by P. S. Allen, 1: 1484–1514 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), p. 117: 'Sed quid ego tanquam exigua tabella totum orbem, breui epistola totam rhetoricae artis praeceptionem complecti enitar [. . .] ? Nosti Tullium, nosti Quintilianum, nosti Horatium, nosti Gaufridum.'

³⁰ Mary J. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mary J. Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jody Enders, *Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval Drama* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

³¹ Cheryl Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the Renaissance* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997), Chapter 3 (pp. 74–117): 'Medieval Rhetoric: Pagan Roots, Christian Flowering, or Veiled Voices in the Medieval Rhetorical Tradition'.

I

Abelard and Rhetoric

Peter Abelard on Dialectic, Rhetoric, and the Principles of Argument

CONSTANT J. MEWS

Peter Abelard has always been remembered as a logician rather than as a theorist of rhetoric. In his so-called ‘Confession of Faith to Heloise’, written at the height of the public controversy about his theological teaching, Abelard complains that:

Logica has made me hateful to the world. For the malicious with their crooked thoughts [...] say that I am outstanding in *logica*, but stumble not a little when handling Paul. I refuse to be such a philosopher as to reject Paul; I refuse to be such an Aristotle as to be shut out from Christ.¹

What does Abelard actually mean by this remark? What was it in his *logica* that was so controversial? Some measure of the animosity he provoked can be seen in the caricature that Bernard of Clairvaux presented in his letter to Pope Innocent, widely circulated prior to the Council of Sens (25 May 1141): ‘We have in France a former teacher turned into a new theologian, who from his earliest years has dabbled in the

¹ *Confessio fidei ad Heloisam*, ed. and trans. by Charles S. F. Burnett, “‘Confessio fidei ad Heloisam’—Abelard’s Last Letter to Heloise?”, *Mittelateinisches Jahrbuch*, 21 (1986), 147–55 (p. 152): ‘Soror mea Heloisa [...] odiosum me mundo reddidit logica. Aiunt enim perverse pervertentes, quorum sapientia est in perditione, me in logica prestantissimum esse, sed in Paulo non mediocriter claudicare [...] Nolo, nolo sic esse philosophus ut recalcitrem Paulo; nolo sic esse Aristotiles ut secludar a Christo.’ The phrase *odiosum me mundo reddidit logica* was given a new twist by Jacques Lacan in 1964, when he referred to the study of language making him hateful to his peers, within Seminar 12, *Les Problèmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse*, a passage I discuss within ‘Abelard and Heloise: Logic, Love, and Desire’, *Analysis (Australian Centre for Psychoanalysis in the Freudian Field)*, 9 (2000), 37–57.

art of dialectic, and now raves insanely about the holy Scriptures.² Bernard of Clairvaux was himself widely celebrated as the embodiment of the powerful orator, but also as a notorious critic of what he saw as Abelard's dialectical sophistry.³ Abelard had certainly established his early reputation in dialectic, rather than in rhetoric, above all through his *Dialectica* (perhaps 1112–18) and his *Logica 'Ingredientibus'* (perhaps 1118–22).⁴ By the mid 1130s, however, even though he was still teaching on dialectic, his literary attention was then more focused on theology and Scripture. One unfortunate consequence of the celebrity that Abelard attained in the teaching of dialectic is that what he had to say about rhetoric and the principles underpinning argument as a whole has tended to be overshadowed by his teaching on one specific issue, that of universals. In his commentary on the *De differentiis topicis*, itself part of the *'Ingredientibus'* series of glosses, Abelard reserves a number of issues to a *Rhetorica* that he promises to write.⁵ By contrast, in his written sermons, Abelard proclaims to Heloise that he prefers 'the sense of the

² Bernard, Ep. 190, *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. by Jean Leclercq and others, 8 vols (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–1977), VIII, 17: 'Habemus in Francia novum de veteri magistro theologum, qui ab ineunte aetate sua in arte dialectica lusit, et nunc in Scripturis sanctis insanit.' On the date of this letter and the Council of Sens, see Constant J. Mews, 'The Council of Sens (1141): Bernard, Abelard and the Fear of Social Upheaval', *Speculum*, 77 (2002), 342–82.

³ Wibald of Stavelot, in a lengthy review of the situation of rhetoric within the contemporary Church (Letter 147 to Manegold, a teacher of Paderborn, PL 189, 1255B), identifies Bernard as particularly brilliant as an orator: 'Oratorem eum non immerito dixerim, qui a rhetoribus definitur: Vir bonus dicendi peritus' (Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, I. 1). Wibald advises Manegold to read Quintilian, 'who teaches how to polish and fashion a child, received from his mother's womb, into the substance of a perfect orator' (1254C). This passage is translated and commented on by Karin Margareta Fredborg, 'The Scholastic Teaching of Rhetoric in the Middle Ages', *CIMAGL*, 55 (1987), 85–105 (pp. 90–91).

⁴ *Dialectica*, ed. by Lambert Marie De Rijk, 2nd edn (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970); *Logica 'Ingredientibus'*, ed. by Bernhard Geyer, BGPTMA, 21.1–4 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919–1931). Also part of the latter series of glosses is Abelard's *Super topica*, an extended commentary on the *De differentiis topicis* of Boethius. On the dating of these works see Constant J. Mews, 'On dating the works of Peter Abelard', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 52 (1985), 73–134, and John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 40–53, who argues that Abelard may have begun working on the *Dialectica* as early as 1112.

⁵ *Pietro Abelardo. Scritta di logica*, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Milano, 24, ed. by Mario Dal Pra, 2nd edn (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), pp. 205–330; esp. *Super topica*, pp. 263. 25, 267. 16; see also the new edition of the section of *Super topica* on rhetoric by Fredborg on pp. 64–82 of this volume. While Ward (*Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 109) refers to them as a set of lectures that he proposed to give, I would argue that the phrase *rethorica nostra* suggests a specific treatise.

letter rather than the decoration of rhetoric'.⁶ He nonetheless remained profoundly interested in the theory that underpinned both rhetorical and dialectical argument. Tracing what Abelard had to say about both rhetoric and the theory of argument in general, can help illuminate an aspect of his teaching of *logica* that has too often been neglected.

In the *Historia calamitatum*, Abelard leaves us in no doubt about his earliest passion as a student before he went to Paris, when he was studying under Roscelin of Compiègne in the Loire valley: 'I preferred the tools of dialectic to all the other arts of philosophy.'⁷ As is well known, it was while listening to William of Champeaux lecture on rhetoric that he challenged his Parisian teacher on the universals, a topic that belongs to dialectic rather than to rhetoric.⁸ As John Ward has rightly pointed out, the passage clearly indicates the close nexus between both dialectic and rhetoric in the early twelfth century.⁹ Such was contemporary interest in universals that as a result 'other things in dialectic were scarcely acknowledged, as if the sum of this art consisted in the teaching about universals'.¹⁰ John of Salisbury himself complained that too many students of dialectic were over-occupied with this particular issue, without understanding the deeper intention of Aristotle. He lamented that 'the peripatetic of Le Pallet' was caught in the opinion that universals were simply *sermones* and lamented that even some of his friends still tortured words, to insist that 'it was a monstrosity to predicate a thing of a thing'.¹¹ Although John admired Abelard as a teacher, he was not fully persuaded by all of his opinions.¹² His major purpose in writing the *Metalogicon* was to show that discussion about universals was only part of a broader understanding of *logica*, the core of which was concerned with the reasoning behind all discourse, above all the principles of argument.

John was here following the teaching of Boethius, itself drawn from Cicero, that *logica* was the science of discourse (*ratio disserendi*), which in turn involved both the finding (*inventio*) and the judgement (*judicium*) of arguments.¹³ Topics (*loci*) are

⁶ *Epistola ad Heloisam*, PL 178, 379–80: 'sensum litterae, non ornatum rhetoricae'.

⁷ *Historia calamitatum*, ed. by Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Vrin, 1967), p. 63.

⁸ *Historia calamitatum*, p. 65; see the chapter of Fredborg in this volume, esp. p. 55.

⁹ In *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, pp. 108–09, Ward suggests that 'what Abelard and William meant by "rhetoric" was, in fact, a discussion of Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione* in the context of debate about universals.' To be more precise, the passage demonstrates that Abelard considered dialectical questions of great importance in the analysis of rhetoric, a discipline that William is likely to have taught through presenting Cicero's *De inventione* or perhaps the fourth book of Boethius' *De differentiis topicis*.

¹⁰ *Historia calamitatum*, p. 66.

¹¹ John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, II. 17, ed. by J. B. Hall, CCCM, 98 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), p. 81.

¹² *Metalogicon*, I. 5, II. 10, II. 17, III. 1, 4, 6, pp. 20, 70, 81, 103, 116, 122.

¹³ The two key texts are translated and given illuminating commentary by Eleanor Stump,

the principles underpinning any argument. According to Boethius, a topic was 'the seat of an argument, making for trust in a thing that is uncertain'.¹⁴ Boethius considered the science of discovering the underlying topic or 'seat' of an argument essential for the study of both dialectical and rhetorical disputation. Analysing a topic more abstractly than Aristotle, Boethius considered a topic to be a philosophical axiom or self-evident truth behind an argument, such as 'whatever is predicated of a predicate, is also predicated of its subject'.¹⁵ The truth of any argument was determined by the truth of its maximal proposition (*propositio maxima*). In his *De differentiis topicis*, Boethius explains that dialectic and rhetoric both examine propositions that may or may not be true: dialectic deals only with a thesis, unrelated to particulars ('circumstances' in Stoic rhetorical terminology), whereas rhetoric discusses hypotheses, questions hedged by specific particulars. 'If dialectic ever does admit circumstances, such as some deed or person, into the disputation, it does not do so for their own sake (*principaliter*), but it transfers the whole force of the circumstance to the thesis it is discussing.'

Analysis of Abelard's dialectic has often concentrated on his teaching about universals as an issue in ontology. The topic of the meaning of a universal term (a term predicated of different individuals) was only a preliminary issue, however, leading up to analysis of the principles of argument. By far the largest part of the *Dialectica* is taken up with discussion of topics, the principles on which all argument is based. Abelard both summarizes and revises what Boethius has to say in his *De differentiis topicis* and *In Topica Ciceronis*. As Jean Jolivet argued in his 1969 study *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abelard*, Abelard's discussion of universals was part of a much broader analysis of signification in general.¹⁶ He argued that whether Abelard was writing about language as a whole, or more specifically as theological discourse in particular, he introduced a consistent questioning of the notion that language ever signifies things, an approach that he suggested could be called *non-réalisme*. Jolivet was principally concerned with Abelard's critique of traditional semantics. More recently, John Marenbon has questioned the assumption that Abelard never moved beyond being a critical thinker, by arguing that after an early phase in his teaching, dominated by logical concerns, he transferred his attention to an ethically based theology, directed at nothing less than 'moral reformation'.¹⁷

Boethius's In Ciceronis Topica (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 25, and *Boethius's De topicis differentiis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 29. See also Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages. The Commentaries on Aristotle's and Boethius' 'Topics'* (Munich: Philosophia, 1984), p. 41.

¹⁴ Stump, *Boethius's In Ciceronis Topica*, p. 29.

¹⁵ Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis*, p. 167; Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics*, pp. 21–24.

¹⁶ Jean Jolivet, *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard* (Paris: Vrin, 1969).

¹⁷ Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*, p. 213.

Marenbon suggests that it may have been dissatisfaction with the limitations of his ontology, in particular an implicit tension between Abelard's rejection of the reality of universals, and an Aristotelian tradition of 'strong naturalism' (according to which every particular substance belongs in some way to a particular kind) that prompted him to turn towards a theology guided by ethical concerns.¹⁸ He also suggests that this shift may have been a paradoxical consequence of Abelard's romance with Heloise, 'the one episode which fits uneasily into a life otherwise so dominated by ideas'.¹⁹ While Marenbon is certainly correct to identify Abelard's increasing preoccupation with ethical concerns in the late 1120s and 1130s, his claim that there is a rupture between his interest in logic on the one hand, and ethics and theology on the other is more problematic. Abelard betrays no sense in the *Historia calamitatum* that after he became a monk he was converted away from dialectic to theology. Rather, he saw all the liberal arts as an integral part of the search for wisdom. Peter von Moos has already offered an illuminating study of the rhetorical theory that underpins Abelard's theology.²⁰ In the pages that follow, I would like to suggest how his interest in the theory of rhetoric evolved out of his confrontation with William of Champeaux, and helped shape elements of his theology. Abelard's primary concern in *logica* was not with universals, but with the principles underpinning all argument, whether dialectical or rhetorical.

William's reputation lay as much in rhetoric as in dialectic. He is believed to be the author of important commentaries on Cicero's *De inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.²¹ He also inherited a traditional early medieval view that rhetoric and dialectic are both parts of *logica*. While Cassiodorus mentioned that *logica* was also known to the peripatetics as dialectic, it was more commonly held that rhetoric and dialectic were both parts of *logica*.²² We still see a trace of this view in the *Glosule*

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 208–09.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 94.

²⁰ Peter von Moos, 'Was galt im lateinischen Mittelalter als das Literarische an der Literatur? Eine theologisch-rhetorische Antwort des 12. Jahrhunderts', in *Literarische Interessenbildung im Mittelalter. DFG-Symposion 1991*, ed. by Joachim Heinzle, Germanistische Symposien Berichtsbände, 14 (Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, 1993), pp. 431–51, translated on pp. 83–99 of this volume.

²¹ Karin Margareta Fredborg, 'The Commentaries on Cicero's *De inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium* by William of Champeaux', *CIMAGL*, 17 (1976), 1–39.

²² Cassiodorus, *Institutiones*, Praef. 4 and 2.2, ed. by Roger A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 91. On this theme, see Peter von Moos, 'Rhetorik, Dialektik und "civilis scientia" in Hochmittelalter', *Dialektik und Rhetorik im frühen und hohen Mittelalter. Rezeption, Überlieferung und gesellschaftliche Wirkung antiker Gelehrsamkeit vornehmlich im 9. und 12. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Johannes Fried, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs. Kolloquien, 27 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), pp. 137–38 and Iwakuma Yukio, 'The Division of Philosophy and the Place of the Trivium from the 9th to the Mid-12th Centuries', in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the Symposium, The Copenhagen*

on Priscian's *Grammatical Institutes* I–XVI from the late eleventh century. Here *logica* is explained as about words (*sermocinalis*) and thus embraces grammar, as well as being about discourse (*dissertiva*) and so includes both dialectic and rhetoric.²³ William of Champeaux took a similar view in his own commentary on the *De inventione*, when he observed that logic could be understood in a strict sense *ratio disserendi*, namely as embracing both dialectic and rhetoric, while it could also be understood more broadly as embracing the judgement as well as the finding of arguments.²⁴ This assumption was given wide currency in the twelfth century through statements made by Hugh of St-Victor that *logica* contained both dialectic and rhetoric.²⁵ John of Salisbury adopted a similar view in his *Metalogicon*, although with more subtlety, in observing that Plato divided *logica* into both dialectic and rhetoric, and that both the dialectician and the orator deal with what approximates to truth, rather than with truth and falsehood in themselves.²⁶

Some measure of William's prestige in expounding topics is provided by a comment of John of Salisbury that William, 'of happy memory' had defined the science of the topics 'even if imperfectly' as about finding the middle term implicit in any argument and thereby allowing a valid inference be drawn.²⁷ From records of his teaching preserved in Orléans, Bibl. mun. 266, we know that William defined a topic not simply as an abstract principle, but as 'the thing with which the argument deals and which is signified by one of the terms'.²⁸ He adhered to the notion that the

School of Medieval Philosophy, January 10–13, 1996, ed. by Sten Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (Copenhagen: Reitzels Forlag, 1999), pp. 165–89, esp. p. 166.

²³ Margaret T. Gibson, 'The Early Scholastic "Glosule" to Priscian, "Institutiones Grammaticae": The Text and its Influence', *Studi Medievali*, 3a ser., 20 (1979), 235–54 (p. 249); see Iwakuma, 'The Division of Philosophy', pp. 172–73. In a forthcoming study, Irene Rosier-Catach points to other links between a second recension of the *Glosule* and William of Champeaux, 'Abélard et les grammairiens: sur la définition du verbe et la notion d'inhérence', in *La transmission des textes entre Antiquité et Moyen Âge. Mélanges en l'honneur du Pr. Louis Holtz*, ed. by Pierre Lardet (forthcoming).

²⁴ MS York, Minster Library XVI. M. 7, fol. 1^{vb} quoted by Fredborg, p. 59 n. 16 below.

²⁵ *Didascalicon*, I. 11, ed. by C. H. Buttner, reprinted within Hugo von Sankt Viktor, *Didascalicon de studio legendi*, Fontes Christiani (Freiburg: Herder, 1997), p. 150; see also *Epitome in Dindimum*, 5, ed. by Roger Baron, *Opera Propaedeutica* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 204.

²⁶ *Metalogicon*, II. 3, pp. 59–60.

²⁷ *Metalogicon*, III. 9, p. 129. 43–46: 'Versatur in his inuentionis materia, quam hilaris memoriae Willelmus de Campellis postmodum Catalaunensis episcopus definiuit, et si non perfecte, esse scientiam reperiendi medium terminum, et inde eliciendi argumentum.'

²⁸ N. J. Green-Pedersen derives this from references critical of mag. W. on pp. 194^b–235^b of the manuscript, 'William of Champeaux on Boethius. Topics according to Orléans, Bibl. Mun. 266', *CIMAGL*, 13 (1974), 13–30, and *The Tradition of the Topics*, p. 165. Iwakuma has discovered that this opinion is reported in a fragment of another commentary on the *De*

maximal proposition or general principle underlying an argument ‘produces the senses of all the arguments to which it may be applied’.²⁹ We find a similar attitude in William’s commentary on the *De inventione*, in which he asserts that a rhetorical statement like ‘Verres stole a horse’ refers to a specific thing (*res*).³⁰ This use of *res* to refer to what was signified by a statement follows the vocabulary of Boethius, who repeats the Ciceronian definition of argument as ‘reasoning that generates faith in a thing that is uncertain’ (*argumentum est ratio faciens fidem rei dubiae*).³¹ For William rhetoric is as much part of logic as dialectic, and deals with things as much as with words.

By contrast, Abelard, at least in his *Dialectica*, makes much bolder claims about the superiority of dialectic. In the preface that he attached to the fourth tract of his *Dialectica*, he makes some bold claims while defending himself against accusations that it was not legitimate for a Christian to teach the subject. He insists that no knowledge is ever wrong, only its wrong application: ‘Dialectic, to which all judgement of truth and falsehood is subject, holds the leadership of all philosophy and the governance of all teaching.’³² He is confident that as dialectic is concerned with the discernment of truth, it must be a gift from God. ‘There are few to whom divine grace has deemed to reveal the secret of this knowledge, or rather the treasure of wisdom.’ Abelard acknowledges that many people turn away from dialectic because they cannot stomach the daily effort demanded by the discipline, and that their study is consumed by excessive subtlety. Those who are confused by its subtlety defend their intellectual weakness by blaming the discipline, and criticize those who pursue skill in the art. There is no point to sweating over dialectic without the inspiration of divine grace.³³

A central theme of the *Dialectica* is that logic is properly concerned not with

differentiis topicis (B10: Orléans, Bibl. mun. 266, pp. 74^b–78^a), and argues that it is by William of Champeaux, ‘Pierre Abélard et Guillaume de Champeaux dans les premières années du XIIe siècle. Une étude préliminaire’, *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle*, ed. by Joel Biard (Paris: Vrin, 1999), pp. 114–15. Iwakuma notes that parts of B10 are included in the previous commentary (B8: pp. 43^a–74^b), also found in Paris, Arsenal 910, where it is followed by an extract from Abelard’s own commentary *Super topica* (see Fredborg, p. 57 n. 8). Unlike B10, however, B8 maintains that an argument is *vocale* and *intellectuale*, so he concludes that B8 cannot be William. More work is needed on its authorship.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 166. ‘Proposition’ here refers to the sentence itself, not the proposition that is uttered by a sentence (as in much modern analytic philosophy).

³⁰ Fredborg, ‘The Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’, p. 34.

³¹ Boethius, *De topicis differentiis*, PL 64, 1174C, trans. by Stump, p. 39.

³² *Dialectica*, p. 470. 3–4.

³³ *Dialectica*, pp. 470. 26–471. 10.

things (the domain of physics) but with the imposition of words.³⁴ Specific things exist in the world rather than general categories predicated of those things. As he puts it in a discussion of quantity, 'those who devote themselves to studying logic should discuss things because of names, rather than discussing names because of things'.³⁵ When considering qualities, he observes: 'Those who apply themselves to logic do well to consider the custom, not the nature, of that of which the intention lies in words, the imposition of which is not natural, but customary.'³⁶ In relation to predication, he claims: 'We who apply ourselves to logic consider predication more according to the words of a proposition than according to the existence of a thing. And indeed it is the task of us who serve logic to pay more attention to predication, according to the words of a statement, than according to the existence of the thing, according to which we make different statements about the same subject, as in "Socrates is Socrates, or a man, or a body, or a substance". For one thing is understood in the name *Socrates*, another in the name *man*, but it is not the thing (*res*) of one name rather than of another that inheres in Socrates.'³⁷ Physics deals with the nature of things, logic deals with the imposition of words.³⁸ The fact that there is no discussion of universals in the surviving copy of the *Dialectica* does not deprive the treatise of its central focus, which is with the principles behind reasoning. The first section deals with parts of speech, the second with categorical statements and syllogisms, the third with the topics or common principles underpinning argument, the fourth with hypothetical statements and syllogisms, the fifth with division and definition.

Abelard disagrees with William of Champeaux not just about the meaning of universal words, but about a whole raft of issues relating to the imposition of words (*impositio vocum*). In particular, he questions William's assumption that a topic, the dialectical principle on which any specific argument was based, is a thing. He explains that when we say 'Socrates is a man', 'man' does not refer to the existence of any specific thing, but is rather a predicate making a statement about Socrates. Abelard criticizes William of Champeaux for maintaining that in hypothetical statements, not only necessary, but even probable assertions were true. He insists that hypothetical statements relate not to 'the essence of the thing' but to opinion or what is probable, in other words what holds the appearance of truth.³⁹ It is true or false according to the estimation (*existimatio*) of the listener.⁴⁰ The truth of a

³⁴ *Dialectica*, p. 65. 18.

³⁵ *Dialectica*, p. 73. 4–5; compare p. 99. 5–9.

³⁶ *Dialectica*, p. 99. 19–21.

³⁷ *Dialectica*, p. 66. 8–14.

³⁸ *Dialectica*, pp. 286. 32–287. 1.

³⁹ *Dialectica*, pp. 271. 35–272. 3.

⁴⁰ *Dialectica*, p. 272. 4.

conditional statement like 'if it is a body, it is corporeal' is determined by reference not to any external thing, but to the correct imposition of words. He insists that in conditional statements, the truth of the consequence is established not by its expressing some thing, but by its being contained within the antecedent.⁴¹ This is a perspective quite different from the Boethian analysis of argument taken for granted by William of Champeaux.⁴² John of Salisbury found this particular argument of Abelard, with its radical claim that hypothetical arguments were only valid if the consequence was contained in the antecedent, difficult to swallow.⁴³

While it is not certain exactly when Abelard composed the various glosses on Porphyry, Aristotle and Boethius that make up the *Logica 'Ingredientibus'*, there can be no doubt that his thinking on many issues had matured significantly from the time of writing the *Dialectica*, a treatise in which he never mentions Cicero's *De inventione*.⁴⁴ By the time that he wrote *Super topica*, perhaps in around 1120–22, he is much more familiar with rhetorical theory in general. Unlikely to have been his first commentary on the *De differentiis topicis*, this is a work of great sophistication that deals with the principles of rhetoric as much as of dialectic.⁴⁵

In *Super topica* Abelard develops the theme that knowledge of arguing is not the same as *logica* itself, the science of composing arguments and of analysing them: 'No one can be a logician who is not discerning in finding and judging arguments, unless he knows why arguments are found and once found how they can be proven, should anyone question whether they are strong or weak.'⁴⁶ He is anxious to preserve the distinction between philosophic understanding and practical ability to argue. He even suggests that Boethius was incorrect to think that every question was based

⁴¹ *Dialectica*, p. 285. 4.

⁴² On the originality of Abelard's perspective, see Christopher J. Martin, 'Embarrassing arguments and surprising conclusions in the development of theories of the conditional in the twelfth century', *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la "Logica modernorum"*. *Actes du 7e symposium européen d'histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales, Poitiers, 17–22 juin 1985*, ed. by Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 377–400.

⁴³ *Metalogicon*, III. 6, p. 122. 24.

⁴⁴ The significance of these writings not being present in the *Dialectica* is not noted by Gabriella d'Anna in an otherwise very comprehensive study, 'Abelardo e Cicerone', *Studi Medievali*, 3a ser., 10 (1969), 333–419. Matthias Perkams looks more at Cicero's presence in Abelard's theological writings, 'Der Rhetor als Philosoph—Cicero als Zeuge philosophischen Gottesglaubens in den Schriften Peter Abaelards', in *Cicero in the Middle Ages*, published online as *Convenit Selecta*, 7 (2002) at <http://www.hottopos.com/convenit7/>.

⁴⁵ Iwakuma identifies Abelard as the author of a less sophisticated commentary, one copy of which (B1: Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14779, fols 87^r–105^v) contains some quite outrageous scatological humour, in 'Pierre Abelard et Guillaume de Champeaux', pp. 94–98.

⁴⁶ *Super topica*, p. 209. 24–27.

either on logic, ethics or physics,

because questions of grammar or rhetoric seem to belong to other disciplines, since we completely divide grammar and rhetoric from philosophy. If anyone therefore asks, when one says 'He comes to Rome', whether 'to Rome' is an adverb or a noun, and if it is a noun whether it is in the nominative case or no, or 'whether Verres stole a horse', one is a grammatical question, the other a civil, that is a rhetorical, question; it does not belong to the above-mentioned disciplines, except perhaps for those who assign grammar and rhetoric to logic.⁴⁷

Abelard distances himself from any suggestion that grammar and rhetoric are philosophical disciplines. Thierry of Chartres held this position, that rhetoric is civil science and not to be identified with logic or any part of logic, in his own commentary on the *De inventione*, here siding against the view espoused by William of Champeaux (whom he followed in some other matters).⁴⁸

Abelard is also more explicit than in the *Dialectica* about his disagreement with William of Champeaux over the nature of argument. Whereas Boethius, following Cicero, had always referred to an argument as that which creates faith in a thing (*res*) that is uncertain, Abelard now holds that argumentation exists only for the sake of the argument, intended to make a dubious proposition certain. An argument leads to faith and belief in a conclusion.⁴⁹ He expands on the theme he had developed in his gloss on the *Periermeneias*, that what is said by a proposition (the *dictum propositionis*) is not a thing or essence, developing his understanding of a maximal proposition, the underlying basis of an argument.⁵⁰ In the *Dialectica* he had repeated rather briefly the notion also enunciated by William of Champeaux, that a maxim contains the senses of all those specific arguments to which it applied.⁵¹ By the time of *Super topica*, however, Abelard has moved away from any notion that a maximal proposition contains a meaning in itself. He explains that its potential meanings are

⁴⁷ *Super topica*, p. 290. 2–13; see Fredborg, p. 59 below.

⁴⁸ *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres*, ed. by Karin Margareta Fredborg (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988), p. 51. 45–49: 'Non est autem dicendum rhetoricam aut logicam esse aut eius partem idcirco quod logica circa thesim solam, id est circa generaliter proposita tantummodo versatur, rhetorica vero circa hypothesim solam, id est circa particulariter proposita tantummodo versatur.' Fredborg comments briefly on Thierry's debt to William on p. 12 of her introduction.

⁴⁹ *Super topica*, pp. 222. 38–223. 2; compare *Dialectica*, pp. 459–63.

⁵⁰ *Super topica*, p. 226. 12. There is a large literature on Abelard's understanding of the *dictum propositionis*. See for example Klaus Jacobi, Peter King, and Christian Strub, 'From intellectus verus/falsus to the dictum propositionis: The Semantics of Peter Abelard and his Circle', *Vivarium*, 34.1 (1996), 15–40.

⁵¹ *Dialectica*, pp. 317. 37–318. 1; Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics*, pp. 166–67.

dependent entirely on the terms of the arguments to which it is applied.⁵² The truth of a maxim can only be preserved in relation to specific consequences.⁵³ Instead of interpreting maxims as self-evident truths, as Boethius had done, Abelard emphasizes that they are themselves the product of human imposition, applied variously in different situations. They employ pronouns whose meaning depends on the specific application of the pronoun. Just as a predicate is always an utterance (*vox*) rather than a thing (*res*), so a general statement like 'every man loves' or 'every man loves himself' does not generate a multiplicity of meanings about different individuals.⁵⁴ While Abelard never explicitly accuses older authors of being wrong in their discussion of topics, he claims that they sometimes spoke 'more according to opinion than according to truth'. This is particularly the case in the topics, 'which deal only with probability, and which consist in opinion, rather than in truth'.⁵⁵ He explains that Boethius sometimes identifies as maxims propositions that are clearly not maximal 'for the sake of stretching the reader'. Abelard questions whether any statement can ever signify a thing as a clear, self-evident truth. He recognizes that while some propositions can be certain in one context, in another they can be uncertain, issues that he promises to discuss further in a treatise on argument, presumably the work that he elsewhere calls his *Rhetorica*.⁵⁶

He then interrupts his commentary on the second book of *De differentiis topicis* with a long discussion about rhetorical argument, drawn from his reading of Cicero's *De inventione* and the fourth book of the treatise of Boethius, about rhetorical argument.⁵⁷ Following Boethius, he explains that both dialectical and rhetorical arguments deal with what is uncertain but differ only in that rhetoric is based around a specific person or activity.⁵⁸ He analyses different types of statement that might be made about a person, and that are effective in formulating a rhetorical argument.⁵⁹ He formulates a definition of rhetoric that emphasizes its instrumentality, rather than issues of truth or falsehood: 'Rhetoric consists particularly in persuasion. Persuading is moving and drawing the dispositions of men so that they desire or reject the same

⁵² *Super topica*, pp. 231. 26–232. 40; Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics*, p. 170.

⁵³ *Super topica*, p. 234. 34.

⁵⁴ *Super topica*, pp. 235. 7–236. 6.

⁵⁵ *Super topica*, pp. 242. 20–22.

⁵⁶ *Super topica*, p. 242. 27: 'de quo plenius in tractatu argumenti disputabimus'; see also n. 10 above.

⁵⁷ *Super topica*, pp. 256. 34–268. 29; see the new edition and commentary on this passage provided by Fredborg, pp. 62–80 below. D'Anna observed many more passages drawn from the *De inventione* in this passage than noted by Dal Pra, 'Abelardo e Cicerone', pp. 340–52 (n. 44 above).

⁵⁸ *Super topica*, p. 257. 10; Fredborg, 1.1, p. 62 below.

⁵⁹ *Super topica*, pp. 257. 12–258. 39; Fredborg, 1.1–1.2, p. 62.

thing with us.’⁶⁰ This was also a very different perspective from the more moralistic view of Augustine, who spoke in his *De doctrina Christiana* of rhetoric as persuading people ‘of true and false things’.⁶¹

Abelard runs through specific topics or commonplaces, such as where, when, how and with what help a persuasive argument is made, without ever defining these topics as ‘things’. Fredborg’s discovery that Abelard’s argument here runs close to part of the commentary of William of Champeaux on the *De inventione* suggests that Abelard was deliberately wanting to compete with his teacher in the field of rhetoric.⁶² He then concludes his discussion of specific types of rhetorical topic by referring to the treatise that he wanted to write:

If there is anything lacking in completeness of teaching, we shall pursue this more fully in our *Rhetorica*. But let these things suffice for the discernment of the seven circumstances which consist in a hypothetical question. But although we have discussed all the commonplaces which an orator uses relating to circumstances, we shall talk about the other questions which are properly of an orator, relating to hypothesis.⁶³

Drawing on the *De inventione* Abelard discusses four other *constitutiones* or types of rhetorical assertion: the conjecture, the definition, the general assertion made about something and what was *translativa*, in which one moves from a specific to a general question.⁶⁴ To these, Abelard adds a fifth, judgement (*iudicatio*), based on supplying a reason for something, but then challenging that reasoning and thus raising a question.⁶⁵ ‘For these five [strategies] which come from writing, which Tully calls *status*, together belong to all who invoke the authority of writing, about which there is to be fuller discussion, as also about writings in general, in [our]

⁶⁰ *Super topica*, p. 259. 14–16; Fredborg, 1.3.1, p. 66.

⁶¹ *De doctrina Christiana*, IV. 4, ed. by W. Green, CSEL, 80 (Vienna, 1963), p. 118: ‘Nam cum per partem rhetoricam et vera suadeantur et falsa, quis audeat dicere [...] ut illi qui res falsa persuadere conantur’. Compare Isidore, *Etymologiae*, II. 1. 1: ‘Rhetorica est bene dicendi scientia in civilibus quaestionibus, [eloquentiae copia] ad persuadendum iusta et bona.’ William of Conches has a similar definition of rhetoric in his commentary on Boethius, although seeing it as the culmination of eloquence, *In Consolationem Philosophiae*, I. 1, ed. by Lodi Nauta, CCCM, 94 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), p. 34: ‘deinde rethorica quasi perfectio, scilicet scientia persuadendi uel dissuadendi’.

⁶² *Super topica*, p. 260. 17–31; Fredborg, 1.3.5, p. 68; compare Fredborg, ‘The Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’, pp. 17–19.

⁶³ *Super topica*, p. 263. 24–27; Fredborg, 2, p. 74 below.

⁶⁴ *Super topica*, pp. 263. 33–266. 35; Fredborg, 2.1–2.5, pp. 74–77 (correctly reading *constitutiones* rather than *constructiones*); compare Cicero, *De inventione*, I. 8. 10–14. 19.

⁶⁵ *Super topica*, pp. 266. 32–267. 12; Fredborg, 3.1–3.2, p. 78 (correctly reading *iudicatio* rather than *indicatio*).

Rhetorica.⁶⁶ His line of thinking is that these various types of rhetorical argument relate to the specific circumstances of the person or event under discussion, but do not depend on any external reality for their truth or legitimacy. These are issues which Thierry of Chartres expanded on in more detail in his commentary on the *De inventione*.⁶⁷ Unlike Thierry, however, who follows Cicero in defining a *constitutio* as 'that uncertain thing which is principally held in cause', Abelard defines it simply as a type of question on which any argument is based.

After this extended excursus on rhetorical argument Abelard criticizes 'our teacher William and his followers' for claiming that the grammatical, or strictly literal sense of a proposition, was different from its dialectical sense. Abelard rejects his interpretation of 'Socrates is white' as about some linking of the essence of Socrates with the essence of whiteness.⁶⁸ 'We do not ever want dialecticians to consider one sense in any construction, grammarians another.'⁶⁹ He refuses to accept that the dialectical meaning of a phrase could be different from its grammatical meaning. Again, he was resisting the teaching of William that a predicate signified some *res*, distinct from the subject that it predicated. Just as Abelard uses his commentary to expound what he sees as the principles underpinning rhetorical discourse, so here he explores grammatical questions from a dialectical perspective. While he recognizes that there are those who subordinate both grammar and rhetoric to logic (an allusion to the teaching of William of Champeaux), he does not accept that grammar and rhetoric deal with the same issues as logic.⁷⁰ Rhetorical assertions relate to civil science rather than to objective truth. Abelard was here criticizing William of Champeaux's sense that both rhetoric and dialectic concerned the domain of things (*res*). Without dwelling on the details of rhetorical argument, he observes that rhetorical statements are not necessarily about things that exist in the world.

Abelard devotes much attention to refining Boethius's definition (drawn from Cicero), that an argument is 'reasoning creating faith in a thing that is uncertain'.⁷¹ What was meant by *res* in this definition? He juxtaposes two views about the nature of an argument. The position he supports is that an argument is not a proposition, but the *intellectus* or conception of the proposition, which has no meaning unless through a mental conception.⁷² The contrary view, which he opposes, is that the argument is not the proposition or its conception, but those *res* (things) or terms of the proposition. In this view, based on a literal application of Boethius's definition,

⁶⁶ *Super topica*, p. 267. 13–17; Fredborg, 3.3, p. 78.

⁶⁷ *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres*, pp. 78–93.

⁶⁸ *Super topica*, pp. 271. 38–272. 38.

⁶⁹ *Super topica*, p. 273. 37–39.

⁷⁰ *Super topica*, p. 290. 2–7; see above n. 24.

⁷¹ *Super topica*, p. 294. 3.

⁷² *Super topica*, pp. 294. 21–31, 296. 38–41.

the argument is the topic or *locus* behind the proposition. Again it is William of Champeaux's views that are being targeted. Abelard's point is that the specific words constructed in an argument do not relate to logic, or to the science of discourse (*ratio disserendi*), but to other, more practical disciplines.⁷³ Abelard is openly critical of many arguments that Boethius puts forward, 'arguments more according to opinion than to the truth of the matter'.⁷⁴ 'We call reasoning a type of argument, that is something rationally induced to create faith, not according to the truth of the matter, but according to the quality of mind and estimation of the person to whom it occurs.'⁷⁵ While Boethius employs traditional Stoic vocabulary in speaking of a 'thing' (*res*) that is uncertain, Abelard explains that 'uncertain thing' in fact means 'uncertain proposition'. The *dictum propositionis* can never itself be defined as a thing.⁷⁶

This line of thinking had important implications when applied to *argumentum* in the context of religious belief. Abelard applies his analysis of rhetoric most fully to sacred authors in the prologue to the *Sic et Non*, initially composed around 1120–22, perhaps the same general period as *Super topica*. Here he extends principles raised in discussion of topics to the specific arguments put by Fathers of the Church. Acutely aware of the rhetorical structure of both scriptural and patristic assertions, he considers that such statements belong, like the topics themselves, to the realm of the probable, and have to be analysed as such. It is the task of dialectical enquiry to question these assertions, which like all propositions are *dubia* or uncertain, not to demolish their meaning, but in order to move to greater certainty. Drawing on Cicero's *De inventione*, Abelard observes that all human language is invented according to specific situations, to meet specific needs.⁷⁷ No single proposition can ever be identified as a final definition of truth. Is it surprising that the Fathers of the Church declared many things 'based on opinion rather than on truth'?⁷⁸ All an assertion can do is provide an approximation (*existimatio*) of truth. This is the direct application to theology of a principle first raised in the *Dialectica* and elaborated more fully in the *De intellectibus*.⁷⁹

Abelard opened his commentary on St Paul's Epistle to the Romans by observing that 'All divine Scripture intends to teach or warn in the manner of rhetorical

⁷³ *Super topica*, p. 296. 4–21.

⁷⁴ *Super topica*, p. 299. 40–42.

⁷⁵ *Super topica*, p. 300. 21–23.

⁷⁶ *Super topica*, p. 301. 25–28.

⁷⁷ *Sic et Non*, Prol. lines 1–20, ed. by Blanche Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976–77), p. 89; for fuller analysis of this prologue, see the study of Peter von Moos in this volume, pp. 81–97.

⁷⁸ *Sic et Non*, Prol. lines 175–76, p. 96.

⁷⁹ Abelard, *De intellectibus*, 24–28, ed. by Patrick Morin (Paris: Vrin, 1994), pp. 42–44.

speech'.⁸⁰ He had already anticipated this observation, for which there is no clear precedent in patristic tradition, in a remark incorporated into the *Theologia 'Scholarium'* that as Scripture made great use of rhetorical devices, it was absurd to assume that there was no need to study the liberal arts.⁸¹ While Augustine had acknowledged that Scripture employed the tools of eloquence to convey its message, he preferred to emphasize the contrast between secular and Scriptural rhetoric.⁸² Abelard's emphasis, by contrast, is on identifying the intention behind the writing of the Gospel (*intentio euangelii*), in this case the writing of St Paul. He transfers his persistent interest in identifying the intention of an author (employed to great effect in his commentaries on Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boethius) to the writing of St Paul. By emphasizing the intention behind the Epistle to the Romans, Abelard interprets its text, not itself as the perfection of the Gospel, but as a tool by which the Church at Rome could be edified and developed. There were many precepts in Christian tradition that were rhetorically useful, but were not essential to the Gospel.⁸³ As Minnis has observed, Abelard's skill in identifying the rhetorical techniques being employed by St Paul, and thus the *intentio* of the author, enabled him to go much further than most of his contemporaries, who tended to be more concerned with the *auctoritas* of this key Christian text.⁸⁴ The technique of defining the *intentio operis*, introduced by Boethius in his own commentary on Porphyry, became a significant feature of literary prefaces in the early twelfth century.⁸⁵ By emphasizing that a proposition does not signify any specific thing (*res*), but rather conveys some truth

⁸⁰ *Commentaria in Epistolam ad Romanos* [*Comm. Rom.*], Prol. lines 5–6, ed. by Eligius-Marie Buytaert, CCCM, 11 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), p. 41: 'Omnis scriptura diuina more orationis rhetoricae aut docere intendit aut monere [Buytaert: mouere]; docet quippe dum quae fieri uel uitari oportet insuat, monet [Buytaert: mouet] autem dum sacris ad-monitionis suis uoluntatem nostram uel dissuadendo retrahit a malis uel persuadendo applicat bonis'. Following two manuscripts, Peppermüller provides *monere* and *monet* in his edition, *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos*, Fontes Christiani, 26, 3 vols (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), p. 62. A similar correction needs to be made to Buytaert's edition of *Comm. Rom.*, IV, p. 314, corrected in the edition of Peppermüller, p. 834. 14: 'omnem scripturam aut docere aut monere [Buytaert: mouere] intendere'; see Rolf Peppermüller, 'Zur kritischen Ausgabe des Römerbrief-Kommentars Abaelards', *Scriptorium*, 26 (1972), 82–96 (p. 85).

⁸¹ *Theologia 'Scholarium'*, II, 28, ed. by Eligius-Marie Buytaert and Constant J. Mews, CCCM, 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987), p. 420, drafted as an addition to *Theologia Christiana*, II, 125b, ed. by Buytaert, CCCM, 12 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), p. 190.

⁸² Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, IV, 28–30, p. 124. On Augustine's caution about rhetoric being capable of uttering both truth and falsehood, see n. 61 above; see also the comments on Von Moos, pp. 84–85 below.

⁸³ *Comm. Rom.*, Prol. lines 36–78, pp. 42–43.

⁸⁴ Alistair J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship*, 2nd edn (London: Scolar Press, 1988), pp. 59–63.

⁸⁵ Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship*, pp. 18–28.

about an issue, Abelard turns attention to the intention of the speaker of a proposition, rather than to the specific things that he might say.

According to the definition attributed to St Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11. 1), faith is 'the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not appearing'. Abelard paraphrases this definition in his *Theologia 'Scholarium'* as 'the estimation of what is not apparent' (*existimatio non apparentium*).⁸⁶ He understands faith not as a supernatural gift, but as an *argumentum*, a rational process by which we know about what is not apparent to the senses, quite different from knowledge, based on experience of those things: 'Clearly because faith is the argument for those things which cannot appear. For those things that are apparent do not generate faith, but knowledge.'⁸⁷ Abelard draws on Boethius' definition of argument as reasoning which made faith in a thing that was not certain, but distances himself from the idea that a statement based on faith refers to any physical thing (*res*). Faith is rather mental estimation of things not evident to the senses. Bernard of Clairvaux, a former protégé of William of Champeaux, was alarmed by the subjectivity of this definition, which seemed to undermine the doctrinal certainty conveyed by the Pauline definition.⁸⁸ Bernard was certain that rhetorical statements did refer to real things.

When Bernard complained that Abelard had only 'dabbled' or 'played' (*ludit*) in dialectic, and now extravagantly 'raved' (*insanit*) about Holy Scripture, he had little understanding of the way Abelard had developed his thinking from those early years in which he had publicly questioned the teaching of William of Champeaux during those classes on rhetoric. While Abelard had certainly made his initial reputation in dialectic, he was interested in developing an understanding of the dialectical principles that underpinned all rhetorical argument. At the time of writing his *Super topica*, perhaps sometime around 1120–22 (in any case, before the *Logica 'Nostrorum petitioni sociorum'*, from the period 1122–25), Abelard was at least contemplating a *Rhetorica*, perhaps conceived as matching his earlier *Dialectica*. Whether he ever carried out this wish is not known. In about the same period, Abelard also revised the first section of the *Dialectica*, the so-called 'book of parts [of speech]' as a treatise that he later referred to as his *Grammatica*. Because this work is only known through references within his *Theologia Christiana* and *Theologia 'Scholarium'*, we cannot be fully sure of its contents.⁸⁹ From the surviving references, it would seem that Abelard wanted to reformulate the principles of

⁸⁶ *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 1, p. 318.

⁸⁷ *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 49, pp. 432–33, commenting on Gregory, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, II. 26. 8, PL 76, 1202A.

⁸⁸ Bernard of Clairvaux, Letter 190, ed. by Leclercq, VIII, 25 (n. 2 above).

⁸⁹ Abelard refers to his *Grammatica* in *Theologia Scholarium*, III. 70, p. 529 and in *Theologia Christiana*, IV. 155–58, pp. 343–44, as 'a reconsideration of the predicaments'; see Constant J. Mews, 'Aspects of the Evolution of Peter Abelard's Thought on Signification and Predication', *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains* (n. 42 above), pp. 15–41.

grammar along dialectical lines, in exactly the same way as he started to think about rhetorical argument in his commentary on the *De differentiis topicis* of Boethius.

By the early 1130s, Abelard was becoming increasingly interested in questions relating to ethics and Scripture. In the *Collationes*, composed perhaps sometime between 1127 and the early 1130s, Abelard refers more often to the authority of Cicero, whether on the topics or for his comments on the virtues in the *De inventione* (which he once calls a *tractatus ethice*) than to that of Aristotle.⁹⁰ He transfer his attention from *logica*, the theory of discourse, to *ethica*, the study of moral behaviour and its relationship to the supreme good.

Abelard was also convinced that the study of philosophy led naturally to philosophical reflection on the subject matter of religious faith. His *Theologia* provided the sacred counterpart to what he had attempted in his *Dialectica*, a systematic treatise worthy of standing beside any writing by Augustine or Boethius. He emphasized that the propositions of the Church Fathers had to be examined like any rhetorical argument, as expressions of opinion, formulated through human imagination and intellect, rather than as dialectical statements that were either true or false. Again, Abelard's intellectual ambitions outstripped his capacity to complete the books that he promised his readers. While writing his commentary on Romans, he reserved some matters to 'our *Ethica*', also called *Scito teipsum* or 'Know thyself' in the manuscript tradition.⁹¹ We have no idea whether his promise within his commentary on Romans to consider certain matters in a forthcoming *Anthropologia*, perhaps a treatise on the redemption paralleling the *Theologia*, was ever fulfilled.⁹² Abelard's planned *Rhetorica* was part of a much more ambitious project, a set of independent treatises that encompassed the spheres of both secular and sacred learning. While he did not have the physical capacity or institutional support to complete this ambitious project, he was very interested in the philosophical foundations of all kinds of argument. Understanding these principles deepened his grasp of the writings of St Paul.

⁹⁰ Peter Abelard, *Collationes*, II. 115, ed. and trans. by John Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 130. Abelard quotes from or refers or alludes to Cicero with great frequency: *Collationes*, II. 62, 64, 74 (via Boethius), 85 (via Boethius), 91, 98, 106, 115, 118, 126–36 (indirect allusions), (see also II. 129–32), pp. 78, 80, 94, 106, 112, 116, 130, 134, 138–46; see also the comments of Marenbon, pp. lxxvi–lxxviii. Aristotle is quoted or referred to in *Collationes*, II. 85, 111, 117, 145, pp. 106, 128, 132, 156.

⁹¹ *Comm. Rom.*, II and IV, pp. 126 and 306; Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, ed. by David E. Luscombe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); this latter work has been edited afresh by Rainer Ilgner under the title, *Scito te ipsum*, CCCM, 190 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001). At the outset of Book II (of which only the beginning survives), Abelard refers to Book I as 'Superior *Ethice* nostre libellus', Luscombe, p. 128, and Ilgner, p. 85.

⁹² *Comm. Rom.*, III, p. 215; this may also be the same as 'our *Tropologia*' referred to in *Comm. Rom.*, II, p. 118; Abelard promised to write about the incarnation of the Word in *Theologia Christiana*, I. 129, p. 128 and *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 192, p. 401.

Abelard on Rhetoric

KARIN MARGARETA FREDBORG

The only time we hear about the famous dialectician and theologian Peter Abelard being engaged in studying rhetoric is when he resumed his studies with William of Champeaux some time between 1108 and 1113 in Paris. As in other situations, Abelard started an argument and came out victorious:

Preceptor meus ille Guillhelmus Parisiacensis archidiaconus, habitu pristino commutato, ad regularium clericorum ordinem se convertit; ea ut referebant intentione ut quo religiosior crederetur ad majoris prelationis gradum promoveretur, sicut in proximo contigit, eo Catalaunensi episcopo facto. Nec tamen hic sue conversionis habitus aut ab urbe Parisius aut a consueto philosophie studio revocavit, sed in ipso quoque monasterio ad quod se causa religionis contulerat statim more solito publicas exercuit scholas. Tum ego ad eum reversus ut ab ipso rethoricam audirem, inter cetera disputationumstrarum conamina antiquam ejus de universalibus sententiam patentissimis argumentorum rationibus ipsum commutare, immo destruere compuli.¹

Why a dispute about the universals should come up during a disputation in a course of rhetoric, we are never told. Early twelfth-century French rhetorical commentaries, however, including those by William of Champeaux, do deal with philosophical matters.² Three times in his commentaries we find phrases like '*res universalis*' or

¹ *Historia calamitatum*, ed. by Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Vrin, 1967), p. 65; Abelard's polemical tone should be compared with that of Hildebert of Lavardin, who congratulates William on his conversion and urges him to continue with true philosophy within monastic life, *Ep.* 1, PL 171, 141A–143A.

² Karin Margareta Fredborg, 'The Commentaries on Cicero's *De Inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium* by William of Champeaux', *CIMAGL*, 17 (1976), 1–39. John O. Ward, 'From Antiquity to the Renaissance. Glosses and commentaries on Cicero's *Rhetorica*', in *Medieval Eloquence*, ed. by James J. Murphy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 25–67 (p. 47, n. 60) has questioned the attribution of these commentaries (*In primis* and *Etsi cum*

‘invincible reasons for saying *genus est res*’,³ which could have sparked off such a dispute over the universals. Unfortunately, no extant Ciceronian commentary or traces of Abelard’s own teaching on, for instance, the *De inventione* or the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* exist today, but we know that Abelard was interested in Cicero.⁴ We also possess an interesting twelve-page digression on rhetorical argumentation in his glosses to Boethius’ *De differentiis topicis* which I intend to re-edit here.⁵

The *De differentiis topicis* was to twelfth and thirteenth-century scholars an important treatise providing them with a method of analysing arguments through the topics underlying the individual arguments. In teaching practice, it was the dialecticians, not the rhetoricians, who wrote commentaries on it, whereas in the copying of texts, the fourth book of *De differentiis topicis* often also accompanies Cicero’s *De inventione* (*Rhetorica Prima*) and the *Ad Herennium* (*Rhetorica secunda*).⁶ While the first three books of *De differentiis topicis* deal with dialectical topics and the classification of topics according to Themistius and Cicero’s *Topica*, the last book deals with rhetorical topics as set forth in Cicero’s *De inventione*. Normally the dialectical commentaries on *De differentiis topicis* from the twelfth century deal with Book III in a very perfunctory manner, and not with Book IV at all. This is quite different from the next century, when the university statutes still did not prescribe Book IV as obligatory, but the commentaries now include Book IV.⁷

Tullius) to William, but accepted the attribution of the ‘Epilogue’ following these commentaries in York, Minster Library XVI. M. 7, fols 68^{vb}–69^{vb}, edited by Fredborg, ‘Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’, pp. 33–39. See also Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, pp. 108, 150–52, 166, 250, 252, 276.

³ Fredborg, ‘Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’, pp. 13, 29, 30.

⁴ Gabriella d’Anna, ‘Abelardo e Cicerone’, *Studi Medievali*, Ser. 3a, 10 (1969), 333–419; David Luscombe, ‘The School of Abelard Revisited’, *Vivarium*, 30.1 (1992), 127–38 (p. 132).

⁵ See Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, pp. 108–110; Julia Barrow, Charles Burnett, and David Luscombe, ‘A Checklist of the Manuscripts Containing the Writings of Peter Abelard and Heloise and Other Writings Closely Associated with Abelard and his School’, *Revue d’histoire des textes*, 14–15 (1984–85), 183–302 (p. 258, nos. 319, 321); Constant J. Mews, ‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard’, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 52 (1985), 73–134 (p. 93).

⁶ Birger Munk Olsen, *L’Étude des auteurs classiques latins aux XIe et XIIe siècles*, 1 (Paris: CNRS, 1982), p. 132 enumerates eighteen copies of the *De differentiis topicis* Book IV; it follows the *De inventione* and *Ad Herennium* in eight cases, the *De inventione* in three cases, and is positioned between the *De inventione* and *Ad Herennium* in five cases.

⁷ H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, *Cartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (Paris: Delalain, 1889), no. 20, p. 70, and no. 201, p. 228; see P. Osmond Lewry, ‘Rhetoric at Paris and Oxford in the Mid-Thirteenth Century’, *Rhetorica*, 1.1 (Spring, 1983), 45–63 (p. 45 n. 1); Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages: The Commentaries on Aristotle’s and Boethius’s ‘Topics’* (Munich: Philosophia, 1984), p. 125; John O. Ward, ‘Rhetoric in the Faculty of Arts at the Universities of Paris and Oxford in the Middle Ages: A

Only one twelfth-century commentator included something on the rhetorical topics after finishing Book III, and he did not write out his own thoughts on the subject matter, but lifted his material from Peter Abelard's commentary and the digression on *circumstantiae* and the rhetorical topics when dealing with *thesis* and *hypothesis* in *De differentiis topicis* I (PL 64, 1177C).⁸ Perhaps it was the copyist of the *De differentiis topicis* commentary in MS Paris, Arsenal 910, fols 105^{ra}–20^{vb} rather than its author, who thought fit to include Abelard's digression on the rhetorical topics on fols 120^{vb}–121^{rb} since the other, complete copy of this anonymous text in MS Orléans, Bibl. mun. 266, pp. 43^a–74^b has no such addition. Moreover, the scribe copied only half of this digression of Abelard, stopping just before Abelard (below § 2) refers to 'Our rhetoric', *Rethorica nostra*. Evidently, the anonymous author of the preceding commentary on *De differentiis topicis* was not also to have a *Rethorica nostra* attributed to him as well—or all that was desirable to have copied out from Abelard's digression was about the rhetorical topics; the rest (§§ 2–4) on the rhetorical issues (*constitutiones*) was not in demand.

Why the twelfth-century commentators normally ignored Book IV we do not know. Nor does Abelard himself specify why he went to such length in this digression, except to tell us that he was 'prompted by the mention of the *circumstantiae* and of the *quaestiones rethoricae*', but he would deal with further details in his *Rhetorica* (§§ 1.1, 2, 3.3). It is tempting to assume that Abelard did so to deal with the rhetorical material as early as possible, so not to have to deal with Book IV and rhetoric later on. On the other hand, the copyist of the Arsenal MS

Summary of the Evidence', *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange)*, 54 (1996), 172–82, and John O. Ward, 'Rhetoric in the Faculty of Arts (Paris and Oxford) A Summary of the Evidence', in *L'Enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe–XVe siècles)*, ed. by Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 149–55. I am deeply indebted to Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen for his generous and stimulating help with this interesting text and his placing at my disposal the Arsenal manuscript not known to the editor, Mario Dal Pra in his *Pietro Abelardo, Scritti di logica*, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Milano, 24, 2nd edn (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969).

⁸ Green-Pedersen, *Tradition of Topics*, p. 422. For this commentary, see also the description of MS Arsenal 910 in Lambert Marie de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962), pp. 116–22, and Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, 'The Doctrine of "Maxima Propositio" and "Locus Differentiae" in Commentaries from the Twelfth Century on Boethius' Topics', *Studia Mediewistyczne*, 18.2 (1977), 125–63. For its affiliation with the doctrines of Abelard's master William of Champeaux, see Iwakuma, Yukio, 'Pierre Abélard et Guillaume de Champeaux dans les premières années du XIIe siècle. Une étude préliminaire', *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle*, ed. by Joel Biard (Paris: Vrin, 1999), pp. 93–123, esp. p. 101 and p. 114: 'B8 (= *Intentio* Boetii: Paris, Arsenal 910, fols 105^{ra}–120^{vb}, Orléans, Bibl. mun. 266, pp. 43^a–74^b, Vat. Reg. Lat. 230, fols 72^{ra}–79^{vb}) n'est pas attribué à Guillaume de Champeaux, mais B8 n'est sans rapport avec lui; c'est peut-être la révision d'une oeuvre de Guillaume qui est perdue aujourd'hui.'

seems to have turned such an argument around, and inserted the Abelardian material as a small, independent section on *circumstantiae* and rhetorical topics to make up for a missing commentary to Book IV.

Even if the Arsenal manuscript can only supply us with roughly half of this digression on rhetoric, it is most welcome to have a second copy of a text otherwise only preserved in a single manuscript that, despite its orderly appearance, presents difficulties to the modern reader and editor. Still worse, Abelard's commentary survives only as a torso. His commentary on most of Books II and III is missing in MS Paris, BnF lat. 7493, fols 168^{ra}–183^{vb} (s. XII).⁹ The commentary on *De differentiis topicis* is probably from around 1120¹⁰ and Abelard is clearly still engaged in an ongoing discussion with his former teacher, William of Champeaux (*preceptor noster Willelmus eiusque sequaces*), explicitly so in the section immediately following this digression on rhetoric.¹¹

Doctrinally, Abelard leans closely on Boethius here and his section on rhetoric should perhaps rather be read as an exposition of the middle part of Book IV of *De differentiis topicis* on the issues (1209A–1210B) by recourse to the *De inventione*, and as a careful analysis of how the *circumstantiae* are related to the set of rhetorical topics set forth in the *De inventione* (1212A–1215A). When dealing with the *constitutiones* or issues, Abelard is unconcerned with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and its tripartite division of the issues (*Ad Her* I. 11. 18). Therefore his discussion of the nature and the number of *constitutiones* or issues (below § 2.1–5) follows Cicero and Boethius, not the *Ad Her*. But it is unusual in other ways, because of his unorthodox statement (§ 3.1) that the issues constitute the first four rhetorical *quaestiones*, whereas the *iudicatio* is taken as the fifth rhetorical *quaestio*. Here, Abelard is probably following Cicero's *Topica* (I. 2. 6: 'omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partis, unam inveniendi, alteram iudicandi') that argumentation can be seen from two angles, 'one concerned with the invention of arguments', that is topics used for the different issues, 'the other with the judgment of their validity'.¹²

In the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition, for instance represented by Thierry of

⁹ *Super topica*, pp. 205–330; Green-Pedersen, *Tradition of the Topics*, p. 424. The text breaks off in the gloss on Book II, PL 64, 1184A.

¹⁰ Green-Pedersen, *Tradition of the Topics*, p. 424; Mews, 'On Dating', p. 91 and 'Aspects of the Evolution of Abelard's Thought on Signification and Predication', *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains*, ed. by Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 15–41 (pp. 15, 25); Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 109; John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 46–48.

¹¹ *Super topica*, pp. 271–75, Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, 'William of Champeaux on Boethius's Topics according to Orléans Bibl. mun. 266', *CIMAGL*, 13 (1974), 13–30; Green-Pedersen, *Tradition of the Topics*, pp. 166–76.

¹² *Topica*, I. 2. 6, in *De inventione, De optimo genere oratorum, Topica of Cicero*, trans. by H. M. Hubbell (London: Heinemann, 1949), p. 387.

Chartres,¹³ the *iudicatio* is taken to be directed towards the same issue as proposed by the orator and the *quaestio* in the mind of the audience, since the *iudicatio* is the matter for judgement belonging to the jury. Here the *iudicium* is part of invention.¹⁴ Of course, *iudicium* is etymologically related to *iudicatio*, says Thierry, but they are not the same, since *iudicatio* is only functioning properly if it is the judge's evaluation of the speakers' proof and disproof.¹⁵ Abelard, on the other hand, follows the tradition of William of Champeaux in seeing *iudicium* as a part of invention, because logic or *diligens ratio disserendi* is divided into dialectic and rhetoric, as we find it in his discussion of the place of rhetoric within the division of sciences (*cui parti philosophiae supponitur*):

(*Super topica*, p. 289. 40–290. 16) Aliam divisionem quaestionis ponit, quod videlicet quaerit de his que pertinent ad logicam [...] ad physicam [...] ad ethicam. Sed quod ait omnem quaestionem trahi ex aliqua harum scientiarum [...] falsum videtur, quia quaestiones grammaticae sive rethoricae ad alias scientias pertinere videntur, cum videlicet gramaticam et rethoricam omni<no> a philosophia dividamus. Si quis itaque quaerat cum dicitur 'Romam venit', utrum *Romam* sit adverbium vel nomen, et si sit nomen, utrum nominativi casus vel non, vel 'utrum Verres furatus sit equum' grammatica est quaestio et illa civilis id est rethorica, nec ad supradictas scientias attinet, nisi forte secundum eos qui grammaticamque rethoricam<que> logicae supponunt. Boethius tamen hoc nomen *logica* non ponit, sed *disserendi ratio* scientiam, quod multo minus applicare potest grammaticae quae nullo modo disserere, id est argumentari vel disputare docet.¹⁶

¹³ *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres*, ed. by Karin Margareta Fredborg (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988), p. 175. 52–59.

¹⁴ *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres*, p. 77. 18.

¹⁵ *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres*, p. 80. 42–55.

¹⁶ Compare William of Champeaux in York, Minster Library, XVI. M. 7, fol. 1^{vb}: '*Supponitur logice*. Logica alia sermocinalis ut gramatica, alia disertiva ut dialectica et rethorica [...]. Sed queritur cum rethorica dicatur habere quinque partes, quare Tullius in *Topicis* (I. 2. 6) inquit "Omnis diligens ratio disserendi distribuitur in duas partes, in scientiam inveniendi et scientiam iudicandi". Que sic solvitur. Logica strictim aliquando accipitur aliquando large. Quando strictim habet hanc diffinitionem: *diligens ratio disserendi* et tunc continet dialecticam et rethorice partem illam que vocatur inventio large accepta scilicet ut et iudicium contineat', and William in Fredborg, 'Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux', p. 22: 'iudicium vero est expositio argumenti, quia reddit efficaciam argumento invento, constituendo probationes et rationes ut locus inventus exerceat vim suam, scilicet syllogismum vel alium modum probationis et argumentationis et ut argumentum excogitatum explicetur. Praecogitare enim docet inventio prius quod *homo* vel alius terminus habet cum substantia affinitatem talem quod iunctum alicui praedicando facit substantiam eidem cohaerere. Postea iudicium constituit aliquam argumentationem ubi hoc argumentum explicatur. Haec vero inventio, quam hic definit (*De inv.* I. 7. 9) invenit locos et rationes probationum ubi loci habent probandi efficaciam. Itaque habet et officium sui et iudicii'; see Green-Pedersen, *Tradition of the Topics*, pp. 194–200. Also the Priscian commentary *Glosule*

Furthermore, Abelard is very clear that, in rhetoric, *iudicium* works both within invention when we argue *pro* and *contra*, in the parts of a speech called argumentation (*confirmatio*) and counterargument (*reprehensio*). Hence the arguments and topics for arguments work on two levels: the ‘introductory’ arguments and the ‘corroborative’ arguments when we devise tactics for proof and disproof, with the set of rules learnt for both. Therefore he mentions analogous tactics in dialectic and advocates for the art of judgement *on par* with the training in rhetorical tactics of argument and counterargument:

(*Super topica*, p. 212. 29–30) Loci non solum ad inventionem, verum etiam ad iudicium valent [...]

(*Super topica*, pp. 213. 26–214. 13) Non absurde quaeritur quare scientia iudicandi in inventione hic quoque sicut in rhetorica non contineatur. Quippe qui argumentationem probat rursus invenit <argumenta> quibus priora argumenta valere demonstrat. Sed profecto non omnis inventio argumentorum hic dicitur inventio, sicut non omnis comprobatio dicitur resolutio. Inventio namque priorum argumentorum, quae videlicet non inducuntur ad ulla argumenta probanda ipsa tantum in hoc loco inventio dicitur. Inventio vero posteriorum argumentorum scilicet ad comprobanda priora argumenta vel improbanda ea quae pro argumentis inducta sunt resolutio dicitur. Huius namque duae partes sunt: resolutio confirmandi sua argumenta et infirmandi contraria. Huiusmodi vero argumentationes quae infirmant alias Tullius in *Rethoricis suis* (*De inv.* I. 24. 34) reprehensionem appellat, caeteras vero omnes confirmationem; et quemadmodum per scientiam inveniendi et iudicandi hoc loco totam logicam comprehendimus, ita etiam per scientiam confirmandi et reprehendi tota[m] comprehendit. Nam confirmatio[nem] et inventionem priorum argumentorum continet quam hic simpliciter inventionem vocamus et partem illam iudicii per quam nostra argumenta confirmamus; reprehensio vero aliam partem iudicii continet per quam adversarii nostri argumenta destruimus aut infirmamus. Quae quidem *reprehensio non solum oratori, verum etiam cuilibet disputanti necessaria*¹⁷ est, propter quam etiam ars sophistica ab Aristotele tractata est, in qua quidem dialecticum docet reprehendere fallaces complexiones eorum quae pro argumentis inducuntur.

In the choice of issue or *constitutio*, Abelard suggests a rather pragmatic approach, since it is not so much a question whether rhetorical issues differ essentially, but whether they differ in the way we treat arguments (*modus tractandi*). If the orator proceeds by definition, the issue becomes definitive; if by conjectures, it

divides the trivial arts in a similar way: ‘Nec dubitandum quin *logice supponatur* cuius est ipsa grammatica tertia pars. Logicae alia pars est sermocinalis, alia disertiva. Disertiva partes habet inventionem et iudicium quae solis dialecticis et rethoricis conveniunt. Sermocinalis vero grammaticorum est’, from Margaret Gibson, ‘The Early Scholastic “Glosule” to Priscian “Institutiones grammaticae”: The Text and its Influence’, *Studi Medievali*, Ser. 3a, 20 (1979), 235–54 (pp. 249–50).

¹⁷ My italics.

becomes conjectural. Likewise, the definitive issue may intrude also in the general issue, just as the translative issue about external factors (as to the right courtroom, right time, etc.) may involve definition (below § 2.4–2.5). However, the question for judges, the *iudicatio*, is seen *on par* with the issues, but focused on a deeper analysis: the *vis quaerendi* in the general issue is about a *quale*, or ‘of what nature’ in this case, while the *iudicatio* seeks the underlying reason for an orator’s choosing a particular line of argument (below § 3.1–2).

Abelard also deviated from mainstream rhetoric in the twelfth century by holding that topics that Cicero calls the *adiuncta negotio* are not rhetorical, but dialectical topics (§1.4). Also, topics from authority, *consequentia negotium* (§1.6–1.6.1) are extrinsic to a rhetorical case, in much the same manner as the *status in scripto*, introducing written, legal authority, are not really special issues, but can be introduced from outside whenever legal material is cited (§3.3). Here again, Abelard refers to his *Rethorica* (§3.3) which might have been lectures he proposed to give or a treatise he would write.¹⁸

Edition

I have used the manuscript **P** = MS Paris, BnF lat. 7493 as my main manuscript, partly because it preserves the full text of the digression, and partly because **A** = MS Paris, Arsenal 910, is obviously abbreviating certain sections, particularly towards the end. **A**, however, occasionally supplies a better reading, as can be seen from the apparatus; all variants are indicated, except trivial details of word order and **A** often preferring ‘scilicet’ for **P**’s ‘videlicet’, ‘id est’ for ‘hoc est’. Dal Pra followed **P** with a few conjectures. Where Dal Pra’s readings of **P** differ from my own, this is also indicated in the apparatus except for trivial misprints and misreadings (‘vero’ for **P**’s ‘ut’ in §1.2). However, Dal Pra’s insistence on *lectio difficilior* in the technical terminology of ‘constitutio’ and ‘iudicatio’, preferring ‘constructio’ and ‘indicio’ I have not followed. The word order and orthography follows **P** with its occasional use of *c* for *t* and *e caudata* (=ae); **A** never makes use of *e caudata* and, very occasionally, has a different word order.

Abelard, *Super topica glossae* (Dal Pra, pp. 256. 34–268. 29, based on **P**)

A = MS Paris, Arsenal 910, fols 120^{vb}–121^{rb}

¹⁸ Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 109; see Mews, p. 38 above.

P = MS Paris, BnF lat. 7493, fols 174^b–176^{ra}

<De questione circumstantiis implicita et de locis>

1.1 Questionis autem (Boethius, *De differentiis topicis*, I, PL 64, 1177C) Aliam divisionem questionis supponit per thesim et ypothesim. Est autem thesis quæstio quæ circumstantias¹⁹ in se non continet, ypothesis vero quæ continet. Sunt autem circumstantiæ quidam²⁰ loci rethorici, unde ducuntur²¹ coniecturæ, hoc est²² extrahuntur²³ coniecturalia argumenta quæ videlicet²⁴ suspicionem generant. Heæ²⁵ vero circumstantiæ, sicut in *Quarto libro* Bo<etius> (1205D) dicet, septem sunt /P fol. 174^{va}/ quæ in illo continentur versiculo:

Quis, quid, ubi, qui | Dal Pra, p. 257 | *bus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando*

Quis vero undecim attributa personæ continet, nomen videlicet persone, naturam ipsius, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, studium, consilium, facta, casus, orationes. *Quid* vero et *cur* continent²⁶ de attributis negotio ea quæ vocantur *continentia cum ipso negotio*. Ceteræ vero quattuor circumstantiæ sunt ea attributa negotio quæ dicuntur *in gestione negotii*. Quæ omnia et Tullius in *Rethoricis* (*De inv.*, I. 24. 34–27. 41) et Bo<etius> in *Quarto libro* (1212A–1213D) diligenter posterius aperit,²⁷ quæ etiam hoc loco²⁸ prelibare nos convenit.

Certum est autem disputationem rethoricam circa personam vel negotium eius, id est factum ipsius personæ, versari. Persona est, testante Bo<etio> in *Quarto libro* (1212C) qui²⁹ in iudicium vocatur, cuius dictum aliquid factumve reprehenditur, negotium vero factum dictumque³⁰ persone propter quod in iudicium vocatur. In his itaque duobus, inquit (1212B–C), omnium³¹ iudiciorum ratio versatur, in persona scilicet et negotio. Persona igitur et negotium suggerere argumenta non possunt. De ipsis enim questio est. De quibus autem dubitatur, ea dubitationi fidem facere

¹⁹ circumstantias] circumstantiam A

²⁰ quidam] quidem A

²¹ ducuntur] dicuntur P

²² hoc est] id est A *et sic saepius*

²³ extrahuntur] argumenta *add* P

²⁴ videlicet] scilicet A *et sic saepius*

²⁵ heæ] hæc Dal Pra

²⁶ continent] continet A

²⁷ aperit] aperuit P

²⁸ hoc loco] in hoc loco A

²⁹ qui] quod A

³⁰ factum dictumque] est dictum factumve A

³¹ omnium] omnis A

nequeunt;³² faciunt autem fidem ea que sunt personis ac negotiis attributa.

Et quia modo precipue circa personam, modo circa negotium controversia consistit, sunt quedam circumstantiae ad convincendam personam vel in suspicionem ducendam, ut videlicet prompta concedatur³³ ad committendum peccatum vel non, quaedam ad comprobandum negotium. Quae vero personam probant, attributa personae dicuntur, id est pertinentia ad eius³⁴ probationem vel improbationem³⁵ quae sunt undecim³⁶ premissa:

1.2 *Nomen* scilicet eius 'Verres' quod³⁷ hoc modo probat: 'Credibile est quod verrat, id est destruat³⁸ omnia, quia³⁹ Verres nominatur'; locus a nomine.

Natura ut in sexu, quod vir est vel mulier,⁴⁰ vel in natione⁴¹ patriae quod Grecus est vel⁴² Atheniensis,⁴³ vel in cognatione⁴⁴ generis quod de Grac<ch>is est,⁴⁵ vel in aetate quod adolescens est.⁴⁶ Que scilicet natura probat sic: 'Non est mirabile si terreri vel superari potuit, cum sit mulier;' vel 'Credibile est sapientem esse quia Grecus est vel Atheniensis, vel seditiosum quia de genere Grac<ch>orum⁴⁷, vel levem quia est adolescens'; loci a natura.

Victus ut in conversatione eorum cum⁴⁸ quibus educatus est, comprobatur⁴⁹ hoc modo: 'Credibile est eum esse huiusmodi,⁵⁰ quia cum huiusmodi hominibus conversatus est'; locus a victu.⁵¹

³² in persona scilicet ... facere nequeunt] *om A*

³³ concedatur] credatur *A*

³⁴ eius] eiusdem *A*

³⁵ vel improbationem] *om P*

³⁶ undecim] decem *et lacuna unius litt P X<I> Dal Pra*

³⁷ scilicet eius Verres quod] *om A*

³⁸ verrat ... destruat] verret ... destruet *P ureret ... destrue<re>t Dal Pra*

³⁹ quia] quae *P qui Dal Pra*

⁴⁰ quod vir est vel mulier] *om A*

⁴¹ natione] nominatione *P*

⁴² vel] *om P*

⁴³ Atheniensis] Athesuensis *P*

⁴⁴ cognatione] cognitione *AP cognatione conj Dal Pra*

⁴⁵ quod de Gracchis est] *om A* quod de Grecis est *P*

⁴⁶ quod adolescens est] *om A*

⁴⁷ Gracchorum] Grecorum *AP Graecorum Dal Pra*

⁴⁸ cum] in *P*

⁴⁹ educatus ... comprobatur] est conversatus vel educatus, quod probat *A*

⁵⁰ huiusmodi] talem *A*

⁵¹ locus a victu] *om A*

Fortuna ut in eo quod dives est vel pauper, que sic [Dal Pra, p. 258] probat: ‘Credibile est eum non abhorruisse id⁵² facere, quia dives est vel pauper’; locus a fortuna.

Habitus ut⁵³ est qualitas per applicationem veniens, difficile mobilis, sicut scientie vel virtutes quas etiam ipse Aristoteles (*Categoriae* [Cat] 8b27–31, AL, pp. 23. 25–24. 3) in prima specie qualitatis habitus⁵⁴ appellat. Hic ita probat: ‘Artificiose loquitur, quia est orator’; locus ab habitu.

Affectio quam et ipse⁵⁵ (*Cat* 9a9, AL, p. 24. 9) dispositionem vocat, qualitas est non naturaliter sed quodammodo⁵⁶ veniens per applicationem et facile mobilis, ut laetitia, metus, molestia (*De inv.* I. 25. 36), quae sic probat: ‘Audivit quod nolebat, qui⁵⁷ sic molestus rediit’; locus ab affectione.⁵⁸

*Studium*⁵⁹ intenta et assidua applicatio animi ad rem aliquam⁶⁰ sicut ad perceptionem alicuius artis vel rei⁶¹; hoc ita probat: ‘Probabile est eum in hoc valere, quia in hoc studuit’; locus a studio.

Consilium in discretione⁶² est excogitandi⁶³ quid faciendum sit vel non sit, quod ita probat.⁶⁴ ‘Non est mirabile si tam callide fecerit,⁶⁵ quia magni consilii est’; locus a consilio.

*Factum*⁶⁶ dicimus omnia facta personae preter id ex quo⁶⁷ modo in causa est,⁶⁸

⁵² abhorruisse id] adhorruisse eum P abhorruisse id conj Dal Pra

⁵³ ut] non P [non] Dal Pra

⁵⁴ in prima specie qualitatis habitus] primam speciem qualitatis A

⁵⁵ et ipse] Aristoteles A

⁵⁶ quodammodo] (quodammodo Arist.) quoquomodo A

⁵⁷ qui] quia A

⁵⁸ affectione] effectione P; see William in Fredborg, ‘Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’, pp. 17–18: (*De inv.* I. 25. 36) ‘Habitus est qualitas superveniens per industriam subiecti diuturna et difficile permutabilis (*Cat* 8b29) [...] *Affectio est commutatio*, id est qualitas aliqua permutabilis [...] ista sic probant: vere affert bonum nuntium quia laetus est [...] vere non affert bonum nuntium quia tristis est’

⁵⁹ studium] est add A

⁶⁰ rem aliquam] aliquid A

⁶¹ vel rei] om A sequitur lacuna 8 fere litt P

⁶² in discretione] discretione P discretio[ne] Dal Pra

⁶³ excogitandi] cogitandi A

⁶⁴ probat] probantur P proba[n]tur Dal Pra

⁶⁵ fecerit] fecit Dal Pra

⁶⁶ factum] facta P

⁶⁷ preter id ex quo] per idem quod A, preter id quod equo P preter id ex quo conj Dal Pra

⁶⁸ in causa est] causa P

quod quia in questione est, adhuc ad probationem persone conferri⁶⁹ non potest, sicut illa⁷⁰ possunt quae constat antea eum fecisse, quibus ipse probatur vel improbat⁷¹ hoc modo: 'Vere⁷² impudens quia cotidie litigat cum meretricibus'; locus a factis.

*Orationes dicta*⁷³ sunt persone ex quibus conscientia eius manifestatur, ut 'Quoniam sic locutus est, coniurationis reus credebatur'.⁷⁴

Casus est eventus sicut et fortuna; sed in hoc differunt quod *casus* quasi transitorius est, fortuna vero⁷⁵ permanentior et maioris effectus⁷⁶ et diuturnioris memoriae, sicut est paupertas contingens alicui et permanens; *casus* vero qui levior est sic probat. 'Vinceris, quia malum augurium apparuit'⁷⁷ tibi'.

Hec sunt undecim *attributa personae* quae⁷⁸ eam idoneam ostendunt⁷⁹ vel promptam ad agendum⁸⁰ aliquid vel non, seu quocumque modo eam probant vel improbant aut in suspicionem trahunt, quae omnia continentur in prima circumstantia quae erat *quis*. Caeterae vero sex *circumstantiae* pars quaedam sunt *attributorum negotio*, unde etiam attributa negotio diligenter consideremus.⁸¹ Attributa vero negotio quattuor modis dividuntur: quaedam enim dicuntur *continentia cum ipso negotio*, quaedam *in gestione negotii*, quaedam *adiuncta negotio*, quaedam *gestionem negotii*

⁶⁹ adhuc ad ... conferri] adhuc ad probationem afferri A ad probationem persone conferri P

⁷⁰ illa] non add A

⁷¹ improbat] non probatur P

⁷² vere] est add A

⁷³ dicta] dicte AP dicta conj Dal Pra

⁷⁴ credebatur] accusetur credatur A

⁷⁵ vero] om P

⁷⁶ effectus] affectus P effectus A Dal Pra. See Matthieu de Vendôme, *Ars Versificatoria*, I. 90, in *Les arts poétiques du XIIIe et XIVe siècle: recherches et documents sur la technique littéraire du moyen âge*, ed. by Edmond Faral, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 238 (Paris: Champion, 1924), p. 142

⁷⁷ augurium apparuit] accidit A, see William in Fredborg, 'Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux', p. 18 (*De inv.*, I. 25. 36): 'Vere vinceris in bello quia malum augurium tibi apparet'

⁷⁸ que] qui P

⁷⁹ Compare William in Fredborg, 'Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux', p. 18: (*De inv.*, I. 25. 36) 'Haec sunt illa XI attributa quae induunt et informant personam ad hoc ut sit idonea ad negotium'; William in York, Minster Library XVI. M. 7, fol. 19^{ra}: 'Sed sciendum est quod non dicitur probari persona, nisi quando ostenditur esse idonea ad negotium. Aliter totum refertur ad negotium etiamsi locus sit persone comparabilis'

⁸⁰ que ... ostendunt vel promptam ad agendum] qui ... agendum P que ... constituunt pronuntiatam ad arguendum A

⁸¹ caeterae ... consideremus] om A

consequentia.⁸²

[Dal Pra, p. 259] *Continentia vero cum ipso*⁸³ *negotio* sub/P fol. 174^{vb}/dividuntur in *summam facti*, in *causam*,⁸⁴ in *ante rem*, *cum re*, *post rem*.

1.3.1 Quod autem⁸⁵ Bo<etius> (1213A) *summam facti* nominat, Tullius (*De inv*, I. 26. 37) *brevem complexionem* *tocius negotii* tamen⁸⁶ appellat. Hoc vero est nomen ipsius⁸⁷ facti, sicut ‘parricidium’, vel diffinitio eius⁸⁸ sicut⁸⁹ ‘parentis occisio’.⁹⁰ Ex hac, teste Bo<etio> (1213A) maxime locus amplificationis sumitur, cum videlicet ipsum factum exaggeramus, frequenter quidem eam proferentes in oratione nostra et exclamantes:⁹¹ ‘Parentis occisio, Patriae prodicio!’ ut animos audi/A fol. 121^{ra}/entium ex ipso terrore⁹² nominis accusator[um] ad indignationem commoveat,⁹³ vel defensor e contrario ad benivolentiam,⁹⁴ si quod ille⁹⁵ prodicionem, hic patrie dicat liberationem.

Sunt itaque rethorici loci quidam comprobandi,⁹⁶ quidam commovendi. Quippe rethorica maxime in persuasione constat.⁹⁷ Est autem persuadere commovere et trahere⁹⁸ affectus hominum ut idem nobiscum velint vel nolint; unde quosdam locos ad commovendum habere debet, qui precipue in exordio et conclusione consistunt.

⁸² attributa ... consequentia] om P (*homoioleuton*)

⁸³ ipso] om P

⁸⁴ summam facti in causam] versutiam facti A

⁸⁵ quod autem] quia versutiam facti A

⁸⁶ tocius ... tamen appellat] tocius negotii A tocius negotii tamen appellat P ipsius ... tantum appellat Dal Pra

⁸⁷ ipsius] totius A

⁸⁸ vel diffinitio eius] vel contrarium vel A

⁸⁹ sicut] ut Dal Pra

⁹⁰ occisio] vel sacrilegium add A

⁹¹ eam ... exclamantes] eam in oratione nostra multiplicamus ut A

⁹² terrore] horrore A; see William of Champeaux, MS York, Minster Library, XVI. M. 7, fol. 17^{rb}: ‘Exaggeracio vero est in solo horrore nominis. Cum enim dicatur “Occisio parentis” ex horrore vocabuli exaggeratur sceleris magnitudo (-dine a c) alienando per hoc animum auditoris ab adversarii causa ... fol. 17^{va}: defensor vero debet dicere e contrario “Salus patrie” illud quod accusator vocavit proditionem patrie’

⁹³ commoveat] promoveat A commovebat P commove[b]at Dal Pra

⁹⁴ ad benivolentiam] in violentiam A

⁹⁵ quod ille] quidem P

⁹⁶ comprobandi] approbandi A

⁹⁷ constat] consistit A

⁹⁸ persuadere commovere et trahere] persuasio commovere A

1.3.2 *Causa* vero modo impulsiva est, modo⁹⁹ ratiocinativa. Ratiocinativa est quando ex deliberatione aliquid facimus ut aliquid commodi prosequamur vel incommodi¹⁰⁰ vitemus, quae sic probat.¹⁰¹ ‘Verisimile est ab eo necatum esse,¹⁰² quia eius hereditatem expectabat’. Impulsiva vero¹⁰³ causa est quando ex subito motu animi impremeditate aliquid facere compellimur, ut ex amore vel ex iracunda vel violentia quae animos excecant, quae sic probant: ‘Non est mirabile si tale quid presumpserit, quia vehementer amavit eam, vel iratus fuit’.¹⁰⁴

Et notandum quod, ut ait Tullius (*De inv.* II. 5. 19) locus iste qui a causa ducitur¹⁰⁵ quasi fundamentum et subsidium est coniecturalis quaestionis, quae de facto est, pro eo scilicet quod nil factum esse potest ostendi si causa non possit demonstrari; et maxime ad confirmationem facti valet adiunctio, sic<ut> ad improbationem huius causae subtractio.¹⁰⁶

1.3.3 *Ante rem* vero, *cum re*, *post rem* facta sunt quae illud factum de quo causa agitur¹⁰⁷ probant, vel precedentia ipsum vel consequentia, ut, si factum ponamus homicidium de quo iudicium est, *ante* ipsum dicitur esse quod homicida gladium suum arripu[er]it¹⁰⁸, socios adduxit, domum occisi intravit. *Cum re*¹⁰⁹ vero sunt quae evenerunt¹¹⁰ dum fieret homicidium, sicut in [Dal Pra, p. 260] ipsa interfecione auditus est tumultus, vox percussu, puer aliquis prosiluit clamans de domo. *Post rem* sunt illa quae statim consequentia sunt post¹¹¹ negotium, ut quod¹¹² effugit de illa domo per diverticula, secutio canum latrantum,¹¹³ latibulum in domibus suis¹¹⁴ factum.¹¹⁵

⁹⁹ causa vero modo impulsiva est modo] causarum alia impulsiva est, alia A causa vero modo impu *et lacuna 5 fere litt* est modo P

¹⁰⁰ commodi prosequamur vel incommodi] commodius consequamur vel A

¹⁰¹ probat] *om* A

¹⁰² esse] *om* P

¹⁰³ vero] *om* A autem *Dal Pra*

¹⁰⁴ amavit eam vel iratus fuit] eum hec res iratum fecerat A amavit eam vel iratus P

¹⁰⁵ ducitur] dicitur P

¹⁰⁶ questionis ... subtractio] condicionalis A

¹⁰⁷ illud ... agitur] rem factam de qua causa agit P

¹⁰⁸ suum arripu[er]it] arripuerit A suum extraxerit P

¹⁰⁹ re] *lacuna 2 fere litt* P <re> *Dal Pra*

¹¹⁰ evenerunt] eveniunt A

¹¹¹ post] *om* A

¹¹² quod] quia A

¹¹³ latrantum] latrantium A

¹¹⁴ domibus suis] domo sua A

¹¹⁵ Compare William in Fredborg, ‘Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’,

1.3.4 Hec autem tria signa dici possunt, quae, dum sub aliquem sensum¹¹⁶ cadunt, id ex quo profecta¹¹⁷ sunt, designant (*De inv.* I. 30. 48). Signa autem non semper facta sunt, ut cruor, pallor, pulvis, et similia.¹¹⁸ Ab his ita ducitur argumentum:¹¹⁹ ‘Credibile quod eum interfecerit¹²⁰ quia fer<r>o ita se preparavit’; vel ‘Credibile¹²¹ quod vim virgini intulit,¹²² quia vehementer illa clamabat’; ‘Verisimile¹²³ quod eam oppresserit,¹²⁴ quia ita alacer et¹²⁵ ridens de domo prosiluit.’

1.3.5 Si quis autem requirat causam nominis, unde¹²⁶ scilicet *continentia cum negotio* dicantur, hanc Tullius (*De inv.* I. 16. 37, II. 12. 39) satis indicat dicens ea maxime¹²⁷ adiuncta esse ad negotium, quia nulli rethoricorum locorum ita sunt necessarii ipsi negotio probando vel improbando quia¹²⁸ maxime factum exaggerant. *Brevis complexio* ex proprietate significationis ac cetera quattuor ad probationem facti maxime valent. Ita *causa* quae quasi fundamentum et origo (*De inv.* II. 5. 19) totius causae dicitur. Caetera vero tria *ante rem*, *cum re*, *post rem* ita ipsi negotio coherent quasi de ipso sint quae continue cum eo peraguntur.¹²⁹ Hec vero¹³⁰ quinque

p. 18: (*De inv.* I. 26. 37) ‘*Ante rem* [...] ut potes videre in homicidio, prius homicida arripuit gladium, adduxit socios, intravit domum. *Cum re* sunt illa quae in ipso actu evenerunt sicut in ipsa interfectione auditus est tumultus, vox percussi, puer aliquis prosiluit clamans de domo. *Post rem* sunt illa quae statim secuta sunt post negotium ut effugium de domo illa per diverticula, secutio canum latrantium, latibulum in domibus suis (domo sua MS Vatican, Borgh. lat. 57, fol. 68^{rb}) factum’

¹¹⁶ aliquem sensum] aliquo sensu P (aliquem sensum *De inv.* I. 30. 48)

¹¹⁷ ex quo profecta] de quo profecta A ex quo perfecta P (profectum *De inv.* I. 30. 48)

¹¹⁸ signa ... similia] om A

¹¹⁹ ducitur argumentum] ducuntur argumenta A

¹²⁰ interfecerit] interfecit A

¹²¹ credibile ... credibile] credibile est ... credibile est A

¹²² intulit] inferebat A

¹²³ verisimile] est add A

¹²⁴ eam oppresserit] illam oppressit A

¹²⁵ et] om A

¹²⁶ unde] tantum P

¹²⁷ ea maxime adiuncta] maxime adiunctam P maxime adjuncta[m] Dal Pra

¹²⁸ improbando quia] improbando et A exaggerando quia P. See *De differentiis topicis* (1212C): ‘Circumstantiae sunt quae convenienter substantiam quaestionis efficiunt. Nisi enim sit qui fecerit, et quid fecerit, causaque cur fecerit, locus tempusque quo fecerit, modus etiam facultatesque si desunt, causa non stabit’; (1213A): ‘*Quid* vero secatur (viz Cicero) in quattuor partes: in summam facti, ut “parentis occisio” (*De inv.* I. 26. 37), ex hac maxime locus sumitur amplificationis’

¹²⁹ ac cetera ... peraguntur] om A

¹³⁰ hec vero] hec A haec vero P

continentia cum negotio¹³¹ duae circumstantiae testante Bo<etio>¹³² (1212D) comprehendunt, *quid* videlicet et¹³³ *cur*. *Cur enim causam* continet,¹³⁴ *quid* vero alia quattuor comprehendit, *brevem* scilicet *complexionem*, *ante rem*, *cum re*, *post rem*.

1.4 Caeterae vero circumstantiae que restant in *gestione negotii* continentur.¹³⁵ Nam *ubi locum* designat, *quando tempus* sive *occasionem*, *quomodo modum*, *quibus auxiliis facultatem* quae videlicet quinque¹³⁶ Tullius (*De inv*, I. 26. 38) in *gestione negotii* annumerat¹³⁷ quorum singula consideremus.¹³⁸

1.4.1 *Locus* vero¹³⁹ non aliter ut locus probat nisi ex oportunitate quam habet ad factum quod in eo dicitur commissum. Illa autem oportunitas modo secundum quantitatem loci, modo secundum qualitatem consideratur; ex quantitate sic probat: ‘Non fecerunt hoc ibi quos nec locus caperet.’ Ex qualitate sic probare potest secundum hoc quod proximus¹⁴⁰ ei erat vel solitarius, vel remotus vel celebris,¹⁴¹ vel montuosus vel siccus vel humidus vel planus, vel sacer vel profanus, vel notus ei qui fecit vel non,¹⁴² et similia secundum que locus idoneus esse vel [Dal Pra, p. 261] non idoneus¹⁴³ esse potest. Si enim idoneitas loci non attenditur non est a loco locus, /P fol. 175^{ra}/ veluti si dicatur. ‘Non fecit in civitate, quia erat extra’; locus ab oppositis potius vel a facultate remota¹⁴⁴ dici¹⁴⁵ poterit.

1.4.2 *Tempus* autem sive *occasio* temporum nomina sunt, sed tunc est locus a tempore quando sola temporis quantitas¹⁴⁶ attenditur, veluti si negetur dialecticam legisse qui non nisi per mensem fuit in scholis.¹⁴⁷ Nempe hic, ut ait Tullius (*De inv*, I.

¹³¹ negotio] negativo P negotio conj Dal Pra

¹³² testante Boetio] om A Tullii Bo.P Tullii <et> Boetii Dal Pra

¹³³ et] om A

¹³⁴ enim causam continet] causam optinet A

¹³⁵ continentur] versantur A

¹³⁶ quinque] quattuor conj Dal Pra

¹³⁷ annumerat] connumerat A annuerat P annumerat Dal Pra

¹³⁸ consideremus] consideramus A

¹³⁹ vero] om A

¹⁴⁰ quod proximus] quod diximus A proximus P

¹⁴¹ celebris] celebs P creber Dal Pra

¹⁴² vel notus ... non] om A

¹⁴³ idoneus] om A

¹⁴⁴ remota facultate] facultate A facilitate remota Dal Pra

¹⁴⁵ dici] non add P

¹⁴⁶ temporis quantitas] spatii oportunitas A

¹⁴⁷ Compare William in Fredborg, ‘Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’, p. 20: (*De inv*, I. 26. 39) ‘Tempus [...] Vere potuit legere Priscianum et rhetoricam Lauduni, quia fuit ibi per annum’

26.39) oportet commetiri actionem cum tempore et videre¹⁴⁸ an poterit actio transigi¹⁴⁹ in tanto spatio temporis. Tunc vero tempus sicut *occasio* probat quando ex opportunitate aliqua accidente idoneum videtur <ad> aliquid faciendum vel non, sicut ex qualitate aeris, ut cum dico quod¹⁵⁰ nox est, vel dies, vel ex actionibus hominum quando videlicet¹⁵¹ vel vindemiae intendunt, vel messi,¹⁵² vel alicui tam ludo quam serio,¹⁵³ vel si dormiant omnes vel vigilent, ut credibile sit¹⁵⁴ aliquid posse peragi vel non, tali tempore¹⁵⁵ incumbente.

1.4.3 *Modus* vero duobus modis consideratur, vel secundum eventum facti ut in eo quod clam vel palam factum est, vel secundum qualitatem animi eius qui fecit, quod videlicet pacato animo fecit, vel irato vel benivolo vel non. Hunc autem locum qui est a *modo*, sive illum qui primus inter continentia cum negotio¹⁵⁶ *summa facti* vel *brevis complexio* dicebatur,¹⁵⁷ in coniecturali constitutione¹⁵⁸ vim probationis habere non dicunt, sed exaggerationis.¹⁵⁹ Quippe, ubi factum non constat, nec modus facti, nec nomen eius recipitur ut possit ad¹⁶⁰ argumentum afferri. Sed exaggeratione facti¹⁶¹ possunt, ut postquam factum probaverit exaggeraret¹⁶² ipsum factum quasi admirando¹⁶³ quod tam impudenter, iudicantibus illis¹⁶⁴ omnibus, fecerit vel tam crudeliter. In generali autem¹⁶⁵ constitutione ubi iam factum¹⁶⁶ constat, sed de¹⁶⁷

¹⁴⁸ videre] videri A

¹⁴⁹ transigi] *om* P

¹⁵⁰ cum dico quod] *om* A

¹⁵¹ vel ex ...videlicet] *om* A. Compare William in Fredborg, 'Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux', p. 19 (*De inv.* I. 27. 40): 'Tempus vero superius acceptum solum spatium sine respectu opportunitatis. Opportunitas autem illa, alia ex qualitate aeris, ut est dies, nox, aestas, hiems, alia ex actione hominum ut messis, vindemia'

¹⁵² messi] *mensi a c* P

¹⁵³ intendunt ... serio] *om* A

¹⁵⁴ sit] *ei add* A

¹⁵⁵ tempore] *temperie* P

¹⁵⁶ cum negotio] *negotium A et negotium P cum negotio conj Dal Pra*

¹⁵⁷ dicebatur] *nominabatur* A

¹⁵⁸ constitutione] *constructione P et sic saepius — eodem modo abbreviantur hae dictiones grammaticae et rhetoricae*

¹⁵⁹ exaggerationis] *expugnationis* P

¹⁶⁰ ad] *om* P

¹⁶¹ exaggeratione facti] *exaggerare factum A aggeratione facti P aggravatione facti Dal Pra*

¹⁶² exaggeraret] *exaggeret* AP

¹⁶³ factum quasi admirando] *om* A

¹⁶⁴ iudicantibus illis] *iudicantibus A iubentibus illis P*

¹⁶⁵ autem] *vero* A

qualitate vel quantitate eius queritur, utrum videlicet iustum an¹⁶⁸ honestum vel utile vel tantum quantum dicitur, ad probationem quoque possunt afferri.¹⁶⁹ *Brevis complexio* sic probat.¹⁷⁰ ‘Vere iniustum est quia¹⁷¹ parricidium’. Unde bene fortassis Bo<etius> dicit (1213A) ex ea maxime amplificationem¹⁷² fieri, innuens per hoc quod ait ‘maxime’ probationem quandoque fieri, sed non tam frequenter vel fortasse tam [in]convenienter.¹⁷³ *Modus* etiam in hac quaestione sic probare videtur, quod eum dolose fecisse dicamus¹⁷⁴ quia clam fecit.

1.4.3.1 Sed hi quidem qui probationem *modi* a coniecturali constitutione separant, falluntur,¹⁷⁵ nescientes coniecturalem questionem quandoque fieri etiam [Dal Pra, p. 262] dum constat de facto, veluti si queratur <an> premeditate fecerit vel hac de causa fecerit. Unde Tullius in secundo *Inventionis* (*De inv.* II. 24. 73) tractans iu<ri>dicialem¹⁷⁶ assumptivam, eam quoque constitutionem quae est de intentione, id est de causa facti, coniecturalem nominat dicens: ‘Infirmatio est hec: “Non perissent milites” aut altera coniecturalis: “Non ideo fecistis”’.¹⁷⁷

Coniecturalis itaque constitutio est omnis illa que¹⁷⁸ per coniecturas tractatur, sive sit de facto simpliciter, ut illa: ‘Utrum ille eum percusserit’, sive de causa facti: ‘Utrum videlicet ideo percusserit,’ sive etiam de modo: ‘Utrum premeditate’, sive etiam de proprietate persone, veluti si queratur utrum inimicus sit illius. Et quaecumque¹⁷⁹ coniecturalibus argumentis tractantur coniecturales constitutiones dicuntur.¹⁸⁰ *Modus* autem etiam si¹⁸¹ in illa que de facto sit¹⁸² non videtur habere

¹⁶⁶ factum] esse add P

¹⁶⁷ de] om P <de> Dal Pra

¹⁶⁸ an] vel A

¹⁶⁹ ad probationem quoque possunt afferri] om A

¹⁷⁰ sic probat] fit P

¹⁷¹ quia] est add A

¹⁷² amplificationem] amplificatione P amplificatione<m> Dal Pra def A

¹⁷³ unde bene ... [in]convenienter] om A

¹⁷⁴ modus ... dicamus] modus sic probat. Dolose fecit A

¹⁷⁵ See *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres*, p. 248. 30–34: ‘Nota quod modus, una scilicet de circumstantiis, non connumeratur in constitutione coniecturali tractanda inter locos qui sunt in gestione negotii, sicut nec eventus inter adiuncta negotio; quod ideo factum est, quoniam argumenta quae a modo vel ab eventu sumuntur, non valent nisi de facto constat’, *Victorinus*, ed. by C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1863), pp. 207. 24–32, 266. 33

¹⁷⁶ iu<ri>dicialem] iudicialem P def A

¹⁷⁷ fecistis] fecisti Cic

¹⁷⁸ que] qua P que Dal Pra def A

¹⁷⁹ quaecumque] quidamque P def A quaecumque Dal Pra

¹⁸⁰ sed hi quidem ... dicuntur] om A sed hic ... Dal Pra

probationem, in caeteris coniecturalibus habere potest.¹⁸³

1.4.4 *Facultates* Tullius (*De inv.* I. 27. 41) esse dicit aut *quibus facilius* aliquid *fit*¹⁸⁴ aut *sine quibus fieri non potest*. Facilius autem homicidium gladio fit quam baculo. Navale vero bellum sine navibus omnino fieri non potest; sic autem ex utraque¹⁸⁵ facultate coniectura capitur, ut videlicet negemus eum aggredi hostem qui gladium non habet, vel navale bellum fieri cum non habeantur naves.¹⁸⁶

1.5 *In adiunctis vero negotio* Tullius¹⁸⁷ (*De inv.* I. 28. 41) locos dialecticos includit, quibus quandoque oratur utitur. Cum enim orator proprios locos suos—per suprapositas videlicet circumstantias ex quibus coniecture capiuntur—senserit ad probationem non sufficere, confugit ad dialecticos, ut rethorica quae est copia dicendi copiam argumentationum habeat.¹⁸⁸ Hos itaque ex dialecticis locis, quibus orator maxime utitur, Tullius adiuncta vocat,¹⁸⁹ quae sunt: *maius, minus, equale, simile, contrarium, disparatum, genus, species, eventus*. In contrario vero quaelibet opposita includit preter affirmationem et negationem, quas per disparatum accipit. Eventus vero est exitus, id est effectus, ipsius negotii qui accidit ex ipso facto ei qui facit, ut si¹⁹⁰ ex concubitu partus, vel ex superbia odium contingat.¹⁹¹ De his autem locis dialecticis plenius¹⁹² in sequentibus agemus.

¹⁸¹ autem etiam si] autem etsi A etiam si P

¹⁸² sit] fit A

¹⁸³ potest] poterit A

¹⁸⁴ fit] sit P

¹⁸⁵ utraque] cum add P [cum] *Dal Pra*

¹⁸⁶ vel ... naves] *om A*. For these illustrations, also in MS Hereford, Cathedral Library P. 1. iv, fol. 10^r, see Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 110, and William in Fredborg, 'Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux', p. 19: (*De inv.* I. 27. 41) 'Facultas alia sine qua non fit, ut navale bellum sine navibus, alia qua facilius fit ut interfectio facilius fit gladio quam baculo'

¹⁸⁷ negotio Tullius] Tullius negotio P

¹⁸⁸ Compare William in Fredborg, 'Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux', pp. 19–20: (*De inv.* II. 5. 18) 'Amplificat enim causam illam per definitionem et tunc erit locus dialecticus. Assumunt enim rhetorici dialecticos aliquando locos, vel per exemplum [...] et tunc est a simili', William in York, Minster Library, XVI. M. 7, fol. 18^{va}: 'quia in supradictis (supradictis a c) continen/fol. 18^{vb}/tur omnes circumstantie, sed tamen cum in nostro negotio ex omni circumstantia argumenta ceperimus, et adhuc fides in aliquo claudicarit, [v]ideo quedam extranea <sunt>, sine quibus negotium bene consideratur, que tamen per quandam collectionem bene possunt facere fidem, et ideo adducit illa et ostendit inde possunt trahi argumenta, ut que est copia dicendi sic copiam argumentorum habeat'

¹⁸⁹ cum enim ... vocat] *om A*

¹⁹⁰ si] *om A*

¹⁹¹ contingat] contingit A

¹⁹² plenius] penitus P

1.6 Nunc ad quartam partem attributorum negotio transeamus quae dicuntur *consequentia*, quando¹⁹³ scilicet consideramus qui primum fecerunt¹⁹⁴ huiusmodi factum, qui postea¹⁹⁵ sint imitati, vel qui ipsum laudaverunt, vel in¹⁹⁶ ipso ostensi sunt /P fol. 175^{rb}/ vel quo nomine ipsum appellaverunt, sive scilicet [Dal Pra, p. 263] dixerunt¹⁹⁷ sacrilegium esse sive¹⁹⁸ furtum, vel quam sententiam dederunt inde, vel quam legem statuerunt, et cetera huiusmodi, quae circa auctoritatem consistunt. Hec autem ita probant¹⁹⁹ ut dicamus bonum esse huiusmodi factum quia a tam religiosis et²⁰⁰ discretis personis primum²⁰¹ factum sit vel approbatum etc.;²⁰² locus ubique a²⁰³ consequentibus.

1.6.1 Hec autem ideo *consequentia*²⁰⁴ sunt appellata quod quasi a longe sequuntur²⁰⁵ negotium maxime ab eo remota, cui neque ita vicini²⁰⁶ herent sicut continentia, vel quae sunt in gestione neque per aptionem relationis cognata sicut sunt adiuncta, sed omnino remota sunt,²⁰⁷ atque ideo hec quoque ultime²⁰⁸ sunt collocata, quae precipue in auctoritate atque opinione hominum consistunt. Locus vero hic ab auctoritate, scilicet omnino remotus²⁰⁹ ab omnibus, extrinsecus²¹⁰ est

¹⁹³ quando] quoniam P

¹⁹⁴ consideramus qui primum fecerunt] consideramus A qui primum fecerunt P

¹⁹⁵ postea] om A

¹⁹⁶ in] om A

¹⁹⁷ scilicet dixerunt] om A

¹⁹⁸ esse sive] seu A

¹⁹⁹ hec ... probant] hoc probat A

²⁰⁰ quia a tam religiosis quam] quod a tam religiosis et A quia tam a religiosis quam P

²⁰¹ primum] primis P

²⁰² etc] om A

²⁰³ a] om P

²⁰⁴ consequentia] consequentibus P

²⁰⁵ sequuntur] sequantur P

²⁰⁶ See William in Fredborg, 'Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux', pp. 19–20: '(De inv, I. 28. 43) Hi loci, de quibus acturus est, valde remoti sunt a negotio. Quia neque de ipso neque vicina ipsi nec sibi per aliquam comparisonem adiuncta, sed a longo sequuntur et ideo vocantur consequentia negotium id est a longe sequentia et ideo ultimo loco ponuntur'

²⁰⁷ maxime ... remota sunt] om A

²⁰⁸ quoque ultime] ultime A quoque ultima P

²⁰⁹ scilicet omnino remotus] om A

²¹⁰ locus ab auctoritate remotus ... extrinsecus: see William of Champeaux (= *In Primis*) in Mary Dickey, 'Some Commentaries on the *De inventione* and *Ad Herennium* of the Eleventh and Early Twelfth Centuries, *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, 6 (1968), 1–41 (p. 39):

constitutus unde consecutio recte nominatur. *Adiuncta* vero ex comparatione relationis²¹¹ sic sunt nominata. *In gestione* vero *negotii* post continentia negotium²¹² suum²¹³ naturaliter /A fol. 121^{rb}/ locum obtinent quia²¹⁴ *continentia* dicuntur quod²¹⁵ maxime negotio cohereant et precipue in probatione eius valeant. *In gestione* vero *negotii* dicuntur que post continentia²¹⁶ secundo loco ipsi negotio coniuncta sunt. Quae licet sine negotio possint esse, negotium tamen absque his peragi nullatenus valet,²¹⁷ quia quod fit, aliquo loco, aliquo tempore, aliquo modo, aliqua facultate fieri necesse est.²¹⁸

<De constitutionibus et iudicatione>

2 At de locis quidem rethoricis gratia circumstantiarum satis egimus. Si qua vero desunt ad perfectionem doctrine, in *Rethorica nostra* plenius exequamur. Hec autem dixisse sufficiat ad discretionem septem circumstantiarum quae in hypothesi questione consistunt. Sed quemadmodum gratia circumstantiarum communiter egimus de locis omnibus quibus orator utitur, ita gratia hypothesis de caeteris quoque questionibus que proprie sunt oratoris disseramus. Heae²¹⁹ vero questiones sunt quinque, quarum quattuor Tullius (*De inv.* I. 8.10–I. 14. 19) constitutiones appellat, quintam vero iudicationem²²⁰ vocat.

2.1 Constitutionum vero alia *coniecturalis* dicitur, alia *diffinitiva*, alia *generalis*, alia *translativa*. *Coniecturalis* vero et *diffinitiva* ex modo tractandi sic sunt nominatae, pro eo videlicet quod illa per coniecturas probatur vel improbatur, hec per diffinitionem. *Generalis* vero ex proprietate facti de qua queritur accepit nomen,

‘Artificiosa cum lite ut oratorum qui utuntur argumentis in disputacionibus suis. Inartificiosa cum lite ut iuris peritis, id est in iudiciis, quae inartificiosa vocatur quia cum inter se de sententia litigant non utuntur argumentis ut oratores, sed solis auctoritatibus legum quae probatio est inartificiosa, unde locus ab auctoritate *expers artis* vocatur et *inartificialis* in *Topicis* (1199D)’

²¹¹ relationis] *om* A

²¹² post continentia negotium] *om* A

²¹³ suum] secundum A

²¹⁴ quia] et A

²¹⁵ quod] quae *Dal Pra*

²¹⁶ continentia] continentiam P

²¹⁷ valet] potest A

²¹⁸ *hinc solummodo* P

²¹⁹ heae] haec *Dal Pra def* A

²²⁰ constitutiones ... iudicationem] constructiones ... indicionem P *et sic saepius*. Compare *De inv.* I. 14. 19: ‘Quare necesse est eandem esse quaestionem et iudicationem: factum est, non est factum, factumne sit? Quot autem in causa constitutiones aut earum partes erunt, totidem necesse erit quaestiones, rationes, iudicationes, firmamenta reperiri’

translativa <ita dicitur> ex eo quod²²¹ translatione facta, id est remotione accionis, causa²²² de ipsa translatione fit²²³ [Dal Pra, p. 264] utrum iusta sit vel non. Sed de singulis agentes a coniecturali incipiamus.

2.2 Est autem *coniecturalis* <constitutio modo de>²²⁴ *persona*, sicut ista: ‘Utrum sit inimicus illius’; modo de *facto simpliciter* velut hoc: ‘Utrum ceperit equum’; modo de *causa* facti sic: ‘Utrum hac de causa fecerit’; aliquando de *tempore*: ‘Utrum fecerit ante vel post vel simul’; aliquando de *loco*: ‘Utrum in cubiculo fecerit’; aliquando de *modo*: ‘Utrum premeditate fecerit vel imprudenter’; quandoque etiam de *facultate* ita: ‘Utrum facile iste perficeret’.

Eam vero coniecturalem constitutionem que de facto est Tullius (*De inv.* I. 25. 36) in tria tempora constituit, in preteritum videlicet et presens et futurum, ut si quaeratur utrum fecerit iam vel faciat modo vel faciet. Omnes autem questiones huiusmodi ideo, teste Tullio (*De inv.* II. 14. 47) coniecturales dicuntur, quoniam causa earum per coniecturas agitur.

2.3 Cum autem de facto constat, sed de certo²²⁵ vocabulo criminis controversia incurrit, *diffinitiva* questio dicitur, quoniam ea per diffinitionem tractatur, veluti si quis, cum de furto equi arguitur, contendat se quidem equum cepisse, sed furta vocari neget, diffiniendum quid sit furtum et secundum diffinitionem furti illud ostendendum furtum esse vel non. Unde huiusmodi questio de nomine *diffinitiva* est appellanda, quia per diffinitionem tractatur, quae tamen fortasse aliquando sine diffinitione agi poterit, si quis probet esse furtum, quia est [s]peculatum (*Ad Her.* I. 12. 22),²²⁶ vel ita iudicatum est. Nec solum de facto, verum etiam de persona *diffinitiva*²²⁷ constitutio fieri potest, veluti illae quas Tullius (*De inv.* II. 18. 55) ponit dicens: ‘Ut si quis sacra ex privato subriperit, utrum fur aut sacrilegus sit iudicandus’. ‘Furtum’ quippe nomen est furti, ‘fur’ autem persone, et diversis diffinitionibus <de>terminatur.

2.3.1 Et fortasse eadem constitutio modo coniecturis, modo diffinitione tractabitur, ut si quaeratur utrum hic sit inimicus, tunc per coniecturas in suspicionem trahi poterit, tum²²⁸ per diffinitionem inimici comprobari. /P fol. 175^{va}/ Ille etiam, quas in diffinitivo statu Tullius (*De inv.* II. 51. 154) ponit: ‘Utrum videlicet ille reliquerit navim, vel iste remansit in navi’, coniecturis etiam tractari possunt, sic et diffinitionibus, quando, ut ait (*De inv.* ibid.) diffinitionibus queritur quid sit

²²¹ ex eo quod] quod ex eo P def A

²²² causa] cause P def A

²²³ translatione fit] fit translatione P def A

²²⁴ constitutio modo de] lacuna 6 fere litt P def A

²²⁵ certo] cetero P def A certo conj Dal Pra

²²⁶ [s]peculatum] speculatum P

²²⁷ diffinitiva] constitutiva P def A diffinitiva conj Dal Pra

²²⁸ tum] tamen Dal Pra def A

relinquere na|Dal Pra, p. 265|vim vel remanere in navi, denique quid sit navis ipsa. Ubicumque vero diffinitio, ibi *brevis complexio* necessaria est et in hac precipue constitutione.

2.4 *Generalis* vero constitutio tunc incidit, cum et factum conceditur et de nomine etiam quo impetitur constat, sed ex proprietate facti defensio paratur, ut si quis et se cepisse vasa concedat et etiam furtum vocet, poterit se defendere si iustum esse monstraverit. Hec itaque constitutio, quae est de proprietate facti, ut si queratur utrum sit iustum vel utile vel honestum vel tantum quantum dicitur, *generalis*.²²⁹ nominatur. In qua²³⁰ fortasse de nomine quoque quaeri videtur, cum ipsum factum iustum vel utile nominatur, quod etiam per diffinitiones horum nominum tractari poterit, ut si<t> hec quoque diffinitiva constitutio. Sed profecto supra nomen accepimus quod certum beneficium vel maleficium continet, de quo quis impetit alium, sicut ‘homicidium’, ‘parricidium’, ‘victoria’ pro qua triumphus exigitur. Nemo vero impetens alium de aliquo facto simpliciter affert quod iustum fecerit, <s>et certo et speciali nomine facti id quod impetit appellat. Ac si de furto vel homicidio appellet, de ipsa videtur substantia facti magis quam de qualitate, id est proprietate eius, obiurgans.

2.4.1 Quod autem dicitur in probatione *generalis* constitutionis diffinitio induci non potest, est absonum, quia et in coniecturali induci poterit, ut²³¹ supra meminimus. Nam si quis vulneravit aliquem qui post diuturnos lang<u>ores mortuus sit, cum de homicidio²³² accusetur, recognoscat se eum vulnerasse sed non occidis, poterit diffinitio occidentis induci, per quam agitur causa, vel coniecture. Nec fortasse impedit si eadem constitutio dum per coniecturas tractatur coniecturalis sit, et diffinitiva dum per diffinitionem. Quia quandoque diversitas constitutionum magis attenditur secundum differentiam modorum tractandi quam²³³ secundum diversitatem essentie constitutionum, maxime in his constitutionibus que ex modo tractandi considerantur, sicut coniecturalis et diffinitiva, ut supra (§ 2.3.1) meminimus.²³⁴ *Generalis* autem, licet quandoque per diffinitionem tractetur, numquam tamen ideo in diffinitivam constitutionem²³⁵ incidere videtur, quia licet diffinitiva ex eo quod diffinitione tractetur sola inde ea a Tullio (*De inv.* I. 8. 11) diffinitiva dicitur quae est nominis supra determinati²³⁶ substantialis non accidentalis.²³⁷ Nam ‘furtum’ vel

²²⁹ *generalis*] generale P *def* A

²³⁰ *qua*] quo P *def* A

²³¹ *ut*] in P *def* A ut *Dal Pra*

²³² *homicidio*] homicidia a c P *def* A

²³³ *quam*] quando P *def* A

²³⁴ *meminimus*] meminimus P *def* A

²³⁵ *diffinitivam constitutionem*] diffinitiva constitutione P *def* A

²³⁶ *determinati*] determinata P *def* A

²³⁷ *non accidentalis*] vel accentualis P (vel) accidentalis *conj* *Dal Pra def* A

'homicidium' quasi specialia et substantialia nomina sunt factorum et eorum causae circa iudicia, et distinctas distribuciones habent, [Dal Pra, p. 266] quod non habent 'iustum' vel 'iniustum' vel similia quae sunt accidentalia.²³⁸

2.5 *Translativa* vero constitutio, cuius inventor Hermagoras²³⁹ esse, teste Tullio (*De inv.*, I. 11. 16) existimatur, sub generali comprehendi videtur. Cum enim aliquis diffiniens actionem causae dicit eam non debere agi a tali persona, vel apud tales, vel tali tempore, vel tali loco, de qualitate facti quaestio nascitur, utrum videlicet sit iustum causam agi sic vel non. Nam quoniam actio quoque causae facta est, patet etiam questio facti de ipsa. Quam Tullius (*De inv.*, I. 8. 10) *coniecturalem* appellat, veluti si quaeratur utrum hec causa agatur ibi; et de qualitate ipsius actionis potest fieri generalis, utrum ab illis²⁴⁰ iuste agatur ibi, vel utiliter, vel honeste. Sicut si diceretur: 'Utrum fur debet ab eis suspendi, vel in tali tempore, vel in tali loco'. Unde fortasse illi per quos inventionem eius²⁴¹ in argumentatione Tullius reprehendi dicit, non omnino rationis expertes exstiterunt, licet eos Tullius (*De inv.*, I. 11. 16) invidia²⁴² increpet, cuius gravissima est auctoritas. Ut igitur, Tullium sequentes, translativam constitutionem dividamus a generali facto, de cu<iu>s qualitate *generali*²⁴³ quaerit, illud intelligendum quod extra <a>ctionem causae consistit, id est quodcumque non est actio causae. Nam et quando constitutionem de facto Tullius coniecturalem nominat, non omnis quae de facto quaerit coniecturalis dicitur, nec²⁴⁴ etiam sola, sed quaeque per coniecturas tractatur. Si quis etiam quaerit de quadriga quam aliquem²⁴⁵ agitare viderit, utrum ambulet, non est coniecturis²⁴⁶ tractanda, sed

²³⁸ accidentalialia] accentualia P accidentalialia conj Dal Pra def A. For *nomen substantiale, accidentale*, compare Priscian, *Inst. Gram.*, II. 25: 'Nomen est pars orationis quae unicuique subiectorum corporum seu rerum communem vel propriam qualitatem distribuit'. Adjectives may signify accidents in *adiacentia*, nouns may signify substance; compare Abelard, *Super topica*, p. 278. 11: 'ut *album* [...] scilicet est accidens huic nomini *homo* id est accidentale vocabulum secundum significationem. Et nota quod *album* maius vocat *homine*, sicut *iustum* superius' (*here*). Therefore adjectives can be put in positive, comparative, superlative forms: *Super topica*, p. 285. 27 'Solum accidentale vocabulum recipit in constructione maius et minus'

²³⁹ inventor Hermagoras] invector maior P inventor Hermagoras conj Dal Pra def A

²⁴⁰ illis Dal Pra] Tullius P illis conj Dal Pra def A

²⁴¹ inventionem eius] invectionem ei P def A

²⁴² invidia] a circumstantiis P def A. Compare *De inv.*, I. 11. 16: 'Post autem ab hoc inventam multi reprehenderunt, quos non tam imprudentia falli putamus (res enim perspicua est) quam invidia atque obtreptione impedi'

²⁴³ generali] generali<s> Dal Pra def A

²⁴⁴ nec] nunc a c P def A

²⁴⁵ quam aliquem] quem P def A

²⁴⁶ coniecturis] coniecturalis P def A

potius diffinitione /P fol. 175^{vb}/ vel per remocionem partium scilicet²⁴⁷ ambulationis. Si quis etiam quaerat utrum Ajax sit occisus ab Ulixē, de passione magis quam de actione coniecturalis est constitutio, ut²⁴⁸ si quis querat utrum filius sit illius, quod per coniecturas firmabitur, coniecturalis erit constitutio, nec tamen de facto, nisi forte quis per quaestionem de facto idem penitus accipere velit quod per coniecturalem. Hec ad descriptionem quattuor constitutionum dicta sufficiant.²⁴⁹

3.1 Nunc de quinta quaestione rethorica, quam *iudicationem*²⁵⁰ nominavimus, disseramus. Hec autem nascitur ex ratione subposita et infirmatione²⁵¹ rationis hoc modo: Dicit Horestes se iuste interfecisse matrem, et statim rationem supponit dicens: 'Illa enim patrem occiderat', quam ratione<m> adversarius infirmat dicens: 'At non [Dal Pra, p. 267] ideo a te filio matrem necari oportuit, quia potuit sine tanto scelere ipsius factum puniri'. Ex ratione itaque praemissa et ex infirmatione subposita nascitur quaestio quae iudic<at>io vocatur, hoc modo: 'Utrum Horestes iuste occiderit matrem, quia illa patrem occiderat, vel ideo iniuste quia potuit occidi per alium' (*De inv.* I. 13. 18). Huiusmodi videtur esse quaestio illa hypothesis de qua Bo<etius> (1177D) exemplificat dicens: 'Iurene Cicero²⁵² in exilium etc.'.

3.2 Poterit forsitan hec quaestio ad constitutiones suprapositas retorqueri, veluti ad generalem, cum sit de qualitate facti; sed eam profecto Tullius (*De inv.* I. 9. 12) generalem accipit quae vim quaerendi circa qualitatem habet, hec vero magis circa rationem suppositam²⁵³ quam circa qualitatem consistit.

3.3 Hec de questionibus quae proprie sunt oratoris dicta sufficiant. Nam ille quinque quae de scripto veniunt, quas Tullius (*Topica* 25. 95–96) appellat status,²⁵⁴ communiter ad omnes pertinent quicumque auctoritatem scripturae inducunt, de quibus una cum scripturis in *Rethorica* plenius disputandum est.

4.1 Nunc autem tam circumstantiis quam rethoricis quaestionibus breviter assignatis propter doctrinam scilicet hypothesis, quam appellat (1177C) quaestionem implicitam circumstantiis, propositum consummemus in descriptione thesis et hypothesis, distinguendo scilicet quomodo hypothesis et non thesis circumstantias habeat, sive scilicet in sui constitutione, sive in sui probatione. Et fortasse utroque modo differentia poterit assignari, quia fortasse hypothesis aliter non erit nisi in se

²⁴⁷ scilicet] *om P def A*

²⁴⁸ ut] *aut P def A*

²⁴⁹ sufficiant] *sufficiunt Dal Pra def A*

²⁵⁰ iudicationem] *indic[at]ionem Dal Pra def A*

²⁵¹ infirmatione] *in confirmatione P def A*

²⁵² Cicero] *Cisero P def A*

²⁵³ suppositam] *supra positam P def A*

²⁵⁴ Compare *Cornifici Rhetorica ad C. Herennium*, ed. by G. Calboli, 2nd edn (Bologna: Patron, 1993), pp. 218–21

ipsa aliquam²⁵⁵ septem circumstantiarum, quandoque autem quam plures ut circumstantias²⁵⁶ obtineat, ut videlicet inde argumenta postea coniecturalia²⁵⁷ ducantur, suspicionem scilicet de aliqua persona²⁵⁸ generantia.

4.2 Prima vero circumstantia, <quis>, quae undecim *attributa persone* continet, vel per nomen vel per vi[n]ctum vel per aliquod aliorum poterit poni sic: ‘Utrum is qui Verres dictus est male agat in illa provincia, quod verisimile est quia non sine causa Verres appellatus est.’ Vel: ‘Utrum is qui cum illis educatus est id facere scierit, quod verisimile est, quia illi cum quibus vixit facere consueverant,’ et similiter cetera attributa persone, quae etiam <in> questione tamquam circumstantiae includuntur.

4.3 Nec minus illae quae sunt *attributa negotio*: *Quid*²⁵⁹ hoc modo: ‘Utrum ille qui patriam prodidit, furtum non abhorruerit, quod verisimile est quia quid horribilius quam prodicio patriae?’ Vel: ‘Utrum is qui se ita preparavit ferro fecerit homicidium, quod verisimile est; nam ad quid aliud ita se pre|Dal Pra, p. 268|pararet?’ *Cur*²⁶⁰ vero sic exponitur: ‘Utrum is interfecerit eum qui tot opprobriis²⁶¹ provocaverat, quod verisimile est quia nil presumptuosius est ira.’²⁶² *Ubi* vero et *quando*, quod etiam occasionem continet²⁶³, ita pro circumstantiis ponuntur: ‘Utrum is in eo loco vel in eo tempore hoc fecerit, quod verisimilius est quia ita erat locus vel tempus opportunus’. *Modus* vero sic: ‘Utrum ille qui clam fecit, premeditate fecerit, quod verisimile est.’²⁶⁴ Alioquin non occultaretur’. *Facultas* ita: ‘Utrum is, qui gladium tenebat, illum quem vehementer odio habebat interfecerit, quod verisimile est cum hic armatus <in> inermem praeveniret et solus in solitario loco’.

4.4 Possunt itaque ypotheses in eo circumstantiis implicite dici, quod in se eas habeant in *vi circumstantiarum*, ut videlicet inde postea coniecturalia ducantur argumenta. At vero thesis, si quandoque [cum] id quod circumstantia est continet, non in *vi circumstantiae*, ut videlicet inde eliciat²⁶⁵ argumentum suspicionis; veluti si dicamus: /P fol. 176^{ra}/ ‘Utrum Verres sit homo, quia est animal’,²⁶⁶ ‘Verres’ hoc

²⁵⁵ aliquam] aliqua P def A

²⁵⁶ circumstantias] circumstantie P def A

²⁵⁷ coniecturalia] coniecturaliam P coniecturalia conj Dal Pra def A

²⁵⁸ persona] om P def A

²⁵⁹ quid] quod conj def A

²⁶⁰ cur] cum P def A

²⁶¹ opprobriis] a propriis P def A

²⁶² ira] ita Dal Pra def A

²⁶³ continet] contine<n>t Dal Pra def A

²⁶⁴ est] quia add Dal Pra def A

²⁶⁵ eliciat] eliceat P def A

²⁶⁶ vi circumstantiae ... Verres sit homo: compare William’s Epilogue in Fredborg, ‘Commentaries on Cicero by William of Champeaux’, p. 37. 19–25: ‘Sed ad hoc dicimus quia

nomen quod alibi circumstantia est dum ad designandum vicium proponitur, hic tantum ad significationem persone²⁶⁷ proferatur. Similiter causa illa quae subiungitur; ‘quia est animal’ quod argumentum in sequentibus non probet, non est circumstantia. Similiter circumstantiae in thesi<m> incidere possunt, sed <non> in vi circumstantiarum. Quippe dialecticus coniecturas quae ex circumstantiis veniunt ad suspicionem non affert, nec coniecturas temptat, sed ex concessis arguit, cogit et comprobatur. Si quis autem ypotheses in circumstantiis²⁶⁸ implicitas dicat non quod in se eas contineant, sed quod per eas probant[ur]²⁶⁹ licebit fortassis. Nunc ad litteram redeamus (Dal Pra, p. 268. 29).

in hypothesis aut materialiter apponuntur circumstantiae aut subintelliguntur. Qui enim dicit ‘utrum Verres fecerit furtum necne’ ut hypothesis faciat, necesse est vim attendat ex nomine, quia scilicet taliter vocetur, locum etiam per quem id putet probare quia huiusmodi est etc. Qui vero dicit ‘utrum Socrates sit albus’ nullam vim facit in eo quod tali nomine appelletur vel quod tali loco usus fuerit putat aliquid prodesse’

²⁶⁷ persone] proprie P *def* A

²⁶⁸ circumstantiis] circumstantias P *def* A.

²⁶⁹ probant[ur]] probantur P *def* A

Literary Aesthetics in the Latin Middle Ages: The Rhetorical Theology of Peter Abelard

PETER VON MOOS

In those writings which might seem to provide insight into a medieval literary aesthetic—prologues and epilogues, introductions to the authors, commentaries, practical manuals for the *artes* and so forth—little can be found in the way of theoretical substance other than variations on the Horatian theme of being useful (*prodesse*) and giving pleasure (*delectare*).¹ They emphasize that texts should be of ‘use’ for moral or cognitive or pastoral purposes or for their psychic and physical effect. Even enjoyment (*delectatio*), a form of *recreatio*, is understood as a sub-species of *utilitas* without which no interest in literature can be justified.² This is the essential distinction between the medieval conception of literature and the modern one which emphasizes ‘disinterested pleasure’ in the Beautiful. The medieval conception takes the form of a denial of the autonomy of art, as an exclusion of its powers to seduce into a purely aesthetic hedonism. From it we learn how literature can be misused. We do not learn from it what literature is.

Serendipidity, as in the experience of involuntarily discovering America while sailing to India, played a crucial role in the development of the medieval concept of literature. In this case, discovery came about through reflection in the twelfth century on the logic of language—above all in the area of theology—and its capacity to

¹ Originally published as ‘Was galt im lateinischen Mittelalter als das Literarische an der Literatur? Eine theologisch-rhetorische Antwort des 12. Jahrhunderts’, in *Literarische Interessenbildung im Mittelalter. DFG-Symposion 1991*, ed. by Joachim Heinzle, Germanistische Symposien Berichtsbände, 14 (Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, 1993), pp. 431–51. This English version, originally translated by Peter Godman, has been edited by Ralf Stammberger and Constant J. Mews.

² Joachim Suchomski, *Delectatio und utilitas. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis mittelalterlicher komischer Literatur* (Berne: Francke, 1975); Glending Olson, *Literature as Recreation in the Later Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).

explain the relationship between rhetorical and dialectical structures of argumentation. Unexpectedly, this reflection shed light on the crucial criterion for distinguishing between literature and non-literature, namely linguistic *transsumptio* or transference.

Theologia, understood as the language appropriate to the highest subject and as the linguistic theory concerned with the most elevated form of all linguistic study, was the place in which poetics could be conceived not simply as a trivial didactic instrument, but as possessing its own intrinsic value. The justification and legitimization of a conscious literary *imitatio* of the prophetic word and later of a philosophical liberation of secular fictionality was based on theology. Here the forerunners of the modern autonomy of aesthetics are to be sought. That was what Ernst R. Curtius was pointing to when he outlined in broad brushstrokes (without, however, considering the aspect of linguistic theory), the development of the *theologus poeta* into the *poeta theologus*.³

One could adduce many thinkers who have contrasted proper and improper speech in discussion of divinity: John Scotus Eriugena, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Gilbert of Poitiers, Alan of Lille, and Nicholas of Cusa, to mention the most celebrated.⁴ I should like to concentrate in detail, however, on one especially innovative author. Peter Abelard deserves a place of honour, chiefly because the literary-critical implications of his linguistic theory are too little known. The history of philosophy has been chiefly interested in his propaedeutic writings on dialectic. They provide the grounds for the widely diffused image of Abelard the hyper-rationalistic logician and father of scholasticism which is often contrasted with the humanistic-philological learning of the so-called 'school of Chartres'. Yet in his major theological works, on which Abelard himself based his claim to fame, he developed, with unique power and independence, a cultural programme, centred on aesthetics and metaphysics and nurtured by the *libri platonici*, all too often one-sidedly ascribed to the school of Chartres. The context and centre of Abelard's programme was scriptural exegesis. Beyond the realm of theory, but not I think independently of it, Abelard was also one of the most significant medieval Latin poets. This opens up for us a path from hermeneutics to literary aesthetics.

The first work of theology which I shall deal with is Abelard's *Sic et Non*, written

³ Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, Bollingen series, 36, trans. by Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Chapters 11–12, pp. 203–27.

⁴ See the thematically related work of Kurt Flasch on these neo-Platonic authors: 'Ars imitatur naturam. Platonischer Naturbegriff und mittelalterliche Philosophie der Kunst', in *Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger*, ed. by Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965), pp. 265–306; see also Werner Beierwaltes, 'Sprache und Sache. Reflexionen zu Eriugenas Einschätzung von Leistung und Funktion der Sprache', *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschungen*, 38 (1984), 523–43, as also works cited in notes 28 and 44 below.

ca 1121–26. As is well known, it consists of an important prologue and a catena of contradictory *auctoritates* from scriptural and patristic literature.⁵ The second, the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (after 1133), explains a single book of the Bible: yet both works go beyond exegetical problems to reflect on the genesis and character of the writing process.⁶ Abelard had before him not so much texts and passages as authorial personalities, such as Augustine, Jerome and Paul, all ‘saints’ over whom the reader is not to sit in judgement but before whom he must answer for himself.⁷ These ‘saints’ deserve respect not only as doctrinal authorities but also as writers with their own rhetorical purposes and methods of work. So it is that they shed light on the foundations of literary production. The third work I shall deal with, or rather ‘a work in process’ surviving in several versions written over two decades, is a series of treatises entitled *Theologia* (1120–40), tackling systematically the literary and poetic character of the Bible.⁸ All these writings are distinguished by the same highly refined art of presenting one’s own thoughts as far as possible not in one’s own words but through a carefully chosen and assembled mosaic of quotations of the same and divergent opinions. It serves to build an intertextual bridge between the reader and the relevant tradition, facilitating participation in a ‘conversation of higher minds’ through the last participant in it—Abelard himself.

Three literary-critical theses can be inferred from these works. Firstly, that the language of the Bible and the Church Fathers obeys the rhetorical principle of the *aptum*: it adapts itself to the concrete situation and receptivity of the addressee with pedagogical intent and thereby avoids the harshness and unequivocality of denotative discourse. Secondly, it chooses connotative polysemy, metaphors and fictionality because the message can only be designated very approximately through a kind of ‘covering’ (*involucrum*). Thirdly, such obscurity alone offers the intellectual and aesthetic lure to work on the highest, fundamentally unreachable, object, to an ever new, ceaseless decoding of ‘open literature’ which continues to the end of time. I have formulated these propositions with deliberate technicality to help visualize in advance the literary aesthetic transformation that is indeed later eventually completed in an apologia for a poetic language which resembles theology,

⁵ Peter Abelard, *Sic et Non*, ed. by Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976–77).

⁶ *Commentaria in Epistolam ad Romanos [Comm. Rom.]*, ed. by Eligius-Marie Buytaert, *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica*, CCCM, 11 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), pp. 1–340.

⁷ *Sic et Non*, Prol. lines 1–11.

⁸ *Theologia Christiana*, ed. by Buytaert, CCCM, 12 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), pp. 1–371; *Theologia ‘Scholarium’*, ed. by Buytaert and Mews, CCCM, 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987), pp. 310–549; *Theologia ‘Summi boni’*, ed. by Buytaert and Mews, CCCM, 13, 87–201. On the evolution of Abelard’s writing, see Mews, General Introduction, CCCM, 13, 15–81 and ‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard’, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 52 (1985), 75–134.

but aims at secular disciplines.

All three theses appear together at the very beginning of the prologue to the *Sic et Non*. As a matter of principle, the language of the Holy Spirit which speaks through the authors is superior to the understanding of the reader who potentially lacks illumination by the Spirit. This language is characterized by 'overwhelming richness of words' (redundance due to homonymy and synonymy), by colloquial imprecision (*usus*) and plainness (*evidentia*) as a means of helping the 'uncultivated' to understand, and by hermetic difficulty as a stimulus for the learned to fathom the *occulta mysteria* as far as possible while leaving the incomprehensible 'to the Spirit which had them written down', so that it can have them resolved later through other interpreters.⁹

The prologue presents the three features—semantic polyvalency, figurativeness and ambiguity—which one could describe as 'literary qualities' of the Bible and other inspired texts in an initially negative manner, as obstacles to understanding and boundaries of communication, as if it were a question of defending, if not excusing them against a counter-position. This counter-position is the ideal of linguistic normality (*proprietas*) in the sense of unproblematic agreement between *res* and *verba*. At first glance it seems to derive from the discipline of dialectical logic which Abelard himself practised, where it was one of the self-evident standards of learning. Was Abelard then confronting the specialist language of philosophy with the common language of 'everyday'?

The authorities whom he cites, namely Priscian and Augustine, did indeed emphasize the contrast between linguistic normality (*proprietas* or *integritas*) and custom (*usus*) as a difference between scholarly language, oriented toward its subject independent of any need to mediate it, and a didactic language, oriented toward the recipient, which uses rhetorical means such as the delightful variety (*variatio delectans*) recommended by Cicero to avoid monotonous repetition of the same term for the same thing.¹⁰ Alternatively, one can use studied carelessness (*diligens negligentia*), transformed by Augustine into a licence to popularize, for the sake of understanding. That we are dealing with more than the traditional explanation from the special status of the Christian *sermo humilis* is demonstrated by the apparently contradictory remark that it is the unaccustomed manner of speaking (*inusitatus locutionis modus*) found in inspired speech, which is our greatest threshold for understanding; namely that this unusualness prevents the message from 'being uncovered by lowly language and thus losing its worth'. For 'things are all the more valuable, the more they are sought after and the more difficult the search is'.¹¹ The

⁹ *Sic et Non*, Prol. lines 11–18, 48–54; see also *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 61, p. 438 with Horace, *Epistulae* I. 1. 32: 'est quoddam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra'.

¹⁰ *Sic et Non*, Prol. lines 12–43 citing Priscian, *Institutiones grammaticae*, VII. 28; Cicero, *De inventione*, I. 41. 76 (see also *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 77, p. 140); Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, IV. 9. 10 (Cicero, *De oratore*, 23. 78).

¹¹ *Sic et Non*, Prol. lines 15–18: 'oportet in eadem quoque re verba ipsa variare nec omnia

contradiction can only partially be explained by the historical–philological perspective which Abelard had developed with such hermeneutic originality in the twelfth century.¹² What to us seems the unusual manner of speaking is, in the last analysis, the usual speech of former times. Seen from the perspective of the history of salvation, deviation from normal linguistic usage is still part of the plan of the Holy Spirit, and thus remains of divine origin. Was then linguistic normality (*proprietas*) for Abelard quite different from the language of the Spirit, whether as custom (*usus*) or as unusual speech (*inusitata locutio*)?

Abelard's intellectual partner in dialogue about this issue was Augustine, not so much the Church Father of the *De doctrina Christiana* as the sceptic about language who seeks after God in the *Confessions*. From him Abelard learnt the problem; from him Abelard set himself apart by adopting a more optimistic solution. Augustine had suffered almost physically from the deficiency of language, from the distance between word and thing, at the loss that occurs through attrition when meaning is conveyed in speech or through the 'clamour of words'. 'We are trapped in everyday words which are sullied by contact with life' he declares in Book II (19. 21) of the *Confessions*, anticipating Wittgenstein's discomfort with 'normal' speech. Just as the body taints the purity of the spirit, so language hinders access to the One, so that we are not even capable of adequately expressing our own thoughts. Feelings that run counter to each other, lapses of memory, polyvalences of every kind and especially metaphors and metonyms (*verba translata*) form obstacles to interpersonal communication and are fatal for the attempt to get near to God. Speech is only the shadow (*vestigium* and *umbra*) of the Essential and with time it becomes less and less understandable. Speech dies of *usus*, of being used up by historical human beings. It is pre-eminently a consequence of sin, an expression of evil, a personification of the *regio dissimilitudinis*. It is right to fly from it into the silence of ecstasy.¹³

Augustine's understanding of language as suffering from a 'Babylonian' stigma, rooted in a metaphysical claim to certainty, was not the dominant theory of language in the early Middle Ages. Far more widely spread and influential, even to the time of Dante, was the teaching that God had created the first language with the first soul, and that he had not completely destroyed it after the Babylonian flood, but that he

vulgaribus et communibus denudare verbis: quae, ut ait beatus Augustinus, ob hoc teguntur ne vilescant, et eo amplius sunt gratiora quo sunt maiore studio investigata et difficiliora conquisita.' (Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 103, CCSL, 40, 1490; *De doctrina Christiana*, II. 6. 7–8); compare *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 157–59, p. 383.

¹² See *Sic et Non*, Prol. lines 182–87 on the difference between *tempora* and *dispensationes*; see below on the Commentary on Romans; Arno Borst, *Geschichte an mittelalterlichen Universitäten* (Constance: Universitätsverlag, 1969), pp. 10–15.

¹³ See Guy-H. Allard, 'Arts libéraux et langage chez Saint Augustin', in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge* (Montreal: Institut d'études médiévales, 1969), pp. 481–92, esp. on *Confessiones*, IV. 2, XV. 7.2, and XI. 22 and *De ordine*, II. 14. 39, XVI. 6. 44, and XIX. 51.

had let it continue in Hebrew. Late antiquity, above all through the grammatical speculation of Isidore, connected this teaching about the origin of language to different Stoic and neo-Platonic concepts of metaphysical language to a type of crass 'realist' isomorphism between *res* and *verba* in the Latin tongue, that has been described as a type of 'grammatical Platonism'.¹⁴ Abelard clearly is one of the first critics to break with this theory, according to which linguistic normality (*proprietas verborum*) benefits from an unmediated reliance on a God-given imposition of words (*impositio nominum*). For Abelard, since Adam the reference to things has been a clearly human, historically conditioned process, which like any development of an art can be perfected and improved on the model of a spiritual *natura* or Idea. Abelard thus adopted Augustine's critique of naive trust in a divine semantics, but without drawing pessimistic or mystical consequences from it. Against the decadence of natural language he puts the progress of an artificial language.¹⁵ Linguistic normality (*proprietas*), for him, consists neither in the etymological leap to the original identity of word and thing nor in colloquial or indeed vernacular convention; rather it is a product of art and learning, rationally developed to a very high degree, which the efforts and agreement of scholars in Latin culture have brought to its supreme level and made into a unified and stable instrument of ready comprehension. Its normality is a cultural achievement with normative contours—not 'naturalness' but 'normalization' reached in striving for the ideal by a non-abrasive exchange of intellectual thoughts. Yet that denotes only the pre-condition, the definition, of *proprietas* on which Abelard now proceeds to erect an entirely new theory of speech.

Abelard regards this human construct of rules, monolithic in character, about the polish of speech as majestically interpenetrated by the protean, polysemic, imprecise, figurative, difficult language of the Holy Spirit. Abelard, who again and again emphasized his rise from philosopher to theologian (i.e. from logician of language to biblical interpreter) as a turning-point, even as a kind of conversion, found the scriptural basis for his reflection less in Genesis than in the Acts of the Apostles. To the founder of the monastery of Paraclete, the miracle of Pentecost was the decisive entry of God into the human history of language and the point of revaluation of all

¹⁴ See Alfonso Maierù, 'La linguistica medioevale', in *Storia della linguistica*, ed. by Giulio C. Lepschy, II (Bologna: Mulino, 1990), pp. 101–68, especially 101–04; Jean Jolivet, *Aspects de la pensée médiévale* (Paris: Vrin, 1987) and *Godescalc d'Orbais et la trinité* (Paris: Vrin, 1958); Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo, *Linguistica e retorica di Dante* (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi, 1978), pp. 60–75; Karl-Otto Apel, *Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1975), pp. 104–23.

¹⁵ See Jean Jolivet, *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard*, pp. 85–94, 350–55; Arno Borst, *Der Turmbau zu Babel. Geschichte der Meinung über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker*, 3 vols, (Stuttgart, 1957–1959; reprinted Munich: Taschenbuch, 1995), II, 2, 631–36. Augustine spoke about 'Speech and War' in a negative sense as human discoveries in *De civitate Dei*, VII, 15.

values in the theory of speech.¹⁶

By the event of Pentecost, the Christians have become, in the original Greek sense of the word, the true *logici*: the veritable 'masters of wisdom and eloquence'. For on them is bestowed abundance of speech (*abundantia sermonis*): i.e. not only plurality of language but also the colourful spectrum of all styles and forms of speech which both surpasses and fulfils Cicero's art of rhetorical *variatio*.¹⁷ The salvific event for language also reveals the secret meaning of the specific structure that underpins the redemption of language: 'God was so pleased, he said, with having created us that he preferred to see himself mirrored in the things of nature rather than expressed in our own words. He takes greater pleasure in the likeness (*similitudo*) of things than in the linguistic correctness (*proprietas*) of our words. So Holy Scripture prefers, in the interests of oratorical beauty, to employ the things of nature according to likeness rather than to seek after the purity of the particular form of expression peculiar to each (*propriae locutionis integritas*).'¹⁸ So it is that the Bible speaks, figuratively and beautifully, of Nature as created by God, not single-mindedly in the rational language of converse established by men.

Holy Scripture is to be understood as the product of divine eloquence. To study it one needs, among the propaedeutical disciplines, rhetoric rather than grammar or dialectic. In the prologue to his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Abelard clearly explains first the general structure of the Bible according to the rhetorical and poetological scheme of the aims it intends to achieve: *docere* and *monere*, to teach and to warn. In a lapidary style he establishes in the first sentence: 'Omnis Scriptura divina more orationis rhetoricae, aut docere intendit aut monere.'¹⁹ To teach means to prescribe what should be done or avoided. To warn means on the one hand, to convince by admonition (*persuadere*) and, on the other, to advise against by warning (*dissuadere*). Then the Old and the New Testaments are divided into three: the Old 'teaches' first of all in the law of Pentateuch; then the Prophets 'admonish', moving the spirit to obedience; and finally, in addition to the writings of the Prophets, the historical books of the Bible warn against evil through graphic examples of misconduct. The New Testament teaches in the Gospels, exhorts through the

¹⁶ See Edmé Smits on Abelard's Letter 13, *Peter Abelard. Letters IX–XIV* (Groningen, 1983), pp. 172–88.

¹⁷ Ed. Charles Burnett, 'Peter Abelard. *Soliloquium*', *Studi Medievali*, ser. 3a, 25 (1984), 857–93 (pp. 889–90); *Ep.* 13, ed. by Smits (n. 14), p. 275; Abelard admits that his use of the word *logici* for the Christians inspired at Pentecost is unusual, being metaphorical. In the light of the subsequent narrowing of the use of the term *logica*, we may nowadays link the general gift of speech to a notion of 'the poetic', that Abelard, unlike Alan of Lille, avoids or replaces with the notion of *eloquentia*.

¹⁸ *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 32, p. 423.

¹⁹ *Comm. Rom.*, Prol., p. 41; on Peppermüller's reading of *monere* rather than *movere* (as in Buytaert's edition), see the chapter of Mews, p. 50 n. 80 above.

admonitions of the letters of the Apostles, and warns in the Apocalypse and the historical narratives of the Acts of the Apostles.

This general introduction continues in the second part of the Prologue with a highly idiosyncratic rhetorical interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans.²⁰ Paul's letters should be read not as teaching (*doctrina*) but as warning (*admonitio*), because misapprehension of the different objectives in writing would lead to a hermeneutically naive, ahistorical and literal understanding of the words of the Apostle. What is said 'ad hoc' in a particular situation to particular addressees is not to be construed as if it were an absolute prescription set down for all time for the 'universal public'. This is in other words the problematic core of Paul's remarks on grace. For Paul expressed himself as a writer 'in the manner of one writing letters' (*more scribentium epistolas*) and used the rhetorical techniques of *amplificatio* and *extenuatio* in such a way that he 'exaggerated' the effects of grace to the all too proud Romans, while 'understating' the importance of works, in order to restrain them, to make them more humble and more at peace.²¹ Expansion and contraction therefore provide the specific manner of treatment within the Epistle to the Romans. The explanation given is aesthetic. Abelard bases his thoughts on Cicero's civic legitimization of eloquence from the *De inventione* (II. 56). Unlike economic security, eloquence certainly does not belong to the indispensable, necessary parts of the State, but is to be counted, along with beautiful buildings or political institutions, among the *egregia* (lofty things) which contribute to the standing and worth of the State. The distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions means, with respect to Holy Writ, that the teaching of the Gospel is enough for salvation, but not *ad ecclesiae decorem vel ipsius salutis amplificationem* (not for the beauty of the Church or the increase of salvation). For that reason the Apostles and later the Church Fathers had added many *instituta* such as pastoral letters, canons, decretals, monastic rules etc. which are 'full of admonition' so that the Church may be 'adorned, increased and established'. By the concepts 'adornment and increase' is not meant additional decoration or subsequent embellishment. Already in previous commentaries on St Paul from the time of Pelagius, questions had always been raised as to why the writings of the Apostle were needed, if everything had been said in the Gospels.²² Abelard wanted to give an answer to this question from a quite positive understanding of rhetoric; this did not mean reducing the issue to a distinction between the core and what was external (as in the spirit of contemporary concern about rhetoric). Development (*amplificatio*) refers less to extent than to intensity. Since, according to context, all parts of the Bible, including those of Mosaic or Apostolic teaching, are composed in the manner of rhetorical speech

²⁰ *Comm. Rom.*, Prol., pp. 41–42.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

²² See Rolf Peppermüller, *Abelards Auslegung des Römerbriefes*, BGPTMA, NF 10 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972), pp. 16–22.

(*more orationis rhetoricae*), the admonitory parts are not an addition but a pedagogical deepening, an achievement of the same linguistic intention. In terms of speech-act theory, we could say that the message passes consequently from a simply 'informative' mode to a more elaborate 'illocutive' mode of presentation.

However radical this defence of the rhetorical character of the Bible, its argument is deeply imbued with a conventional view of homiletic rhetoric formed by Augustine. Abelard employs this argument to explain what is essentially only one aspect of preaching to the masses with pedagogical and pastoral intent, saying little more about the function or methods of 'divine eloquence'. Yet other parts of the *Theologia* deal with them, and indeed with astonishing profundity.

Abelard's first concern is to refute the widely diffused objections of the 'purists' to poetic fictionality. He distinguishes between the poetry banished by Plato from the State and by Boethius from the company of Philosophia, and the poetry which serves *ad solam utilitatem*, namely that has cognitive value. The example of St Jerome dreaming that he had been chastised illustrates the point: after his vision, the Church Father was converted from enjoying (*oblectatio*) the sweet juice (*succus*) of reading the classics, to the Bible, which he had previously found repulsively uncultivated. This does *not*, however, mean that Jerome had despised rhetoric. Rather he had learnt from it 'all the embellishment of eloquence in which the Bible—more than all other writings—is by far the richest'. Its beauty (*decor*) was illuminated by Jerome by the careful means of his rhetorical understanding.²³ Here we are dealing not with the trivial distinction between poetry for entertainment and poetry for instruction, but with a philosophical and indeed anthropological claim, which might still be valuable today: namely, that poetry capable of conveying truth deserves intensive reflection, and that poetry which offers merely culinary pleasures or serves the principle of 'art for art's sake', should be neglected. The integration of poetry with rhetoric is already a sign of this claim, with the consequent exclusion of useless beauty. Only rhetorical language is functional and directed toward a goal—potentially even the highest cognitive goal.

The deepest justification for a rhetorical approach to the Bible lies, for Abelard, in the paradox that God is inexpressible, indeed unfathomable, but that revelation nevertheless speaks about him, in a language which can be best understood with the aid of the descriptive repertoire made available by the art of eloquence. Abelard expresses this thought in many ways with a polemical point directed at the 'audaciousness of the pseudo-dialecticians' who believe that they are capable of explaining 'the creator of reason' through the logic of linguistic normality (*proprietas*).²⁴ The so-called 'rationalist' Abelard reveals himself here to be both a rhetorician and an exponent of negative theology.

²³ *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 25, 28, pp. 418–20.

²⁴ *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 32–33, pp. 423–24; II. 93, p. 453; *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 75–80, pp. 140–80 (*invectio in dialecticos*); *Theologia Christiana*, III. 135, p. 246, citing Prov. 26. 5: 'Responde stulto iuxta stultiam suam'.

Every discipline (*ars*), begins one of his central ideas, has its own specific vocabulary on which one should not trespass by carelessly combining it with that of other disciplines.²⁵ The *ars rhetorica*, however, rests on 'pleasing variation', as in his favourite quotation from Cicero's *De inventione* (I. 41): *idemptitas mater est sacietatis* (identity is the mother of weariness). Rhetoric excludes boring sameness, not for the sake of stylistic effects but because it is naturally responsible for the 'singular' and therefore teaches that unique words (*singularia verba*) are to be used. This recalls Boethius' essential distinction between dialectic and rhetoric according to the criterion of the area with which it deals: dialectic deals with the general and essential (*thesis*) in a general manner; rhetoric deals with the unique, which is bound to circumstances (*hypothesis*) in a particular manner.²⁶ Hence Abelard's distance from the later scholastic adherents of Aristotle. Abelard's position is far from their problem: 'As there is only knowledge of the general and as God is unique, how can theology be a science?' On the contrary: divine uniqueness is for him that which is beyond language and comprehension (*illud ineffabile, illud incomprehensibile*), for which the 'general and base words' (*publicae et vulgares locutiones*) of human understanding and learning are completely inadequate, for they refer only to created things (as the laws of nature and of logic), but not to the Creator of all reason.²⁷ Rhetoric, as the discipline of varied and variable expression, serves to prepare the way for what is inexpressible. As 'theological or transcendent rhetoric' it becomes the central discipline of a *logica Christiana*.

Sceptical of learning yet optimistic about hermeneutics, Abelard depicts the *artes* in a background purged by methodological reflection, the foreground of which is dominated by theology. *Variatio* is characterized by such terms as *figuratio*, *similitudo*, *exemplum*, *involucrum*, *velamen*, *translatio*, *obscuritas* etc. meaning all that is figurative and indirect but by no means the merely metaphorical and fictional. *Variatio* means everything which eludes 'naked' expression and direct understanding of what was hidden (the *archanum*).²⁸ In Abelard's words, the central thesis is: 'The Lord delights in remaining hidden so that the more he disguises himself, the more beloved he seems to those before whom he appears. The more difficult it is to work on Holy Scripture, the greater its reader's merit.'²⁹

²⁵ *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 77–78, pp. 140–41; *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 90–91, p. 452, shorter in *Theologia Christiana*, III. 133–34, pp. 245–46.

²⁶ Peter von Moos, *Geschichte als Topik* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1988), p. 654.

²⁷ *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 77, p. 140; *Theologia Christiana*, III. 133, p. 245.

²⁸ See the subtle readings of Edouard Jeuneau, *Lectio philosophorum* (Amsterdam: Hakert, 1973), pp. 125 and 379, and of Peter Dronke, *Fabula* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 32–67.

²⁹ *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 160, p. 384 = *Theologia Christiana*, I. 100, p. 113: 'Quasi ergo in latebris dominus quiescere gaudet, ut, quo magis se occultat, gratior fit illis quibus se manifestat, et quo magis ex difficultate scripture laboratur, meritum lectoris augeatur. [...] Quae quidem tanto cariora sunt intellecta quanto in his intelligendis maior operae facta est

In this context Abelard adduces the Platonic doctrine of the world soul. Beside the Jewish prophets he aligns the ancient sages as precursors of the message of salvation, stating that philosophy, typologically understood, 'was always accustomed to select certain fabled coverings (*fabulosa quaedam involucra*) when it spoke of the highest matters'.³⁰ Many of the early Greek philosophers were monotheists but hid their 'private secret' behind myths of the gods in order to keep it from the credulous people, until Socrates, who was more courageous, spoke out in public as the *idolatriae derisor* and had to pay the penalty for his critique of superstition.³¹ Yet Plato was the first real theologian among the philosophers who poetically composed the *pulcherrima involucris figura* of the world soul to stand for the Holy Spirit with the intention of 'luring' the reader. 'Covering of the mystery' is no longer simply for the sake of protection but also for the sake of attracting others. The same is true, says Abelard (following Augustine) of the secrets of the Bible: on the one hand, they are covered so that they are not cheapened (*teguntur ne vilescant*), as they are too precious to be uncovered; on the other hand, they are spoken obscurely, so as to be explained with hard work, and to generate understanding in place of weariness (*obscurae dicta ad enodandum labore et [...] intellectum a fastidio revocandum*).³² Above all, Abelard praises Macrobius for his synopsis of the whole history of ancient philosophy, by which he discovered the central criterion distinguishing the unphilosophical fancies (*figmenta*) of poets from the fabulous coverings (*fabulosa involucra*) of philosophy. It is the irreplaceability of poetic language before the ineffable. He cites a long series of authorities for this apophatic position, beginning with the famous sentence of Plato's *Timaeus*: 'It is as difficult to find the Creator as it is impossible to express Him.'³³ All these quotations serve the defence of an appropriate metalinguistic approach of that unspeakable majesty (*illa ineffabilis maiestas*), which man cannot know but at least suspect and foretaste 'as if in an image through a mirror' (*per speculum in aenigmate*; I Cor. 13. 12).³⁴ Abelard ends his list of ancient and Christian authorities with the sarcastic question: 'And what do professors of dialectic reply when they seek to discuss with reason what their most enlightened teachers declare to be inexplicable?'³⁵

What we see here is an attempt, akin to that of mysticism, to attribute an erotic dimension to intellectual activity. This is the context of the often-repeated saying

impensa.'

³⁰ *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 141–58, 163, pp. 377–83, 385.

³¹ *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 97–114, pp. 356–63.

³² *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 157–59, p. 383; see above n. 10.

³³ *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 21, p. 121 = *Theologia Christiana*, III. 44 (citing *Timaeus*, 28C); see von Moos, *Geschichte als Topik*, p. 200 (n. 26 above).

³⁴ *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 78, p. 141 = *Theologia Christiana*, III. 134, p. 245; *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 91, p. 452.

³⁵ *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 78, p. 122.

from the *Sic et Non*: 'Through doubt we investigate, by investigating we find truth, as truth itself says: "Seek and ye shall find; knock and the door shall be opened to you."' ³⁶ For not only the fictions and metaphors of the Bible but also its allusions, quotations, ironies and ambivalences—all its departures from linguistic normality (*proprietas*)—are designed to challenge and charm the reader who seeks truth, i.e. the 'philosopher', in order to help him to understand and remain humbly on the road that leads to knowledge, even if he does not arrive at his goal. ³⁷ Although individual words (*singularia verba*) always reveal only a partial insight into an unknowable whole, they contain glimpses of understanding more than common words (*communia verba*). Problems of understanding are, like resistance in love, a spur to desire. Abelard says: 'Since nature has bestowed on the human race a strong urge to seek the abstruse and to long for what is denied them so that they love all the more what they have gained later, truth which is long desired is comprehended all the more passionately'. ³⁸ Hence the theological source of the paradox of Abelard's love-affair with Heloise: the less frequent, the more pleasing. ³⁹

Yet this is not (as it might be) the basis of a poetics of obscurity; we find ourselves in the realm of theology or rather in only one part of it, that is scriptural exegesis. There is no short cut from the aesthetics of theological reception to the aesthetics of literary production. Not even the metalinguistic speech of theologians was able to take biblical distance from linguistic normality (*proprietas*) as a literary example, even though it was accepted without question. Indeed, Anselm of Canterbury had already established an aesthetic claim for theology when he painted an attractive picture of the God-man as 'the most beautiful among men', but Abelard did not develop the practical literary consequences from a specifically tropological, non-technical form of speech in Scripture, for the presentation of his own ideas. ⁴⁰ That preaching and spiritual writing refer to such speech is self-evident. These edifying literary forms were, in the sight of twelfth-century theologians, who took the poetic and rhetorical character of the Bible seriously, generally not seen as the most demanding forms of discourse about God; rather they were mostly seen as discriminating didactic and pedagogical forms of speech, and simply took the form of didactic assertions about divine speech. For them imitating the speech of the

³⁶ *Sic et Non*, Prol., lines 338–40.

³⁷ *Sic et Non*, Prol., lines 143–49, where *phantasma* is compared to Caesar's vision of Rome in Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I. 185ff under the appearance of a pseudo-historical *rei similitudo*.

³⁸ *Theologia Scholarium*, I. 99, p. 357, citing Claudianus Mamertus, *De statu animae*, 2.2 (CSEL, 11, 101).

³⁹ *Historia calamitatum*, ed. by Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Vrin, 1967), p. 78, on the rare joys provoked by the separation of the lovers (attributed by Abelard to the *dehortatio a nuptiis* of Heloise).

⁴⁰ *Cur deus homo* I. 1, ed. by F. S. Schmitt, *S. Anselmi Opera Omnia*, 6 vols (Rome/Edinburgh: Nelson, 1938–68), II, 12.

freely given Spirit in any consciously appropriated way was a sign of pride (*superbia*). In the school of Gilbert of Poitiers, sharp criticisms were made of the charismatically powerful manner of speaking of the famous preacher, Bernard of Clairvaux, because he had tried with elaborate persuasion (*ornata persuasio*) and imprecise metaphors to surpass the boundaries of his own rhetoric, and to pour swollen pseudo-prophetic rhetoric over the hidden things of God (*ineffabilia dei*).⁴¹ Robert of Melun, a disciple of Abelard, also engaged in an extended polemic against a dialectical and rhetorical *elegantia artificiosa* which had come into fashion in theology, in contrast to biblical *simplicitas* of speech. Robert was hostile to unusual linguistic adornment, torturing understanding with subtleties and ambiguities, although he had also insisted on the stylistic superiority of *translatio* as the speech of the Holy Spirit, above all human art.⁴² Generally such criticism in theological commentary tends not to imitate biblical departures from conventional speech, but to retranslate it to the linguistic normality (*proprietas*) of learned discourse. Abelard himself does this only with the significant reservation that one had to assault overblown dialecticians with their own weapons, to answer 'fools by their own foolishness' (Prov. 26. 5), namely by dialectic.⁴³ The further history of theological discourse, above all since high scholasticism, is increasingly based on Aristotle rather than the Bible. Effort was needed to legitimize biblical metaphor against the accusation of 'being poetical' because for 'the philosopher' poetics had been called the lowest form of teaching, while theology wanted to secure its position as the highest of the sciences.⁴⁴

⁴¹ See Peter von Moos, 'Literatur- und bildungsgeschichtliche Aspekte der Dialogform im Mittelalter', in *Tradition und Wertung. Festschrift für Franz Brunhölzl*, ed. by Günter Bernt (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1989), pp. 165–209, esp. 193–94 on the *Dialogus Ratii* of Everard of Ypres, ed. by Nikolaus Häring, *Mediaeval Studies*, 17 (1955), 261–71, where the core criticism is identified not as rhetorical speech (legitimized through the Bible), but as confusion with the discourse about *proprietas*.

⁴² Robert of Melun, *Sententie*, Praefatio, ed. by R. M. Martin, *Oeuvres de Robert de Melun* 1, *Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense*, 13 (Louvain: Université catholique de Louvain, 1932), pp. 25–41, esp. p. 37: '[...] illo docendi modo quo mentem auditoris [...] ex inaudita locutione in incerta ambiguitate suspendit.'

⁴³ *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 79, p. 141; see also above n. 10.

⁴⁴ See the path-breaking account of Tullio Gregory, 'Forme di coscienza e ideali di sapere nella cultura medievale', in *Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences*, 121/38 (1988), 187–242 (p. 222), as also Curtius, pp. 229–32, 473–76 (n. 3 above). The *Quaestio: utrum Scriptura sacra debeat uti metaphoris* (P. I q. 1a9) in the *Summa theologica* of Thomas Aquinas contains in watered-down form all the arguments of Abelard, enriched by the negative theology of the Areopagite, through consideration of the appropriate distance between a sign and what it signifies: 'magis est conveniens quod divina [...] tradantur sub figuris vilium corporum quam nobilium corporum [...]; magis enim manifestatur nobis de ipso quid non est, quam quid est; et ideo similitudines illarum rerum quae magis elongantur a Deo, veriores nobis faciunt aestimationem, quod sit supra illud quod de Deo dicimus vel

Relevant here is an aspect of Abelard's hermeneutic theory which refers to the Church Fathers: if the incommensurability of biblical language is not subordinate to capricious subjectivity, but, since God does nothing 'in superfluity', represents pure and indisputable necessity,⁴⁵ this is not the case with the language of other, even inspired authorities: like poets and philosophers they say much according to their opinion (*iuxta opinionem*) rather than according to the truth of the matter (*iuxta rei veritatem*).⁴⁶ This kind of opinionated, indirect and even faulty speech, like metaphor and fiction, belongs to an imprecise realm and demands the same skills in interpretation as the *difficultas* of the Bible. In addition to human contingency (even the best people are 'not without fault in *multiloquium*'),⁴⁷ Abelard mentions a wholly positive reason for this imprecision: the Fathers have not always spoken as doctrinal authorities but also 'to make progress in practice'.⁴⁸ They have, at various times and places, expressed themselves in a contradictory manner and corrected themselves later;⁴⁹ they have spoken tentatively in problematic style and left the solution open; they have exaggerated for effect and freely invented *officiosa mendacia* (useful lies).⁵⁰ In brief: they have written as authors not as scholars because they attributed to readers a hermeneutic sense of responsibility and freedom to judge, accept, or reject, and also because posterity should never lack difficult problems. The solution is always: 'Test everything, and keep what is good' (I Thess. 5. 21).⁵¹

Beside the divine and sacrosanct obscurity of the Bible there is also a human,

cogitamus.' On the tradition of this way of thinking, see Paul Michel, *Formosa deformitas. Bewältigungsformen des Hässlichen in mittelalterlicher Literatur* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1976), p. 138, and *passim*. In contrast to Abelard's engaged defence of biblical 'speaking differently' against the hermeneutic distortions of dialecticians, the question is put here of confronting a contemptible 'poeticity' with learned *proprietas*. It relates the transcendental foundation of biblical *figurae sensibiles* and above all their harmonization to an extreme notion of speech as denotative that itself does not need to be problematized.

⁴⁵ *Sic et Non*, Prol., lines 296–304. See also *Comm. Rom.* (notes 19 and 20 above), and Aquinas (n. 44 above): 'sacra doctrina utitur metaphoras propter necessitatem et utilitatem.'

⁴⁶ *Sic et Non*, Prol., line 149. One may notice the juxtaposition of *poeticae seu (!) philosophicae scripturae*. On Abelard's valorization of *opinio*, see Peter von Moos, "Was allen, den meisten oder den Sachkundigen richtig scheint". Über das Fortleben des *Endoxon* im Mittelalter, Teil 1', in *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch*, ed. by Burkhard Mojsisch (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1991), 2, 711–44, and 'Die angesehene Meinung, Studien zum *endoxon* im Mittelalter. Abaelard', *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 45 (1998), 344–80.

⁴⁷ *Sic et Non*, Prol., line 254; Prov. 10. 19.

⁴⁸ *Sic et Non*, Prol., lines 276, 353.

⁴⁹ *Sic et Non*, Prol., lines 967–135.

⁵⁰ *Sic et Non*, Prol., lines 139–44, 149, 175, 249, 255, 293, 329.

⁵¹ *Sic et Non*, Prol., lines 279, 285, 291, 310, 324.

literary obscurity; this imperfect 'speaking differently' has a similar aesthetic and intellectual usefulness, namely to be a lure and provocation to inquiry into truth. Its problematic character trains the understanding in its ability to interpret. Unscholarly language is thus the servant of learning. As opposed to the secret language of canonical books, such discourse has a more methodological and formal function. If nowadays we regard it as self-evident that philology is the handmaiden of texts and has no meaning without them, the opposite applies here: texts are the servants of philology. They are written to achieve perfection in the discipline. (We must understand 'philology' here in the medieval sense of all the arts of language, as well as in its modern sense.)

Here I see the decisive connection between the exegetical theologians and the creative writers and poets. This scheme for legitimating (in H. Weinrich's phrase) 'literature for readers', by which is meant the provision of enigmas and ambivalence for subtle interpretation, is to be found in many Latin and even vernacular prologues, such as Marie de France's attribution of the traditions of the clergy to herself: 'Assez oscurement diseient / Pur ceus ki a venir esteient [...] / ki peüssent gloser la lettre / E de lur sen le surplus mettre'.⁵² (It was customary for the ancients [...] to express themselves very obscurely so that those in later generations, who had to learn them, could provide a gloss for the text and put the finishing touches to their meaning.)

The ideal to which Marie refers is also familiar from research into Chrétien and Chaucer.⁵³ The emphatic division of society into *simplices* (uncultivated) and *sapientes* (educated) cannot be equated with a simple dichotomy between social groups. The division was recalled for purposes of rhetoric or even propaganda, to wake the slumbering multitude from its cultural torpor. The idea that 'few are chosen' was a stimulus to achieve *eruditio*. For the historian of medieval Latin, a literature written by clerics for clerics or for those who were to become clerics, there is no more important focus. 'All that is written is written for our instruction': this comprehensive motto taken from Romans 15. 14, but applied to all writing, evokes an educational utopia of informed readers. 'Instruction' was understood both in terms of content and of method, not only as Christian morality but also as schooling in the ability to interpret. Abelard calls this doctrine 'learning' and defends it against simplistic reproaches in terms of content: all branches of knowledge, he maintains,

⁵² *Les Lais de Marie de France*, ed. by J. Rychner (Paris: Champion, 1983), p. 1, lines 13, 15–16; *The Lais of Marie de France*, trans. by Glyn S. Burgess and Keith Busby (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p. 41. There are also analogies in the prologues to Wolfram's *Parzival* and Gottfried's *Tristan*; von Moos, *Geschichte als Topik* (n. 26), p. 183.

⁵³ The writings of Alistair J. Minnis are useful here because of their relevance for the theological background, in particular *Medieval Theories of Authorship. Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages*, 2nd edn (London: Scholar Press, 1988); further writings are given in its bibliography. The relationship between the notion of *difficultas* in exegesis and the poetic trope *ornatus difficilis* as well as of the *trobar clus* of the troubadours, needs further investigation.

are good, including knowledge of evil. ('Adultery is bad; knowledge of adultery is good.')

⁵⁴ John of Salisbury compares the usual, unscholarly reader, as distinct from the true expert, to a youth who (according to Terence) is sexually aroused at the sight of a painting of Jupiter's golden rain falling into Danae's lap. These are only two examples of the 'doctrine' that reading is not looking at the outside of stories, histories or images, but penetrating into their hidden sense. Reading is the opposite of looking.⁵⁵

I should like to conclude these all-too-brief theoretical remarks with a number of the theses with which much later Boccaccio defended his concept of the poet, developed chiefly in relation to the model of the *Divina Commedia*, against scholastic and monastic hostility to poetry. They are practically the same as those Abelard had developed to improve understanding of the Bible, but now they are cast in non-theological terminology so as to justify poetic creativity in general. As such they have been celebrated by post-medieval philologists as a kind of Magna Carta of literary autonomy.⁵⁶ The theses are:

- (1) Like the Bible, poetry requires a language suited to its subject, transcending plebeian usage, and covers the precious core of truth under a veil of unusual words, *figurae*, fictions, *obscuritates et ambiguitates*.
- (2) This covering attracts the ignorant and sharpens the understanding of scholars.
- (3) Obscurity prevents a work being devalued by over-familiarity. What is once concealed produces with time an increasing richness of meaning and so attracts us permanently to intellectual work.

Comment on these propositions is superfluous. It is enough to observe that, at the

⁵⁴ *Theologia Summi boni*, II. 7, p. 116; *Theologia Scholarium*, II. 29, p. 421; *Theologia Christiana*, III. 6, p. 196.

⁵⁵ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* VII. 9, 2 vols, ed. by C. J. J. Webb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), VII. 9, II, 126; see von Moos, *Geschichte als Topik* (n. 26), p. 180.

⁵⁶ Boccaccio, *Trattello in laude di Dante* IX-X, ed. by P. G. Ricci, *Tutte le opere di Giovanni Boccaccio*, III (Milan: Mondadori, 1965): *The Life of Dante*, trans. by Vincenzo Zin Bollettino (New York: Garland, 1990), pp. 35-51; *Genealogiae Deorum*, XIV. 9-10, 12-14, ed. by J. Reedy, *Boccaccio. In Defense of Poetry* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), pp. 50-54. Unlike Abelard, Boccaccio sees the opposite to *obscuritas poetarum* not in dialectical *proprietas* but in rhetorical *plana atque lucida oratio*; see *Genealogiae*, XIV. 12, p. 51. The particular significance of the specifically pragmatic orientation of the Italian *ars dictaminis* must be compared to the strongly poetological reliance on rhetoric in the French tradition. See on this Peter von Moos, 'Die italienische *ars arengandi* des 13. Jahrhunderts als Schule der Kommunikation', in *Wissensliteratur im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by Horst Brunner and Norbert R. Wolf, Schriftenreihe des Sonder-Forschungs-Bereiches, 226, vol. 12 (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1992), pp. 67-90 and 'Rhetorik, Dialektik und *civilis scientia* im Hochmittelalter', in *Dialektik und Rhetorik im früheren und hohen Mittelalter*, ed. by Johannes Fried, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992), pp. 133-55.

alleged beginning of modern literary aesthetics, the theological speculation of the twelfth century about linguistic *proprietas* and *transsumptio* was not without influence on the genesis of a special status for literature among other kinds of writing. The history of theology is also a source for the history of literary criticism, perhaps not only for its history. The sentence that the necessarily untrue form of poetic language is the only glass through which nature's rays reach us could stem just as well from a *poeta theologus* of the twelfth century as from Goethe, who expressed it.⁵⁷ It points to the dignity of reading poetry. This glass, however, does not fall from heaven, but must be cast by the hand of a master in the workshop of language. Augustine defined it as an instrument of reconciliation between men. This is a different insight, both older and newer, heightening poetic creativity.

H. G. Coenen has attempted to define the pragmatic communicative function of literature in terms of a 'divergence from normal speech'.⁵⁸ The medieval doctrine of tropes, 'regular violations of rules', contains *in nuce* the modern theory of literary divergence or *écart*. Like Abelard, the linguistic theorist today explains the essence of the literary in terms not of poetics but of a rhetoric that encompasses it. However one understands the poetic, it was for the Middle Ages maximum literariness.⁵⁹ Poetry distinguished itself from other *scripta*, with which it shared the task of imparting 'useful' knowledge, neither in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of mimesis or by formal technical criteria, but through its quasi-utopian aim of transmitting an awareness of the incapacity of language before the *ineffabilia*. It did so by attempting metaphorical transgression, in such a way that the 'reader' (i.e. interpreter) whom it addressed was seduced into reflection and difficult thinking about the ultimate questions. This is even today, at the highest level, a profoundly useful and therefore rhetorical task.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ See Wolfram von den Steinen, 'Natur und Geist im 12. Jahrhundert', in *Die Welt als Geschichte*, 2 (1954), 71–90.

⁵⁸ H. G. Coenen, 'Literarische Rhetorik', in *Rhetorik. Eine internationales Jahrbuch*, 7.1 (1988), 43–62.

⁵⁹ This has passed completely unnoticed in the lower ranks of those who classify *poetica* as a writing technique within a system of knowledge that is either part of grammar or somewhere between grammar and rhetoric, in a way that is quite incompatible with the philosophical or theological significance of *transsumptio*. Such poetics has as little to do with medieval poetry as literacy has with so-called pragmatic literacy. Both need to be analysed through medieval criteria, rather than through an outdated contrast between late Romantic advocacy of medieval 'Belletristik' and supposedly unaesthetic prose.

⁶⁰ See Paul Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), pp. 13–34; trans. by Robert Czerny, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 9–27.

Eloquencie vultum depingere: Eloquence and *Dictamen* in the Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard

JUANITA FEROS RUYS

This chapter takes as its point of departure the study by John O. Ward of Letter 49 of the *Epistolae duorum amantium*, an exchange identified by Constant J. Mews as the early love letters of Abelard and Heloise.¹ Letter 49 contains at its heart a conundrum, for in it the young Heloise articulates, as Ward argues, a crisis over the nature of eloquence; yet this same Heloise is famed in current scholarly thought for her adherence to eleventh-century humanistic ideals regarding the importance of eloquence in ethical life.² What is the impetus for Heloise's apparent questioning of eloquence and what does it reveal about the development of her thoughts on rhetorical theory? I intend to show that this key moment in Letter 49 is anomalous, representing not Heloise's personal view of eloquence so much as the extraordinary effect upon her of Abelard's rhetorical theories. An examination of this passage raises questions about the nature of Abelard's instruction of Heloise,

¹ John O. Ward and Neville Chiavaroli, 'The Young Heloise and Latin Rhetoric: Some Preliminary Comments on the "Lost" Love-Letters and Their Significance', in *Listening to Heloise: The Voice of a Twelfth-Century Woman*, ed. by Bonnie Wheeler (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 53–119 (esp. pp. 88–91, part of a section authored by Ward); Constant J. Mews, *The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard: Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

² Ward and Chiavaroli, 'The Young Heloise and Latin Rhetoric', pp. 55–59; C. Stephen Jaeger, 'The "Epistolae duorum amantium" and the Ascription to Heloise and Abelard', forthcoming in *Voices in Dialogue: New Problems in Reading Women's Cultural History*, ed. by Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004). My thanks to Professor Jaeger for allowing me to read a pre-publication copy of his paper.

reveals a surprising distinction in Heloise's thought between eloquence and letter-writing (*dictamen*), and highlights the extraordinary intellectual and literary influence Heloise and Abelard had upon each other, the effects of which were still evident decades later in Abelard's late writings for Heloise and their son Astrolabe.

The passage in question at the heart of Letter 49 is one long and grammatically complicated sentence—so complicated and difficult of thought that, as Ward notes, it can hardly have been invented as a textbook example for study.³ It is set out in full as follows:

Magne temeritatis est litteratorie tibi verba dirigere, quia cuique litteratissimo et ad unguem usque perducto, cui omnis dispositio artium per inveterata incrementa affectionum transivit in habitum, non sufficit tam floridum eloquencie vultum depingere, ut iure tanti magistri mereatur conspectui apparere, nedum michi que vix videor disposita ad queque levia, que demorsos ungues non sapiunt, nec pluteum cadunt: magistro inquam tanto, magistro virtutibus, magistro moribus, cui jure cedit francigena cervicositas, et simul assurgit tocius mundi superciliositas, quilibet compositus qui sibi videtur sciolus, suo prorsus judicio fiet elinguis et mutus.⁴

[It is very rash of me to send studied phrases to you, because even for one learned right down to his fingertips, for one who has transformed every artistic arrangement into habit through long-established practice, it does not suffice to paint the face of eloquence so floridly that it should rightly merit to appear before the gaze of so great a master, still less does it suffice for me who seem scarcely disposed to such trifles 'which neither taste of nibbled nails nor bang the desk': before a master, I say, so great, a master of virtues, a master of morals to whom French pigheadedness rightly yields and, at the same time, the haughtiness of the whole world rises in respect, and anyone who considers himself even slightly learned would be rendered, by his own judgment indeed, speechless and mute.]

The key phrase here is *non sufficit tam floridum eloquencie vultum depingere*, 'it does not suffice to paint the face of eloquence so floridly'. For whom does Heloise suggest that this does not suffice? For two types of people: first, for those who are more than capable of writing eloquently, given their training and long experience in the arts of rhetoric (*cuique litteratissimo et ad unguem usque perducto, cui omnis dispositio artium per inveterata incrementa affectionum transivit in habitum*); then second—and even less so—for herself who is, all questions of ability aside, simply not inclined to employ eloquence for its own sake, nor to write of light and frivolous

³ 'We are indeed led to wonder how such enigmatic language could be of any use in the dictaminal schoolroom', 'The Young Heloise and Latin Rhetoric', p. 89.

⁴ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 49, p. 228; the translation provided is based on that of Chiavaroli and Mews (p. 229), although in certain sections I have adopted a more literal translation, intended to highlight those points where Heloise finds herself unable to sustain the grammatical structures she has established.

things which do not deal with weighty matters (*nedum michi que vix videor disposita ad queque levia, que demorsos ungues non sapiunt, nec pluteum cadunt*). And why does Heloise state that the painted face of eloquence is insufficient? She argues that writings which are merely eloquent, which simply paint the face of eloquence, are insufficient to merit an appearance before a master who is known for his greatness and his pre-eminence in virtues and morals (*ut iure tanti magistri mereatur conspectui apparere [...] magistro virtutibus, magistro moribus*). These are certainly damning words and Ward is right to suggest that with them Heloise criticizes eloquence as 'a false indicator of truth' and 'a (male) fraud'.⁵ The question is, however, why she would do so, and whether this represents a pivotal moment in her thinking on rhetorical theory, or only an unsustained foray into (for her) novel ideas. To answer this, I believe we must consider Abelard's rhetorical theories, the nature of his pedagogic instruction of Heloise in their early relationship, and consequently the influence which his theories had upon her.

It is generally now agreed that Heloise arrived at her lessons with her own stylistic competencies and rhetorical practices, but that these were very much the product of the 'old' eleventh-century learning. As such, her ideals included an equation of the ornaments of eloquence with ethical practice (an idea drawn in this period largely from Cicero's *De inventione*), an emphasis upon the epistolary genre (most notably expressed in her Ep. II with its appeal to the Senecan idea of the letter as making present the absent friend), and a belief in the charismatic teacher as a figure of morals and virtue. By contrast, Abelard stands as an exemplar of the 'new' twelfth-century learning in which a plain, straightforward style was favoured and ethics was therefore divorced from eloquence.⁶ Abelard's emphasis on simple style over eloquence is stated in several of his later writings, the best-known example being the prefatory letter to the Sermons which he sent to Heloise and the nuns of the Paraclete where he stated: 'I insist upon plainness of exposition, not composition of eloquence: the sense of the words, not the ornament of rhetoric' (*expositionis insisto planitiem, non eloquentiae compositionem: sensum litterae, non ornatum rhetoricæ*).⁷ It is, however, in the *Carmen ad Astralabium*, a long poem of advice to his son, that he articulates many of the tenets of the emerging scholasticism. There he advises his son against eloquence, claiming that 'Persuasion may seize minds with ornate words, to teaching plainness is rather owed' (*ornatis animos captet persuasio uerbis / doctrine magis est debita planities*); that 'meaning must be preferred to words' for 'an abundance of words exists where there is not an abundance of meaning' (*sensus uerbis anteferendus erit; copia uerborum est ubi non est copia sensus*); and that 'reason surpasses any kind of eloquence' (*ratio cuius preminet*

⁵ Ward and Chiavaroli, 'The Young Heloise and Latin Rhetoric', p. 89.

⁶ See C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).

⁷ PL 178, 379–80.

eloquio).⁸ Another important theme in this didactic work, and one closely associated with the devalorizing of eloquence, is the precedence which deeds must have over words. Abelard argues: 'In deeds, not in words, does wisdom declare itself' (*factis, non uerbis sapientia se profitetur*); 'Every man is glorified by his deeds, not his words' (*Factis quisque suis, non dictis glorificatur*); and 'make sure you place deeds before words' (*factaque sint uerbis anteferenda tibi*).⁹ Finally, in the *Carmen* Abelard makes a strong case against the old eleventh-century valorization of the master as a person, advising his son that 'Not by whom, but what is said should be your care' (*non a quo sed quid dicatur sit tibi cure*) and that 'Neither should you swear upon the words of a master whom you love, nor should the teacher hold you bound by his love' (*nec tibi dilecti iures in uerba magistri / nec te detineat doctor amore suo*).¹⁰

It is possible to see these same precepts appearing in Abelard's first letters to Heloise some decades earlier. In part, Abelard's communication of his rhetorical ideals in the early love letters is practical and exemplary, since he writes to Heloise in the very style he commends. Thus, as C. Stephen Jaeger remarks, Abelard writes 'prose and poetry in a style that cultivates plainness, avoids rhythm and rhyme in prose, and favors a kind of technical, commentary-style vocabulary'.¹¹ For the most part, however, in this correspondence Abelard extends his ideas on eloquence to Heloise in a way which is pedagogically expedient, using her rhetorically high-flown observations on her inability to express fully her love for him as opportunities which allow him to counter with his own arguments on the lack of value of words. For instance, when Heloise cries out in Letter 11 over her lack of time to put into words her feelings for him, Abelard replies in Letter 12: 'I do not think there is any need, sweetest, for you to recommend with words to your beloved the faith that you clearly show through actions' (*Non opus esse reor dulcissima ut fidem tuam quam factis evidenter exhibes, verbis dilecto tuo commendes*).¹² Similarly, Heloise's lament in Letter 21 that she does not know what gift to lavish upon him elicits the response: 'you transcend your sweetest words with the number of your actions and you have so surpassed them by the demonstration of your love that you seem to me poorer in words than in actions' (*verba tua factorum quantitate transcendis, ipsa amoris exhibicione*

⁸ Latin edition by Josepha Marie Annaïs Rubingh-Bosscher, *Peter Abelard. Carmen ad Astralabium: A Critical Edition* (Groningen: [privately published], 1987), ll. 12–15, 824 (hereafter *Carmen*); English translation by Ruys and Ward, in *The Repentant Abelard: Abelard's Thought as Revealed in his Carmen ad Astralabium and Planctus* (New York: Palgrave, forthcoming).

⁹ *Carmen*, ll. 57, 339, 852.

¹⁰ *Carmen*, ll. 7, 9–10.

¹¹ 'The "Epistolae duorum amantium" and the Ascription to Heloise and Abelard' (n. 2 above).

¹² *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 12, pp. 196–97.

transgrederis, ita ut pauperior michi in verbis quam in factis videaris).¹³ The elaborate and classically-learned references expressing how much she misses Abelard in her Letter 45 are met with his answer in Letter 46: 'with how much exultation of spirit I would like to meet your love for me, I would rather show through action than describe in words' (*quanta animi exultacione tuo in me amori velim occurrere, potius opere volo exhibere, quam verbis demonstrare*).¹⁴ When in Letter 53 Heloise makes her hyperbolic claim as to the failure of Latinity to provide a word capable of expressing her love for Abelard (*in omni latinitate non est sermo inventus qui aperte loquatur erga te quam sit animus meus intentus*),¹⁵ he deftly presses home his argument on the unimportance of eloquence in the face of actions in his subsequent Letter 54: 'there is little need for words because we are overflowing with what is real' (*verbis minime opus est, quia in rebus abundantes sumus*).¹⁶ A similar exchange is evident in Letter 104 where she declares: 'But I do not know what is the most important thing to say' (*Sed quid potissimum dicam ignoro*) and he replies in Letter 105: 'Indeed, your actions prove that it is very easy to trust in your words' (*Verbis eciam tuis ut facillima fides sit, opera tua probant*).¹⁷ Even when attempting to resolve an interpersonal crisis brought about by his own behaviour, Abelard does not miss an opportunity to instruct, informing Heloise in Letters 74 and 75 that his hurtful words were 'only words, not backed up by any action' (*verba illa vere tantum fuerunt, que nullo opere claruerunt*), that words 'are like the winds' (*Verba omitto que ventis similia sunt*), and that she should 'look not to words but deeds' (*noli verba sed facta consulere*).¹⁸ In Letter 75 Abelard expresses particularly forcefully his views on eloquence and the masters of oral presentation, arguing that there are situations where even the abundant eloquence of Cicero could not avail (*Si ipse Tullius de se tale aliquid iactasset, vere copiosa eius facundia in solvendo deficeret*).¹⁹

Yet the question arises as to whether this instruction of Heloise in the rhetorical ideals of the new scholasticism is as opportunistic as it appears, or whether the love letters contain evidence of a formal pedagogic arrangement. Letter 41, for instance, suggests the latter. In this very short letter Abelard writes: 'I have no instructions for you, do what you wish. Write anything, even a couple of words, if you can' (*Ego preceptum in te non habeo, fac quod vis. Aliquid scribe duo saltem verba si potes*).²⁰

¹³ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 22, pp. 202–05.

¹⁴ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 46, pp. 226–27.

¹⁵ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 53, pp. 234–35.

¹⁶ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 54, pp. 236–37.

¹⁷ *Lost Love Letters*, Letters 104 and 105, pp. 280–81.

¹⁸ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 74, pp. 254–55; Letter 75, pp. 256–57.

¹⁹ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 75, p. 254.

²⁰ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 41, pp. 222–23.

Similarly almost the only words which the scribe has left of Letter 63 constitute Abelard's appraisal of Heloise's epistolary style: 'The letter which you sent had a logical and orderly arrangement and contained mature judgements; certainly I have never seen anything more fittingly set out' (*In litteris quas misisti, mature fuerunt sentencie, rationalis et ordinata compositio; nunquam certe aptius vidi dispositas*).²¹ Are these words evidence of instruction, or are they merely typical of Abelard's analytical style, seen again, for instance, in the opening passage of his much later Ep. v to Heloise where he divides her complaints into four 'counts' and declares: 'I have decided to answer you on each point in turn'?²² In support of the instructional contention, we might note that in her Letter 9 Heloise states that she will exchange letters with Abelard 'according to your bidding' (*iuxta preceptum tuum*),²³ while her Letter 71 opens with striking words in which she apparently agrees to comply with his stylistic precepts, but only under duress, drawing attention to the pressure under which he has put her: 'Terrified by the Lord's judgement, which says: "It is hard to kick against the goad," I send you this unadorned letter as proof of how devotedly I submit myself to your instructions in all matters' (*Dominica sententia perterrita per quam dicitur: 'difficile est contra stimulum calcitrare', has inornatas litteras tibi mitto, earum probans indicio quam devote in omnibus me tuis preceptis subicio*).²⁴ Similarly, in her Letter 76, following Abelard's disquisition on eloquence and the precedence of deeds over words in Letter 75, Heloise thanks him for his instruction: 'Truly I admit, most beloved, that many times I would have halted like an idle sheep along the way, if the masterly skill of your instruction had not kept calling me back as I strayed from the proper path' (*Vere fateor dilectissime quod multociens ut pecus ignavum via subsisterem, nisi magisterialis institutionis tui sollertia, me prono digressam assidue revocaret tramite*).²⁵

There have long been discussions over the discipline in which Abelard's instruction of the young Heloise proceeded: dialectics, theology, ethics and philosophy have all been proposed. It is not generally thought, however, that Abelard instructed Heloise in matters of language and literature. Most scholars from the early twentieth century onwards have asserted that Heloise probably came to her lessons with Abelard already well-learned in Latin, and possibly in Greek and

²¹ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 63, pp. 244–45.

²² Betty Radice, *The Letters of Abelard and Heloise* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 137 (hereafter Radice); Eric Hicks, *La vie et les epistres Pierres Abaelart et Heloys sa fame: Traduction du XIIIe siècle attribuée à Jean de Meun, avec une nouvelle édition des textes latins d'après le ms. Troyes Bibl. mun. 802*, Nouvelle Bibliothèque du Moyen Âge, 16 (Paris and Geneva: Champion, Slatkine, 1991), p. 70 (hereafter Hicks).

²³ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 9, pp. 194–95.

²⁴ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 71, pp. 250–51.

²⁵ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 76, pp. 256–57.

Hebrew as well.²⁶ In recent years, moreover, it has become standard to suggest that Heloise's knowledge in the fields of classical literature and dictaminal practice was so extensive, that here she took the role of instructor to Abelard. This idea is most forcefully stated by Peter Dronke who argues that 'we should not imagine Abelard as giving Heloise her literary formation', but that in fact, 'it would seem that Abelard assimilated to quite an extent Heloise's habits in the epistolary style, rather than the other way around'.²⁷ Michael Clanchy likewise suggests Heloise's influence over Abelard in the matter of letter-writing: 'As an already accomplished stylist, she may also have demonstrated to him, through her earliest letters [...] how writing Latin prose could be individually distinctive while remaining classical'.²⁸ These views may now have to be reconsidered in light of the early love letters.

The difficult and anomalous passage on eloquence in Heloise's Letter 49 may well bear witness to the effect of Abelard's compositional imperatives upon her, for what Heloise undertakes in Letter 49, I believe, is an attempt—and not ultimately a successful one—to absorb Abelard's ideas on eloquence and combine them with her own understanding of the links between morals, masters, and words. Thus she declares, in a marked emendation of the humility topos which she employed more conventionally in Letter 23, that she is deliberately sending him unpolished letters of rude style (*impolitas tam rudis stili litteras*), not because her talent for greater ornament is lacking, but because she is disposed neither to write frivolous things (*queque levia*), nor to write to her master with false ornamentation (*tam floridum eloquencie vultum depingere*). That it is the nature of eloquence in general and not her capacity for it in particular which is at issue, she indicates specifically, and in some technical detail, by her description of the rhetorically-trained *litteratissimi* for whom, likewise, painted eloquence would not be sufficient to merit an audience with the great master. Her unadorned letters are therefore meant not as a lesser gift, but rather as a greater gift, 'because', as Ward points out, 'they say the moral truth to someone of great virtue, better than polished eloquence from someone whose eloquence may exceed their morals'.²⁹ It is not fitting, she seems to argue, to send painted ladies to a master renowned for his virtue, and this comparison of rhetoric with prostitution, made through the image of the floridly painted face of eloquence, again clearly reveals the influence of Abelard. It is an image he articulates later in

²⁶ This is discussed in my 'Genre, Gender and Authenticity: Readings of Heloise in the Twentieth Century' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sydney, 1999), pp. 47–52.

²⁷ Peter Dronke, *Women Writers of the Middle Ages: A Critical Study of Texts from Perpetua (†203) to Marguerite Porete (†1310)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 111; see also Dronke, 'Heloise, Abelard, and Some Recent Discussions', in *Intellectuals and Poets in Medieval Europe* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1992), pp. 323–42 (p. 326): 'there is evidence that stylistically Heloise was as much a giver as a receiver.'

²⁸ Michael T. Clanchy, *Abelard: A Medieval Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 169.

²⁹ Ward and Chiavaroli, 'The Young Heloise and Latin Rhetoric', p. 89.

his *Carmen* where he argues that false-seeming is an attribute of the traitor and the prostitute who both proceed by false words, and that false-seeming and vice also reside in cosmetic beautification, or ornament, which aims to 'deceive with fraudulent goods'.³⁰ Heloise thus adopts Abelard's beliefs on the deceitful nature of eloquence, but at the same time refuses to yield on the central importance of the master of morals, in fact inverting Abelard's arguments on eloquence to show that it is precisely because he *is* a teacher of virtue that she will not write eloquently to him.

It is a brave attempt to blend their widely varying ideals, and had it succeeded, Heloise would have achieved a remarkable synthesis of the new learning of the twelfth century, with its divorce of eloquence from ethics, and the old learning of the eleventh century in which the figure of the moral master stood supreme as a didactic force. This innovative formulation, however, is not sustained by Heloise in subsequent letters, as the florid Letter 53, with its return to a traditional humility topos and a markedly neutral use of *depingere*, attests. In fact Heloise has difficulty articulating and sustaining this synthesis even in this one passage, as the confused syntax bears witness. Heloise's repudiation of eloquence (*non sufficit tam floridum eloquencie vultum depingere*) breaks off in a sudden, grammatically disjointed and insistent return to the concept of the master of morals: *magistro inquam tanto, magistro virtutibus, magistro moribus*, which itself ends in an appeal to eloquence as the site of Abelard's moral victory over his detractors who will be left *elinguis et mutus*. The two competing ideas do not really fuse; rather, they fall into two distinct halves of the sentence between which even grammatical consistency fails. Even so, the history of rhetoric in the twelfth century should now encompass this attempted assimilation, and the role of women in formulating Latin rhetorical theory and practice should be reconsidered.³¹ As Jaeger declares of the young Heloise: 'In her love language as in her learning, she forges a bold and original amalgamation of old and new.'³²

It is not possible to tell whether Heloise attempts this fusion of ideas in Letter 49

³⁰ *Carmen*, ll. 225–42, 573–76. The classical association of eloquence with prostitution is discussed by Jacqueline Lichtenstein in 'Making Up Representation: The Risks of Femininity' (trans. by Katharine Streip), pp. 77–87 in *Misogyny, Misandry, and Misanthropy*, ed. by R. Howard Bloch and Frances Ferguson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 78–79. Abelard's strong views on the link between the *proditor* and eloquence in the *Carmen* render problematic the line of his Love Letter 113 where he states: *Dicam nam verbis proditor omnis abest* ('I will speak, for a traitor is devoid of words'), *Lost Love Letters*, pp. 288–89.

³¹ For a current assessment of this issue see John O. Ward, 'Women and Latin Rhetoric from Hrotsvit to Hildegard', in *The Changing Tradition: Women in the History of Rhetoric*, ed. by Christine Mason Sutherland and Rebecca Sutcliffe, Papers at the Conference of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric at the University of Saskatchewan in July 1997 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1999), pp. 121–32.

³² 'The "Epistolae duorum amantium" and the Ascription to Heloise and Abelard' (n. 2 above).

because of her own desire to mesh her ideas with those of Abelard, or because she was under specific compositional instruction from him, but to argue either alternative is not to suggest that Heloise always responds meekly to Abelard's instruction. Indeed, the intellectually dynamic nature of their relationship is revealed on occasions, notably those later in the correspondence, when Heloise deliberately plays with and inverts Abelard's precepts on the inherently deceitful nature of words. Thus in a poem in Letter 69 in which she is quite critical of his behaviour towards her, she includes the line: *Eius sermonis credula facta dolis* 'I came to believe in the guile of his speech'.³³ Here she indicates that his words have not been consonant with his actions; she thus proves by his own behaviour his argument that words can deceive. This line also contains an interesting reconsideration of the word *credula*. Heloise used this word earlier in Letter 49 where she stated that she was happy to send Abelard unpolished letters (*impolitas litteras*) because she knew she could trust in his benevolence (*sit michi credula benignitas tua*) to comprehend the true feeling beneath the rough style. In Letter 69, however, she points out that she has now, on the contrary, trusted in his artful, polished phrases, and so must pay the price of knowing herself deceived by his eloquence. In Letter 86 she extends her usual expression of invoking God's witness (*deo teste*) with the phrase: *cui difficile est verba dare fallacie* ('to whom it is difficult to give deceitful words').³⁴ This appears to be a playful refutation of Abelard's assertion that words can never be trusted, as she argues that, on the contrary, words directed towards God cannot be deceitful.

Of particular interest is Heloise's Letter 94 which contains the striking though perplexing assertion: 'You give words to the wind. If you stone me for such things, what would you do to the one inflicting the injuries?' (*Verba das ventis. Si me pro talibus lapidas, quid faceres ferenti iniurias?*).³⁵ The Ovidian phrase *Verba das ventis* picks up Abelard's similar sentiment in Letter 75 (*Verba omitto que ventis similia sunt*) and appears to indicate that his words are worthless because they have not been backed up by actions. As Mews says: 'He is not worthy to be a friend if he throws such stones. His words come too easily.'³⁶ This suggestion is strengthened by her subsequent Letter 95 in which she strongly indicates that she has been constant while he has faltered ('To the imperilled boat not having the anchor of faith, she who is not moved by the winds which fan your faithlessness'; *Navi periclitanti, et anchoram fidei non habenti, illa quam non movent ventosa que tue infidelitati sunt congrua*).³⁷ Thus in Letter 94 she seems to be arguing that for all his rather forceful injunctions to her on the importance of matching words to actions, he has failed to do so himself, and in the process has hurt her—he should now consider what an

³³ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 69, pp. 248–49.

³⁴ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 86, pp. 266–67.

³⁵ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 94, pp. 274–75; my amendment of the translation there.

³⁶ *Lost Love Letters*, p. 22.

³⁷ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 95, pp. 274–75.

appropriate punishment might be for such behaviour. It is interesting to note that in his Letter 96 immediately following these two damning missives from Heloise, Abelard apparently abandons his position on the importance of actions over words, instead adopting one of Heloise's typical literary formulations, describing her as one 'whom neither mind nor tongue is capable of praising enough' (*cuius laudi nec mens nec lingua sufficit*).³⁸

Heloise continues to use Abelard's arguments over the comparative value of words (*verba*) and things (*res*) in her first letter of the later correspondence (Ep. II) in order to prove her contention that Abelard owes her the debt of a letter. For example, in only the second sentence of the epistle, she claims that now she has lost his person (*cujus rem perdidit*), he is required at least to present his image to her in words (*verbis saltem*).³⁹ She returns to this idea at the conclusion of her letter, arguing that his failure to provide her with written communication only underlines his inability to offer her anything more tangible: *Frustra te in rebus duxilem expecto, si in verbis avarum sustineo* ('It is no use my hoping for generosity in deeds if you are grudging in words'),⁴⁰ and that in return for her actions in preceding him to the monastic life at his command, he owes her at the least some correspondence: *si gratiam referas pro gratia, modica pro magnis, verba pro rebus* ('if you give grace in return for grace, small for great, words for deeds').⁴¹

Whatever may be said of Heloise's attempt to encompass a suspicion of eloquence within her personal theory and practice of rhetoric, there can be no doubt that she firmly defends those other features of the 'old' eleventh-century learning—letter-writing (*dictamen*) and the genre of the epistle—from the incursions of a scholasticism which valued rather the genres of treatise, commentary and *summa*.⁴² There are a number of indications in the early love letters that the epistolary exchange is driven by her, such as Letter 6 where Abelard writes that he presents himself to her in a letter 'Because you have so instructed me' (*Quia tu ita precepisti*).⁴³ Heloise notably keeps these discussions of letters and *dictamen* strictly separate from the concurrent discussions of (oral) eloquence ensuing between her and Abelard. This is observed by Ward who writes of her Letter 5: 'Her wish is surprisingly specific—not for eloquence in general but for the dictaminal ability to

³⁸ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 96, pp. 276–77.

³⁹ Ep. II, ed. by Hicks, p. 45, ll. 9–10: 'ut cuius rem perdidit verbis saltem tanquam ejus quadam imagine recreet'.

⁴⁰ Hicks, p. 52, ll. 225–26; Radice, p. 116.

⁴¹ Hicks, p. 52, ll. 244–45; Radice, p. 117.

⁴² See John Van Engen, 'Letters, Schools, and Written Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', pp. 97–132 in *Dialektik und Rhetorik im früheren und hohen Mittelalter: Rezeption, Überlieferung und gesellschaftliche Wirkung antiker Gelehrsamkeit vornehmlich im 9. und 12. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Johannes Fried (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), pp. 129–32.

⁴³ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 6, pp. 192–93.

greet appropriately.⁴⁴ It is also particularly evident in the two letters in which she specifically deals with the nature of words. Thus in Letter 49, following her long and involved disquisition on painted eloquence, masters of morals and unpolished letters, she proceeds by expressing her continuing desire for Abelard's letters, declaring: 'that honey-like sweetness of your writing clings to my heart' (*Heret [...] cordi meo illa tue scriptionis mellita dulcedo*).⁴⁵ Similarly, in Letter 69, having upbraided him for the deceitfulness of his words, she then asks: 'With what sweetness of composition might I appeal to you?' (*Qua dictaminis dulcedine te alloquar*).⁴⁶

Heloise's repeated use of the term *dulcedo* in connection with *dictamen* is also significant, proving revelatory both of the characters of the lovers and of the long-standing nature of Heloise's literary influence on Abelard. Throughout the love letters, the noun *dulcedo* and adjective *dulcis* abound: out of a total of one hundred and thirteen letters or letter-fragments, these words appear eighty-six times in a total of fifty-five letters; as far as it is possible to judge from what are only excerpts, these terms are more commonly used by Abelard than Heloise. Yet there is a striking difference in the usage each writer makes of these terms. Heloise applies them to a whole range of experiences, including, as noted above, those of learning and correspondence; by contrast, Abelard overwhelmingly uses the terms simply as an appellation: twenty-one times he refers to Heloise as *dulcissima*, sometimes using this term alone, sometimes as part of a more hyperbolic construction, such as *o omnium mulierum dulcissima* (Letter 50),⁴⁷ or *o omnium rerum dulcissima* (Letter 54),⁴⁸ or a combination of both: *Vale dulcissima non mulierum, immo generaliter omnium rerum* (Letter 56).⁴⁹ When he uses the term *dulcedo* it almost always refers to something corporeal or sexual, indicating Heloise herself, or her body, or his sexual enjoyment of it, as in, for example, Letter 26: *totus ille copiosissime dulcedinis tue fons ebulliat* ('let that whole fountain of your most abundant sweetness bubble forth')⁵⁰, or Letter 77: *dulcedinem tuam quo plus haurio plus sitio* ('the more I drink of your sweetness, the more I thirst').⁵¹ A similar distinction can be perceived in their respective use of the term *favum*, since Abelard addresses Heloise rather simply in Letter 39 as *super mel et favum dulci* ('sweeter than honey and the honeycomb'),⁵² while Heloise stretches the term to its hermeneutic limits,

⁴⁴ Ward and Chiavaroli, 'The Young Heloise and Latin Rhetoric', p. 74.

⁴⁵ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 49, pp. 230–31.

⁴⁶ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 69, pp. 248–49.

⁴⁷ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 50, p. 232.

⁴⁸ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 54, p. 236.

⁴⁹ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 56, p. 238.

⁵⁰ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 26, pp. 212–13.

⁵¹ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 77, pp. 258–59.

⁵² *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 39, pp. 220–21.

conjoining love, learning and letters in the much-remarked sentence from Letter 53: *De favo sapientie si michi stillaret guttula scibilitatis, aliqua olenti nectare cum omni mentis conamine, alme dilectioni tue litterarum notulis conarer depingere* ('If a droplet of knowability trickled down to me from the honeycomb of wisdom, I would try with every effort of my mind to portray in the jottings of my letter various things with a fragrant nectar for your nourishing love').⁵³ This difference in usage accords with the observation made by both Mews and Ward that in these early love letters, Heloise appears to have integrated love, life and learning, while Abelard remains fixed upon his sexual access to her body.⁵⁴

Yet there is an image of sweetness used by Abelard in these early love letters which resonates significantly in his later writings for Heloise and Astrolabe. On two occasions in the love letters, perhaps inspired by Heloise's example, Abelard describes her speech as sweet. Thus in Letter 42 he describes himself as without 'the refreshment of your sweetest speech' (*nullo dulcissimi sermonis tui refrigerio*),⁵⁵ and in Letter 56 he praises 'Your speech, sweeter than honey' (*Sermo tuus super mel dulcis*).⁵⁶ The interesting distinction might be noted that whereas Heloise associates sweetness with *dictamen* (the written word, the epistle—an idea which she employs again in her first letter of the later correspondence⁵⁷), for Abelard the association is with *sermo* (the spoken word). Subsequently in his theological writings, however, Abelard uses the term *dulcedo* in a thoroughly spiritualized sense, though notably most often in his writings for Heloise and the Paraclete. In his Ep. VII on the History of Nuns he associates it with the singing of hymns to the Lord,⁵⁸ in his Ep. VIII, the Rule for the Nuns, with understanding the words of God (particularly in contrast with the vaniloquence of the words of men),⁵⁹ and in his Sermon VI with the life to

⁵³ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 53, pp. 234–35.

⁵⁴ Mews, *Lost Love Letters*, pp. 18, 25–26, 84; Ward and Chiavaroli, 'The Young Heloise and Latin Rhetoric', pp. 59, 82.

⁵⁵ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 42, pp. 222–23.

⁵⁶ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 56, pp. 238–39.

⁵⁷ Heloise, Ep. II, in Hicks, p. 52, ll. 224–25: 'Dum tui presentia fraudor, verborum saltem votis, quorum tibi copia est, tue michi imaginis presenta dulcedinem'; 'While I am denied your presence, give me at least through your words—of which you have enough and to spare—some sweet semblance of yourself', Radice, p. 116.

⁵⁸ Abelard, Ep. VII, in Hicks, p. 119, ll. 429–31: 'que dum ad celestia se suspendit, quasi terrene habitationis castra deserit, et de ipsa contemplationis sue intima dulcedine hymnum spiritalem summa exultatione Domino persolvit'.

⁵⁹ Abelard, Ep. VIII, ed. by T. P. McLaughlin, 'Abelard's Rule for Religious Women', *Mediaeval Studies*, 18 (1956), 241–92 (p. 287): 'ut vaniloquio vacantes divina tanto amplius fastidiamus eloquia, quanto magis sine dulcedine vel condimento intelligentiae nobis fiunt insipida. Unde et Psalmista, ut supra meminimus: Quam dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua super mel ori meo. Quae quidem dulcedo in quo consisteret statim adnexuit dicens: A mandatis tuis intellexi.'; Radice, pp. 260–61.

come.⁶⁰ Yet it also has for him connotations of sin, especially in his Commentary on Romans where he quotes Augustine on those who are blind with the sweetness of carnal lusts⁶¹ and speaks of those who are enticed by a certain sweetness of taste to the evils of carnal lusts.⁶² A similar usage recurs in the *Carmen* where Abelard writes that for Heloise, the sweetness of her lust has been too great to allow of any penitence.⁶³

It is therefore significant that despite this long history of spiritualized meanings for terms for sweetness (a period of decades having elapsed since the time of the early love letters), when Abelard comes to write his reconciliatory *Planctus* for Heloise,⁶⁴ he reverts to the understandings of sweetness which he and she both employed and discussed in their first correspondence. Thus in his *Planctus Jacob super filios suos*, Abelard has the elderly Jacob reminisce about the first lisping words of his son Benjamin, describing them as: *Informes in facie teneri sermones / Omnem eloquentiae favum transcendent* ('Unformed on your lips, your tender words / every honeyed eloquence surpassing').⁶⁵ And it is tempting to surmise, other explanations notwithstanding, that when Abelard addresses the opening line of his *Carmen ad Astralabium* to *Astralabi fili, uite dulcedo paterne* ('Astrolabe, my son, sweetness of a fatherly life'), he is recalling the unusual words and sentiments of Heloise in her Letter 23 where she requests his pardon for not writing sooner, since, as she says to him: *sis vere dulcedinis filius* ('you are the son of true sweetness').⁶⁶

Heloise's unexpected attack on eloquence in Letter 49 of the early love letters provides a point of entry into an extraordinary intellectual collaboration. The

⁶⁰ *Sermo VI*, PL 178, 426B: 'Qui tanto ardentius vitae hujus amaritudinem appetunt, quanto futurae dulcedinem minus advertunt. [...] Haec dulcedo dicitur abscondita, tanquam eis solis in futurum reposita et reservata, non pro reprobis communicanda'.

⁶¹ *Comm. Rom.*, I (2. 9), *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica I, Commentaria in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos; Apologia contra Bernardum*, ed. by Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM, 11 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), p. 82, l. 203: 'caecati sunt dulcedine carnalium uoluptatum'.

⁶² *Comm. Rom.*, IV (12. 3), p. 274, ll. 36–37: 'ut experientia uoluptatum quasi cuiusdam saporis dulcedine illecti, mala ipsa cognoscant'.

⁶³ *Carmen*, ll. 377–78: 'uoluptatis dulcedo tanta sit huius / ne grauet ulla satisfactio propter eam'.

⁶⁴ On the reconciliatory function of the *Planctus* see my 'Quae maternae immemor naturae: The Rhetorical Struggle over the Meaning of Motherhood in the Writings of Heloise and Abelard', pp. 323–39 in *Listening to Heloise*, especially pp. 332–36; and 'Planctus magis quam cantici: The Generic Significance of Abelard's *Planctus*', *Plainsong and Medieval Music*, 11 (2002), 37–44.

⁶⁵ Latin edition by Wilhelm Meyer, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur mittellateinischen Rythmik* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1905; repr. Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1970), p. 368; English translation by Ruys and Ward, *The Repentant Abelard*.

⁶⁶ *Lost Love Letters*, Letter 23, pp. 206–07.

moment in which Heloise stretches herself to incorporate Abelard's forceful views on plainness of style and the nature of eloquence, while maintaining her faith in the role of the master as pre-eminent in virtues, lays bare the mechanics of this intellectual partnership. Revealed there is the master of twelfth-century learning who learns to value speech as 'sweet', an image to which he will return many years later in a tender lament written about his son and for his wife; there also is the young woman who strove to disengage *dictamen* from its union with eloquence so that her delight in letter-writing could at least be spared in the new world of scholasticism, and who, out of love for and obedience to a beloved master, attempted to span the divide between two disparate schools of learning.

II

Voices of Reform

Satire, Irony, and Humour in William of Malmesbury

RODNEY M. THOMSON

The twelfth century was an age of irony. More satire was written than at any other period of Western history, and some of it is of high quality.¹ Its manifestations were multifarious: mostly in Latin but sometimes in a vernacular or a mixture of both, in prose and verse, following classical or classically based patristic norms or else entirely independent, occurring as whole works or as passages within larger, essentially non-satirical writings, on a spectrum ranging from serious polemic at one end to sheer fun at the other. The reasons for the dramatic increase in popularity of the mode were doubtless manifold. One of them was clearly a European-wide expansion in the teaching of grammar and rhetoric, the basic texts of which included the ancient satirists Juvenal and Persius. There was also increased interest in the polemical writings of St Jerome, himself steeped in the same ancient texts.² Our honorand has not

¹ John Yunck, *The Lineage of Lady Meed: The Development of Mediaeval Venality Satire* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1963); John Yunck, 'Economic Conservatism, Papal Finance, and the Medieval Satires on Rome', *Mediaeval Studies*, 23 (1961), 334–51, repr. in *Change in Medieval Society*, ed. by Sylvia Thrupp (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), pp. 72–85; Josef Benzinger, *Invectiva in Romam: Romkritik in Mittelalter vom 9. bis 12. Jahrhundert* (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1968); Helga Schüppert, *Kirchenkritik in der lateinischen Lyrik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Fink, 1972); Rodney M. Thomson, 'The Origins of Latin Satire in Twelfth-Century Europe', *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch*, 13 (1978), 73–83, repr. in *England and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), xi; Valerie I. J. Flint, 'The *Historia Regum Britanniae* of Geoffrey of Monmouth: Parody and its Purpose', *Speculum*, 54 (1979), 447–68; Jill Mann, 'Satiric Subject and Satiric Object in Goliardic Literature', *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch*, 15 (1980), 63–86; Ian M. Resnick, "'Risus monasticus": Laughter and Medieval Monastic Culture', *Revue Bénédictine*, 97 (1987), 90–100; Martha Bayless, *Parody in the Middle Ages: The Latin Tradition* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

² On Juvenal and Persius in the twelfth century, see Bernhard Bischoff, 'Living with the Satirists', in *Classical Influences on European Culture A.D. 500–1500*, ed. by R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 83–94; on Jerome's

written directly on the topic of satire in twelfth-century Europe, but the subject has always been dear to his heart, and it was his interest in it that stimulated my own, both in the phenomenon itself, and in individual examples such as the *Tractatus Garsiae*, the *Gospel of S. Mark-of-Silver*, and the writings of Berengar of Poitiers, defender of Peter Abelard.³

William of Malmesbury (ca 1090–ca 1143), Benedictine monk, historian of England, and omnivorous reader of the Latin classics, did not write satire as such,⁴ but his view of the world was an ironic one, he liked to season his writing with ‘Roman salt’ (‘romano sale condire’),⁵ and irony, satire and humour permeate his historical works to an unusual extent. There seem to be at least three explanations for this: William’s intensive reading of ancient literature, his view of human nature (especially of motivation, and thus of the course of human history), and his conception of the role of the historian.

If he were alive today we should regard William as a formidably armed classicist, in view of the breadth and depth of his reading, and the philological and historical skills he brought to bear upon it. Virgil and Lucan were easily his most quoted classical authors, but Horace, Juvenal, and Persius were well known to him, as was the comic playwright Terence, though apparently not Plautus.⁶

influence as a satirist, see Constant J. Mews, ‘Un lecteur de Jérôme au XIIe siècle: Pierre Abélard’, in *Jérôme entre l’occident et l’orient: Actes du Colloque de Chantilly (septembre 1986)*, ed. by Yves-Marie Duval (Paris, 1988), pp. 429–44 (pp. 442–44); Berengar of Poitiers, defender of Abelard (see the next note), made extensive use of Jerome in his works.

³ *Tractatus Garsiae or The Translation of the Relics of SS. Gold and Silver*, ed. and trans. by Rodney M. Thomson, *Textus Minores* 46 (Leiden: Brill, 1972); ‘The Satirical Works of Berengar of Poitiers: An Edition with Introduction’, *Mediaeval Studies*, 42 (1980), 89–139, repr. in my *England and the 12th-Century Renaissance*, XIII.

⁴ Short biographies, together with relevant literature, are in my *William of Malmesbury* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1987), Chapter 1, and William of Malmesbury, *Gesta regum Anglorum* (henceforward *GR*), I, ed. and trans. by Roger A. B. Mynors, Rodney M. Thomson, and Michael Winterbottom; II, general introduction and commentary by Rodney M. Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998–99), II, xxxv–xlvi. To the literature should be added Heinz Richter, *Englische Geschichtsschreiber des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Jüncker und Dunnhaupt, 1938), pp. 54–125; Bernard Guenée, ‘L’histoire entre l’éloquence et la science. Quelques remarques sur le prologue de Guillaume de Malmesbury à ses *Gesta Regum Anglorum*’, in *Comptes rendus des séances, Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* (1982), 357–70; John Gillingham, ‘Civilizing the English? The English Histories of William of Malmesbury and David Hume’, *Historical Research*, 74 (2001), 17–43. I also refer to William’s *Gesta pontificum Anglorum* (henceforward *GP*), ed. by Nicholas E. S. A. Hamilton (London: Rolls Series, 1870), new edition and translation by Michael Winterbottom and Rodney M. Thomson forthcoming in the series Oxford Medieval Texts. *GR* is cited by chapter and subsection, *GP* by chapter and page-number in Hamilton’s edition. The translations are our own.

⁵ *GR* Book 1 Prol. 4.

⁶ Thomson, *William of Malmesbury*, p. 16. Although Plautus was rare in twelfth-century Europe, William’s apparent ignorance is a little strange, because a copy of the first eight plays was made at Salisbury in the late eleventh century: BL Royal 15 C. xi,

The satirists are quoted throughout his historical works, though not copiously and not always with satirical intent; on the other hand William lifted ironic quotations, or applied in an ironical way quotations from non-satirical writers, above all Virgil. He also quotes sharp sayings of Jerome, whose polemical and other works he excerpted in his florilegium, the *Polyhistor*.⁷

Generally speaking, William's irony has a serious moral undertone, and is directed against contemporary or near-contemporary leaders in Church and State. His opinion of his own day was characteristically ambivalent: the Normans had halted the decline of the English Church, and standards of learning were superior to those of earlier ages.⁸ But greed and immorality were, if anything, on the increase.⁹

[I]n our day ambition has so changed and corrupted everything in England that what men of old gave so generously to monasteries is scattered abroad to suit the greed of the owners rather than going to serve the lives of monks, guests, and the poor.¹⁰

[I]t is now openly said, even in the streets, that he is unsuitable for a bishopric who is unwilling or unable to mis-employ worldly power in the pursuits of the forest, the stimulation of the appetites, the elaboration of dress, and the rowdiness of his retinue. Little or no account is taken of the winning of souls. And when it is objected that bishops were once looked to for piety and education, not ambition and money, people answer: 'Now we have another age, and other ways to suit the age,'¹¹ thus employing a fluent reply to soften the harshness of the charge.¹²

And of a particular individual, Ralph, bishop of Chichester (1091–1123):

Three times each year he would go round the diocese to preach, demanding nothing from the people by virtue of his bishop's powers, but gratefully receiving anything they offered. I should not mention this, were it not that in our own age it is accounted a miracle if a bishop shows any skill in preaching or any moderation in receiving.¹³

fols 113–84. See Rodney M. Thomson, 'British Library Royal 15 C. xi: A Manuscript of Plautus' Plays from Salisbury Cathedral', *Scriptorium*, 40 (1986), 82–87, repr. in my *England and the 12th-Century Renaissance*, xvii.

⁷ William of Malmesbury, *Polyhistor: A Critical Edition*, ed. by Helen Testroet Ouellette (Binghamton: State University of New York, 1982). Characteristic quotations from Jerome appear in GR 1 Prol. 7, 15. 4, 215; 4, Prol. 4, 339. 3, 419. 4.

⁸ GR, 461. 2, 444. 1; GP, 80 (p. 177).

⁹ For example GR, 279. 2; 314, 338–39, GP, 68 (p. 127), 73 (p. 146 n. 4), 90 (p. 194), 122 (p. 263 n. 2).

¹⁰ GR, 84. 7. This could be a misunderstanding of the difficulties of founding large and well-endowed new houses in the early twelfth century: Richard W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970, 1982), pp. 245–48.

¹¹ *Hildeberti carmina minora*, ed. by B. Scott (Leipzig: Teubner, 1969), no. 17, line 7.

¹² GP, 73 (p. 146 n. 4).

¹³ GP, 96 (p. 206).

But William's greatest exemplar of the 'old' episcopal virtues was Wulfstan II of Worcester (1062–95) who, like Ralph, engaged vigorously in open-air preaching and conducted baptisms and confirmations free of charge. Once again, William describes these activities in contrast to the alleged common practice of his own time.¹⁴

From around 1100 the most prominent object of satire and criticism by men of letters in Western Europe was Rome and the papacy, seen as the source of the greed and corruption so widespread throughout the Church.¹⁵ A topos in itself, its literary expression was in terms of a plethora of widely shared topoi. William was fully cognizant of, and sympathetic to this tradition, often exceeding his sources (notably Eadmer of Canterbury) in targeting popes of whose actions he otherwise approved. A good deal of this occurs in the context of his account of Archbishop Anselm's difficulties with contemporary kings and popes over the vexed matter of investitures. For instance, in describing the machinations at Rome of the royal clerk and envoy William de Warelwast, later bishop of Exeter:

[He] went about the business with his usual art, bribing individuals with presents and promises; and finally he won the king an extension to Michaelmas. Urban did not grant this quickly, for he was torn between the religious claims of Anselm and the gifts on offer; but in the end money won the day. Is that how it is, then, that cash always overcomes, always weighs down the scales? A sorry state of affairs, that in the mind of such a man as Urban reputation should count so cheap, God should be forgotten, money should outrun justice! It seemed best to Anselm not to waste time looking for anything from so corrupt a man, but to go back to Lyon.¹⁶

And a little later, during negotiations over the primacy of Canterbury versus the claims of York:

If the pope had at this point said expressly 'the church of Canterbury had such and such dignities, and I confirm them to it,' he would have resolved the dispute and put an end to any controversy; but by saying 'we do not diminish its authentic privileges in any way', he left the matter in the air and as undecided as before. This is typical of the way in which the clever Romans turn to rhetorical ploys, and use hollow evasion to delay whatever they wish, not bothering about the trouble they cause others so long as they forward their own advantage.¹⁷

¹⁴ GP, 137 (p. 278): 'He did not, as some [priests] did then and still do, sing the mass cursorily in the morning, and then spend the rest of the day intent on food and profit. [...] He needed no more than the offerings of the faithful to support his austere life.' And in William's *Vita Wulfstani*, in William of Malmesbury, *Saints' Lives*, ed. and trans. by Michael Winterbottom and Rodney M. Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 8–155: i. 14. 2, after saying that Wulfstan continued to act as a monk when bishop: 'He was far removed indeed from the men produced in our century'.

¹⁵ See the article by Yunck and monograph by Benzinger cited in n. 1 above.

¹⁶ GP, 54 (pp. 101–02).

¹⁷ GP, 70 (pp. 130–31).

Famously, in the *Gesta regum*¹⁸ William discusses the character of Rome and Romans in the context of the First Crusade:

As for Rome, once mistress of the world and now [...] more like a small town, and the Romans, in olden times 'lords of the world, those who the toga wore',¹⁹ and now known as the most inactive of mankind, who put justice on the scales against gold and set a price on canon law—as for Rome, what I might try to say of the city and its citizens has been forestalled by these lines of Hildebert.

He then quotes the whole of Hildebert of Le Mans' great elegy on the destruction of ancient Rome, which terminates with the couplet:

Thrice happy Rome, were she of tyrants free,
Or were her lords ashamed to break their troth.²⁰

He did not quote its twin, the elegy²¹ in which Christian Rome repudiates the negative message of the first.

Turning to English bishops, it comes as no surprise that William was critical of many of them on the score of simony above all, and of greed and luxury more generally. Nor are the persons selected for targeting a surprise, for most of them were criticized by others: the simoniacs Stigand of Canterbury and Herbert Losinga of Norwich, and the worldly Ranulf Flambard of Durham, though the last two are admitted to have eventually redeemed themselves.²² Herbert Losinga (1090/1–1119) is perhaps our best example, for William quotes extracts from an anonymous contemporary verse satire about him:

The son a bishop, the father an abbot: Simons both!
What might we too not hope for, if we had the money?
Money is now the master: it does what it would, it adds or takes away;
O the injustice of it! Bishop and abbot are made by money!²³

Herbert's bad behaviour is linked by William back to Roman venality. Having later repented, the bishop went to Rome to resign his staff and ring, and 'was allowed by the great mercy of the Holy See to receive them back. In Rome they think it more in accordance with religion and good order that the funds of all the churches should be subservient to their own coffers, rather than be drafted into the service of any old prince'.²⁴ In the heavy sarcasm there is a clear hint that

¹⁸ GR, 351.

¹⁹ Virgil, *Aeneis*, I. 282.

²⁰ *Hildeberti carmina minora*, no. 37.

²¹ *Hildeberti carmina minora*, no. 38.

²² GR, 199. 10–11, GP, 23 (pp. 35–36) (Stigand); GR, 338–39, GP, 74 (pp. 151–52) (Herbert); GR, 314. 1–4, 394. 2, GP, 134 (p. 274) (Ranulf).

²³ GR, 338. 2.

²⁴ GR, 339. 1.

Herbert in effect obtained forgiveness with the aid of bribery. There is also a clear realization that the papal position on simony and lay investiture involved, not a cessation, but a diversion, of money paid for benefices.²⁵

Ranulf Flambard (1099–1128) is also censured for greed, but there is more:

What too of the fact that he more than once made monks—against their will of course, for they are most religious persons—dine in his hall, serving up forbidden food to them in public? And, to outrage their scruples still further, he would tell off very pretty girls of pert figure and face to serve their drinks, in skin-tight dresses and with their hair loose down their backs. And here was a choice piece of mockery! Any monk who either cast his eyes modestly on the ground, or shrugged off the bishop's impudent behaviour with over-free jests, did not escape reproof, the one for hypocrisy, the other for lack of respect. Yet this man, so efficient in worldly affairs, and so lazy in those of the spirit, tried to obscure and gloss over these and similar offences by the ornamentation he lavished on his church.²⁶

The reference to monks as 'most religious persons' was presumably tongue-in-cheek. One also suspects a degree of enjoyment on the part of William, not too successfully disguised by the note of moral indignation.

All of these sins and sinners are unexceptional as targets of monastic criticism. But in a passage in the *Gesta pontificum* William was prepared to cast aspersions on one of his and other persons' more admired figures, none less than Archbishop Lanfranc himself, yet again with a sideswipe at Rome:

For his part, Lanfranc managed [King William I] with a holy skill, not sternly upbraiding what he did wrong, but mixing jokes in with his serious language. In this way, he could usually bring him back to a right mind, and mould him to his own opinions. But if he had thought of taking a hard line, he would surely have wasted his effort. The king was beyond measure in his swelling pride, often doing things that could be justified only by the vastness of his power, not any consideration of innocence. [...] What all this implied will be seen by anyone who knows that everything is for sale at Rome, everything in England, so long as supplies of money hold out. [...] He used to say that the pope and his own bishops alike could be persuaded by gifts from enforcing the rigour of the canon law; indeed it was explicitly rumoured that even Lanfranc did not refrain from taking money, and that it was wheeled in by bishops and abbots, to ensure their going scot free when they had done wrong.²⁷

William later expunged this passage, and his final verdict on Lanfranc is one of unalloyed admiration. Yet even on his earlier, more ambivalent view, Lanfranc

²⁵ Yunk, 'Economic Conservatism', pp. 77–82.

²⁶ *GP*, 134 (p. 274 n. 5).

²⁷ *GP*, 42β. This passage was omitted by Hamilton from his edition; it is printed and translated, with commentary, by its rediscoverer, Michael Winterbottom, 'A New Passage of William of Malmesbury's *Gesta Pontificum*', *Journal of Medieval Latin*, 11 (2001), 50–59.

was still a reformer, and one of William's rare sallies below the level of great prelates relates to the behaviour of the monks of Christ Church Canterbury prior to Lanfranc's arrival:

The monks of Canterbury, like all monks at that period, were hardly to be distinguished from lay persons, except in their reluctance to betray their chastity.²⁸ They wasted time hunting with hounds; they pursued avian prey by setting raptors on them in the sky; they straddled the back of the foaming steed,²⁹ shook dice, drank deep; too choosy in their diet and too elaborate in their dress, they did not know the meaning of frugality, and refused to be sparing; and so on—you might, from the size of their staff, have thought them consuls rather than monks.³⁰

William also vented his irony on unsuccessful and oppressive kings. He was more than anyone else responsible for the negative image of Æthelred II transmitted to modern times.³¹

The king meanwhile, active and well-built for slumber, put off such important business and lay yawning; and if he ever thought better of it to the extent of even rising on one elbow, at once sloth was too much for him or Fortune was against him, and he sank back into wretchedness.³²

Thurkil meanwhile sent to invite Swein [Forkbeard, king of Denmark], to come to England, saying that it was a splendid rich country, with a king who was asleep and snoring; given to women and wine, he thought of nothing so little as fighting, which made him unpopular with his own people and a laughing-stock to others; his generals disloyal, his subjects weak, both liable to leave the field at the first blast of the trumpet.³³

William expressed an ambivalent view of the Conqueror, in the earliest versions of *GR* and *GP*,³⁴ but the king singled out for special attention and critical assessment is William Rufus. William's attitude to this man was complex. There is on the one hand moral outrage at the spectacle of great natural gifts gradually being overtaken by, and perverted into, viciousness, particularly greed and cynicism.³⁵ But there is also a distinct feeling of frisson about

²⁸ Is even this sarcasm? A few lines later, William mentions Lanfranc's efforts to detach the monks from their illegitimate offspring.

²⁹ Compare Ovid, *Met.*, VIII. 34.

³⁰ *GP*, 44 (p. 70).

³¹ Simon Keynes, 'The Declining Reputation of King Aethelred the Unready', in *Ethelred the Unready*, ed. by David Hill, British Archaeological Reports, British Ser. 59 (Oxford, 1978), pp. 227–53.

³² *GR*, 165. 7.

³³ *GR*, 176.

³⁴ *GR*, 279. 2, but even many unexpurgated passages are ambivalent: 254, the rest of 279; *GP*, 42β (translated above, p. 106).

³⁵ *GR*, 312.

William's revelations of the king's freethinking, and he was also clearly captivated by the king's dry wit. William the ironist could not resist being attracted by such a rich sense of irony in another. It is a sign of William's particular engagement with his subject that more classical reminiscences are deployed by him in characterizing Rufus (in the *Gesta regum*) than any other. In describing the king's quirky sense of humour, for example, he invoked two passages in Suetonius:

Intus et in triclinio cum priuatis omni lenitate accommodus, multa ioco transigebat; facetissimus quoque de aliquo suo perperam facto cauillator, ut inuidiam facti dilueret et ad sales transferret.³⁶

(Suetonius, *Vesp.* 22) Et super cenam autem et semper alias comissimus multa ioco transigebat[...] (23. 1) Maxime tamen dicacitatem adfectabat in deformibus lucris, ut inuidiam aliqua cauillatione dilueret transferretque ad sales.

The very next chapter begins with a disquisition on the difference between true generosity and mere wastefulness, heavily dependent upon Cicero, *De officiis*, followed by an amusing story, unique to William, illustrating Rufus' irresponsible attitude to money:

The cost of his clothes he liked to be immensely inflated, and spurned them if anyone reduced it. For instance, one morning when he was putting on some new shoes, he asked his valet what they had cost. 'Three shillings,' the man replied, at which the king flew into a rage. 'You son of a bitch!', he cried; 'since when has a king worn such trumpery shoes? Go and get me some that cost a mark of silver.' The servant went off and returned with a much cheaper pair, pretending they had been bought at the price specified. 'Why,' said the king, 'these are a good fit for the royal majesty.' So the servant henceforward paid what price he liked for the royal wardrobe, and made a good thing out of it.³⁷

But it was the king's disrespect for the Church and apparent lack of real Christian belief which particularly caught William's attention.

[B]efore long reports multiplied that [Pope] Urban was dead, and that before the term which had been assigned to William. For he had given him a respite till Michaelmas, so that this consideration might soften him and make him collect and send Peter's Pence more assiduously. But William, after much beating about the bush, finally refused to pay up. When he heard news of the pope's death, he said: 'God's hatred go with the man who cares.' Not satisfied with that, he added: 'It has worked out well for me that he did not get my money.' When he asked about the character of Urban's successor, and was told that he was in some respects similar to Anselm, he said: 'By the Face of Lucca, if that is what he is like, he doesn't matter. If he is to be pope, I will do what I like.' [...] His belief was that everything is in the hands of fate; he thought, and said openly, that none of the saints can help us, often remarking provocatively: 'Of course those long dead are

³⁶ GR, 312. 3.

³⁷ GR, 313. 3.

concerned to interfere in our affairs!’ [...] A number of people accused of taking deer he ordered to be examined one and all by ordeal of hot iron. When two days later they all turned up with no trace of burning, he was unreasonably upset, and burst out: ‘What is this? Is God a just judge? Perish the man who believes *that* in future! By the hills and vales, people will answer to my judgement in future, not God’s, which is at the mercy of the last request He gets.’³⁸

When Gundulf bishop of Rochester warned him to live a more temperate life, after a severe illness interpreted by many as a reprimand from God, William has him say ‘By the Face of Lucca, God will never make a better man of me by any ill He may do me.’³⁹ Some of these stories appear in other sources, but William multiplies them; perhaps the most outrageous is of the king’s alleged intention to stage an outdoor debate between Christian and Jewish leaders, stating his intention of converting to Judaism if he thought that that side had won.

William was certainly racist, even to the point of paranoia.⁴⁰ He saw Celts as inferior to the English,⁴¹ Greeks and Saracens as inferior to Europeans,⁴² Scandinavians (while they were pagan) as violent and lecherous;⁴³ he was strongly and unpleasantly anti-Semitic.⁴⁴ Thus he has Pope Urban II, in his speech at Clermont, dilate upon the relatively small numbers of Christians in the world: ‘There remains Europe, the third division of the world, and how small a part of that do we Christians live in! For all those barbarous peoples who in far-distant islands frequent the ice-bound Ocean, living as they do like beasts—who could call them Christians?’ This is the backdrop to William’s own description of part of the response to the famous speech:

³⁸ *GP*, 55 (p. 104 n. 1).

³⁹ *GP*, 49 (p. 83 n. 4).

⁴⁰ John Gillingham, *The English in the Twelfth Century: Imperialism, National Identity and Political Values* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), pp. 9–10, 13, 18, 27–29.

⁴¹ His views on Celts (Irish, Scots, Welsh and Bretons) are collected together and commented on in *GR*, II, p. 371.

⁴² *GR*, 225. 4, 262. 5 (Greeks), though William was not as anti-Byzantine as many of his contemporaries: Thomson, *William of Malmesbury*, p. 181, quoting from William’s unprinted *Commentary on Lamentations*, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodl. 868, fol. 34^v (Saracens).

⁴³ *GP*, 259 (p. 412).

⁴⁴ Documented by Peter N. Carter, ‘The Historical Content of William of Malmesbury’s Miracles of the Virgin Mary’, in *The Writing of History in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Richard William Southern*, ed. by Ralph H. C. Davis and others (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 146–54. A striking example, not known to Carter, is in William’s unprinted *Commentary on Lamentations*, in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodl. 868, fol. 41, after a series of quotations showing that the Jews have always been exprobrated: ‘Nunc quoque ut de Christianis sileam, quorum ad eos discidium ubique terrarum scitur, Sarracenis etiam sunt opprobrio, quos obliqua gentis linea et secte respiciunt instituto. Nam quamdumque male fidei et praeue notant ingenii hoc infamant dicto “Iudeus est.” Quod a tali uiro audiui, quem puderet mentiri.’

The central areas were not alone in feeling the force of this emotion: it affected all who in the remotest islands or among barbarian tribes had heard the call of Christ. The time had come for the Welshman to give up hunting in his forests, the Scotsman forsook his familiar fleas, the Dane broke off his long drawn-out potatoes, the Norwegian left his diet of raw fish.⁴⁵

These peoples are not 'barbarians' because they are unbelievers; rather vice versa: they are not to be classified as Christian because they *are* barbarian. For William, to be barbarian meant to be uncivilized.⁴⁶ One index of 'civilization' was the literal fact of living in cities, and reflections on this call forth more of his irony. The Scots are 'more used to lurking obscurely in bogs than to living in high cities.'⁴⁷ And he is even harder on the Irish:

What would Ireland be worth without the goods that come in by sea from England? The soil lacks all advantages, and so poor, or rather unskilful, are its cultivators that it can produce only a ragged mob of rustic Irishmen outside the towns; the English and French, with their more civilized way of life (*cultiori genere uitae*), live in the towns, and carry on trade and commerce.⁴⁸

Underpinning all of this is William's ironic (rather than simply pessimistic) view of human nature and the course of history, which he saw as dominated by chance, and by an ineluctable tendency towards decline and fall in human affairs. Some of William's classical reading may have been responsible for this: Justin's epitome of Livy, and both of the Senecas.⁴⁹ After an admiring account of the origins of the Cistercians, he ends with a sober reflection deriving from Seneca the Elder: 'Their hope is to abide by their resolution and set an example to their successors, whom any relaxation will dispose to sin. And so, to be sure, it will be—such is human weakness, whose unfailing principle it is that nothing won by great toil can long endure.'⁵⁰ This tendency in human nature influenced not only events themselves, but the way in which they were reported: 'It is always so: disgraces are never forgotten, good fortune barely finds a mention in

⁴⁵ GR, 348. 2.

⁴⁶ William's concept of 'civilization' is discussed perceptively, with a challenging general application, by Gillingham, 'Civilizing the English? The English Histories of William of Malmesbury and David Hume', 21–42.

⁴⁷ GP, 72 (p. 135).

⁴⁸ GR, 409. 1.

⁴⁹ There is much in William that recalls Livy himself, but none of Livy's text was available in England until later in the century: Leighton D. Reynolds, 'Livy', in *Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics*, ed. by Leighton D. Reynolds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 205–14, at p. 209. However, his deep interest in Justin is documented by Guenée (n. 4 above). For his use of both Senecas, see Thomson, *William of Malmesbury*, pp. 27–30, 56, 206.

⁵⁰ GR, 337. 5. Compare Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae*, I. pr. 7: 'fato [...] cuius maligna perpetuaque in rebus omnibus lex est ut ad perducta rursus ad infimum [...] relabantur.'

the chronicles, whether this be intentional or due to a flaw in human nature, for the memory of benefits is short, while "aeternum quae nocuere dolent" (Ausonius, *Caesares*, 92–93).⁵¹ William never enunciates a strongly providential view of history, and never once refers to the traditional overarching framework beginning with Creation and terminating with the Last Judgement. There is no sense of the imminence of 'the last days' in any of his historical writing nor, indeed any prophecies or even calculated guesses about what might happen in the immediate future. 'Fortuna', metaphorically personified as a goddess, is invoked nearly as often as the will of God: about a dozen times in the *Gesta pontificum*, much more prominently (thirty-four times) in the *Gesta regum*.⁵² One quotation sums up William's view, which is not what one might expect from a devout and theologically aware monk: 'Our life is a dice-board, on which Fortune with her unexpected throws makes game of mortal men.'⁵³ Even more remarkably, on one occasion Fortune is imagined as being in competition with Divine Providence itself. Describing Rufus' good luck (which William found inexplicable because it ran counter to his bad character), William dares to say that 'he so completely benefited from the play of chance that God might have been thought to be vying with Fortune to do him service'.⁵⁴

Although an orthodox believer in the miraculous, and in divine intervention in human affairs, William more often than not preferred to offer mundane, even cynical human motivation and causation for historical events. Two examples will show how he modified in this direction stories which came to him already laden with a different interpretation. Perhaps the most extraordinary is his explanation for the summoning of the Council of Clermont:

In the year of our Lord 1095, Pope Urban II [...] crossed the Alps and arrived in Gaul. The ostensible purpose of his journey was to seek recognition from the churches this side of the Alps [...]. He had, however, a less immediate aim which was not so widely known: to arouse almost all Europe, on the advice of Bohemond, for an expedition into Asia, in order that in the great confusion that would ensue in every province, which would make it easy to hire auxiliary troops, Urban might overrun Rome, and Bohemond Illyricum and Macedonia.⁵⁵

In its details the interpretation is scarcely credible; but in its perception that initiating such a crusade would on the one hand enhance Urban's standing as a European leader, and on the other enable Bohemond to satisfy his territorial

⁵¹ *GR*, 15. 1.

⁵² *GP*, 50 (pp. 91–92), 55 (p. 103), 71 (p. 132), 75 (p. 160), 83 (p. 183), 100 (p. 222), Book 4, Prol. (p. 277), 187 (p. 331), 192 (pp. 337–38)*, 222 (p. 373), 232 (p. 386); *GR*, 2. 2, 3. 2, 5. 1, 8. 3*, 17. 2**, 47. 4, 48. 4, 50. 2, 79*, 107. 3, 127. 2 and 3, 135. 9, 139. 4, 165. 7, 177. 6, 180. 8, 181. 6, 189. 1, 196. 6, 201. 5, 228. 1*, 251. 3*, 256. 2, 270**, 333. 7, 347. 7, 380. 2, 383. 3, 389. 7 and 10**, 396. 1, 398. 5, 419. 5. * = Fortune's wheel; ** = Fortune as dice-player.

⁵³ *GR*, 17. 2.

⁵⁴ *GP*, 50 (p. 91).

⁵⁵ *GR*, 344. 1.

ambitions, it is not lacking in shrewdness—even if it benefits from hindsight. The second example also concerns Bohemond and the crusade.⁵⁶ William's main written source, Fulcher of Chartres, attributed the capture of Antioch (3 June 1098), after a dreadfully hard siege, to a miracle. William however, for once preferred to follow the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*, in attributing the capture to Bohemond's bribery of an unscrupulous defender,⁵⁷ a vivid illustration of 'ordinary' human motives: Bohemond's cunning and the defender's greed. Far from supernatural assistance being involved, the traitor, 'to cover the scandal of his treachery by an excuse that none could overlook, had given his son to Bohemond as a hostage, declaring that he did so by the express command of Christ given him in a dream.'

Finally, we come to William's view of his task as a historian. This can only be glimpsed indirectly and by implication and, as usual with William, it is also complex and not without contradictions. It includes, on the one hand, the traditional Christian moral imperative: the responsibility of the historian to present, with commentary, examples of good and bad conduct—preferably good in fact.⁵⁸ On the other, the historian must lace this serious matter with light relief, material designed to entertain and refresh the reader, before plunging him into the next round of serious historical narrative with its moral overlay. Finally, and less usual in a medieval writer, the historian had to be a detached and critical observer of, and commentator on both past and present. In particular, the mighty in the land were to be scrutinized, and their failures to live up to the ideals and expectations inherent in their office exposed. Style was important in relation to achieving at least the last two goals.

Not all modern scholars have appreciated William's irony. In comparing him with his older contemporary, Eadmer of Canterbury, Richard Southern wrote that 'for those who prefer lucidity to wit, original observation to learning, and a certain naive candour to a strain of sour vindictiveness, Eadmer will appear the better man and the better historian.'⁵⁹ Rees Davies has spoken of William's 'toffey-nosed Englishness' and 'fawning Francophilia'.⁶⁰ But William was not always sour and ironic. He also had a straightforward and occasionally earthy sense of humour. Some of this emerges in his entertaining stories about German emperors.⁶¹ Probably, though, his two best jokes concern the Irish philosopher John the Scot and his patron Charles the Bald, and I end in the hope that our honorand will enjoy them:

⁵⁶ *GR*, 363.

⁵⁷ *Gesta Francorum*, ed. and trans. by Rosalind M. Hill (Edinburgh and London: Nelson, 1962), Chapter 20 (pp. 44–45).

⁵⁸ As William explains, for example, in *GR* Book 3, Prol. 1–2, 316.

⁵⁹ Richard W. Southern, *St Anselm and his Biographer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 274.

⁶⁰ Rees R. Davies, *The Matter of Britain and the Matter of England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 10.

⁶¹ *GR*, 189–94, 290–93.

He [John] was a witty and pleasant man, as stories about him witness to this day. For instance, he had sat down to dine opposite the king, on the other side of the table. As the drinks circulated and the courses went by, Charles grew jovial, and after some other remarks, noticing that John had done something that offended against Gallic *politesse*, he told him off urbanely with the words: 'What is the difference between a sot and a Scot?' John turned the old rebuke back against its author, saying: 'Only this table.' What could be wittier? The king's question had concerned different kinds of behaviour. John replied in terms of the spatial gap that separated the two men. But the king was not put out: under the spell of his wonderful learning, he would not cross his master (as he used to call him) even in words. Again, when a servant had offered the king at dinner a platter containing two giant fish and a rather small one, he handed it to his 'master' to share out between two clerks sitting next to him. *They* were giants, John a tiny man. Always one to find some unexceptionable method of amusing the diners, he kept the two bigger fish for himself and divided the single small one between the two of them. When the king criticized the unfairness of this distribution, he said: 'On the contrary, I have been perfectly fair. Here is one small one' (meaning himself) 'and two big ones' (touching the fish). And turning to the clerks, he said; 'Here are two big ones' (nodding at them) 'and one small' (touching the fish as before).⁶²

Such stories—and one thinks of those about Gerbert the magician, the semi-magical world of the German emperors, the witch of Berkeley and so on—were partly intended by William as non-serious 'light relief'. 'Variety' was an important ingredient of his historical style, and that reminds one of the classical definition of satire as 'farrago', a mixture of subjects and styles in which the literary genre imitates and comments upon the chaos, contradictions and absurdities of real life. In this respect, William is at or near the beginning of what was by the end of the century a recognizably English satirical tradition, in which stood also John of Salisbury and, more centrally, Nigel Wireker, Walter Map, and Gerald of Wales.⁶³ It was not so much engaged in by other historians, with one notable and ironic exception: for William was himself to be criticized and parodied by Geoffrey of Monmouth in his *Historia Regum Britannie*.⁶⁴

⁶² GP, 240 (pp. 392–93). The source of these stories is unknown; they are unique to William.

⁶³ On John of Salisbury as satirist, see my 'What is the *Entheticus*?', in *The World of John of Salisbury*, ed. by Michael Wilks, Studies in Church History Subsidia 3 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 287–301, repr. in my *England and the 12th-Century Renaissance*, xii. For the others, see Egbert Türk, *Nugae Curialium: le règne d'Henri II Plantagenêt 1154–1189, et l'éthique politique* (Geneva: Droz, 1977).

⁶⁴ Christopher N. L. Brooke, 'Geoffrey of Monmouth as a Historian', in *Church and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. by Brooke and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 77–91; Valerie I. J. Flint, 'The *Historia Regum Britanniae* of Geoffrey of Monmouth: Parody and its Purpose. A Suggestion', *Speculum*, 54 (1979), 447–68; John Gillingham, 'The Context and Purposes of Geoffrey of Monmouth's *History of the Kings of Britain*', in his *The English in the Twelfth Century*, pp. 19–39.

The Language of William of Malmesbury

MICHAEL WINTERBOTTOM

‘**V**triusque gentis sanguinem traho.’¹ Nothing is more crucial to an understanding of William, precentor and librarian of the Benedictine monastery of Malmesbury, than his mixed blood. We do not know, but can conjecture, that it was his father who was the Norman, coming over with or soon after the Conqueror and marrying an Englishwoman somewhere in the West Country, perhaps Somerset. Their clever son was born around 1090, and was writing from about 1117 till his presumed death about 1143. He was English enough to say on one occasion that King Æthelred *plotted*, by marrying the daughter of the duke of Normandy, to deprive his successors of the kingship of all England, ‘ut perniciosus in posteris esset’.² But more significant than such an isolated remark is William’s enduring *feeling* of Englishness. Later Englishmen have known that ‘wogs’ began at Calais; William thought in terms of English and barbarians. Wilfrid, harassed by King Ecgfrith of Northumbria, is put in prison. But the gaoler is sympathetic: ‘in

¹ *GR*, III, Prol. 1. I cite all but one of William’s major works from the Oxford Medieval Texts volumes edited by Rodney M. Thomson and myself (see above, p. 116 n. 4): *GR* = *Gesta regum Anglorum*, cited by chapter and section; *GP* = *Gesta pontificum Anglorum* (forthcoming; cited by chapter and section, with the addition of page references to Hamilton’s fine Rolls Series text; *VD* (*Vita Dunstani*) and *VW* (*Vita Wulfstani*), both cited by book, chapter, and section from *Saints’ Lives* (see above, p. 118 n. 14). *HN* = *Historia novella* is cited by chapter from the Oxford Medieval Texts edition by Edmund King (1998). I could not have written this piece without the computer concordance of most of William’s works produced under the direction of Dr Martin Brett, or without the Packard Humanities Institute, CETEDOC, and Patrologia Latina CD-ROM databases. I am very grateful to Christine Rauer, Rod Thomson, and Philomen Probert for their help, and to the colleagues who made such helpful remarks (some drawn on below) when I read an earlier version to the Corpus Classics Seminar, Oxford, in February 2002.

² *VD*, II. 34. 3–4.

alios barbarus et immanis, in istum *Anglus* et lenis.³ Barbarians were cruel as well as foreign. Their savagery was exemplified particularly by the Danes, who had plundered England so sorely. But other barbarians were closer: Scots, Welsh and Irish all qualified.⁴ For the ancient Greeks, the worst (and defining) feature of barbarians was that they did not speak Greek. And failure to speak English was part of what William had against them. Even of the Northumbrians, he says that 'their language, particularly in York, is so inharmonious and uncouth that we southerners can make nothing of it. This is the result of the barbarian tribes being so near.'⁵

Barbarians, though, did not begin at Wissant; and when speaking of the French (as opposed to the Normans) William acknowledges that England is in the second division. Indeed, in the old days (according to William) one went to France to slough off one's English barbarity, as did Sigebert future king of the East Angles in the seventh century, or Ecgbert future king of the West Saxons in the ninth.⁶ Now the two were coming closer together. William can contrast the squalid Irish peasants with 'the English and the French (*sic*)' who lived and made money in the towns of Ireland 'cultiori genere uitae'.⁷ All the same, in the passage about Ecgbert mentioned above, William uses the present tense to say that 'both in martial exercises and in polish of manners [*comitate morum*] the men of France are easily first among the nations of the West'. Conversely, Bishop John de Villula, who hailed from Tours, dealt harshly with the monks of Bath because he thought them 'hebetes et [...] barbari'.⁸ As for Latin, that was the language at the opposite pole from barbarism.⁹ Writing in Latin, and for a cultured audience, William betrays some signs of unease at least with English proper names.

³ GP, 101. 3 (p. 230); not in the source (Eddius Stephanus, *Vita Wilfridi*, Chapter 36). In VD, I. 23. 1 Dunstan is represented as thinking it would be the mark of 'barbari et minime mitis animi' to desert the sickly king Eadred.

⁴ For the Scots, see below (also GR, 49. 4). For the Welsh, GR, 196. 3; for the Irish, VW, II. 19. 2. See also the discussion by R. M. Thomson, and the recent work by John Gillingham cited by him, above, pp. 123–24 and notes 40–46.

⁵ GP, 99. 4 (p. 209). See also GP, 115. 6 (p. 249): Oswald was sent to York to control the *barbaries gentis*; and (even after the Conquest) VW, II. 1. 7: the *barbaries* of Cheshire, Shropshire, and Staffordshire.

⁶ GR, 97. 2 (associated with becoming Christian; compare GR, 245. 1: the *Angli* on their first arrival were 'uultu et gestu barbarico, usu bellico', then arms gave way to religion; similarly in GR, 8. 2 the invaders are barbarians contrasted with the Christian Arthur who fought against them; 106. 2). In GR, 400. 2 David, future king of Scotland, is represented as losing *his* 'barbaries' by contact with the English.

⁷ GR, 409. 1 (with Thomson's note).

⁸ GP, 90. 3 (p. 195).

⁹ And those who understood it, wherever they lived, formed the *orbis Latinus*: GP, 65. 5 (p. 122); compare the concrete use of *Latinitas* at (for example) GR, 267. 2.

That unease can be exaggerated. William perhaps uses the displeasing sound of English as an excuse not to give long lists of names that he did not wish to give anyway: pedigrees of the royal lines of early England (though he does not shrink from giving the names of the sons of Woden who stood at the head of those lines),¹⁰ or the names of the saints buried at Thorney.¹¹ Yet in other places he is happy baldly to list the bishops of a diocese when he has no further information about them: 'Waldhere, Ingualdus, Egulf, Wigeth, Edbriht, Edgar, Kenwalk, Edbald [...]',¹² straight from the archives, with little attempt to Latinise. These names after all *mattered*; the most basic aim of the *Gesta pontificum* is given, right at the start, in the words 'ut [...] Anglorum pontificum nomina transcurram'.¹³ Again, he refuses¹⁴ to tell us the names of the sixteen out of thirty-two counties invaded by the Danes under Æthelred 'propter barbariem linguæ'; that is tantamount to a cross-reference to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle *sub anno*. But he is perfectly happy to give the crudely Latinised names of the counties—*Oxenefordensis*, *Scrobberiensis*, *Snotigensis*, and the rest—when he has no alternative. Equally, he does not blench at telling us that the first church at Glastonbury was known as the 'Ealdecirce'.¹⁵ He adds a gloss, 'id est Vetusta Aecclesia'; but then so he does for a Greek word like *paralipsis*.¹⁶ And why should he blench? The name is part of the wonderful antiquity of the church: 'the oldest of all that I know in England', a building full of relics and the graves of saints, an oath by which was the most solemn any local could swear.¹⁷ And he twice cites Old English phrases: Dunstan's jingle 'Ode se gode'¹⁸ in honour of his predecessor Archbishop Oda at Canterbury, and a fine curse on Urse of Abitot which he explicitly says cannot preserve its original concinnity in Latin translation.¹⁹

¹⁰ *GR*, 44. 3. At 115–16 he again apologizes, but gives the complete genealogy of the kings of Wessex.

¹¹ *GP*, 186. 5 (p. 327). Note too *VW*, I. 16. 5 (Coleman's 'witnesses').

¹² *GP*, 73. 15 (p. 144), London; there are many other examples. Note, in one of them (258. 1 [p. 411]), a list of abbots of Malmesbury, the use of four Old English letters, again straight from the archives. At *GR*, 28 the names of three Celtic abbots of Glastonbury are given despite their 'Britannicam barbariem'.

¹³ *GP*, Prol. 3 (p. 4). Compare *GP*, 72. 2 (pp. 133–34): in the absence of further information, 'nuda [...] nomina si ponam, succenseri mihi non debet'; also 73. 15 (p. 144): a matter of great glory in London to be able to recite even the names of its bishops.

¹⁴ *GR*, 165. 6. Contrast *GR*, 101.

¹⁵ *GR*, 20. 1.

¹⁶ *GP*, 259. 10 (p. 414): 'illa ualitudine quam Grece paralisin, id est resolutionem membrorum, dicunt'.

¹⁷ *GR*, 20. 2 and 3.

¹⁸ *GP*, 19. 7 (p. 30). There is a problem about exactly what Dunstan would have said.

¹⁹ *GP*, 115. 21–22 (p. 253). At *GP*, 153. 4 (p. 292) he describes the Severn bore, and calls it 'illa higrā', commenting 'sic enim Anglice uocant'. What else could he call it? Yet notice

English, then, is not shunned. And indeed there may be a touch of irony in one of William's apologies for the barbarous names of the race: 'ne uocabulorum barbaries delicati lectoris sautiaaret aures.'²⁰ But the fact remained that his whole purpose in the *Gesta regum* was (as he put it) to patch up the interrupted course of British history as written in *Latin*.²¹ There had been nothing in Latin between Bede and William's contemporary Eadmer except the eccentric Æthelweard at the end of the tenth century; and for him William felt an understandable *fastidium*. But we may dwell on this exception for a moment. Æthelweard (it has been recently argued)²² was much influenced by the techniques of Old English poetry in writing his Latin version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. William, polarizing the two cultures, sees his task as 'exarata barbarice Romano sale condire', and he must be thinking of the Chronicle in the first instance. The barbarous annals are to be given Roman elegance.²³ There is, as in Æthelweard, poetic colouring; but it comes from William's deep knowledge of Virgil, Lucan, and Statius in particular. He is trying to bring, or bring back, English historiography into the main European stream. King Alfred, in the ninth century, had tried to bring the Continent to England by organizing the translation of important Latin books. William, while full of praise for Alfred,²⁴ sees his task as being the reverse of that. He twice²⁵ relates a telling story of the death of St Kenelm in the early ninth century. It had been suppressed in England. But miraculously it became known in Rome, when a dove let fall on the altar of St Peter's a parchment giving details of the circumstances. It was written in English characters, and Romans and men of other nationalities there could not read it. But an Englishman appeared, and 'untied the knot of language by speaking good Latin to those men of Rome', *linguae inuolucrum Latialiter Quiritibus euoluens*. If English history was to be known to more than the English, William had to do just the same as that excellent Englishman; he had, like Bede, Asser and Æthelweard before him,

the Latin inflexion; William, or another, has adapted Old English *egor*.

²⁰ *VW*, I. 16. 5. Compare Leonardo Bruni in the proem to his *History of the Florentine People*: he had been put off his task by 'nominum [...] asperitas uix cuiuscumque elegantiae patiens'. Leofranc Holford-Strevens compares Martial on Spanish names: IV. 55. 9 (*duriora*) and 27 (*delicate lector*), XII. 18. 12 (*crassiora*).

²¹ For this and what follows see *GR*, I, Prol. 2–4.

²² Angelika Lutz, 'Æthelweard's *Chronicon* and Old English Poetry', *Anglo-Saxon England*, 29 (2000), 177–214.

²³ It goes without saying that William avoided linguistic barbarism. A comment at *GR*, 112. 1, preserved only in a sub-branch of the tradition (see p. 834), is surely William's; he remarks that he has kept a faulty form in citing a (continental!) document at 111. 3: 'et *glomerem* masculino genere, sicut in exemplari corrupte habebatur, posui.'

²⁴ *GR*, 123. 1.

²⁵ *GR*, 211. 1–2 = *GP*, 156. 4–5 (pp. 294–95).

to recount it in the language common to the civilized world. The Norman conquest made the task only the more urgent.²⁶ To write English history in Latin, then, was not an expression of distaste for a barbarian culture; it was an act of patriotism.²⁷

But such an act meant that attention had to be given to the Latin itself. And in this paper I shall, by a series of varied illustrations, try to give some idea of what William's language was like, and what his aspirations for it may have been. I am very conscious that I am only making a tiny and random start on a vast topic: vast not only because of the range and length of William's own works, but because the necessary context of comparative material has yet to be assembled. What I say should be seen against the background of something that can be asserted without undue hyperbole: that William had read with attention a very great deal of the Latin, classical, patristic and English, that was available in England in his time.

We have seen William apologizing, however tongue in cheek, for the English personal names he must deploy. But they were normally given some Latin tinge, if only for ease of declension. In the Bible Adam, for his sins, had to do without an accusative form; Cain, for *his*, was quite indeclinable. Thanks to the inestimable advantage of having the autograph of the *Gesta pontificum* still extant, we can know for sure that William had a consistent system for Latinising Old English names. There was no hope of making these names sound classically Latin, but they could be tamed. OE 'Ecgeberht' becomes 'Egbertus'. On the same sort of principle, English diphthongs and ashes are ironed away, so that (to choose a name featuring both) 'Eadmær' becomes 'Edmerus'. The English Orderic, who was writing in Normandy at the same time, and of whom we again possess an autograph, spelt the name 'Edmarus',²⁸ and here as elsewhere there seems room for investigation by those interested in the twelfth-century pronunciation of both Latin and the vernaculars.

Similarly with place names. Take Winchester.²⁹ The Antonine Itinerary called it 'Venta Belgarum'; Bede called it 'Venta ciuitas', though he knew the Saxon *Wintanæstir*. Asser coins *Wintonia*, and that is what William favours, with its adjective *Wintoniensis*. The other forms leave some slight trace, but William likes a

²⁶ The Italian Faricius, monk of Malmesbury and biographer of Aldhelm, did not know English (*GP*, v, Prol. 5 [p. 331]). But that was not his only failing. Observe the protests in *GP*, 67. 4–5 (p. 126) when he is being canvassed for the archbishopric in 1114: there had been enough Italians already (Lanfranc, Anselm), and there was no lack of people who spoke the *lingua patria* (in this context French). Ralph d'Escures of Le Mans was chosen instead.

²⁷ Much the same may be said of William's major *Lives of Saints*, which are historical as well as hagiographic. That of Wulfstan was translated from an Old English original; that of Dunstan was designed at once to celebrate and replace the early Latin Life by 'B.' and to exploit a neglected Old English Life contemporary with it.

²⁸ Note too that Orderic (see below, p. 136 n. 45) spells Ælfheah 'Alphagus' where William writes 'Elphegus'.

²⁹ Eilert Ekwall, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Place-names*, 4th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 522. For Chester, *ibid.*, p. 101.

word that has a Roman ring (compare *Bononia*). He does not go back to Bede's Roman name (Orderic, by contrast, calls the place *Guenta*); but he softens the edges of the English word. Equally, he knows that Chester was once called 'Castrum Legionum' (OE *Legaceaster*), and indeed he at times uses that grand name. But the English had come to call it *Ceaster* for short, and William (like Orderic) is happy with *Cestra*. William is not greatly interested in archaizing.

William's spelling of words other than names generally follows consistent principles. Most noticeably and sometimes to bizarre effect he regularly writes *t* for *c* before *i* when a second vowel follows: *fatio* (but *facitis*), *fautium* (but *faucibus*), *felitius* (but *feliciter*); this may reflect an idiosyncratic attempt to reproduce a current difference in the pronunciation of the consonant involved.³⁰ But William is 'correct' and classical in one thing that mattered to the reader, the distinction between final *-e* for adverbs and final *-ae* for certain cases of some groups of nouns and adjectives. In other positions, he is less consistent in deciding between the two, though one can establish preferences for his spelling of particular words. I doubt if these choices have anything to do with pronunciation;³¹ it seems more likely that William was affected by random precepts of grammarians (often based on etymology or the desire to differentiate words).³² Again, it has been supposed that Eadmer's spellings *nanque* and *-cunque* reflected contemporary pronunciation.³³ If so, William did not try to do the same: he spelt, when he did not abbreviate, *namque*, *-cumque* and the like. Still, while writing *quamquam*, he markedly favours *quanuis*, and that can hardly be for no reason at all. And why does he write *dampnum* (and cognates) and *contempno*, but not *sollemnus* or *sompnus*?³⁴ There is much yet to discover about the principles underlying his orthography and that of his contemporaries.

William, it may be recalled, was of mixed parentage, and must have conversed in either Old English or Norman French, or both, before he left home for Malmesbury. Is there any way of telling what his only (or preferred) vernacular was? The usual tests for 'vulgar Latin' come up with nothing significant. The one case of *manducare* may have the full sense of 'chew' as a preliminary to digestion.³⁵ *fabulari* is used

³⁰ Or might William misunderstand a rule like that in Alcuin, *De orthographia*, ed. by H. Keil, *Grammatici Latini*, 7 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855–80), vii, 298: 'benedictio et oratio et talia t debent habere in paenultima syllaba, non c'?

³¹ In contrast to *The Life of St Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury by Eadmer*, ed. by Richard W. Southern, Nelson's Medieval Texts (London: Nelson, 1962), p. xxxiv.

³² Thus Alcuin (see above, n. 30) recommends for example *aeternus*, *caelum*, and *laetus*, which William prefers, but also *aemulus*, *daemon*, and *praemium*, which he does not.

³³ See n. 31 above.

³⁴ The four words I mention behave almost without exception as I imply. I suppose that *contempno* may be influenced by *contemptus*.

³⁵ *GR*, 207. 1: 'ore gemino manducabatur, sed uno meatu digerebatur'. The word is much more common in Orderic.

four times, once of conversation,³⁶ thrice (more choicely) of the telling of fictions.³⁷ *focus* is once used of a (smithy) fire;³⁸ that is in itself a perfectly classical use, but William's fires are elsewhere *ignes*. No more significant is the one occurrence³⁹ of *seminare* (as opposed to twenty or so of *serere*); *grandis* is quite often used, but not nearly so often as *magnus*; and it too is classical. As for the defective verbs that Romance abhorred, William deploys them without embarrassment; if he once⁴⁰ uses the form *odiar*, as a subjunctive passive, he could plead *odiremur* in Jerome. But then it is probably misguided to expect that as late as this a speaker of a Romance language would let it show in his learned, and learned, Latin. All the same, the chances are that Old English was William's vernacular: it only took him six weeks to translate Coleman's English Life of Wulfstan.⁴¹ That would have made it easier, if anything, for him to learn a 'pure' Latin.

That does not mean that he classicises at all obsessively; there was nothing in Western Europe that paralleled the Atticism of medieval Byzantium, and William, I take it, would have regarded Jerome and even Bede as *auctores* no less to be revered than Cicero and Sallust. That means that some features of his vocabulary and syntax⁴² that sound unfamiliar to classicists are merely part of a common Late Latin stock. There is nothing 'vulgar' about the use of *quod* to introduce (in particular) clauses where classical Latin would employ the accusative and infinitive. But it is characteristic of William's Latin that he does not overdo what (he will have been

³⁶ *GP*, 19. 8 (p. 30).

³⁷ *GR*, 67, 287. 2; *GP*, 197. 2 (p. 345). The subject in each case is *antiquitas*; compare Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, I. 2. 20: 'qualiter in uulgus antiquitas fabulata est'.

³⁸ *VD*, I. 9. 4; *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, s.v. 4a. At *GR*, 282. 2 *foci* is used for variation after *igni* just before.

³⁹ *GR*, 204. 7 (also 111. 2, from the French *Visio Caroli*), metaphorical (literal in classical Latin, but metaphorical from Cyprian, according to Souter, *Glossary of Later Latin*).

⁴⁰ *GR*, IV, Prol. 3: 'ut aut odiar aut mentiar'. For passive forms of *odi* see *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (henceforward *TLL*), s.v. 455, 46–67.

⁴¹ *VW*, III, 29. 3. When at *VD*, II Prol. 3 he says 'utriusque linguae' he does not need to explain that he means English and Latin.

⁴² Using *GP*, where we can be quite sure what he wrote, for sampling, I find that, though he often uses *dum* + imperfect subjunctive in the sense 'while' (already in *Bellum Africanum*), he is well aware of the classical use with the pres. ind. He always uses *fore* 'correctly', though he uses *iri* eccentrically: thus II, Prol. 3 (p. 139) 'hoc [...] impetratum iri rogo, ne [...]'; 173. 3 (p. 310) 'se tumulatum iri precepit' (compare 265. 2, p. 421); 255. 4 (p. 408) 'imaginabatur monasterium [...] predatum iri'. Compare Eadmer, *Historia novorum*, ed. by Martin Rule, Rolls Series 81 (London: Longman, 1884), p. 10: 'nulli [...] concessum iri permittebat'. Earlier, *Vita Ædwardi*, ed. by Frank Barlow, *The Life of King Edward Who Rests at Westminster*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 70: 'nusquam [...] credidit elemosinam magis iri saluam quam ubi [...]' (commented on by Barlow, p. 1): apparently for *fore*.

aware) was a not strictly classical use. To give some rough indication, I looked at fifty consecutive uses of *quod* in the third book of the *Gesta pontificum* and another thirty in Book Four. Of these eighty, twelve came in quoted documents and can be ignored. Of the other sixty-eight, only seven are 'unclassical'; *quod* in these passages follows *credebat*, *non immemor*, *intelligi*, *causatus*, *opinari*, *subitiet*, and *constat*.⁴³ William does not in this sample use *quod* to introduce final or consecutive clauses.⁴⁴

Restraint is also evident in William's vocabulary. Again, there is no need for surprise at non-classical words that had become standard over the centuries, least of all at those connected with the Church. What is of interest is the author's attitude to more recent words; and here comparison with contemporaries in England or Normandy is essential. But such comparison is difficult in the absence of concordances for almost all authors in question. I can only make some sighting shots, exploiting the Patrologia Latina data base and the part-concordance to Orderic printed by Marjorie Chibnall.⁴⁵ Orderic's life was in crucial respects parallel to William's. He was born near Shrewsbury in 1075, of a Norman father and an English mother. He learned to read Latin at Shrewsbury, but in 1085 he was sent off to the Norman monastery of Saint-Évroul, where he spent the rest of his life. His great *Ecclesiastical History* was composed between 1114 and 1141, almost exactly the years when William was labouring on his historical works at Malmesbury.

A range of horses prance or amble over Normandy in the pages of Orderic. Most of them, of course, are *equi*. Interchangeable with them, it seems, are *caballi*, in both peace and war. They are not now, at least in France, vulgar beasts, but respectable *chevaux*. William will have nothing of them, except (by implication) to draw the *reda caballaria* in which the body of William Rufus was taken to Winchester Cathedral for burial: the adjective is chosen to match the sordid circumstances and the low status of the *rusticani* in charge.⁴⁶ He does not know of Orderic's *manni* (nor do the dictionaries), *palefridi* or *dextrarii*. But both writers like to talk of steeds in

⁴³ The passages are in: *GP*, 100. 24 (p. 217; already in Apuleius); 100. 40 (p. 221; found in Justin); 109. 11 (p. 244; at least from the Itala); 137. 4 (p. 279; already in Suetonius); *ibid.* (from Palladius); 142. 1 (p. 283; *adde quod* already in Lucretius); 142. 2 (p. 284) from the 4th century. In a rather smaller sample (thirty instances, seven in citations) from Book IV of *GP*, I found only one case of *quia* after verbs of saying etc. (with *cogitans* at 163. 5, p. 300; already in the Itala). There is no case of *quoniam* used thus in *GP*.

⁴⁴ William only four times employs *quatinus* in *GP* (except in citations), and to replace *ut* only at 75. 40 (p. 167): 'precipe ut dicatur episcopo Athelwoldo quatinus [...] efferat [...]' (for variation?). At 82. 6 (p. 181) it seems to mean 'how' in an indirect question.

⁴⁵ *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, Oxford Medieval Texts, 6 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969–80), I, 246–386. Dr Chibnall has valuable remarks on Orderic's style and language at I, 100–110. I henceforth cite Orderic by volume and page of her magnificent edition.

⁴⁶ *GR*, 333. 5; compare Bede's phrase *feretrum caballarium* (*Historia ecclesiastica*, IV. 6). *rusticanus* (for *rusticus*) is only found twice in William; Orderic uses it thrice.

epic mode, sounding their horned feet (*cornipedes, sonipedes*).

These animals frequent an often wooded countryside. Orderic knows of *boscus* and *parcum*,⁴⁷ not used by William, though both employ the technical term *foresta*. William (naturally) often uses *silua(e)*, but varies it with the poetic *nemus*. As for towns of various sizes and distinction, Orderic can ring the changes on *burgus*, *casale*, *castellum*,⁴⁸ *ciuitas*, *urbs*, *uicus*, and *uilla*. William does not employ *casale*, and *burgus* is only used once, in the *Historia novella*.⁴⁹ That is of double interest. The word is the obvious equivalent of Old English *burh*, which William only brings in as the name of Peterborough. And the *Historia novella* is a late work, devoted to very recent history. There is work to do on the ways in which its language differs from that of the earlier books.⁵⁰

Finally, the administration of this world. What of the feudal system? William does not talk of *alodium*⁵¹ or *feudum* or *manerium* or *uillani*. He once uses the verb *saisio*, once *dissaisio* (and that in the *Historia novella*). Or the magnates? Orderic is well acquainted with *barones*; William spurns them until the *Historia novella*, and never mentions the *tirones*⁵² of chivalry. He does not talk of bedels or constables. It is only in the *Historia novella* that *dapifer* is applied to a royal steward. Of Orderic's alternatives, *dispensator*, *procurator* and *senescalcus*, William uses none in this sense. It is noticeable that when he (once) employs the word *firmarius*, a lessee, he

⁴⁷ Not in Chibnall's list; but see Orderic, iv, 224. These two words, and some others mentioned below, came naturally to the pen of Jocelin of Brakelond (writing after 1200).

⁴⁸ Note Orderic, ii, 218: 'munitiones [...] quas castella Galli nuncupant' scarcely known in England under William the Conqueror; but William used the word frequently of English castles (so perhaps once in Asser).

⁴⁹ *Burgenses* appear once in *GR*, of inhabitants of Norman towns (389. 9), then, of Englishmen, four times in *HN*; in three of these places, the word has been substituted for *ciues* in MS Ce, which Edmund King has shown to be interpolated. Ce also comes up with a unique case of *uauassores*.

⁵⁰ The troubled reign of King Stephen is evoked by words that William uses here but not in his earlier works: its military activities (*incastellare*, *municipia* = 'castles', *munitiuncula*, *obsidatus*) and its reliance on personal loyalty (*affidare*, *diffidiare* [note, in the second of the two cases, (41) 'quod diffidiare dicunt'], *iniuriare*, *manutenementum* [used in a passage of a speech of Bishop Henry of Blois that William heard in person; the rhetoric of the closing passage is surely Henry's own]), but also its administration (*solidatae*, *thesauraria*). William remarks on two further novelties: 'proludium pugnae [...] quod *iustam* uocant' (43), to be compared with *GR*, 228. 10 'dum gloriabundus *proludit* ipsa securitate incautor'; and (49) '*communione* quam uocant Lundoniarum' (apparently the only place where William uses this plural form).

⁵¹ Used by Eadmer, *Historia novorum*, p. 37, but not by Orderic.

⁵² Note that in recording the victims of the White Ship disaster, where Orderic (vi, 302) speaks of 'filios et electos tirones precipuosque barones', William has 'quisquis erat in curia lectissimus miles uel capellanus, et optimatum filii ad militiam prouehendi' (419. 7).

does so with the comment: 'ut uerbo parum Latino utar.'⁵³

Can any conclusions be drawn? Each word needs further investigation. William may differ from Orderic where he finds his words too vulgar, too French, too technical; his vocabulary may reflect in one instance the slow acceptance of Norman language in England, in another his personal distaste for it, at least in a work of history that was to show *sal Romanus*.

I proceed to discuss a series of words that crop up in unusual senses in William's work.

In *GR* 31. 1 William says, very interestingly, that Aldhelm's style is often misjudged because people do not realise that literary style inevitably varies with the nationality of the writer: 'non attendentibus quia iuxta mores gentium uariantur modi dictaminum.' He goes on: 'Denique Greci inuolute, Romani circumspecte, Galli splendide, Angli pompatice dictare solent.' William is clearly giving examples, and Mynors rightly translated *denique* 'for instance'. The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*⁵⁴ gives instances of the sense 'exempli gratia' from Fronto on, with particular wealth of illustration from the Jurists and the grammarians. I am not aware of the word being used thus in post-Conquest Anglo-Latin writers apart from William; but he uses the word almost always in this sense. It would be nice to know how he came upon the usage: it may, or may not, be relevant that he knew the *Breviarium Alaricum*, and was also a student of canon law.⁵⁵

In Classical Latin *triclinium* means a dining room in a private house, whether Augustus's or Trimalchio's. And William knows that sense (the word is common in his favourite Suetonius, for example). Thus, in one scene the *pincerna* of King Æthelstan slips while pouring out wine 'in medio triclinio'.⁵⁶ But this is by no means always the meaning. That engaging lecher William, count of Poitou, falling in love with a viscount's wife, puts her picture on his shield, 'often saying' (Roger Mynors' translation) 'that he would serve under her ensign in battle as she did under him in the bedchamber' (*in triclinio*).⁵⁷ The difference from classical usage is very clear from two more tales of sexual behaviour. In Suetonius's Life of Augustus, Mark Antony (we are told) alleged that the *princeps* had taken off a consul's wife 'e triclinio uiri coram in cubiculum', returning her later *in conuiuium* with ears burning

⁵³ *GR*, 314. 3.

⁵⁴ *TLL*, s.v. *denique* II D.

⁵⁵ Rodney M. Thomson, *William of Malmesbury* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1987), pp. 62–66. But Bede can use the word in this sense, as in *Historia Ecclesiastica*, III. 12 (more normally = 'in fact, indeed', as in III. 5); I have also noticed *Encomium Emmae Reginae*, ed. by Alistair Campbell, Camden Society Third Series, 72 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1949), p. 8.

⁵⁶ *GR*, 139. 5. Compare *GP*, 63. 4 (p. 118): the *cena* of Luke 14. 17 is held in a 'nuptiale triclinium'; 94. 5 (p. 201): monks eating in one *triclinium*, sleeping in one *cubiculum*.

⁵⁷ *GR*, 439. 2. At 190. 1, the Emperor Henry III has his *triclinium* next to his sister's, and clearly sleeps in it.

and hair a mess.⁵⁸ Not less disgracefully, in William's Life of Dunstan,⁵⁹ King Eadwig, at his coronation, goes off to the toilet (*in secretum*) and thence 'in triclinium feminarum', to join a mother and daughter whose charms have been described earlier. After some discussion, Abbot Dunstan and a brave bishop volunteer to bring him back to his place among the nobles; and this they do after finding him where 'uolutabatur [...] inter meretriculas'. The (strange) locution *triclinium feminarum* comes from the Book of Esther in the Vulgate translation,⁶⁰ where women go in turn from the harem (the Greek is *απο τοῦ γυναικῶνος*) to the bedroom [*cubiculum*] of King Ahasuerus. William is of course entirely aware of the piquancy of this delicate allusion. This particular passage thus stands apart from William's other uses of *triclinium*; but it does share the only feature that the score or so instances have in common, the *privacy* of the room involved: in this case a chamber away from the feast or council in progress, a room assigned to women, and apparently equipped with beds or at least sofas.⁶¹ A *triclinium*, then, is not the *aula*, the great hall of a big house or castle. In the Life of Wulfstan we learn that the saint 'nusquam [...] in uillis suis aulis, nusquam triclinia fecit'.⁶² The two are different, then. But it should be noticed that the implication is that they are both substantial rooms, for William goes on to comment that Wulfstan rejected 'operosa ... architectura' in these secular buildings and in churches alike. This vagueness is especially tiresome when we have to interpret a fascinating passage in the *Gesta pontificum*⁶³ where William describes a then extant Roman building in Carlisle, a 'triclinium lapideis fornicibus concameratum', with *in fronte* an inscription reported as reading 'Marii Victoriae': perhaps, says William, because some of the Cimbri driven by Marius from Italy had settled in those parts and become Cumbrians. What this building really was is anyone's guess. But if my analysis of William's usage is right, it was in his view *not* a public building like a temple or basilica, but something substantially built for private use. In any case, William favours the word *triclinium* for its classical ring, without apparently minding that his classical authorities used it much less widely. Much more investigation is needed. Orderic apparently employs the word once only, of a secluded room to which an archbishop of Rouen flees in a riot;⁶⁴ but he is much freer with *aula* (and *camera*) than William, who perhaps sub-

⁵⁸ Suetonius, *Divus Augustus*, 69. 1.

⁵⁹ *VD*, I. 26. 3–4.

⁶⁰ Esther 2. 13.

⁶¹ Note *GR*, 121. 5 (King Alfred admitted 'in secretiora triclinii' of the Danish camp), 312. 3 (William Rufus 'intus et in triclinio cum priuatis'). I am grateful for the help of John Blair, who stressed to me this aspect of William's *triclinia*.

⁶² *VW*, III. 10. 2.

⁶³ *GP*, 99. 3–4 (pp. 208–09).

⁶⁴ Orderic, VI, 294: 'in triclinio receptus delituit.'

consciously avoids what he might have thought of as relatives of Old English *heall*⁶⁵ and Fr. *chambre*.

A brief curiosity. In the *Gesta regum* William gives an uncomplimentary description of the English before the Normans came.⁶⁶ And very familiar they sound, with their shaven heads, their arms loaded with bracelets, their skin tattooed, eating until they were sick and drinking until they spewed—‘in potibus irritantes uomiam’. Roger Mynors thought of emending *uomiam* to *uomitum*, but the same word is so used in the Life of Dunstan.⁶⁷ What has happened to *uomica* since it meant ‘abscess’ in Classical Latin? In the late medical writers like the Latin Oribasius it already means ‘vomiting’, and William, who mentions a youthful enthusiasm for such studies,⁶⁸ may have read them.

I follow these nouns with a verb. William somewhat extends an earlier use of *interesse*, with the sense ‘to concern, be the job of’. When he writes ‘si illi quorum interest [...] ea [...] Dei seruis impertirentur’,⁶⁹ ‘if only those concerned passed the money on to the monks’, that can be compared with phrases in the lawyers like ‘a publicis personis quorum interest audiendi sunt’.⁷⁰ William several times makes explicit the notion of ‘duty’: thus ‘uillicus cuius offitii intererat’, ‘the bailiff whose job it was’.⁷¹ But such uses have medieval parallels. Others are more individual. John de Villula was ‘salsioris [...] dicacitatis quam gradus eius interesse deberet’,⁷²

⁶⁵ Not, however, linked with *aula* by the etymologists. Nor does William (or Orderic) use *sala* (→ *salle*), already (like *halla*) in Domesday.

⁶⁶ GR, 245. 5.

⁶⁷ VD, II. 9. 3: ‘cibo intenti ad gulam, potui ad uomiam’. It seems to have its classical sense in John of Salisbury, *Ep.* 124, *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, 2 vols, ed. by W. W. J. Millor and H. E. Butler, revised by C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979–1986), I, 215.

⁶⁸ GR, II, Prol. 1 ‘phiscam [...] aliquanto pressius concepi.’ Jim Adams remarks that *uomiam irritare* is a common phrase in medical writers; see for example TLL, s.v. 1 *irrito* 430, 34–6.

⁶⁹ GP, 84. 7 (p. 185). Compare (with clauses attached) GR, 202. 8: ‘illum cuius interest rem agere gladio’, VW, II. 5. 1 ‘illos [...] quorum pro cognatione [...] intererat ut miserum miserarentur’. Note also Osborn, *Miracula Dunstani*, in *Memorials of Saint Dunstan, Archbishop of Canterbury*, ed. by W. Stubbs, Rolls Series 63 (London: Longman, 1874), p. 143: ‘ii quorum interfuit uindictam donare’.

⁷⁰ Dig., 19. 2. 56. The earlier examples in TLL s. v. *intersum* 2289, 20 ff. do not seem the same.

⁷¹ GP, 172. 6 (p. 308). So, for example, GP, 263. 4 (p. 420): ‘quod [...] nostri non intersit offitii’, 270. 4 (p. 430): ‘quanuis id parum sui interesset offitii’. There are parallels in papal documents and in Lanfranc. Similar is Eadmer, *Historia novorum*, p. 10 ‘nihil ea nostri officii scribere refert’.

⁷² GP, 90. 5 (p. 195). Very similarly of Archbishop Ralph in GP, 71. 2 (p. 132): ‘ad risus [...] inclinior [...] quam uel dignitatis uel gradus interesse uideretur’. The earlier version

which must mean something like: 'more witty than should have been consistent with his rank'. And what is meant when Wulfstan's practice of baptizing without a fee caused a rush of clients to him, 'ab illis precipue quorum non intererat dare nummum ut soboli suae mercarentur lauacrum'?⁷³ It is clear from the context that William is referring to the poor who could not afford the fee. So the phrase has to mean: 'especially those who were in no position to give cash for the baptism of their children.'

Dictionaries and data bases desert us when we come to syntax. I point to only a single phenomenon in this area, one oddly confined (I think) to the *Gesta pontificum*. In one passage, William writes: 'Haec non ambiguis auctoribus sparsa acceperim, sed eis qui uiderint [itself perhaps strange].'⁷⁴ I can only think that the locution is influenced by the use of perfect subjunctives like *dixerim*, classified as potential in the grammars. William several times uses *dixerim* himself, to soften the tone of assertions: 'Magis certe dixerim [William Rufus speaks] Vrbanum Anselmi cedere sapientiae quam Anselmum Vrbano indigere';⁷⁵ or quasi-parenthetically as in: 'uir [...] summis pontificibus comparandus et pene dixerim preferendus'.⁷⁶ But *acceperim* in our original passage is hardly like this, and other instances are quite unlike it. It may be by mistake that William writes in a main clause: 'Quapropter [...] Odonem bonum uocauerit';⁷⁷ there is no call for any reserve here. Similarly, in a comparison between Lanfranc and earlier primates like Dunstan, William says: 'Nam illi [...] aridente etiam rege facile quod uellent efficerent ['could do what they liked', another odd subjunctive, perhaps influenced by *uellent*], iste autem solus contra tot obsistentes rem profligauerit et uicerit.'⁷⁸ William's use of the subjunctive deserves a thesis.

I mentioned that we possess William's working copy of the *Gesta pontificum*. One of the pleasures of an autograph is to watch an author changing his mind. I pull out two plums. The first is very intriguing. In one place William wrote 'lusi

read: 'inclinatio [...] quam uel dignitatem gradus decebat uel longeuitatis uitae intererat.' When John of Glastonbury writes (*Cronica*, chapter 23: see James P. Carley, *The Chronicle of Glastonbury Abbey* [Woodbridge: Boydell, 1985], p. 58): 'durius quam herilis clemencie interesset agens cum adolescente', he is doubtless reproducing the language of William's lost *Vita Patricii*.

⁷³ *VW*, 1. 7. 2.

⁷⁴ *GP*, 263. 4 (p. 420).

⁷⁵ *GP*, 50. 4 (p. 92); also 232. 1 (p. 386): 'crediderim'. Add Eadmer, *Historia novorum*, p. 5: 'commemorauerim'.

⁷⁶ *GP*, 12. 2 (p. 19). For this particular phrase I find a number of patristic parallels.

⁷⁷ *GP*, 19. 7 (p. 30); Savile emended to *uocauit*. At 183. 7 (p. 324) *contulerit* should be taken parallel to *annumeret* in the previous clause; William punctuates eccentrically.

⁷⁸ *GP*, 44. 7 (p. 72).

operam', 'wasted his effort', in another 'luisisset operam'.⁷⁹ Thinking better of these expressions, he changed the first to 'perdidit impensam', the second to 'profecisset nichil', though the original phrase survives in three passages of other works.⁸⁰ According to the *Thesaurus*⁸¹ the only examples of the phrase are in comedy, three in Plautus (*Casina* 424, *Captivi* 344, *Pseudolus* 369), one in Terence (*Phormio* 332; but that is passive, 'opera luditur'), apart from one instance in Fronto (also passive). William had certainly not read Fronto, and his direct knowledge of Plautus has hitherto been denied. But, as Rod Thomson has pointed out, 'a copy [of the first eight plays] was made at and for Salisbury Cathedral in the late eleventh century'.⁸² It does not seem impossible, then, that William found the phrase in either *Casina* or *Captivi*. A less exciting possibility is that he found it in either or both of two passages in Ambrose.⁸³ In either case, his coming up with so rare a phrase is remarkable. Why he took against it when he came to revise the *Gesta pontificum* must remain obscure.

Equally mysterious is a sudden dislike William conceived for the word *momentum*, used in the general sense of 'importance' or 'decisive influence'. At various points he replaces it with *firmamentum*, *leuamentum*, *augmentum*, *emolumentum*, *adiumentum*, *auctoritas* and *miraculum*.⁸⁴ Four instances of this sense only survive correction, one untouchable as being from Lucan.⁸⁵ And I cannot see in the corrected passages any reason for change.

The autograph of the *Gesta pontificum* is valuable in another way. It not only (as we have seen) shows us how William spelt what he wrote, but also how he punctuated it. The system is very unsophisticated, perhaps because the book is so informal, hardly more than a notebook. Simple points mark pauses. Sometimes they

⁷⁹ *GP*, 70. 2 (p. 131), 190. 4 (p. 336).

⁸⁰ *VD*, I. 15. 2 (see below, p. 143), *VW*, I. 16. 5, *Miracula Sanctae Mariae*, ed. by J. M. Canal, *El Libro De laudibus et miraculis sanctae Mariae de Guillermo de Malmesbury*, 2nd edn (Rome: Edizioni Ephemerides Mariologiae, 1968), p. 123, line 339.

⁸¹ *TLL* s.v. *opera* 666, 46–48.

⁸² *William of Malmesbury*, p. 49; see his 'British Library Royal 15 C. XI; A Manuscript of Plautus' Plays from Salisbury Cathedral (c. 1100)', *Scriptorium*, 40 (1986), 82–87, reprinted in his *England and the 12th-Century Renaissance* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), xvii. The one Plautine quotation known to Thomson is from the *Pseudolus*. But that play was not available in England at this time, and the quotation is doubtless secondhand (see Thomson, *William of Malmesbury*, loc. cit.).

⁸³ *Exameron*, vi. 3. 13 (CSEL, 32. 1, 211), *Ep.* 64. 7 (CSEL, 82. 2, 153); both works are excerpted in William's *Polyhistor*. *TLL* does not know these passages.

⁸⁴ Respectively *GP*, 40. 1 (p. 62), 45. 3 (p. 74), 100. 26 (p. 218), 107. 1 (p. 238), 156. 3 (p. 294), 186. 6 (p. 327), and 269. 7 (p. 428).

⁸⁵ Several occur in the precisely contemporary *Gesta regum*, and William did not (I think) take advantage of his several revisions of that work to iron any out.

are positioned quite high, sometimes medially. The height of the point does not seem to differ with the strength or weakness of the pause, and a sentence end is marked only by a following capital letter. The cola (if one should call them that) are usually four or five words long, though they may be rather longer, or as short as one. Much could be done to investigate the principles (if any) on which William operates. Here I shall only make one observation. William has an occasional habit of making separate sentences of collocations of words lacking a main verb. Thus, having described the strange noises emitted by an insane rustic of Wiltshire, in a sentence of which the rustic is not the subject, the author turns to the man's diet:⁸⁶ 'Cibos nec humanos· nec coctione conditos· uoragini uentris immergens· Sic dementia molares exacuerat· ut quodlibet osseum· ligneum· ferreum· facili ut putabatur negotio demoleret·' Elsewhere it is possible to take the pendant participle with a preceding verb.⁸⁷ But it seems best in such cases to leave William's major punctuation as it is. The minor, I fear, would, here and elsewhere, prove too distracting for a modern reader.

I move finally to consideration of an extended passage of William's prose. And as I have spoken so much of his historical works, I have chosen from one of his saints' Lives, that of Dunstan.⁸⁸ In fact, stylistically and in other ways too, William does not draw too strict a line between history and hagiography. And the manner I illustrate here is one he uses in telling stories, whether improving or not, in the major *Gesta* as well as in the Lives. I shall use my discussion to draw together some of the threads of this paper, but my main concern will now be with sentence construction, rhyme and (in some sense) rhythm (I fear this goes rather beyond my title). The passage, printed below, tells how King Edmund, having quarrelled with Dunstan and ordered him to leave his court, survives a hunting incident near Cheddar Gorge and makes the young man abbot of Glastonbury instead.

¹Mons est in Ceddro arboribus opacus, decliui crescens supercilio, faucibus immane quantum patentibus. ²Ibi cerui et ceterae ferae uenatibus aptae in praeiunctis posuere cubilia saxis. ³Ad eas persequendas rex mane surrexerat, ingenita diuitum consuetudine ut nichil putent uoluptuosius quam indulgere uenatibus. ⁴Canes ergo emissi copulis exciuerant feras lustris, inter quas ingenti corpore ceruum cursu insuperabilem, cornibus ramosis minacem. ⁵Hunc alipede cursu per plana, per auia fugientem animosius rex persequabatur. ⁶Iam fera decliuiam percurrerat, iam in summum montis iugum euaserat. ⁷Ibi quoque canibus terga eius uellicantibus, negata omni fugiendi copia, precipiti ad ima saltu compleuit fata. ⁸Nec uero rapacitas canum molliori mortis genere absumpta. ⁹Horum casu rex perterritus et equi rapiditatem frenare conatus, lusit operam, uires consumpsit anhelas. ¹⁰Nam nisui hominis

⁸⁶ GP, 261. 2 (p. 416).

⁸⁷ GP, 23. 2 (pp. 35–36): 'Sacros [...] deesset' (four participles); 77. 2 (p. 172): 'Deinceps [...] familiaritatis' (another four); 90. 5 (p. 195): 'Litteratorum [...] deberet'.

⁸⁸ VD, I. 15. 1–4 (I have numbered the sentences and refer to them thus below).

repugnante bestia, habenae diruptae et procul disiectae.¹¹ Ita conatu irritō equus furens regem sub ipsum hiatum fautum peruexit.¹² Non tamen ille in tanto periculo sui oblitus, sensatas cogitationes uoluebat animo, et fortassis expromebat dicto: se in proximis diebus nullum aliqua temerasse iniuria, nisi quod Dunstanum summa lesisset arrogantia, quod expulisset amicum curia, prius addictum quam conuictum, ante dampnatum quam auditum; id se plane correcturum ex placito, si eum Deus ipsius meritis a presenti eximeret periculo.¹³ Tua Deus misericors gratia, tua Christe omnipotens clementia!¹⁴ Vix haec uel cogitauerat uel dixerat, et equus, iam positus in uoragine pedibus anterioribus, qui ante seuerat tyrannico cursu superbius, constitit oue placidius.¹⁵ Haec res tantum apud Edmundum ualuit ut ex illa die in reliquum nullus in animo eius fuerit Dunstano gratiosior, nullus in regno gloriosior.¹⁶ Denique statim accitum benigno quidem respexit oculo, sed dissimulato paulisper animo iussit ut ascenso equo secum Glastoniam contenderet.¹⁷ Quo ubi peruentum est, rex inclinatus ad preces de sua liberatione Deo recitauit grates.¹⁸ Comitabantur oratione lacrimae ueris singultibus expromptae.¹⁹ Quas ubi et ratione resorbuit et digito compescuit, auide beati uiri dextram apprehendens grato eam demulsit osculo.²⁰ Tum deinde, ut ueteris scriptoris uerba subitiam, ducens eum ad sacerdotalem cathedram et eum imponens dixit: 'Esto istius sedis princeps potensque insector, et presentis aecclēsiae fidelissimus abbas.'

I could spend the rest of this paper on the literary allusions here; and they are certainly part of the *sal Romanus*. Suffice it to point out the cluster that set the poetic, even epic, tone at the start of the passage. 'uenatibus aptae' (2) is an Ovidian phrase. William seems to think in particular of 'femineos coetus uenatibus aptos', 'ripe to be hunted', in the *Ars*;⁸⁹ King Edmund, unlike King Eadwig, whom we met earlier, is bent on bagging animals. The beasts 'posuere cubilia' like winds in the *Thebaid*,⁹⁰ or the Cares in the *Aeneid*,⁹¹ but on *saxa* that are *prerupta* as in the *Georgics*.⁹² (Note the almost complete hexameter that results, with elegant word order.) The stag who is one hero of the story, his antlers branching (4) like those of a *ceruus* in the *Eclogues*,⁹³ runs 'per plana, per auia' (5), like Theban mourners in Statius.⁹⁴

This barrage of classical allusion introduces a tale that, though thoroughly Christian, is told in more or less timeless Latin (though notice at 16 one instance of *denique* in the sense I discussed earlier). The sentences are not long or complex; the only exception (12) is the centrally placed report of the king's thoughts as he faced

⁸⁹ *Ars Amatoria*, I. 253. But we cannot be sure that William knew this work (maybe he knew it but was shy of showing his knowledge).

⁹⁰ Statius, *Thebais*, II. 37.

⁹¹ Virgil, *Aeneis*, VI. 274.

⁹² Virgil, *Georgica*, II. 156.

⁹³ Virgil, *Eclogae*, VII. 30.

⁹⁴ Statius, *Thebais*, III. 115. Stephen Harrison adds the echo in 12 of Virgil, *Aeneis*, V. 334.

death in the gorge, giving weight and suspense to this crucial moment, which is further marked by the (for William) unusual⁹⁵ authorial invocation to Christ that immediately follows (13). As for *cursus*, this (admittedly very small) sample shows no *velox* at all, and only twelve out of twenty endings that could charitably be regarded as 'rhythmical' in the medieval sense:⁹⁶ a proportion (out of twenty) much the same as a figure I once calculated for the (as I should say) unrhythmical Bede.⁹⁷

But that is *not* to say that the passage lacks rhythm. Cicero says in the *Orator*⁹⁸ that *collocatio uerborum* comes under three heads. The third of these is what we think of as prose rhythm, 'ut comprehensio [the period] *numerosa et apte cadat*'. But the second, not subordinated to the third, is concinnity, 'ut forma ipsa concinnitasque uerborum conficiat orbem suum'. When he comes to discuss concinnity,⁹⁹ Cicero tells us that Gorgias was leader in this field, and gives an example from his own *pro Milone*:¹⁰⁰ 'Est enim, iudices, haec non scripta sed nata lex, quam non didicimus accepimus legimus, uerum ex natura ipsa arripimus hausimus expressimus, ad quam non docti sed facti, non instituti sed imbuti sumus.' The Gorgianic figures of *parisa*, *homoeoptota* and antithesis are here exemplified, and Cicero goes on to repeat the importance of antithesis in producing a rhythmic effect that 'follows without being sought'. Cicero has illustrated the devices of Gorgias in his own periodic terms, but of course they can be employed in much less elaborate constructions. William could not have read the *Orator*, but he did not need to. The Gorgianic figures have an after-life quite independent of precept, as the range of Norden's *Die antike Kunstprosa* and Polheim's *Die lateinische Reimprosa* shows. Writers of the twelfth century took their place in this tradition to varying extents, but they could not escape its allurements.

Genre was not decisive here. I open the pages of the historian Orderic at random, and find (in a speech):¹⁰¹ 'Omnia quae dicis, domine rex, uere et iusta esse censem^{us}, nec uni uerbo rationis tuae contradicere ualem^{us}. Beniuolentia tamen cogente potentiam tuam humiliter oram^{us}, ut consideres qui sunt pro quibus

⁹⁵ Note also *VW*, III. 20. 3; *GP*, 161. 1 (p. 297), compare *GR*, 212; and two exclamations prefaced by *macte*: *GR*, 309. 2, *GP*, 135. 1 (p. 275). See my remarks in 'The *Gesta regum* of William of Malmesbury', *Journal of Medieval Latin*, 5 (1995), 158–73 (a companion piece to the present paper) at p. 169.

⁹⁶ Charitably as not ruling out three endings with hiatus, or two planus endings that, metrically, give hexameter endings.

⁹⁷ 'Aldhelm's Prose Style and its Origins', *Anglo-Saxon England*, 6 (1977), 39–76 (at p. 73).

⁹⁸ Cicero, *Orator*, 149.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 164–67.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁰¹ Orderic, IV, 132.

tantopere rogamus.' The first passage of narrative I come upon¹⁰² is equally insistently rhymed: 'Nam ille qui pene omnes comprimebat, omnes nichilominus metuebat, ideoque publicum certamen cum hoste cominus agere non audebat.' These not unfairly represent the monotony of Orderic's effects. William shows superior tact.¹⁰³

His devices are attractively varied in our passage. In 4 the rhymes of *copulis* and *lustris* mark off a kind of couplet, and another, signalled by the further rhyming of *insuperabilem* and *minacem*, characterises the stag. In 6 the two *iam* clauses, the second slightly longer than the other, rhyme in *-erat*; perhaps more important, they say the same thing. This is the so-called Isidorean style, illustrated in Isidore's *Synonyma*, but in fact going back much further; it is, for example, commonly employed in the *Minor Declamations* attributed to Quintilian. William could have known it from Aldhelm.¹⁰⁴ There is another example¹⁰⁵ here in 9, where the phrase 'lusit operam', which we have met before, is repeated (and deepened) in 'uires consumpsit anhelas' (itself a variation on Statius' 'uirisque instaurat anhelas').¹⁰⁶ Here the pair reflects the paired rhyming participles *perterritus* and *conatus* earlier in the sentence. The rhymed clauses in 12 'uoluebat animo et [...] expromebat dicto' are given savour by the antithesis: one important to William, who often protests his disbelief in the speeches he finds given to characters in his sources (compare 'uel cogitauerat uel dixerat', itself consciously pretty, in 14). The (as we have seen) central 12 is given shape by the correspondence of 'lesisset arrogantia' and 'expulisset [...] curia' in the parallel *quod* clauses; and this is again Isidorean in a

¹⁰² Orderic, IV, 160.

¹⁰³ William does sometimes use this manner insistently, for example in the prologue to Book 5 of *GP* (where one wonders if the mistaken *commentatio* [p. 330: read *commentario*] is the result of the rhyme with *silentio*). Further investigation might establish whether such devices are restricted to particular kinds of subject matter. Tact in any case is to be expected of an author who preferred the 'sobriety' of Bede (*GR*, 57; *GP*, 107. 1, p. 238) or Eadmer (*GR*, I, Prol. 3) to the *tinnula uerba* of Æthelweard (*GR*, I, Prol. 7). For William's assessment of the style of Goscelin, whose techniques of rhyme approach William's in subtlety, see *GR*, 342. 2 (*comptius, expoliuit*). The rhyming technique of another writer praised by William (*GR*, 149. 3), Osbern of Canterbury (for example, his *Vita Dunstani*, pp. 150–51: 'Ab illo [...] appareret'), would be worth comparing with William's. Re-writing Osbern's *Vita Dunstani*, Eadmer employs rhyme too, but seems careful not to use the same ones he found in his source.

¹⁰⁴ See my *The Minor Declamations ascribed to Quintilian* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), p. xvi; for Aldhelm, my remarks in 'Aldhelm's Prose Style', pp. 59–63 (n. 97 above,).

¹⁰⁵ Compare also *VD*, I. 14. 3 'hostes omnes aditus precluserant, omnes calles obsederant'; *VW*, III. 29. 2: 'quasi ex caelestibus insonuisset templis, quasi ex diuinis profunderetur aditis'; and, in a historical work, *GR*, 35. 2: 'ut pretio mollitus bellum solueret, metallo prestrictus receptui caneret'. All three passages, like my first example, reinforce the parallelism with rhyme.

¹⁰⁶ *Thebais*, XII. 600.

way, for the second clause particularises the first. Then, in another pair of clauses, *prius* is varied by *ante*, and four *-tum* participles are played against each other; but this is *not* Isidorean, rather a sort of climax. The whole is rounded off by a longer sentence, in which the rhyme and alliteration of *placito* and *periculo* mark off the clauses (a little contrivedly: it is not clear what *ex placito* means). The invocation in 13 has its proper hymnic balance and rhyme. Then the crisis is over: the horse's change of mood is dramatised by the contrast of 'tirannico cursu superbius' with 'oue placidius'—and the king too will change from tyrant to sheep. The fireworks are almost over. But the new concord between Edmund and Dunstan is emphasized by the repetitions and rhymes of the parallel 'nullus' clauses in 15; and we are meant to enjoy the king's treatment of his own tears in 18: they are brushed away from without, but also controlled from within: 'resorbuit [...] compescuit'.

Much more could be done in analysis of William's many styles. Here, as throughout this paper, I have been pointing the way rather than going on the journey. The study of the language and style of twelfth-century writers of Latin prose generally is in its infancy. I have no doubt that John Ward, who has written acutely about William's technique,¹⁰⁷ and who has done so much to illuminate medieval rhetoric, would welcome advances along this road.

¹⁰⁷ John O. Ward, 'Some Principles of Rhetorical Historiography in the Twelfth Century', in *Classical Rhetoric and Medieval Historiography*, ed. by Ernst Breisach, *Studies in Medieval Culture*, 19 (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, Western Michigan University, 1985), pp. 103–66.

The Origins of 'Policy': Fiscal Administration and Economic Principles in Later Twelfth-Century England

CARY J. NEDERMAN

One part of the enduring discussion about the nature of the cultural watershed known as the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century is the character of the English contribution to its general intellectual trends.¹ In a famous essay on the topic, Richard Southern asserted the generally parasitic and secondary quality of the English contribution to European thought during the 1100s. Yet Southern did identify what he deemed to be four distinctively English expressions of the general movement of the twelfth century, one of which was 'the literature of secular government', that is, works that 'aspired in some degree to invest the routine of government with intellectual generality.'² As evidence for this claim, he cites law books such as Glanville, administrative treatises such as the *Dialogus de Scaccario*, and theoretical writings such as John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, all of which, he says, are characterized by a 'mixture of philosophical interest and practical familiarity.'³ The English tradition of pragmatic yet principled politics that would crystallize in the High and Late Middle Ages thus had its roots in twelfth-century soil.⁴

¹ Versions of this paper have been presented to audiences from the Victorian Universities Medieval and Renaissance Society in Melbourne (July 2002) and the Texas Medieval Association (October 2002). I wish to thank participants in both those forums for their helpful comments and insights. Support for this research was provided by a faculty fellowship from the Glasscock Center for Humanities Research at Texas A&M University.

² Richard W. Southern, *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 174, 176.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁴ See *Political Thought in Early Fourteenth-Century England: Treatises by Walter de*

In a spirited revaluation of the topic published some years later, Rodney Thomson argued for 'a more positive interpretation of England's place in the twelfth century renaissance' than had been proposed in Southern's original essay.⁵ Thomson's case rested on a combination of linguistic, geographical, biographical, and textual evidence. Yet he shared with Southern the view that the study of 'the art of government' constituted a field of investigation 'for which there were no immediate Continental precedents.' Thomson's sole caveat on this score was a desire to refine Southern's nomenclature to the more precise phrase 'literature of the art, practice, and evils of secular government'.⁶ The English approach to political thought, Thomson seems to maintain, is characterized by an ambivalent attitude that is both pragmatic and sceptical in its regard for the exercise of power.

I do not wish in the present paper to dispute the basic conclusions drawn by Southern and Thomson. Instead, I propose to contribute a further refinement to their scholarship by filling in and fleshing out their quite schematic observations. In particular, I would like to ask and begin to answer the question: are there any substantive doctrines or ideas that unite an otherwise highly diverse body of political literature that one finds in twelfth-century England? I pose this question in part because successive centuries of medieval, and even early modern, English political writing displayed a remarkable degree of linguistic and conceptual coherence.⁷ So it seems appropriate to ask whether some more concrete political ideas—as opposed to a general interest in political problems—were articulated across a range of authors and genres in twelfth-century England as well. In the present context, it is hardly possible for me to attempt to provide a comprehensive response. Rather, I shall offer only preliminary evidence for an affirmative answer to my query by offering a modest example of such intellectual unity (or at least overlap) in English political thought during the 1100s: the early glimmerings of 'policy', by which I mean (following John Pocock) the recognition that economic problems and their management form a core part of public affairs. Pocock has argued that the origination of the English term 'policy' in the fifteenth century signals a transformation in the very meaning of 'politics' from the classical paradigm (which divided political identity from household [*oikos*] stewardship) toward modern

Milemete, William of Pagula, and William of Ockham, ed. by Cary J. Nederman (Tempe: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 2002), pp. 1–14.

⁵ Rodney M. Thomson, 'England and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance', *Past and Present*, 101 (1983), 3–21 (p. 4).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁷ Two attempts to characterize this English tradition are Donald W. Hanson, *From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), and Robert Eccleshall, *Order and Reason in Politics: Theories of Absolute and Limited Monarchy in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

conceptions of 'political economy' and national jurisdiction over markets.⁸ 'Policy' thus stands as an intermediary way of thinking about the relationship between political and economic realms, and it is an invention that speaks with a noticeably English accent all the way up to the time of Adam Smith.

I suggest that some of the underpinnings of 'policy' understood in this manner may be discovered in key English texts on 'the art of government' associated with the Twelfth Century Renaissance. At present I shall consider two important contributions to this body of literature: John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* (completed in 1159), the work of a highly placed English churchman whose extensive education was matched by his broad political experience; and Richard FitzNigel's *Dialogus de Scaccario* (1177–1179), a manual designed to codify and explain the operations of the English royal fiscal mechanism that collected and processed revenues. In many ways, these tracts might seem to have little in common—the latter being mainly a technical discussion, the former imbued with a large measure of the classical and Christian learning in which its author was steeped. Indeed, there may be a certain sense in which FitzNigel's book may be read as critical of what he perceived to be John's idealism. In their fundamental conclusions, however, I believe that John and Richard concur about the basic nature and goal of government as a manager of the fiscal interests of the realm, concerned to balance the material wealth of the king and his subjects with the potentially corrupting effects (moral and political) of commerce and the circulation of money that had overtaken England in a short period of time. They both eye this growth of wealth with suspicion, while recognizing the benefits it offers to the king and his subjects as well.

Money against Nature

John of Salisbury has been widely recognized for constructing an image of the human community via an organic metaphor that includes all ranks and classes of people—from king and nobility all the way to artisans and peasant farmers.⁹ The leading principle that supports John's inclusive vision of social order, extending to economic practice, is his naturalism. Nature has licensed the production and circulation of goods—the fruits of the mechanical arts already mentioned—but only for the advantage of each and all of the members of the communal body. Hence, commerce, construed as private profit from the sale of commodities, stands opposed

⁸ J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Political Limits to Premodern Economics', in *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics*, ed. by John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 138–40.

⁹ See Tilman Struve, *Die Entwicklung der organologischen Staatsauffassung im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1978), pp. 123–48 and Cary J. Nederman, 'The Physiological Significance of the Organic Metaphor in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*', *History of Political Thought*, 8 (1987), 211–23.

to the common benefit embodied in the well-ordered organism. And money represents for John the purest expression of the preference for personal interest over public good. He sets out this argument explicitly in Book IV of the *Policraticus*, in the course of a commentary on the command of Deuteronomy 17. 17 that the king should not have a large quantity of gold and silver. It is not appropriate for a ruler to possess a substantial amount of wealth, John reasons, because it promotes in him the vices of avarice and covetousness.¹⁰

But the tendency of the rich to become greedy is not the only ground he gives for resisting the excessive acquisition of money. He relates the tale, drawn from Petronius, of the Roman craftsman who discovered a glass so hard that it rivalled precious metals and could not be broken even if thrown down on hard pavement. The talented craftsman presented a vessel made of this substance to Caesar, demonstrating dramatically its properties. Yet the ruler, so far from praising and rewarding the artisan's efforts, determined that no one else should know about the unbreakable glass and ordered its maker to be immediately killed. The rationale for such an apparently ungrateful action was the potential of the miraculous glass for devaluation of money: 'If this process should come into common knowledge gold and silver would become as cheap as mud.'¹¹ The ruler's desire to maintain his own personal wealth overwhelmed the benefit of unbreakable glass to the community as a whole. John declines to judge the factual truth of the story; his concern, rather, is the moral lesson that the *exemplum* teaches.¹² He delivers a stinging rebuke of the ruler:

I consider that the devotion of a most able craftsman was ill requited, and that it is a barren prospect for the human race when an excellent art is wiped out in order that money and the material of money—the fuel of avarice, the food of death, and the cause of battles and quarrels—may be held in high value. This cannot take place without human effort, since without it there cannot be fixed a price for anything.¹³

The innovation introduced by the unfortunate artisan constitutes for John a

¹⁰ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 2 vols, ed. by C. J. J. Webb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), IV. 5 (I, 248). I am forced to use this edition until the second volume of K. S. B. Keats-Rohan's new version of the *Policraticus* is published. Translations are my own.

¹¹ *Policraticus*, IV. 5 (I, 248–49): 'si hoc artificium innotesceret, aurum et argentum vilescerent quasi lutum.'

¹² On the importance of *exempla* in John's thought, see Peter von Moos, 'The Use of *Exempla* in the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury', in *The World of John of Salisbury*, ed. by Michael J. Wilks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 207–61.

¹³ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, IV. 5 (I, 249): 'Ego vero sapientiorum non praeiudicans intellectui devotionem potentis artificis male remuneratam arbitror, et inutiliter humano generi prospectum, cum ars egregia deleta sit, ut fomes avaritiae, pabulum mortis, contentionum proeliorumque causa pecunia pecuniaeque materia servaretur in pretioquod sine diligentia hominis fuerat habitura, cum sine se esse non possit quae rerum pretium est.'

contribution to the improvement of the human condition. To sacrifice such material benefit for mere money perverts the true utility of physical objects.

The story from Petronius thus affords John the opportunity to provide a quite extensive and critical appraisal of the consequences of the circulation of money—a passage that has received (to my knowledge) no previous attention from historians of economic thought. In particular, money leads to the mis-valuation of people: in a society where cash value determines human worth, the poor man is 'trampled on' and the rich man is 'honoured solely on account of his money'. Moreover, unlike objects that directly meet human needs, money has no intrinsic value; its desirability is determined by 'opinion' alone. In this connection, John invokes nature as the standard by which to judge the value of things: 'The only really valid kind of value is that the usefulness of which is recommended by nature, the best guide of living.' The naturalism characteristic of the *Policraticus* thus becomes an absolute and universal yardstick for differentiating between the worthless and the worthy:

Bread and victuals, which consist of necessary foodstuffs or clothing, are regarded as valuable everywhere throughout the earth by the dictates of nature. Things that please the senses are naturally valued by all. [...] Things that derive their value from nature are not only everywhere the same, but are held in esteem among all peoples; those that depend on opinion are uncertain, and as they come with fancy, so they disappear when the fancy passes.¹⁴

The value of the goods produced by the mechanical arts is sanctioned by nature and so beyond question. These objects directly meet material and evident human needs.

By contrast, money is at best a mechanism for facilitating the exchange of useful goods. Indeed, John commends to his readers the policy advocated by the Greek figures Lycurgus and Pythagoras (according to him) of completely eliminating money and commerce from society.

To far better advantage certain peoples have sought to banish utterly from public business this subject-matter of disputes and litigation, this cause of hatred, to the end that, the cause being removed, the resulting ill-will and its consequences might disappear.¹⁵

¹⁴ *Policraticus*, IV. 5 (I, 250): 'sit sola virtus in pretio et illa quorum usum optima optima dux vivendi natura commendat. [...] Panis siquidem aut victualia, quae in alimentis aut indumentis necessariis constant, dictante nature sunt ubique terrarum in pretio. Quae sensus oblectant naturaliter omnibus grata sunt. [...] Quae naturae sunt, non modo eadem sed vigent apud omnes; quae opinionis arbitrium sequuntur, incerta sunt; et, sicut ad placitum sunt, ita et ad placitum evanescent.'

¹⁵ *Policraticus*, IV. 5 (I, 249): 'Longe utilius quidam omnem materiam iugioem et causam odii a suis rebus publicis exterminare studuerunt, ut causa deficiente effectus malitiae evanesceret.'

The absence of money as a mediating force in social relations could only improve, in John's view, the strength of the communal bond, for then nothing would interfere with the proper values being placed on people and things. Nor ought we to expect that the elimination of monetary currency would occasion the collapse of exchange relations necessary for 'naturally' valuable goods. Apparently referring back to the tale from Petronius, John comments, 'The emperor therefore had no need to fear that the material of commercial dealings would become lacking, since buying and selling are common even among those peoples who are not acquainted with the use of money.'¹⁶ The preferred economic system of the *Policraticus*—the one most consonant with nature—evidently depends upon barter and direct trading of goods produced for use. Money corrupts this natural economy by introducing into the process a foreign medium of no intrinsic value and thus displacing the only genuine measure of value.

Thus, it is hardly a wonder that John fails to include merchants (whose enterprise is expressly associated with money) among the parts of the body politic. Indeed, his *Metalogicon* (a companion work to the *Policraticus* composed at about the same time) condemns the 'sordid, worldly occupations' associated with money-making for their single-minded, immoral devotion to heaping up liquid wealth: 'They lend out cash at interest, alternately accumulating uneven round-numbered sums and increasing these to even multiple round numbers by their additions. They deem nothing sordid and inane, save the straits of poverty. Wisdom's only fruit for them is wealth.'¹⁷ Sharp business practices and devious dealings are only to be expected of people whose entire life is devoted to accumulating corrupt and unnatural riches in the form of metallic currency. Those who enter commercial professions 'have been sucked into the abyss of avaricious money-making, pleading need and duty, but really thirsting for lucre.'¹⁸ Money appears in John's writings as a quasi-Manichean force of moral corruption, which, once introduced, renders virtuous devotion to the public good extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible.

¹⁶ *Policraticus*, IV. 5 (I, 250): 'Non fuerat ergo timendum imperatori ne materia commerciorum deficeret, cum etiam adhuc apud illos venalitium frequens sit, qui pecuniam non noverunt.'

¹⁷ John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, I. 4, ed. by J. B. Hall and K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, CCCM, 98 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), pp. 19–20: 'Exercent faenebrem pecuniam alternis vicibus inaequalia rotundantes, et adiectione multiplici quod rotundaverant abaequant. Nihil enim sordidum putant, nihil stultum, nisi pauperitas angustias, et soles opes ducunt esse fructum sapientiae.'

¹⁸ *Metalogicon*, I. 4, p. 20: 'sub obtentu necessitatis exercendique officii dum lucrum quidem sitiebant multiplicis avaritiae voragine absorbebantur.'

The Corruption of Wealth

The distorting effects of money become especially dangerous, John seems to feel, when they infect the life-blood of politics. John complains that 'it is impossible to seek justice and money at one and the same time; for either a man will cleave to one and despise the other, or else he will be perverted by the worse and lose the better.'¹⁹ The concern is two-fold. First, royal officials only properly dedicate themselves to the duties of their position when they shun opportunities for private gain. Second, the king himself must take special care to ensure the honesty and probity of his administration, so that the corruption that stems from money does not become a hallmark of his rule. Much of the argument in Books V and VI of the *Policraticus* focuses on the regulation of royal servants in order to prevent the values of commercial life from pervading government.

Two principal elements comprise John's advice for the king's officers in economic matters. In the first place, he insists repeatedly that bribery must be resisted in all forms.²⁰ Courtiers are not to sell access to the halls of power, nor conversely to sell inaction and silence.²¹ This is a widespread problem, according to John: 'The dishonesty of court officials is so well known that it is in vain for a suitor to place his trust in the testimony of his conscience, the integrity of his character, his unblemished reputation, the genuineness of his cause or the eloquence with which it is presented, without the intervention of a bribe.'²² The courtly thirst for gold has undermined the ability of the republic to function according to its natural design. Likewise, John counsels provincial administrators, royal judges, sheriffs, and all other secular officials as well as incumbents of ecclesiastical offices that the acceptance of money is incompatible with the tasks to which they have been assigned.²³ The example of the biblical Samuel is held up as a mirror for magistrates: 'Surely this man did not extort villas or lands, or immense sums of gold or silver, or masses of costly furniture or apparel.'²⁴ Instead, Samuel dispensed justice equitably

¹⁹ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, v. 9 (I, 322): 'Impossibile siquidem est quemquam iustitiam et pecuniam sequi; aut enim uni istorum quilibet adhaerebit et alterum contempnet, aut torquebitur altero melioris experts.'

²⁰ For John's contribution to discussions of bribery, see John Noonan, *Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 155–72.

²¹ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, v. 10 (I, 323–25): 'At improbitas curialium eo usque innotuit ut de testimonio conscientiae, de venustate morum, de odore opinionis, de sinceritate causae, de torrente eloquentiae, nisi pretio interveniente quis frustra confidat.'

²² *Policraticus*, v. 10 (I, 326).

²³ For example, *Policraticus*, v. 11 (I, 332–34); v. 15 (I, 346–49); v. 16 (I, 352–58); v. 17 (I, 364–68).

²⁴ *Policraticus*, v. 16 (I, 351): 'Utique villas et praedia aut immensa pondera auri vel

without expectation of earthly gifts and rewards, and he was in consequence found worthy of the people over whom he exercised authority.

Bribery may constitute the most pervasive example of the corrupting results of commercial values, but outright usurpation of property and rights forms a still more serious threat. Hence, John cautions that the servants of the king are to take care lest by laying their hands upon the goods of subjects they overreach. The most obvious opportunity for abuse stems from the collection of taxes. John acknowledges the necessity of the people supporting the activities of the king with their pocketbooks, and he even identifies a specific part of the body politic—the ‘unarmed hand’—as the proper conduit for the funnelling of such revenues. But he warns that this unarmed hand is uniquely placed to exploit its power for the enhancement of personal wealth. In a long and somewhat tortured analogy, John describes tax collectors as swarms of highly destructive insects (locusts and their ilk) that strip the land and people of all their goods: consuming ‘the fruits of the earth utterly’ and ingesting ‘the labours of men.’ Like the insect, the collector of royal revenues

harms those near-by and those far off, and when he has settled himself down upon any person, devours his fortune and does not depart until he carries away all his victim’s substance. Who can count how many wards such an official has dutifully defrauded, how many farms his wrong-doing has put up for sale, and how many of our people the licence of such men has stripped of their possessions and in the name of religion or some other pretext has sent them overseas [...]?²⁵

John admits, then, that the actions of the king’s agents have a very material bearing upon the welfare of citizens. When royal servants are motivated by their own financial gain rather than by the common good of the body politic, the results will be devastating. Because the unarmed hand is directly implicated in the collection of cash, it stands especially vulnerable to the debasing effects of money. It is little wonder, in John’s view, that the ancient ‘publicans’ acquired the reputation for rapacity that they enjoy in both Scripture and secular literature.

Of Kings and Currency

How, then, can official corruption be effectively curtailed? This is the job of the king, John insists. The disintegration of the republic caused by money constitutes

argenti aut pretiosae suppellectilis onera non extorserat. . .’

²⁵ *Policraticus*, VI. 1 (II, 5; cf. II, 3–7): ‘propinquis nocent et remotis, et illius, cui semel insederit, fortunam devoret, nec ante abscedat quam omnes eius auferat facultates. Quis numerare potest quot pupillos officiosissime circumscripserit et quot venales iniuria fecerit agros et quot apud nos licentia istorum suis nudatos bonis sub imagine religionis alio ve praetextu [...]?’

one of the gravest threats to the just governance and reciprocal order of the body politic. Thus, the elimination of such corrosive influences forms a central mission of a good ruler. There are two strategies for successfully accomplishing this goal: 'It is important, therefore, for the prince to curb the malice of his officials and to provide for them out of the public funds in order that all occasion for extortion may be removed.'²⁶ In other words, John advocates a carrot-and-stick approach. On the one hand, the temptation to exact payment in return for the performance of one's assigned duties arises especially when magistrates are insufficiently compensated for their labours. Hence, royal rulers ought to ensure the good behaviour of their officers by paying them an adequate salary. Acknowledging the lesson of 'mother nature, the most loving of parents', which protects the internal organs with ribs and flesh, 'in the republic it behoves us to follow this pattern of nature's craftsmanship and from the public store supply these officials with a sufficiency for their needs.'²⁷ John's logic is compelling: royal officials involved in financial activities will 'covet immoderately the things of others' if they do not receive a salary commensurate to their station and contribution:

All those whose offices touch the inner parts of the republic, and whom we called above the financial officials and bailiffs and overseers of private property [...] must have subsistence in sufficient quantity, and this should be interpreted on the basis of need and use, having due regard for distinction between persons. For if it is absorbed too greedily and not sufficiently distributed, distempers will be produced that are incurable or difficult to cure.²⁸

John offers a canny observation at this juncture. Royal agents are not only to be adequately compensated, but they are to receive payment in direct proportion to their contributions to the common good. Orderly public administration presupposes officers who may reasonably expect some uniform relationship between their revenues and their honest labours.

In turn, when the king's servants misbehave, the royal stick must be applied sharply. 'Because the licence of officials has a freer rein in that they can use the pretext of their office to despoil or harass private persons', John reasons, 'all usurpations contrary to their duties must be punished with a proportionately heavier

²⁶ *Policraticus*, v. 10 (I, 328): 'Refert itaque potestatis istorum cohibere malitiam et eisdem de publico providere ut omnis grassandi occasio subtrahatur.'

²⁷ *Policraticus*, v. 9 (I, 322): 'Oportet autem in re publica hanc naturae opificis servari imaginem et his necessariorum copiam de publico ministrari.'

²⁸ *Policraticus*, v. 9 (I, 322): 'Quod etiam ad eos usque protenditur, qui in corpore rei publicae interiorum obtinent vicem, quos quaestores et commentarienses et rerum privatarum comites esse praediximus. Haec enim omnia ad satietatem reficienda sunt, et hanc ex necessitate et usu, habita ratione personarum, oportet interpretari. Si enim reficiantur avidius et minus digerant, generant morbos aut incurabiles aut difficiles.'

penalty.²⁹ Magistrates are uniquely situated to abuse their powers by converting to their own personal use the goods of the people. John stipulates that no subject may licitly resist the demands of royal agents: 'Against these men, although they are extortionists, despoilers, and torturers, it is not permissible even to breathe a word; for they are the visible ministers of the law.'³⁰ The *Policraticus* expressly forbids self-defence as grounds for refusing to hand over one's money and chattels. While these officers may be nothing more than publicly sanctioned thieves, the fact that they represent the majesty of the king suffices to render them immune from any resistance. Thus, the king himself—who alone may judge and correct his servants—must remain vigilant concerning the conduct of those who act in his name. If the ruler governs wisely, John says, 'he will curb their jaws with bit and bridle, so that they cannot, in the manner of wolves driven on by unclean gluttony, lay waste and mangle the province.'³¹ The prince is responsible to his subjects proximately, and to God ultimately, not only for his own conduct in office, but also for that of his magistrates. He will be judged by history and eternity on the basis of the rigour of his control over his administration.

There is also a utilitarian element to John's advice about the conduct of royal officials. He recognizes that the king's interests are best served when the property of subjects is protected and their wealth augmented. This conclusion derives from the communal and reciprocal structure of property holding posited in the *Policraticus*: neither king nor subjects are true owners of their goods in the modern sense, that is, as individual, private, and independent proprietors. On the one hand, the king is merely a steward of the wealth that he possesses or collects from the community. The ruler properly

looks upon his riches as belonging to the people. He will not therefore regard as his own the wealth of which he has custody for the account of others, nor will he treat as private the property of the fisc, which is acknowledged to be public. Nor is there any reason for wonder, since he is not even his own man, but belongs wholly to his subjects.³²

²⁹ *Policraticus*, VI. 1 (II, 3): 'Quia vero officialium licentia maior est, dum sub praetextu officii spoliare possunt at vexare privatos, quod contra officium praesumunt pena ferendum est graviori.'

³⁰ *Policraticus*, VI. 1 (II, 7): 'Nam cum alias habita moderatione inculptae tutelae vim vi repellere liceat, concutientibus spoliandis torquentibus his mutire non licet; iuris etenim videtur esse ministri.'

³¹ *Policraticus*, VI. 1 (II, 8): 'in cano et freno maxillas eorum constringet, ne more luporum quos improba ventris agit ingluvies, vastare possint et lacerare provinciam'.

³² *Policraticus*, IV. 5 (I, 250): 'divitia suae populi reputet. Non habebit ergo divitias quas nomine possidet alieno, nec sibi privata erunt bona fiscalia quae publica confitetur. Nec mirum, cum nec ipse suus sit sed subditorum.'

When it comes to matters of finance, the properties and revenues of the monarch may be dissolved into those of the realm: in person and estate, the king is truly a common good. Hence, the royal charge is to respect and defend the rights and liberties of his subjects according to their just distribution: 'Each receives on the basis of his worth the resources of nature and the product of his own labour and industry.'³³ One detects in John's conception of the king's role in regulating the distributive share of material goods echoes of the normative naturalism stemming from the proper arrangement of the body politic. When every person possesses what nature has determined that he deserves, according to his contribution to the whole, justice is done and the health and welfare of the body are preserved. But when the ruler disturbs this natural order—say, by treating certain property as his private patrimony rather than a public good—he dismembers the realm.³⁴ The latter reflects the wilful commands of the tyrant, rather than the virtue of the true king.

Yet, on the other hand, John realizes that the king's position requires him to possess wealth adequate to his many vitally important tasks.³⁵ His income is to be cheerfully provided by his subjects to meet his needs, since the members of the body require the protection that he uniquely provides. In this regard, the principle of reciprocity ensures that the ruler who defends his realm will have the resources to hand to perform his proper functions.

What is to the advantage of the provincials is to the advantage of the prince. All things belonging to the provincials are by law subjected and made available to the necessity and advantage of the prince. The whole province is accordingly like the prince's strongbox, and whosoever drains it offends most grievously against the prince by diminishing his resources. For the provincials are like tenants by *superficies*, and when the advantage of the ruling power requires, they are not so much owners of their possessions as mere custodians. But if there is no such pressure of necessity, then the goods of the provincials are their own and not even the prince himself may lawfully abuse them.³⁶

³³ *Policraticus*, I. 3 (I, 20): 'Naturae, laboris, et industriae fructum unusquisque recipiebat ex merito.'

³⁴ John cites royal claims on hunting rights that result in the dispossession of farmers of their arable land as exemplifying how the king may disorder the just economic organization of the realm; see *Policraticus*, I. 4 (I, 31–32).

³⁵ *Policraticus*, IV. 5 (I, 248).

³⁶ *Policraticus*, VI. 1 (II, 8): 'bona siquidem provincialium principis sunt; ad necessitatem et usum principis omnia quae provincialium sunt, de iure exponuntur. Provincia tota quasi archa principis est, quam quisquis exhaurit, gravissime delinquit in principem cuius extenuat facultates. Nam provinciales quasi quidem superficarii sunt et, quotiens usus exigit potestatis, rerum suarum non tamen domini sunt quam custodes. Si vero necessitas non incumbit articulus, sua sint provincialium bona sua, quibus nec ipse princeps licenter abutitur.'

For the very reason, then, that the king must depend for his own income upon the economic health of his people, he must carefully guard against their maltreatment by magistrates. When the king fails to control his agents, he injures his own well being by exhausting 'the whole strength of the republic', as well as eventually succumbing to poverty and rendering himself hateful to his subjects. Because the property of the people is the storehouse for the wealth of the ruler, it falls to his interest to safeguard it against the deprivations of avaricious and unscrupulous officials. Ultimately, the king does well for himself by doing justice to his subjects.

Foundations of Financial Administration

On the face of it, John's *Policraticus* would seem to have little in common with Richard FitzNigel's *Dialogus de Scaccario*.³⁷ The latter was intended to be an entirely practical manual replete with detailed descriptive accounts of the operations of Henry II's fiscal system. Its purpose in recording how and why this structure performs its various functions is to pass on this knowledge to future generations of royal servants. Thus, Richard declines to make grandiose claims for the content and the expression found in the *Dialogue*. When the Master is called upon to offer instruction about the Exchequer and initially refuses to write about a topic so mundane and simple, his interlocutor, the Student, proclaims: 'Those who delight in novelties, or in hunting for fine distinctions, have Aristotle and Plato's books. [...] Your writing is not to be subtle but useful.'³⁸ Likewise, the Master's concern that his language will be too familiar to suit the subject is waved away by the Student: 'Writers on the liberal arts have compiled large treatises and wrapped them in obscure language, to conceal their ignorance and to make the arts more difficult. You are not undertaking a book on the arts, but on the customs and laws of the Exchequer, which, because these ought to be a common matter, must necessarily use words that are known to the speakers.'³⁹ Richard signals that the book which follows

³⁷ For instance, R. I. Moore remarks in *The First European Revolution, c. 970–1215* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 144: 'The *Dialogue of the Exchequer* [...] adds a new genre to the literature of government. It is concerned neither with moral exhortation or reflection, either directly like the "mirror for princes" of which *Policraticus* is the best known, or indirectly like the satires, nor primarily with history, [...] but with explaining carefully and exactly how the king's business is carried on.'

³⁸ Richard FitzNigel, *Dialogus de Scaccario*, ed. and trans. by Charles Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 5: 'Qui novitatibus gaudent, qui subtilium rerum fugam appetunt, habent Aristotilem et libros Platonicos [...] Tu scribe non subtilia set utilia.' I generally follow Johnson's translation with occasional modifications.

³⁹ *Dialogus*, p. 6: 'Artium scriptores ne multa parum scisse viderentur et ut ars difficilior cognitu fieret, multa conquiesierunt et verbis incognitis palliarunt. Tu scribendam artem non suscipis set quasdam consuetudines et iura scaccarii, que quia communia debent esse,

is to be regarded as a work of practical advice, of the sort that were becoming more common by the end of the twelfth century,⁴⁰ rather than as a sophisticated philosophical investigation. He proposes to draw on his own experience, instead of upon the wisdom of the ancients and arguments of subtle logic, to fill the pages of his volume.

Thus, Richard appears far less sceptical than John about the king's need to gather wealth in order to rule effectively. In the dedication of the *Dialogue*, he sets a somewhat authoritarian tone by insisting that the duties of royal subjects extend to providing without question for the material sustenance of their ruler:

We ought to serve them by upholding not only those dignities in which the glory of kingship displays itself but also the worldly wealth that accrues to kings in virtue of their position. The former confers distinction, the latter power. Their power indeed rises and falls as their moveable wealth flows or ebbs. Those who lack it are prey to their enemies, those who have it prey upon them. And although this wealth is not always theirs as a result of strictly legal means, by proceeds sometimes lawfully, sometimes from secret devices known only to their hearts, and sometimes even from their arbitrary wills, still their subjects have no right to question or condemn their determinations.⁴¹

To those familiar with John of Salisbury's teachings about the expectation that the true king (as opposed to the tyrant) will place himself entirely under the laws of God and of his nation, as well as the famous doctrine of tyrannicide enunciated in the *Policraticus*, Richard's assertions sound harsh indeed. Richard evidently expects total submission and obedience to the king's fiscal exactions; anything less is an affront to God who has conferred power on the ruler.

The *Dialogue* quickly downplays this authoritarian rhetoric, however, by stressing that kings will commonly use their coffers only for righteous purposes that

communibus necessario utendum est verbis ut sint cognati sermones rebus de quibus loquimur.'

⁴⁰ For example, see *Walter of Henley and Other Treatises on Estate Management and Accounting*, ed. by Dorothy Oschinsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae qui vocatur Glanvill*, ed. by G. P. G. Hall (London: Thomas Nelson, 1965); and Theophilus, *De diversibus artibus*, ed. by C. R. Dodwell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

⁴¹ FitzNigel, *Dialogue*, p. 1: 'Oportet autem hiis servire non in conservandis tantum dignitatibus per quas gloria regie potestatis elucet, verum in mundanarum facultatum copiis que eos sui status ratione contingunt. Ille enim illustrant, hec subveniunt. Porro mobilium copia vel defectus principum potestates humiliat vel exaltat. Quibus enim hec desunt hostibus predam fiunt, quibus autem hec suppetunt hiis hostes in predam cedunt. Sane licet hec regibus plerumque, iure non prorsus examinato set patriis quandoque legibus quandoque cordium suorum consiliis occultis vel solius interdum sue voluntatis arbitrio, provenire contingat; eorum tamen facta ab inferioribus discutienda vel contempnanda non sunt.'

ultimately benefit all of the inhabitants of their realms. 'The glory of princes consists in noble actions in peace and war', Richard observes, 'but it excels in those in which is made a happy bargain, the price being temporal and the reward everlasting.'⁴² The success of kings may indeed depend upon the requirement to act in accordance with virtue and faith, but this goal is only facilitated when they possess a properly funded treasury. No matter how much a monarch may desire to serve God and goodness, his intentions are easily frustrated if he lacks the resources to realize his aims.

There are occasions on which sound and wise schemes take effect sooner through the agency of money, and apparent difficulties are smoothed away by it, as though by commercial exchange. Money is no less indispensable in peace than in war. In war it is lavished on fortifying castles, paying soldiers' wages, and innumerable other expenses, determined by the character of the persons paid, for the defence of the realm; in peace, though arms are laid down, noble churches are built by devout rulers, Christ is fed and clothed in the persons of the poor, and by practising the other works of mercy mammon is distributed.⁴³

Richard clearly believes that the efficient collection of revenues by the king is a lynchpin in the realization of the public good. Subjects who refuse to contribute to the meeting of royal needs in the end do not recognize their own advantage, for the ruler spends what he receives for the sake of improving the condition of the kingdom. The *Dialogus* therefore reviles those residing in the realm who object to contributing their fair share or who otherwise protest the propriety of exacting royal revenue.

Consequently, the work of the Exchequer in receiving, calculating, and dispensing the royal treasury lies at the heart of government. Those clerks who serve as officials of the Exchequer 'all have the same duty and aim, to protect the king's advantage without injustice.'⁴⁴ For the good of the king is inseparable from the good of the kingdom, and an assiduous financial magistrate demonstrates his devotion both to king and country. Nor should the royal servant become too fussy or critical about the precise sources of his master's revenue: 'Therefore, however questionable may be or

⁴² *Dialogus*, p. 2: 'In utriusque vero temporis strenvis actibus gloria principum est; set excellit in hiis ubi pro temporalibus impensis, felici mercimonio mansura succedunt.'

⁴³ *Dialogus*, p. 2: 'Set fit interdum ut quod sano consilio vel excellenti mente concipitur intercedente pecunia citius convalescat et quod difficile videbatur per hanc quasi per quandam negotiorum metodum facilem consequatur effectum. Non solum autem hostilitatis set etiam pacis tempore necessaria videtur. Illo enim in municipiis fermandis, in stipendiis ministrandis et in aliis plerisque locis pro qualitate personarum ad conservandum regni statum effunditur; hoc vero, licet arma quiescant, a devotis principibus construuntur basilice, Christus alitur et vestitur in paupere et ceteris operibus misericordie insistendo mammona distribuitur.'

⁴⁴ *Dialogus*, p. 13: 'officium omnium est et intentio ut regis utilitati prospiciant, salva tamen equitate'.

appear the origin or the method of the acquisition of wealth, those whose duty it is to guard it have no excuse for slackness, but must give anxious care to its collection, preservation and distribution, since they must give account of the state of the realm, the security of which depends upon its wealth.⁴⁵ The loyalty and honesty of royal fiscal administrators are made by FitzNigel into the *sine qua non* of a well-ordered society and a properly functioning government. Indeed, this forms precisely the normative thrust behind Richard's supposedly empirical project: he wishes to teach future generations of magistrates how to conduct themselves because he believes that upon them rests the burden of ensuring the continuation and glory of the king and of the realm. Richard may not be writing philosophy in the technical sense that he dismisses, but his book has a moral and political force that ought not to be ignored.

Managing the Money Economy

Lest we imagine that Richard embraces the rise of the monetarized economy and its values more wholeheartedly than John, however, we need to attend to some countervailing features of his analysis in the *Dialogus de Scaccario*. Richard gives a fascinating historical reconstruction of the emergence of money as the measure of wealth for the English government.⁴⁶ In the time of the Conqueror, he reports, the crown lived directly off the produce of its own lands; its tenants provided the victuals necessary to feed the royal household, while any coinage in the king's treasury accrued from payments by urban communities lacking agricultural goods. When rent-in-kind was collected by the sheriffs, court officials translated its value into monetarized terms (a shilling for a certain quantity of wheat, four pence for a sheep, and so on) as a matter of convenience only. During the reign of King Henry I, however, necessity and invention altered the method by which rents for crown lands were assessed. On the one hand, Henry's extended foreign sojourns required liquid wealth rather than consumables in order to supply his retinue. On the other hand, the farmers on royal lands, suffering economic hardship as well as 'countless inconveniences', protested against the requirement that rent must be paid in kind. Thus, a bargain is struck between Henry and his tenants according to which a census of the value of the crown lands was established and each sheriff was made responsible for collecting a certain total sum from his region. The shift from rent-in-kind to rent in money alleviated the king's need for coinage; the change from individual to collective responsibility for rents meant that particular farmers whose

⁴⁵ *Dialogus*, pp. 1–2: 'Igitur qualiscumque sit vel videatur adquirendi causa vel modus, hiis qui ad eorum custodiam ex officio deputantur cura remissior esse non debet, set in eisdem congregandis, conservandis vel distribuendis sollicitam decet esse diligentiam quasi rationem reddituris de regni statu qui per hec incolumis perseverat.'

⁴⁶ For what follows, see *Dialogus*, pp. 40–42.

fortunes waned would not be oppressed. The advantage of the king and of the English people happily coincided.

An immediate consequence of this development in the early twelfth century, Richard acknowledges, was the more widespread availability of money throughout England. Whereas coins had previously been common (and useful) only in the towns and villages in which trade occurred, now the agricultural economy became widely monetarized—an important aspect of the ‘commercial revolution’ of high medieval England about which modern historians speak.⁴⁷ The effects of this development were by no means uniformly positive, according to Richard. Rather, the fact that many regions of the country did not have local coinage forced the Exchequer to accept for a long period money of uncertain provenance, and hence of unknown quantity and quality. Hence, the crown could not adequately gauge whether it was receiving the full value of its rents. The problem of irregular currency persisted well into the reign of Henry II, who finally ‘appointed one weight and one money throughout all the realm under his sway’, so that during Richard’s tenure as a royal official ‘every county has become bound by the same law, and must make its payment in legal tender.’⁴⁸ Yet even the regulation of specie does not ensure its conformity. As the Student asks, ‘Since all the coin in the realm must be stamped with the king’s likeness, and all moneys are bound to work to the same standard weight, how does it come about that their work does not all weigh alike?’ The Master responds: ‘It comes about through forgers, and mutilators and clippers of the coin. You see, English money may be bad in three ways: the weight, the alloy, or the stamp may each be bad.’⁴⁹ Consequently, the officials of the Exchequer must vigilantly impose consistent standards to the quality of the coinage received as payment from sheriffs.⁵⁰ Otherwise, the crown runs the risk of losing a considerable amount of its income from its lands and rights as the result of bad money. (It would take some time yet for the king’s treasurers to realize how the manipulation of its monopoly on the minting of money could be turned to its own advantage.⁵¹)

⁴⁷ See R. H. Britnell, *The Commercialisation of English Society, 1000–1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

⁴⁸ FitzNigel, *Dialogus*, p. 10: ‘At, postquam rex illustris cuius laus est in rebus magnis excellentior sub monarchia sua per universum regnum unum pondus et unam monetam instituit, omnis comitatus una legis necessitate teneri et generalis commercii solutioni cepit obligari.’

⁴⁹ *Dialogus*, p. 12: ‘Cum ergo quelibet moneta regni huius impressam habere debeat regis imaginem et ad idem pondus omnes monetarii teneantur operari qualiter fieri potest ut non omne eorum opus eiusdem ponderis sit? [...] Attamen fieri potest per falsarios et nummorum decuratores vel detonsores. Noveris autem monetam Anglie in tribus falsam deprehendi, in falso scilicet pondere, in falsa lege, in falsa imagine.’

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

⁵¹ See the arguments of Nicole Oresme’s *De moneta*, ed. by Charles Johnson (London: Thomas Nelson, 1955).

The administrative problems engendered by widespread use of money in twelfth-century England have an obvious moral dimension. Currency manipulation posed not merely a technical problem, but also a legal issue, since it was akin to theft from the king. Likewise, as Richard admits, payment of rents, tithes, and other revenues owed to the king in liquid form enabled subjects to hide their true assets and thus to avoid their liability. This deception is especially rampant among merchants whose dealings occur on a cash basis:

The bulk of the possessions of those who have land and live by agricultural pursuits consists in sheep, cattle, and grain, and in such things as can hardly escape the notice of neighbours. But those who tend to matters of trade, and who save and scrape with all their might to augment their wealth, are more concerned with coined money. For money is the tool of the trader, and can easily be hidden safely away, which is the reason why rich men whose wealth is concealed are often thought to be poor.⁵²

The threat of tax evasion was exacerbated by the shift to a monetarized economy: it became easier to dissemble about one's wealth and to deny to the king his due income. Richard argues that punishment should be greater for such evasion because 'a superabundance of riches should never appear to be exhausted',⁵³ a claim which I take to mean that a mendacious claim of poverty to enhance one's own private riches constitutes an affront to the royal majesty and to the kingdom alike. Surplus money should be made available for the public good upheld by the ruler, just as surplus fruits of the land should be rendered to the crown when the needs of the realm require it.

Another serious issue raised by the wide circulation of money is the growing practice of lending money for interest. The *Dialogus de Scaccario* contains an extended diatribe against the forms of usury apparently practised in the twelfth century. Richard's tone in this passage is moralistic and uncompromising. He recognizes that the Church prohibits an outright legal prohibition against Christians who engage in usury: 'As we are told by those learned in the law, the crown has no ground of action against a Christian usurer, clerk or layman, so long as he is alive; for he may have time to repent.'⁵⁴ Rather, ecclesiastical authorities enjoy jurisdiction

⁵² FitzNigel, *Dialogus*, p. 108: 'Maxima pars possessionis eorum qui fundos habent et per agriculturam sustentantur in percudibus, in animalibus et in frugibus est et item in hiis que non facile cohabitantium notitiam possunt effugere. At hiis, qui mercimoniis inserviunt, et qui parcentes sumptibus, multiplicandis possessionibus totis viribus et modis omnibus insistent, in numeratam pecuniam sollicitior cura consistit. Per hec enim commercia facilius exercentur et possunt hec in locis tutis et ignotis facile reponi; unde fit ut sepe qui dives est, non patentibus hiis que latent, pauper reputetur.'

⁵³ *Dialogus*, p. 108: 'superhabundans pecuniarum puteus non de facili videtur exhaustus.'

⁵⁴ *Dialogus*, p. 99: 'Ceterum sicut a prudentibus accepimus, in sic delinquentem clericum vel laicum Christianum, regia potestas actionem non habet, dum vita comes fuerit, superest

over the punishment of the usurer in his own lifetime; if he is found to be guilty of the crime of lending money at interest, the Church may require penitence and demand restitution and may even impose excommunication, all forms of spiritual imposition. But if a usurer dies unrepentant, jurisdiction shifts to the secular power.

When any holder of a lay fee, or even a city-dweller (*civis*), is an open usurer and dies intestate or disposes by his testament of his ill-gotten gains without making restitution to those whom he has wronged, not therefore distributing the mammon, but keeping it in his own hands—because by clinging to the possessions he is considered not to have given up the will to keep them—his money and all his chattels are at once confiscated, and brought into the Exchequer by the proper officers without summons. The heir of the deceased must content himself with his father's land and other real property, and be thankful not to have lost them.⁵⁵

Hence, temporal government has a duty to stamp out the moral and spiritual evil of usury by demonstrating that no one—not even the child of the deceased usurer—can profit from his perfidy. The king must directly concern himself with regulating economic activities so that they remain consonant with moral rectitude.

Moreover, royal authority over usury extends not only to the so-called 'open' usurer, who directly charges interest in return for the loan of money, but also to so-called 'hidden' (*non publicas*) usury. This term refers to the practice, apparently growing during Richard's time, of circumventing ecclesiastical usury prohibitions by engaging in a sort of pawn arrangement: 'A man takes a manor or church in exchange for what he has lent, and without abating the principal takes the issues of it until the principal is repaid. This kind, on account of the labour and expense involved in cultivation, has been regarded as more permissible; but it is undoubtedly an unclear thing, and deserves to be reckoned as usury.'⁵⁶ Richard insists that identical punishments pertain to the hidden usurer both before and after his death as to the open usurer. More intriguing is the greed that the common availability of money seems to induce. Even men who have some moral scruples seem intent upon

enim penitentie tempus'.

⁵⁵ *Dialogus*, p. 98: 'Item cum quis laicum fundum habens vel civis etiam publicis inservit usuris, si hic intestatus decesserit, vel etiam hiis quos defraudavit non satisfaciens testamentum de prave acquisitis visus est condidisse, set eadem non distribuit immo penes se reservavit, quia sic perquisitis incumbens animum possidendi deservisse non creditur, pecunia eius et omnia mobilia mox infiscantur et non summonita per officiales ad scaccarium deferuntur. Heres autem iam defuncti fundo paterno et eius immobilibus sibi vix relictis gaudeat.'

⁵⁶ *Dialogus*, p. 100: 'quis fundam aliquem vel ecclesiam pro commodato suscipit, et, manente sortis integritate, fructus eius, donec sors ipsa soluta fuerit, sibi percipit. Hoc genus, propter laborem et sumptum qui in agriculturis solent impendi, licentius visum est; set proculdubio sordidum est et inter usuras merito computandum.'

profiting from their possession of money. Thus, they look for loopholes in the legal and ethical rules about usury that permit them to take interest for their loan without danger of spiritual and temporal sanction. Even Richard, who stresses the importance of wealth (especially in liquid form) for the welfare of king and kingdom, realizes that moral considerations must be paramount in its accumulation and that the monetarized economy yields serious threats to those moral constraints. The practicalities of the market economy must submit before the pieties of Christian moral theology.

Conclusion

Around 1530, Thomas Starkey, in his *Dialogue between Pole and Lupset*, wrote that

the true common weal [...] is the good order and policy by good laws established and set, and by heads and rulers put into effect, by which the whole body as by reason is governed and ruled, to the intent that this multitude of the people and whole commonalty so healthy and so wealthy having convenient abundance of all things necessary for the maintenance thereof, may with due honour, reverence and love religiously worship God, as fountain of all goodness, maker and governor of all this world, everyone also doing his duty to others with brotherly love, one loving one another as members and parts of one body.⁵⁷

Starkey's equation of 'policy' here with both the material and the spiritual goodness of the kingdom and its constitutive elements as regulated by the royal ruler was unexceptional for its day.⁵⁸ And notably, for our purposes, it captures essentially the same set of social and political ideals that one can find in the writings of John of Salisbury and Richard FitzNigel in the twelfth century. For both John and Richard, royal government when properly deployed ensured that the physical welfare of subjects was served by careful management of the economic resources of the realm. Yet such economic considerations were circumscribed by the larger set of moral and religious principles to which it was incumbent upon the king to submit in guiding his subjects.

Thomas Starkey and his contemporaries would very likely have recognized a deep affinity with, if not a direct lineage from, the views of John and Richard. Thus, we might say that the distinctive English contribution of a conception of 'policy' to the

⁵⁷ Thomas Starkey, *Dialogue Between Pole and Lupset*, ed. by Thomas F. Mayer (London: Royal Historical Society, 1989), p. 34. I have modernized and slightly modified the English.

⁵⁸ On early modern uses of 'polycie', see Thomas F. Mayer, *Thomas Starkey and the Commonweal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Neal Wood, *Foundations of Political Economy: Some Early Tudor Views on State and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

Twelfth-Century Renaissance was also a key feature of the demarcation of the terrain of English political thought and discourse more generally. In this regard at least, the intellectual renewal characteristic of the twelfth century was not *sui generis*, but marked an important point of departure for a long-standing tradition of political ideas especially characteristic of England. The doctrines proposed by John and Richard thereby help us to delineate the place of England in the intellectual history of their own time as well as in the course of future developments.

William of Ockham and the Lawyers Revisited

JOHN SCOTT

John O. Ward first introduced me to the study of medieval history more than thirty years ago, with lectures centering on the age of Dante and a specialist course on the Italian pre-humanists. In the last twenty years I have, with great profit and pleasure, read a wide variety of Latin texts with him at his weekly Latin reading group, especially the writings of his beloved humanists. As is appropriate for one who has himself always been *fautor hereticarum hereticorumque*, the writings of declared heretics have always been part of our reading, too. I offer this reflection, as a small token of thanks for the gift of much learning and generous friendship, on a moment in the career of the heretic William of Ockham when he joined with relish in a battle against an old enemy of the humanists of the twelfth century. At the beginning of his lifelong polemical battle against the contemporary papacy, Ockham introduces his magisterial treatise on heresy with a book ridiculing any claims of canon lawyers to more than an administrative role in determining matters of heresy (or truth). This attack on lawyers, however, was no mere *topos*. Ockham was engaged in a battle of the highest seriousness. The whole validity of the papacy was at stake. In this titanic struggle for the soul of Christendom Ockham for his part relied above all on persuasion, on his ability to convince his readers that his interpretation of the contemporary papacy was the right one. It was not the persuasion of the rhetors on which he relied, however, but the persuasion of truth. It was his conviction that the persuasiveness of the truth would lead to a renewal of the very head of the Church.

The background to Ockham's part in the long series of disputes about the power of the papacy is well known. Pope John XXII had issued a series of bulls in the 1320s attacking and rejecting the arrangement whereby the papacy had legal ownership of goods used by the Franciscans, an arrangement which had allowed them to maintain, formally, the rejection of individual and communal ownership which had been central to Francis of Assisi's vision for his friars. Finally the pope declared it heretical to deny that Christ and the apostles had ownership rights over

goods they used. The Minister General of the Franciscans, Michael of Cesena, had throughout been attempting to resist the pope and persuade him to the more traditional view represented by Nicholas III's bull of 1279 *Exiit qui seminat*.¹ Although Ockham was in Avignon while these debates were going on (while his theological opinions were examined for their orthodoxy) he did not at first take an interest in them. Eventually he recognized 'that the one who presided there had fallen into heretical depravity'. This insight came to him when he was ordered by a superior to study some of John XXII's constitutions. 'In these', he explains, 'I found a great many things that were heretical, erroneous, silly, ridiculous, fantastic, insane, and defamatory, contrary and likewise plainly adverse to orthodox faith, good morals, natural reason, certain experience, and fraternal charity.'² The situation came to a head in 1328 when Ockham, Michael of Cesena, and certain other leading Franciscans fled Avignon and sought refuge with the German emperor, Ludwig of Bavaria. Ockham was subsequently excommunicated for leaving Avignon without permission and was considered a heretic by John XXII and his successors. Soon after his escape from Avignon, Ockham produced his first political tract, his *Work of Ninety Days*, a lengthy analysis of the papal bull *Quia vir reprobis*.³ He was himself convinced that this analysis had demonstrated that the pope was a heretic. But the question that then naturally arose was what should follow from this. The first part of Ockham's major political treatise, his *Dialogus*, was an attempt to answer this: it is a very long theoretical analysis of heresy, concluding in its final book with a detailed examination of what should be done about an heretical pope.⁴

The rest of Ockham's life was dedicated to this struggle against Pope John XXII and his successor Benedict XII and against the extreme political claims made by propagandists for the contemporary papacy. His fierce commitment to this struggle against the contemporary papacy is obvious in those political writings that are straight out attacks on individual popes or the pretensions of the papacy. But his

¹ On the poverty controversy see most recently Roberto Lambertini, *La Povertà Pensata* (Modena: Enrico Mucchi Editore, 2000). The standard work in English is M. D. Lambert, *Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order 1210–1323* (London: SPCK, 1961).

² William of Ockham, *A Letter to the Friars Minor*, in *William of Ockham, A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings*, ed. by Arthur Stephen McGrade and John Kilcullen, trans. by John Kilcullen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 3 and 3–4.

³ *Opus nonaginta dierum*, in *Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera politica*, 2 vols, ed. by H. S. Offler (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963, 1974). In English: *A Translation of William of Ockham's Work of Ninety Days*, trans. by John Kilcullen and John Scott, *Texts and Studies in Religion*, 87a (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001).

⁴ The *Dialogus* is in three parts; the first part, with which I will be concerned, is divided into seven books. References will be to books and to chapters within a book. The translation quoted will be that accompanying the edition being prepared for the British Academy and available electronically at <http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/ockdial.html>.

polemical intent is better disguised in his so-called recitative works that examine, as it were dispassionately, the pros and cons of issues of contemporary political debate especially about the power of the papacy.⁵ These recitative works bear testimony to Ockham's commitment to the rhetoric of truth: he believed that if he set out all the arguments for a position, readers of good will who understood his arguments would embrace the truth. The essence of this method is set out by Ockham himself in the *Prologue* to the *Dialogus*. The student explains to his interlocutor, the master, how he wants their discussion to proceed.

Do not set out only one opinion but [...] several opinions about the same question. But would you consent not to indicate to me what you yourself in your wisdom think. For although I certainly do not want you to neglect your own opinion when you examine different and conflicting assertions, would you nevertheless not make clear what your own is?

The explanation for this request by the student, as he hastens to add, is that he does not want to be moved by the authority of the master, whom he holds in high estimation, but 'by how the arguments and texts that you adduce and my own contemplation of them can be assessed'. The student hopes that others, too, whether enemies or friends of Ockham, will attend 'not to who the author of an opinion is but to what is said' and that they 'will look at what is written with more unbiased eyes and will pursue their investigation of the truth more honestly'.⁶ It is the understanding of the truth that is the key for Ockham throughout this work, the key that will lead his readers to share his opinions. Of course, in another way he was forced to argue such a position, because his struggle was against an 'author' (the pope) whose prestige seemed to guarantee the truth of any opinion he held and whose authority was deemed sufficient in itself to condemn an opponent as a heretic.

There was almost certainly a practical reason for these recitative works as well. The polemical works of a condemned heretic were not likely to be copied by papalists, even perhaps by those neutral in the dispute, but works which merely canvass prevailing opinions without asserting any conclusions could be copied, kept and read, since consideration even of erroneous views was considered legitimate as a means of confirming truth. As a tactic this was successful for Ockham. Whereas there are only single copies surviving of his *Contra Johannem*, his *Contra Benedictum*, and his *Breviloquium*, the *Dialogus* was on the evidence of manuscript survival, his most popular work. There are thirty-three extant manuscripts, mostly from the fifteenth century, when two printed editions also became available.⁷ The

⁵ On these two distinct types of political text see Arthur Stephen McGrade, *The Political Thought of Ockham: Personal and Institutional Principles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

⁶ All these quotations are taken from the Prologue to the *Dialogus*.

⁷ See the list of manuscripts in the introduction to the *Dialogus* at the British Academy web

starting point of this investigation is this fact of the popularity of the *Dialogus*. It is not obvious why it should so frequently have been copied. It is true that as a known anti-papalist, who had died impenitent and never sought reconciliation with the Avignon papacy, Ockham might have been considered something of a model by fifteenth-century conciliarists at odds with the popes of their time. The ultimate purpose of his tract on heresy, moreover, was to establish the possibility of papal heresy and to consider what action should be taken against a pope who had become a heretic. It is perhaps plain, therefore, that both those who wanted to end the prolonged schism in the Church by forcing the resignation of, or deposing, the rival popes and, later, those who advocated the supremacy of a general council of the Church over the papacy would be keenly interested in the first part of the *Dialogus* as providing them with a justification for action against whichever particular pope they opposed. Papal propaganda from soon after the conclusion of the Council of Basle encouraged later historians to pursue this line of thought: one sure technique for consolidating the papacy's control over the Church and for underlining the unorthodoxy of conciliarism was to provide the latter with suspect progenitors, of whom Ockham, along with Marsilius of Padua, was one of the most notorious.

But, in fact, as is now well known, Ockham himself was not a conciliarist.⁸ While he provided plenty of grist to the mill of those urging the possibility of papal heresy and fallibility, he was just as insistent that the indefectibility it was believed Christ had promised the Church could not be found in general councils either.⁹ Indeed, the master wielded the razor of logic so ruthlessly that he produced arguments to deny that any part of the established Church, cardinals, the Roman Church, all the clergy, all males, even all Christians having the use of reason, could be relied on to maintain the faith, ending the fifth book of the first part of the *Dialogus* with the conclusion that 'therefore, Christ's promises can be kept through baptised infants.' No section of the Church could buttress its privileges on the basis of the first part of the *Dialogus*.

But it seems likely that the very first book of the *Dialogus* would at once have captured the attention of fifteenth-century theologians and persuaded them that this was a book which they should have. The very first question asked by the Student after the *Prologue* to the whole work has established the subject matter and means of proceeding is:

site.

⁸ Alberigo refers to 'la nature mitica del preteso conciliarismo del francescano inglese'; see G. Alberigo, 'Il movimento conciliare (XIV–XV sec.) nella ricerca storica recente', in *Studi Medievali*, Ser. 3a, 19 (1978), 913–50 (p. 925).

⁹ Book v of the first part of the *Dialogus* considers, in the context of Christ's promise that he would be with the Church always, who would maintain the faith and not be tainted by heresy. Arguments against its being the pope are found in Chapters 1 to 5 and arguments against its being a general council are rehearsed in Chapters 25 to 28.

Since I am going to investigate many matters in the context of the disagreement I see in Christianity about heretical and catholic assertions [...] I have reckoned to seek to find out first to whom it chiefly belongs, that is to theologians or to canonists, to decide what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical.

We shall see in a moment that the competition which this sets up between theologians and canon lawyers was a lively concern for the former in the fifteenth century, but let us note first Ockham's own answer to the question he has posed. Now one of the difficulties about using the *Dialogus* as a means of determining Ockham's own opinions is that since it is one of his recitative works he does not, as we have seen, affirm his own views, as in polemical works, but recites or records various opinions about the subject on hand without indicating what his own view is. This method of proceeding does not mean, however, that we cannot sometimes determine what Ockham's own views were. The first book of the *Dialogus* is one place where his own views are strikingly clear. The first chapter of the book lists three brief arguments affirming the superiority of canonists, while the second deals more substantially with eight arguments for the superiority of theologians; the next three chapters reply at length to the three arguments of Chapter 1, while no reply is offered to the eight arguments of Chapter 2. That is the procedure that is followed throughout the book: arguments in favour of canonists are always answered, those in favour of theologians are not. In keeping with his emphasis on the centrality of truth properly understood, Chapters 7–10 contrast canon lawyers, who have only a good memory for what their law books contain, and theologians who are equipped to understand them. The point is made by an anecdote of Robert Grosseteste, who was charged concerning many articles and maliciously denied legal help, but who triumphed over his adversaries after three days of studying the law. Ockham has his rivals complain bitterly, 'You said that the bishop does not know about laws and rights. He knows the principles, roots, and causes of all laws and rights.'¹⁰ Moreover, while theologians are always referred to respectfully, we find this remark from the master in Chapter 3:

I want you to know that I am acquainted with some theologians who in their hearts very much look down on canonists of the modern time as being unintelligent, presumptuous, heedless, liars, deceivers, scoffers and ignorant, reckoning that they do not know the meaning of the sacred canons.

¹⁰ *Dialogus*, Part 1, Chapter 9. The identification of the bishop, anonymous in the *Dialogus*, as Grosseteste, was made by David Luscombe in 'William of Ockham and the Michaelists on Robert Grosseteste and Denis the Areopagite', in *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy and the Religious Life: Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff*, ed. by Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999), pp. 93–109.

Such a blatant bias of presentation is unusual in Ockham's recitative writings and suggests the importance of the basic question to him. We will explore later the reasons for his own fierce engagement with the canon lawyers; but let us first note that this theme of the ignorant and dangerous canonist was one that was eagerly taken up by many fifteenth-century theologians, only too well aware that they had fallen behind in the competition for intellectual leadership of the Church. So we find hostility to canonists in both Pierre d'Ailly and Jean Gerson. The former frequently attacks *rudae iuristae* and believed that the legalistic spirit of the times encouraged people to forget *epikeia* in interpreting positive laws. It was not the law itself that he was critical of but its practitioners who did not plead for those who needed help but were driven by a love of gain. The canonists' approach to the Scriptures is a sign of their *magnae ruditatis et ineruditionis*, he argued.¹¹ Gerson, in his capacity as chancellor of the University of Paris, delivered a number of still extant addresses to graduates of the Faculty of Canon Law. In each of them he delineates carefully the contribution canon law can make to the Church, emphasizing its inferiority to theology, the architectonic science to which it is to be subordinated, and warning the new graduates that they must not presume to involve themselves in matters that theologians should deal with. The presumption of contemporary canonists had led to many of the contemporary Church's problems, he believed. In particular, he insists that the determination of heresy is something that should be left to theologians.¹² Later conciliarists, caught up in the conflict between Eugenius IV and the Council of Basle, were even more distressed by the influence of canonists. For Heimerich van der Velde the lamentable state of the Church was due to men who undervalue 'the revelations of theology' and who prefer 'human wisdom', that is legal knowledge which is 'foolish in the eyes of God.' Juan de Segovia was another who believed in the primacy of theology and blamed the jurists for the development of the theory of papal sovereignty.¹³ Perhaps the clearest statement of the theologians' case is found in a letter from the Council of Basle to the emperor in 1439, exhorting him to seek advice from universities on the question of which side to support, because they have 'many very expert and studious doctors and masters in theology, whose proper office

¹¹ For d'Ailly's view of canonists, see Francis Oakley, *The Political Thought of Pierre d'Ailly: The Voluntarist Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 22–23. See also Bernard Guenée, *Between Church and State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 153–54.

¹² Gerson's addresses are found in his *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. by P. Glorieux, 20 vols (Paris: Desclée, 1960–73), v, 437–46, and vii, 171–78 and 219–29. For his reference to heresy see the last of these on p. 228.

¹³ For the views of van der Velde and Segovia, see Anthony Black, *Council and Commune: The Conciliar Movement and the Fifteenth-Century Heritage* (London: Burns and Oates, 1979), pp. 62 and 128. For Segovia's debt to Ockham see Jesse D. Mann, 'William of Ockham, Juan de Segovia, and Heretical Pertinacity', *Mediaeval Studies*, 56 (1994), 67–88.

by the nature of their profession and studies it is to decide on faith'; bishops may no longer decide alone 'now that the weeds of human laws, to which bishops of modern times give such importance, have grown up.'¹⁴

It is not surprising that theologians committed to the reform of the Church and to a general council's role in that reform should have been suspicious of canonists: one constant and powerful argument of the papalists was that a general council could be summoned only by the pope and similarly could be prorogued only by him. This argument, like most of the papal case, derives from the *Decretum*.¹⁵ Overall the papal position, as van der Velde recognized, rested on 'the very numerous judgements of the jurists.'¹⁶ But, in addition to the theologians' intellectual opposition to the canon lawyers, there was very probably another factor in their frequent diatribes against canonists in the fifteenth century, and that was the gradual but inexorable supplanting of theology by law as more popular with students and, more importantly, as more highly valued by those who would be employing graduates. Ecclesiastical courts, which had been staffed predominantly by theologians in the early fourteenth century, came to be dominated by law graduates later in that century and particularly in the fifteenth century. Such statistical data as have been extracted from the (mainly English) sources show this fairly conclusively. For instance, a study of the academic degrees of English bishops shows that in the reign of Henry III there were fifteen theologians and one lawyer, but in the years from 1377–1509 there were forty-eight theologians and fifty-five lawyers.¹⁷ A study of the qualifications of Exeter canons shows that there was a steady growth in the number with legal qualifications from 39% 1300–1325 to 61% 1426–1450.¹⁸ Alan Cobban's studies of the colleges at Oxford and Cambridge lead to the same conclusion: he sums up the situation thus, 'by the time of the foundation of New College [1379], a degree in civil or canon law or both had come to supersede a qualification in theology as a prerequisite for a successful career in ecclesiastical administration.'¹⁹

¹⁴ Black, p. 111.

¹⁵ On the canonistic background to the papal views see Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955).

¹⁶ Black, p. 62.

¹⁷ Cited by Guy Fitch Lytle, 'The Careers of Oxford Students in the Later Middle Ages', in *Rebirth, Reform and Resilience: Universities in Transition 1300–1700*, ed. by James M. Kittelson and Pamela J. Transue (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), pp. 213–53 (p. 241).

¹⁸ See D. N. Lepine, 'The Origins and Careers of the Canons of Exeter Cathedral, 1300–1455', in *Religious Belief and Ecclesiastical Careers in Late Medieval England: The Proceedings of the Conference Held at Strawberry Hill, Easter, 1989*, ed. by C. Harper-Bill (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1991), pp. 87–120.

¹⁹ Alan B. Cobban, 'Theology and Law in the Medieval Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library of Manchester*, 65 (1982), 57–77 (pp. 63–

Anecdotal evidence confirms the same trend. We can note, for instance, the late fourteenth-century sermon lamenting that fathers are putting their sons to law, not to divinity, and d'Ailly's accusation 'that the apostolic see promotes more lawyers and canonists than theologians to prelacies of the Church.'²⁰ Even Richard de Bury, bishop of Durham, who quite deliberately had few law books in his library and was early in his career the patron of Bradwardine, Burley, Fitzralph, Holcot and other theologians, was forced by the needs of his diocese to employ more lawyer clerks than theologians towards the end of his life.²¹

In these circumstances it is not surprising that Ockham's fifteenth-century readers embraced his dismissive opinions about canonists. More puzzling is their place in, or, rather, the primacy of their place in his treatise. Why did Ockham begin his treatise on heresy with the question of the respective merits of canonists and theologians? Why is this first book of the *Dialogus* a vigorous attack on canon lawyers? The first relevant point to make is that John XXII, like most of his predecessors since Innocent III, was a lawyer, or, as Ockham says of him in *Contra Benedictum*, 'a quarrelsome advocate completely ignorant of theological learning'²². The canonistic background of contemporary popes was widely acknowledged, as the student, nominally a defender of the pope, makes clear later in the *Dialogus* when he comments, 'For there have been many highest pontiffs since the time of Innocent III who have been very learned in canon law, although they have not been outstanding in theology.'²³ Yet despite this John XXII's own pontificate provided great employment for theologians. Ironically, as though he had read Ockham and been persuaded by him, it was his zealous pursuit of heretics that led to this. The reason for Ockham's own presence at Avignon, for instance, was to allow an examination of suspect opinions of his by a commission of theological experts—as John XXII put it in a letter to King John of Bohemia in 1330, '[Ockham] had been called to the Curia and his writings had been assigned to many doctors so that they might examine them with diligence and make clear what they found that was heretical or

64). He estimates that between the late fourteenth and late fifteenth centuries the percentage of scholars engaged in theology must have fallen from about 40% to about 15% (p. 67).

²⁰ The sermon, delivered by Thomas of Wimbledon in 1388, is edited by Nancy H. Owen, in 'Thomas Wimbledon's Sermon: "Redde rationem villacionis tue"', *Mediaeval Studies*, 28 (1966), 176–97 (p. 181). D' Ailly is quoted by G. H. M. Posthumus Meyjes, 'Exponents of Sovereignty: Canonists as Seen by Theologians in the Late Middle Ages', in *The Church and Sovereignty c. 590–1918. Essays in Honour of Michael Wilks*, ed. by Diana Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 312.

²¹ William Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 131–37.

²² *Tractatus Contra Benedictum* in *Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Politica*, ed. by H. S. Offler, III (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), p. 213.

²³ Book 2, Chapter 30 of the first part of the *Dialogus*.

erroneous'.²⁴ Moreover, a contemporary resident at Avignon was Meister Eckhart, whom Ockham believed to be an outrageous heretic, whose opinions were also being examined by theologians.²⁵ And it is well known that John XXII's overturning of traditional Franciscan views on poverty followed a full debate on the question by theologians whose opinions he had sought. His encounter with Marsilius of Padua also provoked a widespread canvassing of the views of theologians.²⁶ The situation is nicely summed up in a letter from one Stephen of Kettleburg to his friend John Lutterell, former chancellor of Oxford and Ockham's accuser before the pope at Avignon.

The situation at the Curia these days has changed, in that our Lord the supreme Pontiff has shifted wholly and completely his special affection, which heretofore he directed towards jurists thinking them the wise ones, to theologians—and especially to masters in *sacra pagina*. The result has been that any master proficient in fact and by reputation in theology, who is worthy to bear the title of master and who comes to the apostolic see, does not depart from the Curia. For in the first place, our Lord the Pope liberally provides them with great honours and prebends, and depending on varying conditions some he elevates to episcopal dignity and others to archiepiscopal sees [...].²⁷

That Kettleburg speaks of the situation as having changed shows that there was nonetheless tension between the two disciplines, and Ockham was not the first to compare the practitioners of the two disciplines. As early as 1240 Humbert of Romans in the chapter 'On those studying canon law' of his *De eruditione praedicatorum* had complained that 'There are others who so extol their own science that they have reached such a level of stupidity as to say that the Church of God is better ruled by their laws than by theology.'²⁸ Aquinas thought it unsuitable and laughable for professors of sacred doctrine (theologians) to adduce *iuristarum glossulas* as authorities 'since we ought to assent to divine more than to human judgement'.²⁹ Dante's lament that 'the Gospel and the great Doctors are neglected

²⁴ The letter, dated 31 July, 1330, is printed in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, Legum Sectio IV, 6, Part 1, Section 2, p. 688.

²⁵ For Ockham's views on Eckhart, see *Contra Benedictum*, pp. 251–53.

²⁶ Some of the replies to the pope's request for responses to the heretical views of Marsilius are printed in R. Scholz, *Unbekannte Kirchenpolitische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern (1327–1354)*, 2 vols (Rome: Loescher, 1911–1914), II, 3–42.

²⁷ Translated in Francis E. Kelley, 'Ockham: Avignon, before and after', in *From Ockham to Wyclif*, ed. by Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 7.

²⁸ Cited by R. James Long, "'Utrum iurista vel theologus plus proficiat ad regimen ecclesie": A *Quaestio Disputata* of Francis Caraccioli; Edition and Study', *Mediaeval Studies*, 30 (1968), 134–62 (p. 140).

²⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet*, XI, cited by Walter Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism. The*

and only the Decretals are studied' is well known.³⁰ There is a *Quodlibet* of Godfrey of Fontaines on the subject and a *quaestio disputata* of Francis Caraccioli on whether a lawyer or a theologian would be a better ruler of the Church. In the latter, the argument in favour of the theologian takes up about three pages, with liberal quotations from St Bernard's *De consideratione*, a widely known source of anti-legal gems, while the lawyer is allowed only the following single line, 'And when it is argued in reply that a jurist can better defend the rights of the Church, it should be said that it is not so (*quod non*).'³¹

In this first book of the *Dialogus*, therefore, Ockham was continuing a vigorous polemical tradition in which theologians were engaged in what would ultimately be a losing battle for prestige and influence against lawyers. Nevertheless, this tradition cannot in itself, I think, explain why Ockham would begin his major treatise on heresy with a consideration of canonists and theologians. The work is a sustained and well argued theoretical investigation, 'the most extensive single discussion of heresy in our period'.³² It is not a work as engaged a thinker as Ockham would introduce with a popular debating topic. Why then did he begin in this way? I suggest that there were two other pressing reasons for this, and for his implicit but unmistakable conclusion that the determination of heresy belongs to theologians. The first is that it was essential to the whole practical purpose of the treatise that the authority of canon law be impugned. Ockham was convinced that John XXII was a heretic; most of his contemporaries, even among his fellow Franciscans, did not agree but rather accepted John as a legitimate pope. It was therefore necessary for Ockham to define heresy in such a way that he could turn the tables on John who had condemned him and the other Michaelists as heretics. The accepted view was that a heretic was someone who obstinately maintained an opinion that had been condemned by the authority of the universal Church. Ockham agreed with this, but the key question for him was who possessed such authority. The standard opinion was that it was the pope,³³ and the justification for this opinion lay in canon law. Aquinas is explicit about it in his *Summa Theologiae*: 'This authority resides

Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists (London: Methuen, 1949), p. 47, n. 2.

³⁰ *Paradiso*, ix. 133–35. Note his remarks in Book III of *Monarchia* that decretalists are 'ignorant and lacking in any philosophical or theological training'; *Dante: Monarchia*, ed. and trans. by Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 105.

³¹ Francis's *quaestio* is edited in Long; the quotation comes from p. 158.

³² Arthur Stephen McGrade, 'The Medieval Idea of Heresy: What Are We to Make of It?', in Biller and Dobson, pp. 111–39 (n. 10 above). McGrade's article is a splendid account of how Ockham and his contemporaries understood heresy.

³³ In 'The Medieval Idea of Heresy', McGrade affirms that 'there is an increasing tendency in this period to link rejection of papal authority with heresy' (p. 128) and cites the view of Jeffrey B. Russell that 'one is obliged to adopt a very practical approach: heresy (at least from about 1050) was doctrine condemned by Rome' (p. 114).

principally in the highest pontiff, he affirms. Significantly he buttresses this opinion with a reference to the *Decretum*.³⁴ Given his own position relative to that of Pope John XXII this is just what Ockham could not accept. As is well known, he wanted to replace the institutional authority of the pope with the cognitive authority of theologians like himself.³⁵ Hence, since the papal claim to the right to make authoritative decisions about heresy relied on canon law, there was for Ockham a need from the very start to affirm the superiority of theologians to canonists in any question about heretical views or heretics.

The second reason why this first book was a necessary introduction for Ockham was because the investigation and prosecution of heretics were in fact governed by canon law. Despite John's own employment of theologians to examine particular opinions, the theoretical basis for the examination of heretics was to be found in the *Decretals*, the second volume of canon law.³⁶ Although heresy had become a vital problem throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it had not been well pondered by theologians, or at least not at the theoretical level, although there was a number of detailed examinations of the beliefs and practices of particular heretics. Alan of Lille's *De fide catholica*, which treats of the Cathars, the Waldensians, the Jews, and the Muslims, is a well known early example,³⁷ and contemporaries of Ockham who were writing tracts on heresy fell into this pattern, too. One example is Alvarus Pelagius, whose *Collirium contra novas hereses* deals, like Alan of Lille, primarily with the beliefs of heretics; for instance, he writes typically, 'Again, the heretic Marsilius dogmatized that any priest has as great a power as has the pope, which is a heresy because [...]'³⁸ Apart from these specific analyses of a variety of particular heresies, theologians had not explored the concept of heresy as such in depth.³⁹ Of course, in commentaries on Lombard's *Sentences* there were references to heresy, but usually only in connection with specific questions, such as the validity of sacraments administered by heretics or the Church's role in the punishment of heretics.⁴⁰ Even Aquinas's account in the *Summa Theologiae* consists only in one

³⁴ *Summa Theologiae*, 2a 2ae, q. 11, art. 2. He cites 24, q. 1, Chapter 13 as proof of the pope's authority in the matter.

³⁵ Fully explicated in McGrade, *Political Thought*, pp. 48–63.

³⁶ The subject of heresy was not ignored in the *Decretum*, but the overwhelming majority of references to it concern simony.

³⁷ Alan's tract is in PL 210, 305–430.

³⁸ Alvarus's treatise is (partially) edited in Scholz, II, 491–514; the reference is from p. 513.

³⁹ See McGrade, 'The Medieval Idea of Heresy', for an account of contemporary views. Commenting on the view of heresy in the statements of Church councils he notes 'the absence of any formal general definition of heresy or heretic' (p. 121).

⁴⁰ As a typical example I mention the commentary by Alexander of Hales: on dist. 31 of *I Sentences* he lists various heresies and their errors; on dist. 44 of *II Sentences* he asks whether heretics should be coerced by the secular powers; on dist. 37 of *III Sentences* he alludes to the

question with four articles, namely, Is heresy a kind of unbelief? What is its field? Are heretics to be tolerated? Should those returning from heresy be received?⁴¹ Even the ecclesiological treatises that were written by the generation before Ockham, by men such as Giles of Rome or James of Viterbo, did not treat of heresy.

Ockham admits frankly this problem for the theologian. The master presents this argument in Chapter 11 of Book 1:

Some canonists seem to think that it pertains chiefly to them to judge between heretics and catholics. It can be argued as follows. [...] To judge between heretics and catholics pertains more chiefly to those who reflect on heretics more carefully and with more application. However, such people are canonists. So it is that a sufficiently long special title on heretics has been inserted in the book of Decretals. [...] However mention is rarely made of heretics in theology.

So Ockham was writing the first medieval theoretical treatise on heresy⁴² and as a result had to establish first of all his, or rather theology's, credentials. And the competing discipline whose claims had to be rejected was that of the law. In this regard it is significant that, despite the Student's framing of the question in terms of canonists and theologians, an important part of the debate is conducted by comparing the *scientia* of the canonists and of the theologians.⁴³ A key issue dealt with is which of the two is subalternating and which is subalternated. The locating of one's subject matter as a *scientia* within one of the various schema of sciences that had been drawn up had become a standard practice since the translation of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* in the late twelfth century. In particular, related sciences were analysed in order to determine which was superior to which, which relied on principles derived from its superior or subalternating science.⁴⁴ I have noted an

legitimacy of capital punishment for heretics; and on dist. 6, 13, 18, 19 and 39 of *IV Sentences* he discusses different sacraments and the rights of heretics.

⁴¹ *Summa Theologiae*, 2a 2ae q. 11.

⁴² McGrade, 'The Medieval Idea of Heresy', p. 122, quotes Augustine on the difficulty of defining a heretic and his belief that if such a definition were available 'who does not see how beneficial it would be?' But even Augustine did not provide such a definition.

⁴³ In Chapter 10 the student is persuaded that the case he has been arguing for canon law is weak because 'the science of the canonists receives its principles from theology.'

⁴⁴ There is a large literature on this subject. Helpful are W. R. Laird, 'Robert Grosseteste on the Subalternate Sciences', *Traditio*, 43 (1987), 147–69; E. Sylla, 'Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist', in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, ed. by J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), pp. 349–96; and Gordon Leff, *William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), pp. 320–49. There is a translation of one of Ockham's discussions on the subject in *Ockham. Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. by Philotheus

allusion to it already in Humbert of Romans. Indeed, by Ockham's day the Prologue to most commentaries on the *Sentences* began with a consideration of the *scientia* of theology. The first question in Scotus's *Ordinatio* was *Utrum theologia sit scientia* and this is the second question that Ockham treats in his commentary. Most of the theologians of the day have left treatments of this question, either in their commentaries on the *Sentences* or in Quodlibetal disputations. Augustinus Triumphus asks specifically which of the *scientiae* of theology and canon law subalternated the other.⁴⁵ I think that we must see it, therefore, as an important preliminary task in a new intellectual endeavour to establish its status as a *scientia* prior to an exposition of it.

I believe that this was especially important for Ockham because there was available a widely known and powerful presentation of the claims of the status of the *scientia* of canon law. This is in the Prologue to the *Summa aurea* of Hostiensis, perhaps the best known and most highly regarded of medieval canonists. After the usual invocation to God, called 'the head and author of all sciences', and some standard self-justification, the author has a section headed *Unde habuit originem liber iste*. This begins with the Creation and after a brief history of the development of law we read this:

You have three kinds of *scientia*, that is, civil wisdom [...] then theological *scientia*. But canonical *scientia* comprehends both these, and indeed all law, whether it be divine or human, public or private. [...] This *scientia* of ours, therefore, is not purely theological or civil but participates in both. [...] This *scientia* of ours can truly be called the *scientia scientiarum* [...] since it is the art of arts. [...] For if it is understood and known well, both spiritual and temporal matters can be ruled by it, so it should be accepted and maintained by everyone [...] and all ought to be led by it and not by their own understanding.⁴⁶

After showing by natural reason that this *scientia* is worthier than all others and should be preferred to all, he concludes the *Prologue* thus:

Thus canonical *scientia* seems to embrace all philosophy [...] and so it seems that we should not ask to what part of philosophy it should be supposed but to what *scientia* the whole of philosophy should be supposed, and one can reply, to the canonical *scientia* which comprehends everything.⁴⁷

We cannot be sure that Ockham read Hostiensis, but it seems highly likely given

Boehner (London: Thomas Nelson, 1957), pp. 2–16.

⁴⁵ See the extracts from his *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica*, edited in Long, pp. 158–62; the discussion of subalternation is on p. 161.

⁴⁶ Henrici a Segusia cardinalis Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea* (Venice, 1605), p. 7.

⁴⁷ Hostiensis, p. 11.

his wide knowledge of the canonists and the latter's reputation. But even if he had not, Hostiensis's *Prologue* shows both the ambitious claims that were being made for canon law, which Ockham had to counter, and the importance of the idea of *scientia* in contemporary thought. It is in this context, one of grave concern to contemporary theologians, that we must place the first book of the *Dialogus*. As we have seen, the issue was even more urgent for Ockham, convinced as he was of John XXII's heresy, and so he engaged vigorously with what he saw as the false casuistry of canon lawyers by deploying with all his skill a logically based rhetoric of truth which he believed would persuade his contemporaries that they would have to abandon their commitment to John XXII and Benedict XII. As we know, he failed in this, but his *Dialogus* continued to be of great interest to readers for the next century and a half, particularly to theologians who relished its vigorous dismissal of canon lawyers.

III

Rhetoric in Transition

Wycliffite Ciceronianism? The General Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible and Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*

RITA COPELAND

Ciceronian rhetoric had a vast presence in medieval culture, but it was mainly a Latin presence. The chief conduits of Ciceronian teaching on rhetoric were Latin academic commentaries on the *De inventione* and *Ad Herennium*, and various Latin manuals on poetic, homiletic, or epistolary composition which derived their principles from Ciceronian traditions. When we consider the extent of Ciceronian influence on medieval thought about textuality, and the immediacy of Ciceronian precept in teaching about argument, structure, and tropes, it is in fact surprising that the Ciceronian *Rhetorica* found such limited representation in vernacular learning. The massive history of vernacular translations of classical Latin texts, and indeed even Latinized Greek texts, seems to have yielded very few translations of the *De inventione* or *Ad Herennium*, or vernacular treatises based on them.¹ Only a handful are known to us. The most famous of these are Brunetto Latini's treatment of the *De inventione* in his *Rettorica* and his more synthetic survey of rhetorical theory in his *Trésor*; the account of rhetoric in Book seven of John Gower's *Confessio amantis* is in turn dependent on Brunetto's *Trésor*.² The *Ad*

¹ See Jacques Monfrin, 'Humanisme et traductions au moyen âge', *Journal des savants*, 148 (1963), 161–90; Jacques Monfrin, 'Les Traducteurs et leur publique en France au moyen âge', *Journal des savants*, 149 (1964), 5–20; Robert H. Lucas, 'Mediaeval French Translations of the Latin Classics to 1500', *Speculum*, 45 (1970), 225–53.

² Brunetto Latini, *La Rettorica*, ed. by Francesco Maggini, introduction by Cesare Segre (Florence: Felice le Monnier, 1968); Brunetto Latini, *Li livres du Trésor de Brunetto Latini*, ed. by Francis J. Carmody (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1948). On Brunetto's Cicero translations, see Paul F. Gehl, 'Preachers, Teachers, and Translators: The Social Meaning of Language Study in Trecento Tuscany', *Viator*, 25 (1994), 289–323; Charles T. Davis, 'Education in Dante's Florence', *Speculum*, 40 (1965), 415–35; Robert

Herennium was also translated in the late 1250s by the Bolognese Guidetto da Bologna; other versions of this are also associated with the Florentine writer Bono Giamboni.³ Another text that might be placed within an Italian orbit is the French translation by Jean d'Antioche of both the *De inventione* and *Ad Herennium* produced in 1282 for a knight of the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem, and surviving in only one manuscript of eastern Mediterranean origin.⁴ In 1427 Enrique de Villena translated the *Ad Herennium* into Spanish; and we might place Stephen Hawes's account of rhetoric in the *Pastime of Pleasure* (1505) in the category of general adaptation of lore from the *De inventione*.⁵

Thus, given the relatively limited representation of Cicero in vernacular traditions, it is even more surprising to find an English 'Cicero' in a Wycliffite or Lollard text, and a centrally important text at that: the General Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible. It is surprising because Wycliffite thought actively resisted rhetoric as a distorting force in language. While earlier theorists, notably Aquinas, had recognized the presence of figurative language or rhetorical indirection in Scripture and had been willing to separate its localized force from the profound and pervasive *intended* meaning of Scripture, Wycliffite thought moved in the opposite direction, seeing human rhetoric as a false dynamic external to the divine eloquence of Scripture.⁶ Yet the General Prologue is a significant repository of Ciceronian theory

Black, *Humanism and Education in Medieval and Renaissance Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Steven Milner, 'Communication, Consensus and Conflict: Rhetorical Principles, the *Ars concionandi* and Social Ordering in Late Medieval Italy' and Virginia Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric in Late Medieval Italy', in *The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval Commentary Tradition*, ed. by John O. Ward and Virginia Cox (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). On links between Brunetto's *Trésor* and Gower's *Confessio amantis*, see Rita Copeland, *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: Academic Traditions and Vernacular Texts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 202–20.

³ See John O. Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, pp. 24 (and note 77), 67; and for further bibliography, see *Volgarizzamenti del Due e Trecento*, ed. by Cesare Segre (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1964), pp. 14–15, 353–55.

⁴ See Monfrin, 'Humanisme et traductions au moyen âge', pp. 168–69, 183 (Italian orbit) (n. 1 above); Serge Lusignan, *Parler vulgairement: les intellectuels et la langue française aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles* (Paris: Vrin, 1986), p. 143; Lucas, 'Mediaeval French Translations of the Latin Classics', p. 237 (n. 1 above).

⁵ On de Villena, see Monfrin, 'Humanisme et traductions au moyen âge', p. 188 (n. 1 above); on Hawes's echoes of Cicero, see Rita Copeland, 'Lydgate, Hawes, and the Science of Rhetoric in the Late Middle Ages', *Modern Language Quarterly*, 53 (1992), 57–82. This small canon would be expanded only slightly with the inclusion of Notker of St Gall's translation into Old High German of Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, in which a Ciceronian system informs the book on rhetoric.

⁶ See Rita Copeland, 'Rhetoric and the Politics of the Literal Sense in Medieval Literary Theory: Aquinas, Wyclif, and the Lollards', in *Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time: A Reader*, ed. by Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997),

in the vernacular. How do we explain this?

The route from Cicero's rhetorical principles to the Wycliffite Bible is not direct. Ciceronian rhetoric enters Lollard hermeneutical thought through Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*, which constitutes a major source for the theoretical precepts that are laid out in the General Prologue. The Prologue is also a rare, if not unique, vernacular rendering of Augustine's Christian rhetoric. In this essay I shall consider the transformative use that Augustine makes of Ciceronian rhetorical doctrine in the *De doctrina Christiana*, with special attention to those sections of Augustine's text that are appropriated by the Lollard translators. How are distinctive Ciceronian rhetorical precepts smuggled by the back door into a reformist Christian hermeneutics? How is Ciceronian rhetoric an invisible (indeed, to the Lollard writers, an unrecognized) influence informing Lollard doctrines of the hermeneutical sufficiency of the literal sense?

The General Prologue was almost certainly written during or after production of the Later Version of the Wycliffite Bible, that is, sometime in the later 1390s.⁷ It exists only in eleven copies (compared to over two hundred and fifty copies of all or part of the Wycliffite translation of the Bible and twenty-one complete copies).⁸ But while the General Prologue was not as widely disseminated as the Wycliffite Bible itself, it constitutes a central theoretical statement about the most important vernacularizing project of the Lollard movement. The structure of the General Prologue reveals a great deal about its purpose.⁹ The first eleven chapters introduce the books of the Old Testament. The last four chapters present a series of hermeneutical and compositional precepts: the model of the four-fold interpretation of Scripture (using the ancient Alexandrian terminology that was familiar to late medieval theologians and that had been most influentially explained in Nicholas of Lyre's prologue to his literal postilla on the Bible, ca 1333); explanations of figurative speech in Scripture and how to read it properly; the seven rules of Tyconius, taken from Augustine's account in the *De doctrina Christiana*; the degrees of spiritual preparation for reading Scripture and the rule of charity; polemics against the enemies of the Lollards and especially against corruption at Oxford and against university learning; a theory of the primacy of the literal sense of Scripture, based on Lyre's prologue to his literal postilla; a second account of the seven rules of Tyconius, this time drawn from Lyre's prologue (which cites Isidore of Seville's summary in *Liber sententiarum* as its source, although Isidore's account

pp. 335–57.

⁷ Anne Hudson, *The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard History* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), pp. 243–47.

⁸ Hudson, *The Premature Reformation*, pp. 231, 238

⁹ Text in *The Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testaments, Made from the Latin Vulgate by John Wycliffe and his Followers*, ed. by Josiah Forshall and Frederic Madden, 4 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1850), I, 1–60.

is also based on Augustine);¹⁰ an attempt to reconcile the apparent contradictions of Scripture by considering how literal readings in one place can explain seeming inconsistencies elsewhere; a theory of translation advocating an open sense that is not clouded by an overly literal (word for word) translation practice; precepts about grammatical equivalency in translation and the problems for English idiom posed by Latin grammatical usage; a polemic on the right to Scripture in English, based on historical precedent in Britain and on the availability of Scriptures in other European vernaculars; and finally a brief return to practical problems of translation and linguistic equivalency, based on Augustine's discussions of translation from Greek to Latin in Book II of the *De doctrina Christiana*.

The theoretical section of the General Prologue appears to be something of a grab bag. It gives the sense of being disparate, of culling from whatever sources were to hand at any given moment, as in the repetition of the rules of Tyconius, the reiteration of the system of the four levels of scriptural interpretation from Chapter 12 to Chapter 13, or in the writer's expression of frustration with the inaccessibility of references:

Isidre, in the j. book of Souereyn Good, touchith these reulis schortliere, but I haue hym not now, and Lyre, in the bigynnyng of the bible, touchith more opynly these reulis, but I haue him not now, and Ardmacan [Richard Fitzralph, archbishop of Armagh], in the bigynnyng of his book *de Questionibus Armenorum*,, 3eueith many goode groundis to vndirstonde holy scripture to the lettre, and goostly vndirstonding also, but I haue him not now.¹¹

Further evidence of a fluid compositional situation occurs in the following chapter, when the writer picks up the thread of Lyre again with the statement: 'Natheles for Lyre cam late to me, see what he seith of the vndirstonding of holy scripture', and proceeds to recapitulate (presumably with the text of Lyre's postilla now open before him) the information about the four levels of interpretation which earlier he had summarized (apparently from memory).¹²

But the General Prologue also achieves a coherent synthesis out of some of the more disparate elements of Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*. The historical process that brings Augustine's treatise to the foreground in the Lollard text is not in itself a complicated one, because the transmission of the *De doctrina* is continuous, and its influence on hermeneutics, homiletics, and stylistics pervasive. However, the medieval reception of the *De doctrina* as a rhetorical treatise poses problems of

¹⁰ On the reception of the rules of Tyconius see Pamela Bright, *The Book of Rules of Tyconius: Its Purpose and Inner Logic* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 16–18. The rules are edited by F. C. Burkitt, *The Book of Rules of Tyconius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1894).

¹¹ *The Holy Bible, made by Wycliffe and his Followers*, p. 48.

¹² *The Holy Bible, made by Wycliffe and his Followers*, p. 52.

defining what is rhetorical about Augustine's text.¹³

Book IV of the *De doctrina Christiana* was readily received as a Christianized rhetoric and as a guide to Christian style, although its importance as a preceptive text for preaching was for a time superseded by Gregory the Great's *Cura pastoralis*. The *De institutione clericorum* of Hrabanus Maurus, written in the early ninth century, not only revived interest in Augustine's precepts, but brought the Ciceronian doctrine of Book IV into a new and powerful visibility.¹⁴ Augustine's extensive quotations from Cicero's *Orator*, 21–29, in the *De doctrina*, IV. 10. 23–13. 29, quoted again in Hrabanus's text (III. 31–33), served to popularize a Ciceronian doctrine of style through the lens of Augustine's strategic modifications (level of style is no longer tied, as in Cicero, to different subject matters, but to the different purposes of the Christian orator).¹⁵ Before the fifteenth century, Cicero's *Orator* was hardly known apart from its quotation by Augustine, who suppresses Cicero's name as his authority. Thus, through Augustine and Hrabanus, Cicero enters as an unacknowledged source of stylistic doctrine.

But Ciceronian rhetorical thought also enters into Augustine's hermeneutical doctrine, into the crucial dialectic of spirit and letter elaborated across Books II and III of the *De doctrina Christiana*. These are the sections of the *De doctrina* that are most densely appropriated in the General Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible, where Augustine is cited as an authority in matters of negotiating the practical and spiritual distinctions between literal and figurative reading. The very distinctions that Augustine makes, and that form the cornerstone of the influential hermeneutics he articulates here, have their roots in the legal discourses of classical rhetoric, and for Augustine this involves a turn to Cicero.

The Augustinian distinction between spirit and letter is a hallmark of the Pauline inheritance. But it is also a distinction that Augustine takes from the legal questions, treated in classical rhetoric, about the intention behind a written document introduced into court as evidence. The legal–rhetorical distinction between intention and writing was also, in fact, at the heart of Paul's own theological distinction, in which he recast the rhetorical opposition between *voluntas* and *scriptum* in the theologically inflected terms *pneuma* (spirit) and *gramma* (letter).¹⁶ In the law courts,

¹³ The text of the *De doctrina Christiana* used throughout this essay is the edition by William M. Green, CSEL, 80 (Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1963).

¹⁴ *De institutione clericorum libri tres*, ed. by Detlev Zimpel (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996).

¹⁵ On the stylistic influence of *De doctrina Christiana*, Book IV, see Rita Copeland, 'Richard Rolle and the Rhetorical Theory of the Levels of Style', in *The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England*, ed. by Marion Glasscoe (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1984), pp. 55–80. On the notion of the humble style, see Erich Auerbach, 'Sermo Humilis', in *Literary Language and its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages*, trans. by Ralph Mannheim, Bollingen Series, 74 (New York: Pantheon, 1965), pp. 25–66.

¹⁶ See Kathy Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and its Humanist Reception* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 57. See

written documents called for a double-valenced interpretation, according to the letter (as in the letter of a written law) and according to the intentions of the writer. In Cicero's *De inventione*, I. 13. 17 and II. 40. 116–48. 143 we find accounts of the controversies that may arise when the speaker considers the distinction between *scriptum* and *sententia*; the pseudo-Ciceronian *Ad Herennium* makes a similar argument about *voluntas scriptoris* (I. 11. 19).¹⁷ It was also the genius of the rhetorical system to make a key distinction between two ways to read against the letter of the text: in addition to reading *voluntas* against *scriptum*, one might also need to read the letter figuratively, understanding that certain tropological usages, figures of speech, could determine the outcome of an interpretation. Stylistic analysis of figurative speech represents a different system from that of analyzing the spirit or intention of a written document, but it can also illuminate the intention behind the letter, because understanding metaphorical expressions can help to resolve discrepancies between intention and statement, as well as other ambiguities. Thus the literal sense has two distinct non-literal dimensions: the intention or spirit behind the pronouncement and a figurative or 'improper' sense.¹⁸

In the *De doctrina Christiana*, Augustine applies both of these rhetorical systems. He speaks of the distinction between spirit and letter in terms of God's intention and human writing (II. 5. 6); the discussion that follows, on spiritual preparation for Scripture through fear, piety, and knowledge (II. 7. 9–10), develops the theme of recognizing God's will (*voluntas*) to be found in Scripture. This theme is repeated at other points emphatically (for example III. 27. 38). Along with his theological accommodation of the legal tradition of rhetoric, he imports the strategy of stylistic analysis, differentiating between literal and figurative signs, both those that are unknown (considered in Book II) and those that are ambiguous (Book III). For Augustine, the oppositions between literal/spiritual and literal/figurative represent discrete systems, but one can illuminate the other, just as in Ciceronian rhetoric, the legal and stylistic systems are discrete but also overlapping. Thus, Augustine argues, one should have the semiotic knowledge not to take figurative expressions literally, because this would lead to a kind of spiritual slavery (*De doctrina Christiana*, III. 5. 93. 9. 13). The literal can be read spiritually (in the sense of the divine *voluntas* which implants spiritual meaning in ordinary things), but this need not involve

also Boaz Cohen, 'Note on Letter and Spirit in the New Testament', *Harvard Theological Review*, 47 (1954), 197–203.

¹⁷ *De inventione*, ed. and trans. by H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949); *Ad Herennium*, ed. and trans. by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954). See Kathy Eden, 'Hermeneutics and the Ancient Rhetorical Tradition', *Rhetorica*, 5 (1987), 59–86 (especially pp. 75–81). My account here of Ciceronian theory and its reception by Augustine is based on my article 'The Ciceronian Tradition and Medieval Literary Theory', forthcoming in *The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval Commentary Tradition*, ed. by Cox and Ward (n. 2 above).

¹⁸ On this see Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition*, p. 60 (n. 16 above).

figuration; on the other hand, it may be necessary to read figuratively in order to avoid the spiritual error of misunderstanding the rule of charity which is to be found everywhere in Scripture (III. 10. 14).¹⁹

Augustine uses a rhetorical–legal tradition of the writer’s intention to rehabilitate the literal sense of Scripture, to rescue it from strict association with Pauline notions of carnality. The determining factor in good reading is not the letter, but the divine intention that lies behind the words, that is, the reign of charity. Thus sometimes it is better to read literally, in a semiotic sense (the *signum proprium*), than to move to a figurative plane (*signum translatum*), because such a reading may be more in keeping with charity (see, for example, III. 15. 23). A verbal sign taken literally can coincide with the spiritual sense of Scripture; in legal terms, where the literal sense is what the divine author of Scripture intended, it is the *voluntas* of the writer, what Paul recast as the *pneuma*, that we accept. This notion has its immediate theoretical precedent in Ciceronian rhetoric, where one seeks to grasp the writer’s intention by staying close to the words of the document rather than making one’s own inferences about the writer’s desire (*De inventione*, II. 44. 128).²⁰ This is the principle that looks forward to the elevation of the literal sense in scholastic hermeneutics; it was a principle that was to prove most congenial, in turn, to Wyclif, who often cites the *De doctrina Christiana* in his own program for exegesis, the *De veritate sacrae scripturae*.²¹

One further aspect of Ciceronian thought that informs Augustine’s *De doctrina Christiana* is the balance between wisdom and eloquence set forth in *De inventione*, I. 1. 1–3. 5. Augustine’s appropriation of this notion may have been influenced by Victorinus’s neo-Platonist commentary on the *De inventione* (written before 355 AD).²² For Victorinus, the adjoining of eloquence to wisdom is understood as the manifestation of the inner substance of wisdom: eloquence is the bodying forth of wisdom, which is the soul. Where for Cicero a mute and voiceless wisdom has no

¹⁹ See Kathy Eden, ‘The Rhetorical Tradition and Augustinian Hermeneutics in *De doctrina Christiana*’, *Rhetorica*, 8 (1990), 45–63.

²⁰ Eden, ‘The Rhetorical Tradition and Augustinian Hermeneutics in *De doctrina Christiana*’, pp. 59–61.

²¹ Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia I, Article 10; John Wyclif, *De veritate sacrae scripturae*, ed. by Rudolf Buddensieg, 3 vols (London: Wyclif Society, 1905). On Wyclif and scholasticism, see Copeland, ‘Rhetoric and the Politics of the Literal Sense’ (n. 6 above); A. J. Minnis, ‘“Authorial Intention” and “Literal Sense” in the Exegetical Theories of Richard Fitzralph and John Wyclif: An Essay in the Medieval History of Biblical Hermeneutics’, *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 75 (1975), 1–31; Kantik Ghosh, *The Wycliffite Heresy: Authority and the Interpretation of Texts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 22–66.

²² Victorinus, *Explanationes in rhetoricam*, in *Rhetores latini minores*, ed. by C. Halm (Leipzig: Teubner, 1863), pp. 153–304. See Pierre Hadot, *Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1971), pp. 82–87.

meaning for political life, for Victorinus wisdom is the soul seeking to be liberated through the discipline of the arts, and especially through eloquence. Victorinus's commentary may have provided a philosophical platform for the transposition of rhetorical principles into a Christian hermeneutics. The *De inventione* and other rhetorical texts provide Augustine with a structure of exposition, but the theological revaluation that Augustine achieves may have found some of its inspiration in Victorinus's philosophical reading of Cicero. For Victorinus, as for Augustine, the emphasis of the Ciceronian doublet of wisdom and eloquence would be inverted, wisdom taking precedence over eloquence. But the double model of wisdom and eloquence is nevertheless rendered in the *De doctrina Christiana* in the division of the work: the *modus inveniendi* of Books I–III, which lay out not only the means of discovering what is to be learned in Scripture, but the conditions of spiritual preparation for hermeneutical discovery (fear, piety, knowledge, fortitude, mercy, understanding, wisdom; see II. 7–9); and the *modus proferendi* of Book IV, where the rhetorical system for purveying the wisdom of Scripture is set forth.

The General Prologue takes on a considerable amount of the *De doctrina Christiana*, especially continuous readings from Book III, Chapter 5 to the end of Book III (the rules of Tyconius), and some matter from the beginning and the end of Book II. The actual source of the materials from the *De doctrina* is difficult to judge. It is possible, of course, that the writer had a copy of the whole text at hand, and indeed the continuity of quotation, especially from Book III, might argue for this. But it is also possible that the English writer based his reading on citations of Augustine in a compendium of authorities, perhaps derived from a broadly influential compendium such as the *Manipulus florum* of Thomas of Ireland, or from one of the Lollard compilations, the *Floretum* (completed around 1396), or the redaction of it known as the *Rosarium theologiae*.²³ A further possibility is that the English author was inspired by the use of the *De doctrina* in scholastic theology, perhaps Henry of Ghent's *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, which makes extensive use of Augustine's text, although not in the same order or with the same local density of

²³ On the *Manipulus florum* and its influence on other preaching florilegia, see Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia, and Sermons: Studies on the Manipulus florum of Thomas of Ireland* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1979), esp. Chapter 7. On the Lollard *Floretum* and *Rosarium* see Christina von Nolcken, 'Some Alphabetical Compendia and How Preachers Used Them in Fourteenth-Century England', *Viator*, 12 (1981), 271–88; Christina von Nolcken, *The Middle English Translation of the Rosarium Theologiae* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1979), pp. 19–42; Anne Hudson, 'A Wycliffite Scholar of the Early Fifteenth Century', in *The Bible in the Medieval World: Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley*, ed. by Katherine Walsh and Diana Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 301–15; Anne Hudson, 'A Lollard Compilation and the Dissemination of Wycliffite Thought', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 23 (1972), 65–81 (repr. in Anne Hudson, *Lollards and Their Books* [London: The Hambleton Press, 1985], pp. 13–29).

citation.²⁴ Similarly, Wyclif's own *De veritate sacrae scripturae* may have provided thematic inspiration for the General Prologue's appropriation of Augustine's text; but Wyclif's use of the *De doctrina* is much looser and more occasional than what we find in the English text.

Whatever the source, the General Prologue presents a remarkable synthesis of Augustine's text for English vernacular readers. Chapter 12 of the Prologue shows an impressive attempt to collate the arguments of the *De doctrina Christiana*, Book III on ambiguous figurative signs; Chapter 13 deals, in somewhat less detail, with Book II of the *De doctrina*, on the spiritual preparation needed for approaching the unknown signs of Scripture. Only at the end of Chapter 13 of the Prologue, and then through Chapter 14, does the writer turn to the more recent authority of Nicholas of Lyre, to engage with Lyre's theoretical justification for the primacy of the literal sense of Scripture. If we recall that early on (in Chapter 12) the writer voices frustration at not having Isidore of Seville, Richard Fitzralph, or Lyre to hand to aid him in explaining the relationship between understanding the letter and 'goostly vndirstonding' also (p. 48), the reasons behind his dense use of Augustine in Chapters 12 and 13 become clearer: for his treatment of the literal sense he uses Augustine early on precisely because he *did not* have Lyre. In other words, Augustine started out as a default source, but quickly proved more valuable than perhaps the writer had initially anticipated, so that the writer came to shape his discussion of literal, spiritual, and figurative around Augustine's exposition. One possibility that we could imagine is that the writer, without Lyre to hand, remembered the *De doctrina Christiana* as the ultimate source of the rules of Tyconius, and having access to Augustine's text—through whatever circumstances—decided to work with it, and found Augustine's exposition of unknown and ambiguous signs very fruitful. This hypothesis makes sense in light of the fact that as soon as the writer declares (at the end of Chapter 13) that he now has Lyre to hand ('for Lyre cam late to me', p. 52), the citations of the *De doctrina* stop abruptly, and Lyre becomes the chief authority, even to the point where the writer repeats the seven rules of Tyconius, this time from Lyre's account.

If the use of the *De doctrina Christiana* represented a second thought on the part of the writer, Augustine opened a way into treatment of the literal sense that compelled the English writer to pay close attention to the two discrete systems by which the letter of the text is superseded, that is, to the difference between rhetorical indirection and spiritual intention. Nothing that the English author says here is new to the hermeneutical or critical tradition, but setting it forth in English, and as part of a defiant polemic on behalf of lay access to Scripture and its hermeneutical

²⁴ On Henry of Ghent's use of the *De doctrina Christiana*, see Joseph Wawrykow, 'Reflections on the Place of the *De doctrina Christiana* in High Scholastic Discussions of Theology', in *Reading and Wisdom: The De doctrina Christiana of Augustine in the Middle Ages*, ed. by Edward D. English (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp. 99–125.

apparatus, is new. The discussion of figuration in *De doctrina Christiana*, Book III, from which the General Prologue draws the most, is one of the most complex documents in Christian exegesis, because it relies on classical rhetorical teaching while deftly countering or reconstituting the founding assumptions of oratorical theory. So despite the circumstances that may have conditioned the English writer's turn to this section of Augustine's text, in many ways it remains a surprising choice for a Lollard theorist.

It is especially surprising in view of Wyclif's own unease with the Augustinian view that Scripture has a figurative component that is verbal or rhetorical, and not simply theological. In the *De veritate sacrae scripturae*, Wyclif cites the *De doctrina*, but does not engage Augustine's attempt to reconcile human or ordinary eloquence with the divine institution of signs in Scripture. While Wyclif does not contradict Augustine, his concerns take him in another direction. The figurative dimension of Scripture's language is not to be judged by the standards of ordinary rhetoric, but rather by the standards of what he terms the *virtus sermonis*, the divine eloquence that is singular to Scripture.²⁵ Wyclif is uneasy with Augustine's attempt to marry classical rhetorical discourse to Scriptural exegesis, and indeed the main principle that he derives from Augustine (as well as from scholastic theologians) is the reformulation of the Pauline notion of the spiritual sense as the authorial intention behind the words (this is another way to understand the *virtus sermonis*). As Kantik Ghosh has pointed out, Wyclif is so uncomfortable with the notion of a rhetorical dimension of Scripture that he devalues rhetoric in favour of a notion of scriptural *logic*, which has far more significance for his system.²⁶

The thematic structure of Chapter 12 of the General Prologue is revealing, because it is less random than might initially appear. It opens with an entirely traditional account of the four levels of scriptural interpretation, which places us immediately on the axis of letter and spirit, the literal sense and its three crucial spiritual dimensions:

But it is to wite, that holy scripture hath iiij. vndirstondingis; literal, allegorik, moral, and anagogik. The literal vndirstonding techith the thing don in deede; and literal vndirstonding is ground and fundament of thre goostly vndirstondingis [...] Allegorik is a goostly vndirstonding, that techith what thing men owen for to bileue of Crist either of hooly chirche. Moral is a goostly vndirstonding, that techith men, what vertues thei owen to sue, and what vices thei owen to flee. Anagogik is a goostly vndirstonding, that techith men, what blisse thei schal haue in heuene. [*Then follows the conventional exposition of Jerusalem according to the four levels.*] And these thre goostly vndirstondigis ben not autentik either of beleue, no but tho ben groundid opynly in the text of holy scripture, in oo placed other, either in opin resoun that may

²⁵ See, for example, *De veritate sacrae scripturae* 1: 2, lines 7–10, and Copeland, 'Rhetoric and the Politics of the Literal Sense', pp. 14–17 (n. 6 above).

²⁶ Ghosh, *The Wycliffite Heresy*, pp. 46–49, 66 (n. 21 above).

not be distroied, either whanne the gospelris either other apostlis taken allegorie of the eelde testament, and confeermyn it [...]. (p. 43)

This move across the theological terrain of spiritual understandings might predict a lengthier exposition of the multiple signification of things in Scripture, the hermeneutical tradition that spans *De doctrina Christiana*, Book I to Aquinas (*Summa theologiae*, I. 1. Art. 10, and *Quodlibet* 7) and other high scholastic theologians, including Lyre. But instead, the Prologue shifts its focus utterly, to the figurative *speech* that comprises both verbal and spiritual signification. The shift in thought is announced clearly:

Also holy scripture hath many figuratif spechis, and as Austyn seith in the iij. book of Cristen Teching, that autoris of hooly scripture vsiden moo figuris, that is, mo fyguratif spechis, than gramariens moun gese, that reden not tho figuris in holy scripture. (pp. 43–44)

That this is a decisive move into tropology, that is, into the verbal texture of Scripture, is signaled by the citation of this particular passage in the *De doctrina* Book III, which is one of the most explicitly rhetorical of Books I–III:

Sciant autem litterati modis omnibus locutionis, quos grammatici graeco nomine tropos vocant, auctores nostros usos fuisse, et multiplicius atque copiosius quam possunt existimare vel credere qui nesciunt eos et in aliis ista didicerunt. Quos tamen tropos qui noverunt agnoscunt in litteris sanctis eorumque scientia ad eas intelligendas aliquantum adiuvantur. (III. 29. 40)

The turn in the General Prologue from the signification of things (the four levels of interpretation) to the direction of language could be said to reproduce, in condensed form, the thematic structure of the *De doctrina Christiana*, which devotes Book I to the knowledge of things, and Books II and III to an understanding of signs, especially verbal signs. Whether or not such a design represents a conscious imitation, the logical movement becomes visible.

The General Prologue's concentration on Book III of the *De doctrina* brings the English text into engagement with the most Ciceronian sections of Augustine's treatise apart from Book IV. The Lollard text cites densely from the middle and end of *De doctrina* Book III, in the following order: III. 29. 40; III. 5. 9; III. 10. 14; III. 5. 9; III. 10. 14–15; III. 29. 40; III. 11. 17; III. 12. 18; III. 15. 23; III. 16. 24; III. 27. 38 (pp. 44–45 in the Forshall and Madden edition); and III. 30–37, the rules of Tyconius (pp. 46–48 in Forshall and Madden). The sections in the middle of Book III represent Augustine's mapping of the Ciceronian legal system of grasping the author's intention onto a stylistic or semiotic system of recognizing figuration when it occurs. Thus, at III. 5. 9 he enjoins that we must not take figurative expressions literally because this is a kind of spiritual slavery; in other words, making a choice at the

stylistic or rhetorical level pertains also to the welfare of the soul. This is rendered by the English translator:

It is to be war in the bigynnyng that we take not to the lettre a figuratif speche, for thanne, as Poul seith, the lettre sleeth but the spirit, that is, goostly vndirstonding, qwykeneth; for whanne a thing which is seid figuratifly is taken so as if it be seid propirly, me vndirstondith fleschly; and noon is clepid more couenably the deth of soule, than whanne vndirstonding, that passith bgeestis, is maad soget to the fleisch in suyng the lettre. (p. 44)

The English writer understands, and has imported, the Augustinian dynamic of two discrete systems, whereby reading beyond the letter is both a spiritual and a semiotic necessity, where language that is figurative also reveals the spiritual (or, in Ciceronian terms, legal) intention of the author. Thus tropes must be recognized: 'Also it is figuratif speche, where the wordis maken allegorie, ether a derk lynessee, either parable' (p. 44, translating III. 29. 40, 'allegoria', 'aenigma', 'parabola').²⁷ Understanding the dynamics of figuration permits the reader to see how even the most morally ambiguous passage is still governed by the rule of charity:

Alle thingis in holy scripture, that seemyn to vnwijsse men to be ful of wickidnesse a3ens a man himself, either a3ens his nei3ebore, ben figuratyf spechis, and the preuytees, either goostly vndirstondingis, schulden be sou3t out of vs, to the feeding either keping of charite. (p. 44, translating III. 12. 18).

The Wycliffite text chooses those passages in the *De doctrina Christiana* that speak most to its own hermeneutical purposes. Thus it is significant that it gives its attention to one of the most Ciceronian passages in Book III, in which Augustine advocates preferring the literal sense over the figurative when such a reading contributes better to the reign of charity than the figurative interpretation:

Such a reule schal be kept in figuratif spechis, that so longe it be turned in mynde bi diligent consideracoun, til the expownyng either vndirstonding be brou3t to the rewme of charite; if eny speche of scripture sounneth propirly charite, it owith not to be gessid a figuratif speche. (p. 44, translating III. 15. 23)

As noted above, this passage in Augustine's text echoes a Ciceronian legal and textual strategy to understand the writer's intention with the greatest precision. What in Cicero is a legal matter, the writer's intention, becomes in Augustine a theological matter, the reading that can best disclose the intent of *caritas* in a scriptural passage.

²⁷ Interestingly the English text does not import the Greek word 'aenigma' from Augustine's text, preferring the periphrasis 'dark likeness'. On the history of the term in the Middle Ages see Eleanor Cook, 'The Figure of Enigma: Rhetoric, History, Poetry', *Rhetorica*, 19 (2001), 349–78.

Thus under certain conditions, the literal sense, that which ‘sounneth proprily charite’, can coincide with the spiritual sense of Scripture. The Augustinian principle of finding authorial intention in the literal sense, with its grounding in the legal theory of classical rhetoric, is taken up elsewhere in the Prologue under the banner of high scholastic theory of the literal sense. Thus at the opening of Chapter 14, the General Prologue translates Nicholas of Lyre’s second prologue to his literal postilla, concerning the authorial intention of Scripture:

Natheles alle goostly vndirstondinges setten before, either requyren, the literal vndirstonding, as the foundement; wherfore as a bylding bowing away fro the foundement is disposid to falling, so a goostly expociscoun, that discordith fro the literal sense, owith to be arettid vnseemely and vndouenable, either lesse seemely, and lesse couenable; and therfore it is nedful to hem, that wolen profite in the stodie of holy scripture, to bigynne at the vndirstonding of literal sence, moost sithen bi the literal sense alooen, and not bi goostly sencis may be maad an argument, either preef, to the preuyng, either declaring, of a doute, as Austin seith in his Pistle to Vincent Donatiste. (p. 53).²⁸

The principle, so fundamental to Lollard hermeneutics, that both the figurative and the spiritual meanings of Scripture must be in accord with the literal sense, because this is the author’s intention, is ultimately the legacy of Cicero’s legal thought about *scriptum* and *voluntas*, as expressed in *De inventione*.

As noted above, the other important contribution of the Ciceronian *Rhetorica* to Augustine’s *De doctrina Christiana* is the adjoining of eloquence to wisdom, the notion set forth at the opening of Cicero’s *De inventione*. Victorinus’s commentary on the *De inventione* may have provided Augustine with a revised approach to Cicero’s model: for Victorinus, as for Augustine, wisdom takes precedence over eloquence, which is simply the bodying forth of a wisdom achieved through long spiritual purification. We see this in the structure of the *De doctrina*, in which Books I–III lay out the conditions of spiritual and intellectual preparation for hermeneutical discovery, and in which Book IV presents a *technē* for delivering the knowledge gained, in the form of a manual of preaching. In the four theoretical chapters of the General Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible, Chapter 12–15, we find the Ciceronian–Augustinian doublet produced again, reformulated for yet new purposes.

As in *De doctrina Christiana*, Books I–III, Chapters 12–14 treat the hermeneutical and spiritual questions that are preparatory to a proper encounter with Scripture. As suggested earlier, the order in which these questions—spiritual and figurative

²⁸ The text of Lyre’s prologue is most easily found in PL 113, 29B–34B. It is translated in *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism c. 1100–c. 1375*, ed. by A. J. Minnis and B. Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 268–70. All three of his postilla prologues are translated into French in Yves Delègue, *Les machines du sens: fragments d’une sémiologie médiévale* (Paris: Éditions des Cendres, 1987), pp. 97–118.

meanings of Scripture and the primacy of the literal sense—are treated seems to have been determined by the sources available to the writer at different times. But nevertheless there are certain discernible progressions of thought. Having explored Augustine's position on figurative speech in Chapter 12, the writer opens Chapter 13 by turning to *De doctrina*, Book II, where Augustine first introduces the obscurities and ambiguities of Scripture, and sets out a program of spiritual preparation for approaching the mysteries of Scripture. The English text works through Augustine's seven degrees of spiritual preparation: fear, piety, knowledge, fortitude, mercy, understanding, and wisdom (p. 50, Forshall and Madden). Here by way of contrast with the hard-won spiritual preparation that enables good men to read Scripture in wisdom and charity, the writer introduces a polemic against the clerical enemies of vernacular Scripture and reform of the Church:

But alas! alas! the moost abomynacoun that euer was herd among cristen clerkis is now purposid in Yngelond, bi worldly clerkis and feyned religiouse, and in the cheef vniuersitee of oure reume, as manye trewe men tellen with greet weylyng. (p. 51)

'Trewe men' is a Lollard term for those of the sect²⁹; it is to those 'true men' that this Augustinian discourse on the preparation for wisdom has been directed. The General Prologue has demonstrated that Lollard laity can be prepared in knowledge and wisdom, just as they can apprehend the difference between the spiritual understanding of things in Scripture and the figurative values of words:

Bi these reulis of Austin and bi iiij. vndirstondingis of hooly scripture, and bi wijs knowing of figuratijf spechis, with good lyvyng and meeknesse, and stodyng of the bible, symple men moun sumdel vndirstonde the text of holy writ, and edefie myche hemself and other men. (p. 49)

Chapter 15 of the General Prologue, the last chapter, takes up a very different question. Here the text moves beyond hermeneutics, discovery, and spiritual preparation to the practical problem of translation itself. But in terms of its concern with the issue of public dissemination, with language as that which is to be used, and not just to be understood, and in its explicit focus on human languages and rendering Latin into English, it bears a clear thematic correspondence to Book IV of the *De doctrina Christiana*. Like Augustine, the Lollard writer, having laid out a detailed program of hermeneutical understanding and the spiritual preparation leading to wisdom, now turns to eloquence. For Augustine's treatment of oratory and the preacher's responsibility, the Lollard writer substitutes a pragmatic of translation and the translator's responsibility:

²⁹ See Anne Hudson, 'A Lollard Sect Vocabulary?' in Hudson, *Lollards and Their Books*, pp. 165–80 (n. 23 above).

First it is to knowe, that the best translating is out of Latyn into English, to translate aftir the sentence, and not oneli aftir the wordis, so that the sentence be as opin, either openere, in English as in Latyn, and go not fer fro the lettre; and if the lettre mai not be suid in the translating, let the sentence euere be hool and open, for the wordis owen to serue to the entent and sentence, and ellis the wordis be superflu either false. (p. 57)

In this way the Prologue reproduces Augustine's adjoining of eloquence to wisdom, like Augustine inverting the Ciceronian emphasis to privilege wisdom over eloquence, but also ensuring the survival of the Ciceronian rhetorical legacy.

The General Prologue thus appropriates those aspects of Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana* that are most Ciceronian in their premises. The Ciceronian legacy is virtually invisible, so mediated is it by the Augustinian tradition, including both Augustine's Pauline influences and his scholastic reception. But the legacy obviously contributes to the interests of the Wycliffite author and his Lollard audience. Can we justify placing the General Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible among the small canon of medieval vernacular Ciceronian rhetorics? I believe that we can, if we consider the purpose of the General Prologue in relation to the purposes of other, more overtly Ciceronian vernacular works.

Brunetto Latini's *Rettorica*, along with his translations of some of Cicero's orations, presents us with the most vivid vernacularizing mission. In the words of Paul Gehl, Latini 'proposed a popularization of the Latin moral tradition [...] that would empower the vernacular writer to achieve moral eloquence without continual reference back to the Latin tradition. [...] The logic of such a program was to create a *volgare* rhetoric equal in civilizing power to that of Cicero's Latin moral rhetoric'.³⁰ His popularizing and broadly educative projects of translation must create the very public to whose interests they are aimed: a public that can shape its own vernacular civic discourse out of a Ciceronian rhetoric that has been translated, not only out of Latin but out of a context of narrowly academic learning. In other words, Latini was an activist whose aim was to create a vernacular civic rhetoric, a public moral discourse, that could function independently of academic hierarchies. He finds the possibilities of such a public discourse expressly in Cicero's *De inventione*, in which eloquence is theorized as the instrument of the greatest political enfranchisement.

The project of the Wycliffite Bible is also to summon forth the political energies of a lay vernacular community. While its reformist theological purposes are never explicitly or even covertly aligned with the tradition of civic rhetoric, the concerns expressed in the General Prologue bear comparison with the vernacular Ciceronianism of Latini. The Ciceronian underpinnings of Augustine's rehabilitation of the literal sense speak to the needs of a lay, vernacular public for whom the possibilities of religious discourse, and hermeneutical enfranchisement, must be located in the sufficiency of the literal sense.³¹ The General Prologue constructs its

³⁰ Gehl, 'Preachers, Teachers, and Translators' (n. 2 above), pp. 315, 319.

³¹ See Rita Copeland, *Pedagogy, Intellectuals, and Dissent in the Later Middle Ages*:

readers as a community of non-clerical 'true men' who will seek in the author's intention the standard by which the meaning of Scripture must be determined. The author's intention is determined by knowledge and careful study of the verbal composition of Scripture, and particularly an attention to figurative usage that helps to resolve apparent contradictions between intention and word. Where Augustine is most Ciceronian in his legalistic regard for authorial intention, the General Prologue finds Augustine's treatise the most valuable resource for constructing a community that is both hermeneutically and spiritually self-reliant. In its activist appropriation of these principles the General Prologue to the Wycliffite Bible joins the tradition of vernacular Ciceronianism.

Ciceronian Rhetorical Theory in the *Volgare*: A Fourteenth-Century Text and its Fifteenth-Century Readers

VIRGINIA COX

A distinctive and interesting chapter in the long history of the medieval renewal—or renewals—of Ciceronian rhetorical theory is represented by the story of the numerous vernacular appropriations of this body of doctrine from the mid-thirteenth century down to the invention of printing. This story is very largely an Italian one: although one-off translations and adaptations of Ciceronian rhetorical texts do exist in other European vernaculars, it is only in Italian that these are sufficiently numerous to constitute anything like a plausible ‘tradition’. The principal Ciceronian text appropriated by the *volgarizzatori* is, predictably, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which had already, by the dawn of the vernacular tradition in the thirteenth century, largely displaced the incomplete *De inventione* within the Latin teaching tradition. As many as six Italian translations of *Ad Herennium*, full or abridged, survive from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, while the existence of a seventh may be conjectured, though it survives only in a fragmentary form. To these may be added two adaptations of *De inventione* and a compendium incorporating material from both texts, as well as a number of shorter manuals combining extracts from Ciceronian theory with original exemplificatory material.¹ In total, this is an impressive body of material, indicative of a substantial and enduring interest in

¹ A comprehensive list of Italian vernacular adaptations of *Ad Herennium* and *De inventione* between the thirteen and fifteenth centuries will be provided in an appendix to my chapter in the forthcoming volume *The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval and Renaissance Commentary Tradition*, ed. by Virginia Cox and John O. Ward (Leiden: Brill). Meanwhile, *Ad Herennium* adaptations are listed in G. B. Speroni, ‘Intorno al testo di un volgarizzamento trecentesco inedito della *Rhetorica ad Herennium*’, in *Studi di filologia e di letteratura italiana offerti a Carlo Dionisotti* (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1973), p. 25, n. 2.

Ciceronian rhetoric on the part of the vernacular reading public. Taken as a whole, it constitutes an exceptionally interesting document of the dynamics of cultural transmission: it is difficult to think of another case of a body of classical doctrine—certainly not one of this level of complexity and technicality—for which such a precocious, rich and protracted history of medieval vernacular transmission survives.

For understandable reasons, scholarly interest in this vernacular tradition of Ciceronian rhetoric in Italy has been concentrated almost exclusively, at least until recently, on the earliest period of its history. The first Italian adaptations of Ciceronian rhetorical doctrine date from around the 1260s and are among the earliest examples of vernacular prose in Italy; two of them, moreover, are by Brunetto Latini, one of the most distinguished and representative Italian intellectuals of his age, while the third is by Bono Giamboni, again a figure of some literary renown. As a result, Latini's *Rettorica* has been the object of exhaustive study, as has the compilation of rhetorical theory contained in the third book of his *Trésor*, while the critical attention focused on Giamboni's *Fiore di rettorica* has barely been less. Good modern editions exist of all three works—an exceptionally rich and detailed one in the case of the *Fiore di rettorica*—and the methods and emphases of both translators have been the object of close critical scrutiny.² Where the works of Latini and Giamboni's fourteenth and fifteenth-century successors are concerned, the critical record is far patchier. A critical edition exists of one text, a much-abridged *Ad Herennium* adaptation from the 1320s known as the *Trattatello di colori rettorici*,³ but little attention has been given to the four complete *Ad Herennium* translations produced after this date. Though the motives for this neglect are comprehensible—we are talking of a period in which the role of the vernacular in Italian literary culture as a whole was relatively marginal—it is nonetheless unfortunate, in that it prevents a comprehensive overview of this tradition as it developed over more than two hundred years. Furthermore, an excessive concentration on Latini, in particular, risks distorting our understanding of the tradition as a whole. Though the best known of the early vernacular adaptors of Ciceronian rhetoric, Latini is very far from being the most representative; indeed, as we will see, some of the features of his rhetorical writings that have attracted the most attention from critics, such as his precocious and sophisticated interest in the literary applications of rhetoric, are precisely those which most clearly illustrate his

² The editions referred to are Latini, *Rettorica*, ed. by F. Maggini, 2nd edn (Florence: Le Monnier, 1968); Latini, *Li livres dou trésors*, ed. by F. J. Carmody (Berkeley: California University Press, 1948); Giamboni, *Fiore di rettorica*, ed. by G. B. Speroni (Pavia: Università degli Studi di Pavia, 1994). For bibliography, see, for Latini, J. Bolton Holloway, *Brunetto Latini: An Analytic Bibliography* (London: Grant and Cutler, 1986), pp. 19–30, 32–33, 63–73; R. G. Witt, 'In the Footsteps of the Ancients': *The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 201–06; for Giamboni, *Fiore*, pp. cclxxvii–cclxxxvii.

³ A. Scolari, 'Un volgarizzamento trecentesco della *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: il *Trattatello di colori rettorici*', *Medioevo romanzo*, 9 (1984), 215–66.

distinctiveness within the vernacular tradition as a whole.

The present study will be focused on a single text from the 'lost age' in the history of the vernacular transmission of Ciceronian rhetoric: an anonymous translation of *Ad Herennium* produced in Tuscany, probably around the mid-fourteenth century.⁴ This text, which has been the object of a very thorough philological study, but has received little by way of critical or historical analysis, has several claims on our attention.⁵ Most notably, it is the first attempt at a comprehensive translation of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, previous thirteenth and fourteenth-century *volgarizzamenti* being all, to a greater or lesser extent, abridged.⁶ Unlike the translations that followed in the fifteenth century, however, in addition to rendering the text of the original, it also attempts with great diligence to interpret this text in a way that will make sense to its vernacular readership. This interpretive dimension lends the translation a considerable interest within the history of the vernacular fortunes of Ciceronian rhetoric as a whole: it is here, perhaps, that we can feel closest to a sense of the concrete texture of early readers' relationship with this body of doctrine. Specifically, it can give us an idea of the motives that drew these early readers to a work which, on this evidence, they found exceptionally complex and recalcitrant, and an indication of the areas in which this arcane doctrine was perceived most palpably to intersect with their modern-day needs. The feature of the text that gives it this value, in particular, is the richness of its exemplification: in his eagerness to convey to his readers the relevance and utility of the precepts he is translating, the anonymous author periodically supplements these rules with extended examples of model orations. This gives the text something of the character of the great vernacular speech compendia of the previous century, such as Matteo de' Libri's, though, in the richness of its interweaving of praxis and theory, the text under discussion is unique.⁷

The translation—or, better, paraphrase—that is our object of study here (henceforth referred to by its *incipit* as *Avengnia Dio*)⁸ survives in at least eleven

⁴ For the probable date of composition, see Speroni, 'Intorno al testo', p. 26, n. 1.

⁵ The philological study referred to is that of Speroni, 'Intorno al testo'. For critical discussion, see F. Maggini, 'Un manuale di retorica del secolo XIV', in *I primi volgarizzamenti dai classici latini* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1952), pp. 97–111; Felice Tocco, 'Il Fior di rettorica e le sue principali redazioni secondo i codici fiorentini', *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana* 14 (1889), 337–64 (pp. 356–63, although the text is misleadingly described here as a redaction of the *Fiore di rettorica*).

⁶ For details, see Virginia Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy, 1260–1350', *Rhetorica*, 17 (1999), 239–288 (pp. 244–45).

⁷ On the character of the text as a 'fusione tra la teoria e la pratica', see Maggini, 'Un manuale', p. 97. On early Italian speech manuals, see E. Vincenti's edition of Matteo de' Libri, *Arringhe* (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1974); also eadem, 'Matteo de' Libri e l'oratoria pubblica e privata nel '200', *Archivio glottologico italiano*, 54 (1969), 227–37.

⁸ In full, the opening sentence of the text reads 'Avengnia Dio chella natura minisstrasse

fourteenth- and fifteenth-century manuscripts, all, with one exception, Tuscan in origin.⁹ The work comprises four books, corresponding approximately to the four books of the original, preceded by a fairly substantial authorial preface. In broad lines, as noted, it offers a relatively faithful and comprehensive translation of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, though enriched with a substantial amount of new exemplificatory material. The only significant divergence from the Roman text occurs at Chapters 52–53 of the treatise, which replace *Ad Herennium*'s treatment of the cardinal virtues with material taken from Martin of Braga's *Formulae honestae vitae* and from Cicero's *De inventione*.¹⁰ Although the author clearly knew Giamboni's *Fiore di rettorica*, and drew on the earlier *volgarizzamento* at points in his text,¹¹ for the most part his translation of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is original and clearly based directly on the Latin. The terminology used in the fourth book's discussion of the *colores rhetorici* is revealing in this respect. Of the forty-four figures the two translations have in common, twenty are rendered with the same vernacular term (e.g. *sentenzia* for *sententia*), and nine with similar or etymologically related ones (e.g. *addomandare* vs the *Fiore*'s *domandamento* for *interrogatio*). The remaining fifteen are, however, translated in an entirely different manner, and often in a form significantly closer to the Latin original (e.g. *digiungimento* rather than the *Fiore*'s *scevramento* for *disiunctio*, *compimento* rather than *subiacimento* for *subiectio*).¹²

The preface of *Avengnia Dio*, and the short sequence of introductory chapters that follow, are of considerable interest as an indication of the work's intended readership and use.¹³ Besides extolling the virtues of eloquence, and praising Cicero as a benefactor to humanity for his codification of rhetoric, the anonymous author here introduces what will be a major and recurrent theme of the work: the difficulty, for a non Latin-literate public, in gaining access to Ciceronian doctrine. A readership is sympathetically evoked of 'noble and subtle minds', fully literate only in the

edesse alluomo molte propieta perle quali faciesse differentia daesso allo animale bruto, etinfrallaltre li desse la più nobile cheffosse cioè lanobilta delparlare.' ('Although man was endowed by nature with many properties that distinguish him from brute animals, the noblest among these human qualities was the capacity for speech.') This and all subsequent quotations from the text are taken from Florence, BNCf MS II. I. 71 (described at p. 212 below). The passage here is found at fol. 184^r.

⁹ Speroni, 'Intorno al testo', pp. 26–30; Giamboni, *Fiore*, p. cclxxxii.

¹⁰ Speroni, 'Intorno al testo', pp. 31–32.

¹¹ For details, see Speroni, 'Intorno al testo', pp. 30–31; also Giamboni, *Fiore*, p. ccxxviii–ix.

¹² On possible reasons for Giamboni's choice of *compimento* for *subiectio*, see Giamboni, *Fiore*, p. cclv.

¹³ The preface and the first chapter of the text (taken from MS Laurenziana Gaddiano 65) are reproduced in Tocco, 'Il *Fiore di rettorica*', pp. 356–59.

volgare, eager to embrace the useful lessons of the *Rhetorica nova* but held back by its difficult Latin and the obscurity of its style.¹⁴ With these readers' interests in mind, the author has set himself the daunting task of translating Cicero's treatise into Italian, though he does so in the full awareness that their 'hunger and thirst' for rhetorical knowledge will find only a meagre satisfaction in the 'coarse bread' and 'brackish waters' that are all he is in a position to offer.¹⁵ Even in this linguistically mitigated form, prospective readers are warned that the study of rhetoric will still require 'singular attention and energy': an authorial exhortation at the end of the fourth chapter, modelled on a similar passage in the *Fiore di rettorica*, urges the reader experiencing local difficulties of comprehension first to re-read the passage in question several times in an attempt to make sense of it, and then, where necessary, to ask clarification from 'someone more learned, who understands these things'.¹⁶ Such problems, moreover, as we later learn, are not limited to the reader. Indeed, the author candidly confesses that he was tempted to omit Book III's section on mnemonics from his translation in view of its difficulty and obscurity, adding that the only thing that encouraged him to persist was the hope—rather a forlorn one, one must feel, in the circumstances—that 'other minds might be capable of penetrating this doctrine more acutely than my pen has been capable of expressing it'.¹⁷

The solicitude towards the reader apparent in *Avengnia Dio*'s prefatory comments also clearly informs the author's formal choices in the treatise as a whole. The rhythms of the translation are significantly more leisurely than the original, and its tone notably less brisk and austere 'technical'. More than a relentless series of precepts, as in the original, we have something here closer to a spoken monologue—the 'oral' qualities of the translation are very notable—slightly folksy in tone and reassuringly padded with recapitulations, cross-references, and appeals to the reader's everyday experience. Above all, the translation differs from the original in the frequency and extensiveness of its examples, which, cumulatively, as was noted, assimilate the work to the speech-manuals and collections of exordia familiar from

¹⁴ See esp. *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 184^r (compare Tocco, 'Il *Fiore di rettorica*', p. 357), where the author states that he has embarked on his translation 'considerando che molti ingiengnj nobili essottili duomminj volgharj siperdevano emanchavano perloschurita desso libro eperlo stile litterale desso.'

¹⁵ Ibid. 'Et pongniamo che perla mia insufficientia epoca indusstria abbia tocchato pure le cortecce del detto libro lamidolla lasciando nientedimeno tu Lettore fa et prendi esempio dicholui ilquale essendo bene assetato bee laqua torbita che truova perinfine che viene alla chiara enetta, e quando è bene affamato prende emangia ilpane grosso non avendo diquello del grano'. ('And if, as I fear, in my ignorance and laxness, I have merely touched the surface of this book without penetrating to its core, you, Reader, should recall that a thirsty man will make do with any water he comes across, however dirty, until he can find something clearer and purer, and that a hungry man will eat coarse bread if there is no wheaten bread at hand.')

¹⁶ *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 185^r; compare Giamboni, *Fiore*, p. 5.

¹⁷ *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 220^r (Chapter 61).

the dictaminal tradition. The majority of these examples are newly coined, though the author sometimes adapts them from the sparser exemplification of the original, as in the case of *Ad Herennium*'s example of Ulysses and Ajax, employed to illustrate 'conjectural' issues.¹⁸ Even where classical examples are used, however, these tend to be modernized and 'domesticated' in the interest of accessibility;¹⁹ thus we find Ulysses being denounced for the murder of Ajax before a judge addressed as 'Messere lo podestà', and the argument being advanced in his defence that his previous murder of Palamedes should not be taken into account since 'any apostle' would have acted similarly in the circumstances!²⁰ Where *Ad Herennium*'s examples are culturally untranslatable, modernizing equivalents are substituted, as when a Roman example of a man who sells a slave, unaware that the latter's freedom has previously been granted, is replaced by the example—evocative of the conflicted civic realities of the medieval communes—of a citizen who has lent armed support to an acquaintance in a private affair, without realizing that the recipient of his aid was nurturing seditious intent with regard to the public weal.²¹ The topicality of this example inspires a lengthy treatment of the case, illustrated by sample speeches for the defence and prosecution, expanding very considerably on the original, which gives only the barest sketch of a strategy of defence.

The same concern with user-friendliness that we see in the author's lavish provision of exemplificatory material is apparent at a more macroscopic level in the treatise in the way that it organizes its material. As was noted above, the translation is much fuller than previous vernacular adaptations of *Ad Herennium*, fulfilling the author's promise in his proem to 'cover all the matters dealt with by Cicero'.²² Portions of the Roman text omitted entirely in the *Fiore di rettorica*—such as the

¹⁸ *Avengnia Dio*, fols 191^v–193^r (Chapter 30); compare *Ad Her*, I. xi. 18 and II. xix. 28–30. Typically, where the Latin original gives only a prosecution speech laying out the grounds for suspecting Ulysses of the murder of Ajax, the translation supplements this with an equally extensive defence speech (192^v–193^r). *Avengnia Dio*'s treatment of this example is discussed in some detail in Maggini, 'Un manuale', pp. 102–06.

¹⁹ The term 'domesticated' derives from R. G. Witt, 'Latini, Lovato, and the Revival of Antiquity', *Dante Studies*, 112 (1994), 53–61 (p. 59); see also *ibid.*, pp. 56–57 and 58–59 for a useful discussion of this tendency in Brunetto Latini.

²⁰ *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 192^v 'Et poniamo come per l'altra parte sidicie che Palamides fosse morto dalluy, io non so alchuno appostolo che essendo chosi tradito [...] non fosse chaduto nel detto tanto chaso malificio.' ('And although the prosecution claims that he murdered Palamedes, I cannot think that any apostle would have refrained from that misdeed if he had suffered such a betrayal'). Palamedes's treachery is later said to have been so shocking that 'anchora le feminuccie ne parlano' (the gossips of the neighbourhood are still speaking of it.)

²¹ *Avengnia Dio*, fols 198^v–199^v (Chapter 43); compare *Ad Her*, I. xiv. 24, II. xvi. 24.

²² *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 184^r ('oseguaito esso Tulio intutte le materie delle quali tratta.') A good sense of the scope of the treatise may be had by consulting the list of chapter headings reproduced in Tocco, 'Il *Fiore di rettorica*', pp. 359–63.

rebarbative discussion of status theory in Books I–II, dismissed by Giamboni as of interest only to lawyers—are translated in *Avengnia Dio* with only minimal omissions, while even those sections which the *Fiore* treats most fully are more integrally conveyed in *Avengnia Dio*.²³ Within this general spectrum of fidelity, however, the author shows a fairly free hand in rearranging the material of *Ad Herennium* where didactic clarity seems to require it. This is most obvious, precisely, in the first two books of the treatise, which deal with forensic argumentation. The Roman original begins its treatment of this topic in Book I with a long and unwieldy initial list of definitions of the various types of conjectural, legal and judicial controversy, following this in Book II with a further series of chapters discussing, in sequence, how to handle each type; only at the end does he provide exemplification of this material in the form of a model oration. *Avengnia Dio* presents this material in a notably more manageable—if more diffuse—fashion, uniting the material from Books I and II of *Ad Herennium* into a series of integrated discussion of each type of issue, and illustrating each of the three main sub-categories, conjectural, legal, and judicial, with a fully worked speech. Here, as throughout, the author's principle appears to be to avoid submitting the reader to an extended series of rules, without mitigating the experience through the provision of examples of how these rules might be translated in practice. Ubiquitously in the treatise, one can detect an anxiety on his part to keep the practical utility of Ciceronian rhetoric constantly before his readers' eyes; only in this way, one senses, does he feel that the energies demanded in the study of this doctrine can be justified.

What can we deduce, concretely, from *Avengnia Dio* about the kinds of practical application early readers envisaged for Ciceronian rhetoric? One immediately noteworthy feature of the author's exemplification is his exclusive concentration on oral uses of rhetoric, apparent from his initial definition of rhetoric in the proem as an art concerned with speeches (*dicerie* or *arenghe*).²⁴ This differentiates him sharply from Brunetto Latini, who, in an interesting and much-discussed passage of his *Rettorica*, discusses the applicability of Ciceronian rhetorical theory to the composition of literary works such as letters and poems.²⁵ As was noted above, this

²³ For Giamboni's dismissal of status theory, see *Fiore*, p. 70. A good example of a section of *Ad Herennium* covered in some depth in the *Fiore* but in greater detail in *Avengnia Dio*, is Book IV's listing of the *colores rhetorici*, where *Avengnia Dio* covers sixty-one figures to the *Fiore's* forty-four.

²⁴ See *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 184^r (compare Tocco, 'Il *Fiore di rettorica*', pp. 356–57) where rhetoric is defined as 'una cierta arte diparlare perlo [sic] quale salluminasse edichiarasse ciaschuno dicitore come dee e possa fare sua diceria e aringhie sopra alcuno [sic] diceria omateria dando et ponendo saghacissime chautele delle quali ciaschuno dicitore dee essere armato' ('a certain art of speech which informs and teaches speakers how to compose an oration on a given subject, supplying them with all the cunning devices that any orator requires').

²⁵ See *Rettorica*, pp. 147–48, and, more broadly, 146–58; compare also *Li livres dou*

is a feature of Latini's approach to rhetoric that is more distinctive than has often been recognized, *Avengnia Dio's* interpretation of Ciceronian rhetoric as, essentially, an *ars arengandi* being far the more representative stance. This is suggested not only by the internal, textual evidence offered by the other main *Ad Herennium* adaptations of this period, but also, less directly, by a study of the manuscript contexts in which these early vernacular rhetoric texts most characteristically occur. Frequent pairings are with vernacular speech-collections and with other speech-related material such as collections of proverbs and exordia, while other accompanying texts include translations of Ciceronian orations, genuine or Sallustian, and Albertano da Brescia's ethical-practical *De doctrina loquendi*.²⁶ By contrast, combinations of vernacular rhetorical manuals with texts relating to letter-writing are much rarer, while exclusive pairings with poetic and 'grammatical' texts are so rare as to be practically non-existent.

Oratory, then, is the primary field of application to which the author of *Avengnia Dio* seems to envisage his readers' interests will be oriented, but oratory, concretely, of what kind and to be delivered in what kind of context? An answer to this question is supplied in broad terms by a glance at the opening addresses of the treatise's sample speeches, which are directed, almost without exception, either to a judge ('Messere lo podesstà') or to an assembly of councillors ('Signiori'). The applications of rhetoric envisaged in *Avengnia Dio* seemingly correspond, then, with the two principal user-contexts contemplated in classical rhetorical theory: the forensic or judicial oratory of the lawcourts, and the deliberative oratory of the political assembly. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals, as is predictable, a degree of slippage in the case of the former. As has often been noted, a fundamental problem affecting the medieval reception of classical rhetorical theory was that changes to legal practice had eliminated the need for 'amateur' forensic oratory of the type envisaged by theorists like Cicero, the role of the citizen orator in legal representation in ancient Rome having been taken in medieval Europe by professional advocates, who conducted their business in a more technical fashion, by reference to written statutes and precedent. At first appearance, this would seem to have made much of classical rhetorical theory either obsolete or of much reduced relevance, being only of any use to legal practitioners and only of limited pertinence to them. In practice, as is well known—not least through the researches of John Ward—rather than classical forensic rhetoric simply fading into obsolescence, its

Trésor, p. 322. For differing interpretations of the implications of the *Rettorica* passage, see R. G. Witt, 'Brunetto Latini and the Italian Tradition of *Ars Dictaminis*', *Stanford Italian Review*, 2 (1983), 5–24; P. Sgrilli, 'Retorica e società: tensioni anticlassiche nella *Retorica* di Brunetto Latini', *Medioevo Romano*, 3 (1976), 380–93. A further indication of *Avengnia Dio's* contrasting lack of concern with possible literary uses of rhetoric is his omission of the *tertium genus narrationis* as of interest only to 'grandi poeti e autori' ('great poets and writers'): see *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 189^v (Chapter 23); compare *Ad Her.*, I. viii. 12–13.

²⁶ Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric', p. 252, n. 27 (n. 6 above).

transmission became an exercise in creative adaptation, as this potent but antiquated resource of medieval Europe's classical heritage was reappropriated for contemporary uses. *Avengnia Dio* offers an interesting example of this, all the more interesting in that its vernacular target audience excludes almost by definition the potential user group of lawyers. As was noted above, Giamboni's *Fiore di rettorica* radically truncates *Ad Herennium*'s teachings on forensic oratory, omitting all discussion of status theory, for example, as too difficult for laymen and of relevance only to professional advocates.²⁷ *Avengnia Dio*, by contrast, includes this section almost in full, but reorients it implicitly through its choice of exemplification to ordinary citizens in their interactions with the judicial establishment. Thus the primary user-contexts to which reference is made in this section become the denunciation of a criminal before the *podestà* and the defence of oneself or one's allies in the case of a denunciation by others. The topic of conjectural controversies is introduced, for example, with the admonition that 'if you, as the accuser, wish to render a given person suspect of a crime, go to the *podestà* and make your accusation with the support of a series of conjectures and circumstantial evidence and inferences from this evidence, which together can offer plausible grounds for implicating the person you suspect in this crime, even though you have no firm evidence of his guilt'.²⁸ Similarly, in his discussion of the technique of *deprecatio*—an appeal to clemency, to be adopted where no defence is feasible—the author highlights the utility of this strategy for those who have found themselves 'on account of their human fragility' undisguisedly guilty of some crime. In these circumstances, he advises—when 'you have committed and confessed to some misdeed for which you can provide no excuse, and you can see no other way in which to defend yourself'—'you must have resort to the ultimate remedy, which is simply to ask pity for what you have done'.²⁹

Despite these ingenious attempts on the author's part to discover para-judicial uses for Cicero's teachings on forensic argumentation, the primary user-context envisaged in the treatise is undoubtedly deliberative oratory such as that practised in the various councils and assemblies of the medieval communes. The clearest indication of this comes from the fact that council oratory supplies the 'default'

²⁷ Giamboni, *Fiore*, p. 70.

²⁸ *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 191^{r-v} (Chapter 29): 'Ma volendo tu accusatore rendere sospetto alchuna persona del detto exciesso vai alpodesta et per certe congetturre et inditii et argomenti fai tua accusa sicche verisimilmente mosstri checio abbia commesso cholui al quale sospeccione ne porti, poi che nonne sai nelvero alchuna cosa del detto exciesso commesso'.

²⁹ *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 200^r (Chapter 44); compare *Ad Her*, I. xiv. 24, II. xvii. 25: 'perla fragiellita humana tutto di [=di] sicommettono delle colpe et degli exciessi iguali meritano lapena se altro rimedio non aiuta; et pero quando ai commesso ecconfessato alchuno exciesso eaquello nonpuoi dare alchuna scusa ne peraltra difesa difenderti è per messtiero che richorri allultimo rimedio cioè addomandare misericordia del detto exciesso'.

context for the exemplification supplied in the bulk of the treatise, examples set in the podestarial courts being found only locally in the section dealing with forensic argument and in the section on demonstrative oratory, whose 'praise and blame' structure obviously lends itself to such para-judicial contexts. There is a qualitative distinction, too, in the rendering of examples of forensic—or quasi-forensic—and deliberative speeches: where the former frequently draw on the Roman examples of the original, or, if modernizing, feature somewhat generic and under-realized scenarios ('Pietro' accusing 'Giovanni' of an unspecified crime), the deliberative examples used are almost invariably contemporary and are described with a far higher degree of imaginative engagement, including, on occasion, even a degree of 'scene-setting', as when orators are portrayed 'ascending to the pulpit' to speak.³⁰ Where their content is concerned, whether original or adapted from examples in *Ad Herennium*, these deliberative speeches would have had a doleful topicality for the work's early readers: one sequence, translated in the appendix below, debates whether to permit the return to a commune of a potentially seditious group of political exiles, while another laments the discovery of a political conspiracy and urges vengeance on the conspirators, and a third counsels on defensive strategies to adopt in the face of an imminent invasion by a neighbouring power.³¹

Taken together, the examples of deliberative speaking contained in this treatise form a vivid, if stylised, portrayal of the council oratory of the medieval communes, complementing that found in other sources such as chronicles and speech manuals. Obviously, in the absence of more direct evidence, such as the detailed minutes we have of the later, fifteenth-century Florentine *consulte e pratiche*, we have no way of knowing with certainty how far such 'literary' sources may be relied on for evidence of actual oratorical practice. With this caveat in mind, however, certain non-classical features of the model deliberative speeches we find in texts such as *Avengnia Dio* and the speech manuals of the period occur with sufficient frequency for us to assume with some certainty that they reflect contemporary habits of usage. One might particularly point here to the use as the opening line of a speech of a biblical quotation in Latin: an inheritance of dictaminal culture sufficiently well-established to merit one of *Avengnia Dio*'s rare 'updatings' of Ciceronian theory, in Book III's discussion of *dispositio*, where it is noted that on occasion, rather than an exordium, a 'detto di savio', a 'similitudine', or a 'bello exemplo' may be used.³² The

³⁰ See, for example, *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 208^v; also fol. 198^r for a reference to an *arringheria*. On such speech platforms and their place in medieval Italian communal culture, see Stephen J. Milner, 'Citing the *Ringhiera*: The Politics of Place and Public Address in Trecento Florence', *Italian Studies*, 55 (2000), 53–82 (pp. 59–64). On the element of 'local colour' in the text's rendition of council speeches, see Maggini, 'Un manuale', p. 109.

³¹ See, respectively, *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 212^v (Chapter 52); pp. 222^v–223^r (Chapter 62) (echoing an example in *Ad Her*, IV. viii. 12); and fols 208^v–209^r (Chapter 51).

³² *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 217^v (Chapter 58); compare *Ad Her*, I. ix. 17: where the original speaks only of substituting the exordium by 'aliqua firma argumentatione', the translation

discussion of levels of style in the section on *elocutio* suggests, interestingly, that this was regarded specifically as a feature of an elevated style: of the two deliberative speeches given here, to illustrate the high and the middle style, only the first opens in this manner, with the other using a straightforward exordium.³³

Avvegna Dio's 'deliberative' orientation is a feature of the treatise that deserves to be underlined, as it offers strong support for the thesis I have put forward elsewhere, that the deliberative oratory of the communal councils was the prime user-context envisaged by early exponents of Ciceronian rhetorical theory in general.³⁴ Indeed, it may be argued that it was the rhetorical needs generated by this 'new' form of oratory—similar in its adversarial character to the uses envisaged in classical rhetorical theory—that caused readers to turn back to Ciceronian rhetoric with a new interest after almost a century in which rhetorical teaching had been dominated by the *ars dictaminis*. The contemporary relevance of Cicero's teachings on deliberative oratory is acknowledged in most of the early vernacular texts of Ciceronian rhetoric, from Latini's *Rettorica*, which cites 'speaking in seigneurial or communal councils' as among the prime modern applications of classical rhetorical theory, to the classicizing fourteenth-century exordium collection which describes deliberative oratory as the genre of rhetoric 'most in use among speakers in the present day'.³⁵ *Avengnia Dio*, meanwhile, underlines the importance of deliberative oratory ('the kind of policy discussions we see practised every day in councils') by inserting a brief prefatory paragraph in the section on deliberative oratory for which no counterpart is found in the Roman original.³⁶ This is moralizing in its emphases, stressing the importance of council deliberations for the security and well being of society, and urging those involved in them to act with integrity and transparency and to resist any temptation to corruption. The centrality of this latter point is reinforced by the unwonted solemnity of tone that distinguishes this passage quite sharply from the workaday register of the treatise as whole: the council, we are told 'is the locus

expands this to 'alchuna ferma alleghagione o [...] alchuno detto disavio o [...] alchuna similitudine o [...] alchuno bello exemplo'. On the prevalence of this kind of 'substantive' exordium in dictaminal culture, see James R. Banker, 'Giovanni di Bonandrea and Civic Values in the Context of the Italian Rhetorical Tradition', *Manuscripta*, 18 (1974), 3–20 (pp. 8–9). More generally, on the influence of dictaminal theory on civic oratory in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Enrico Artifoni, 'Sull'eloquenza politica del Duecento italiano', *Quaderni medievali*, 35 (1993), 57–78; though compare Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric', p. 256, n. 33 (n. 6 above).

³³ *Avengnia Dio*, fols 222^v–223^v.

³⁴ Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric', pp. 256–64 (n. 6 above).

³⁵ Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric', pp. 258, 264 (n. 6 above).

³⁶ The phrase quoted in the text occurs at *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 208^r (Chapter 51): 'laqual [i.e. 'la seconda gienerazione del parlare, cioè ... la diliberativa] pende inproposste epartiti che tutto di sifanno ne' consigli'.

of conscience, and the storehouse of honesty, the refuge from every danger, and, in sum, the place in which each speaker must bear the truth stamped on his brow'.³⁷

The notion that *Avengnia Dio*'s rhetorical teaching is primarily oriented towards civic, and, more specifically, conciliar uses receives confirmation if we turn from the internal evidence of the text to the evidence of its reception and transmission. Composed around the mid-Trecento, *Avengnia Dio* clearly continued to circulate throughout the following century in Tuscany and particularly Florence, following in this a pattern common to other vernacular rhetorical texts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.³⁸ Especially interesting as evidence of the contexts of fifteenth-century usage are two Florentine manuscripts which preserve the name of their original owners: Laurenziana Ashburnhamiano 975, which belonged to the prominent diplomat and statesman, Neri di Gino Capponi (1388–1457), and Florence BNCf MS II. I. 71, personally transcribed in the 1490s by Antonio da Filicaia (ca 1431/32–after 1510), a member of a pro-Medicean mercantile family and an officeholder in the 1480s and 90s.³⁹ The Da Filicaia manuscript, a miscellany of ponderous proportions, is particularly rich as a testimony to vernacular rhetorical culture in this period.⁴⁰ Besides containing a substantial body of rhetorical theory—the complete text of *Avengnia Dio* is supplemented by extracts from the *Fiore di rettorica* and *Trésor*—it is mainly notable for its vast collection of speeches and letters, some drawn from classical literary sources, but the majority contemporary or near-contemporary, and deriving from contexts that may broadly be defined as 'civic' (whether diplomatic, ritual-celebratory, or properly political). The range of the collection, and the diversity of the speech practices it records, is as impressive as its

³⁷ *Avengnia Dio*, fols 207^v–208^r. For a full transcription and translation of this passage, see Appendix I below. On the attempts of early adaptors of *Ad Herennium* to introduce a moral perspective into the original's essentially amoral treatment of rhetoric, see Cox, 'Ciceronian Rhetoric', pp. 275–76 (n. 6 above).

³⁸ This is well illustrated by the transmission history of the *Fiore di rettorica*, on which see Giamboni, *Fiore*, pp. lxiii–cxxiii. On the manuscript tradition of *Avengnia Dio*, see the references in n. 5 above.

³⁹ On Capponi, see R. A. Goldthwaite, *Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: A Study of Four Families* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 189–94. On Da Filicaia, see Virginia Cox, 'Machiavelli and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: Deliberative Rhetoric in *The Prince*', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 28 (1997), 1109–1141, p. 1117 n. 20. The latter's dates may be reconstructed conjecturally from postscripts in manuscripts copied by him, which include, besides those discussed in the present study, BNCf MS II. I. 388 and BNCf MS II. II. 188 (both containing mainly religious material).

⁴⁰ For discussion of this manuscript, see Giamboni, *Fiore*, pp. cxiv–cxv; Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 67. More generally, on the contents and context of such fifteenth-century Florentine vernacular speech compendia, see S. J. Milner, 'Communication, Consensus and Conflict: Rhetorical Principles, the *ars concionandi* and Social Ordering in Late Medieval Italy', in *The Rhetoric of Cicero*, ed. by Cox and Ward (n. 2 above).

bulk: ambassadorial speeches by Dino Compagni and Leonardo Bruni are juxtaposed with Ciceronian orations and deliberative speeches extracted from Sallust, and a compendious selection of Stefano Porcari's political oratory with such curiosities as 'a speech by a foreign student in praise of study delivered in Santa Maria del Fiore'.⁴¹

A second, autobiographical manuscript (BNCF, MS II. II. 188), copied at around the same time, in the early 1490s, can help refine our understanding of Da Filicaia's rhetorical interests, which seem to have evolved fairly late in his life, as a direct legacy of his political career. This connection is enshrined, in particular, in a memoir in this second manuscript recording Da Filicaia's experiences as a member of the Florentine Priorate in the 1480s, followed by a briefer account of his time on the steering committee of the Arte della Lana.⁴² The interest of this curious *ricordo* from the perspective of the present study lies in the vividness with which it brings to life the field of civic application envisaged for classical rhetoric in a text like *Avengnia Dio*. Da Filicaia's account of his periods in office is notably rhetorical in its emphases, attempting at every stage to convey not only the substance of council debates but the very words the participants used.⁴³ The text opens, moreover, with a lengthy preamble describing in minute detail the oratorical rituals that accompanied the passage of power from one council of the priors to the next.⁴⁴ Throughout, the manuscript attests vividly to that almost superstitious cult of the power of the spoken word that Enrico Artifoni has identified as one of the most distinctive features of late-medieval Italian communal culture and which appears to have continued unabated in the narrower, oligarchic civic realm of Da Filicaia's day.⁴⁵ As Artifoni has noted, within the rhetorical writings of this time, a degree of elision occurs between the terms 'rettorica' and 'rettore' ('governor' or 'ruler').⁴⁶ Power—the

⁴¹ The list of contents of the manuscript, along with those of other sample speech collections of the period, will be reproduced as an appendix to Milner, 'Communication'. Meanwhile, see G. Mazzatinti, *Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia*, VIII (Forlì: Luigi Bordini, 1898), pp. 28–32.

⁴² MS cit., fols 97^v–147^v. The memoir comprises two distinct sections, seemingly written, respectively, in 1485–86 and 1490; see Da Filicaia's opening preambles at 97^v and 141^r.

⁴³ See especially the two detailed accounts of debates over tax proposals at fols 110^r–112^r and 130^r–140^r; also the various quasi-verbatim reports of the ceremonial *proteste di giustizia* delivered at the moment of significant transfers of power (for example, fols 127^r–129^r, where the two speeches reported open with the type of biblical exordium noted as characteristic of the most elevated deliberative speeches in *Avengnia Dio*).

⁴⁴ Fols 98^r–110^r. On these rituals and their significance, see Milner, 'Citing the *Ringhiera*', pp. 63–64; also p. 75 and n. 81.

⁴⁵ See esp. E. Artifoni, 'I podestà professionali e la fondazione retorica della politica comunale', *Quaderni storici*, 63.21 (1986), 687–719 (pp. 693–95).

⁴⁶ Artifoni, 'I podestà', pp. 701–02 (n. 45 above).

power of persuasion in civic contexts—was, ultimately, the promise the study of rhetoric held out to its acolytes. This is made explicit in a passage of the preface to *Avengnia Dio*, which lists the rewards awaiting readers prepared to submit themselves to the study of rhetoric: ‘through this art, discords are resolved into concord; through it the speaker gains mastery over the minds of his listeners; through it with his seductive speech he can lead men to do what he will’.⁴⁷

Da Filicaia records in a postscript that he finished copying the text of *Avengnia Dio* on 25 August 1493, when he was in his sixty-second year.⁴⁸ The date has a certain poignancy, in that the previous year in Venice had seen the publication of the first printed challenge to the Ciceronian authorship of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, for the author of *Avengnia Dio* still, as for generations of medieval readers, the most authoritative introductory text in the field.⁴⁹ Ward has noted that the ‘dethronement’ of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* in the 1490s may be seen as signalling the beginning of the decline of the great Latin medieval tradition of Ciceronian rhetoric, consummated in the following century by the triumph of Aristotle’s more streamlined and philosophically stringent approach.⁵⁰ For very different reasons, the same period may be seen as crucial in the decline of the vernacular tradition of Ciceronian rhetorical study that had meandered along in parallel with the Latin in Italy since the time of the medieval communes. Already by Da Filicaia’s day, the republican civic culture that had sustained this tradition was a strictly localised phenomenon, the majority of the medieval city-republics having long since been replaced by some form of despotic or quasi-monarchical rule. By the mid-Cinquecento, with the definitive establishment of Medici rule, Florence too had succumbed to this process, and the profound cultural continuities that linked Da Filicaia’s Florence with Brunetto Latini’s had finally been broken.⁵¹ Outside Venice—from this period virtually the sole surviving republic of Italy—sixteenth-century vernacular readers who turned their attention to Ciceronian rhetoric did so for

⁴⁷ *Avengnia Dio*, fol. 184^r; compare Tocco, ‘Il Fiore di rettorica’, p. 357 (‘per essa [i.e. ‘essa scientia del parlare ordinata’] le discordie sarechano acconcordie; per essa il dicitore a assingnioreggiare glianimj de gliuomini; per essa col suo piacevole parlare simena luomo acche fine vuole.’)

⁴⁸ The postscript, BNCF MS II. I. 71, fol. 237^v, is reproduced in Giamboni, *Fiore*, p. cxiv.

⁴⁹ James J. Murphy and Michael Winterbottom, ‘Raffaele Regio’s 1492 *Quaestio* doubting Cicero’s authorship of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: Introduction and Text’, *Rhetorica*, 17 (1999), 77–87; John O. Ward, ‘Quintilian and the Rhetorical Revolution of the Middle Ages’, *Rhetorica*, 13 (1995), 234–51.

⁵⁰ Ward, ‘Quintilian and the Rhetorical Revolution’, pp. 280–81.

⁵¹ On these continuities—though also on their role in masking actual discontinuities in power relations in Florence—see J. M. Najemy, ‘The Dialogue of Power in Florentine Politics’, in *City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, ed. by Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub, and Julia Emlen (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 269–88.

reasons quite other than to hone their skills as active citizens.⁵² When Bartolomeo Cavalcanti nostalgically recalls in his *Retorica* (1559) the civic harangues of the last Florentine republic (1527–30), he does so in the full knowledge that the rhetorical culture to which he is alluding is destined to pass into oblivion. As Cavalcanti's treatise well demonstrates, the future of Ciceronian rhetoric lay in a reorientation away from civic towards more generalised and individualistic uses: a shift signalled most clearly by his repositioning of the deliberative genre as a generic art of 'counsel' in private affairs.⁵³ Ward has talked, referring to this period, in a pan-European, Latin context, of the 'medieval rhetorical system' breaking up under the pressures of the 'diversification, pluralization, and courtly reorganization of medieval society'.⁵⁴ The same formula might be applied, at a more local level, to the medieval Italian vernacular tradition of civic rhetoric that has been the object of my analysis here.

Appendix

I. The ethics of deliberative oratory

The passage is taken from the beginning of Chapter 51 of *Avengnia Dio* (BNCF, MS II. I. 71, fols 207^v–208^r), which opens the treatise's discussion of deliberative oratory (compare *Ad Her*, III. ii. 2–III. v. 9). For discussion, see above, p. 210.

Sella⁵⁵ parola non pensata ne dischusa alle volte produtie frutto, quanto maggiormente partorisce salute et bene la parola che ne' consigli si deliberi e maturamente si disquote [sic] in quello luogo dove diverse volontà concorrono, dove ciaschuno parlare puo essere libero[:]; di tale luogo escie sano consiglio, ivi si bilancia la sichurta ditutti quando [per] disputatione sidiscierne ne partiti [qual'] è migliore. Quessta è luogo di conscientia, quessto è armario de lealtà, quessto è

⁵² Tellingly, the two principal sixteenth-century translations of *Ad Herennium*, by Antonio Brucioli (Venice, 1538) and Orazio Toscanella (Venice, 1561) are both addressed to Venetian dedicatees and make particular mention of Venetian forensic and deliberative user contexts.

⁵³ On Cavalcanti's *Retorica* and its context, see Virginia Cox, 'Rhetoric and Politics in Tasso's *Nifo*', *Studi secenteschi*, 30 (1989), 3–98 (pp. 63–64). On the treatment of deliberative rhetoric in this text, see *ibid.*, pp. 64–65 and 68–69.

⁵⁴ Ward, 'Quintilian', p. 281.

⁵⁵ This reading has been supplied from BNCF, MS II. I. 68, fol. 47^r (BNCF MS II. I. 71 has 'Perla'). In the transcriptions that follow, suggested editorial amendments and additions have been supplied in square brackets where the original seems defective.

rifuggio de' pericoli, et concludendo quessto è illuogo dove ciaschuno debba portare laverita in fronte. Pero dicitore abbi intal luogo laconscientia permaesstra, laverita per guardatricie, e la lealtà per exechutricie di iusstitia[;] esepolto lodio ivi nimissta e malvolere perischano. Parla quello che senti in piuvico [sic] non in sechreto, pero chella diritta et buona coscientia quello che porta inboccha tiene nelchuore, sempre disidira turba di gienti, ma colui che [= ch'è] di chattiva conscientia sempre disidera solitudine sempre sta trisstto portando fele in chuore et mele inboccha [...] Nonti lasciare fraudare per pechunia [;] dei [sic] puramente quello che chredi che sia utile delpartito consigliare accioche facciendo il contrario da uno vitio duno huomo nonpenda la morte elpericolo di tutti.

[If even spontaneous and unmeditated words can at times bear fruit, how much greater a source of public good are those words that are exchanged and maturely debated in council discussions, where many different minds come together in harmony and each is free to speak as he will? Thence sound counsel issues forth; there the safety of all is weighed, as the speakers discern through disputation which policy is the best to adopt. Here is the realm of conscience, here the bastion of good faith, here a refuge from all dangers; here, in short, is that place where each must bear the truth stamped on his brow. So, speaker, when you are in such gatherings, have conscience as your guide, truth as your guardian, and good faith as your instrument of justice; let all hatred be buried and all odium and ill-will perish. Let each councillor speak his mind freely and publicly, not in secret, for, in the upright man of good conscience, the words of the mouth always correspond to the secrets of the heart, and such men willingly seek out the public forum, while the man of bad conscience desires solitude and is melancholy of disposition, always harbouring bile in his heart and honey on his lips [...] Do not allow yourself to be corrupted by money: your speech must be guided entirely by considerations of public utility, for, if you allow private motives to sway you, you risk jeopardizing the life and safety of all for the benefit of one individual.]

II. Examples of deliberative oratory

The two model orations given below come from later in *Avengnia Dio's* treatment of deliberative oratory (Chapter 52, fols 212^r–213^v). They follow from a discussion of the use of topics relating to virtue in deliberative speaking (*Ad Her*, III. iii. 4–7). For discussion, see p. 211 above.

Considera[te] dunque per te diligentemente tutte chose predette, accio chelle dette virtu tu dicitore sappi pratchare informa è piaciuto diformare alchuna dicieria per exemplo nelle quali saranno tutte virtu le quali come ai udito innumero sono quattro

poniamo che ditre cose non dipiu innumero sidebba confermare [...] (212^v) Onde volendo fare la detta forma sopra il parlare diliberativo è per messtieri di alchuna propossta dipartito sipropongha accio che il dicitore possa comprendere suo consiglio sopra che il renda. Sia dunque in quessto tenore la propossta: essendo richiessto quessto comune per parte desuoi ribelli divolere rientrare nella terra effare pacie quando il detto comune voglia loro ricievere, addimandasi eper parte di quessto comune sipriegha che ammantenimento eprosperevole stato di quessta terra sopra la presente propossta invochando il nome di san Paulo nostro avvochato ciaschuno debba rendere suo sano e cosstante consiglio diliberando se i detti ribelli sono darricievere appacie come addimandano o vero agguerra aversa essinisstra. Veduta perte ladetta propossta tu dicitore che vorrai diliberare che idetti ribelli nonsi ricievinno appacie ma aguerra, potrai dire effare in questa forma:

Memor, memor fui dierum anticorum meditatus sum innonibus [sic] operibus tuis et infattis manum tuarum meditabar. Signiori, considerata per me diligentemente la propossta fatta nelpresente consiglio per parte di quessto comune, avvengnia che indengnio infra tanto sano consiglio o prosunto diparlare et farmi dicitore in sua persona ennome, aparecchiato disosstenere e diricievere con riverenza debita correctione dove il difetto apparra. Vedete alla addimandita fatta per parte denosstri ribelli aquessto comune meritevolmente vacchade rispossta la detta parola del salmissta: *Memor fui dierum anticorum*, etc. Ribello, ribello, non sono ancho sichasso della memoria, nonsono sì difettuooso dimente chio nonmi ricordi deltempo antichamente passato, nelquale midessi vedovil tresstitie, chio nonnabbia ad mente lopere tue lequali furono depopulatrici dello stato mio, ecchio non pensi amarichatamente i fatti commessi perte michonchulcaro sicche ancora neporto verghongniosa et vituperosa piagha perla faccia. Rispondo dunque: la tua pacie sara lavendetta della ingiuria ricievuta perte, latua concordia sara medicina dellaspra infermita che mai data, la tua amicitia sara purghatrice delle strazievoli onte ricieuto [sic] perte. Certo nondirho et cio non assento considerando che raddoppiamento doltraggio è dinon fare vendetta dicolui ilquale siritruova cholpevole innalchuna offesa. E Singniori nonne pure il comune chessi parta dalvolere denosstri ribelli, ma la Giusstitia che pacie nonsi faccia colloro il comanda, laForza cio consente, laprudenza il vuole, ella Temperanza cio inpronta. O Jusstitia chetti muove che pacie non si faccia? Ello intemperato appetito elloro fallacie tradimento per lo quale ancora nappare leorlique [= relique] dello innociente sangue sparto perli nostri antichi innanzi nati, et pero chemerita vendetta diguerra non aspetti prosperita dipacie. Tu, Forteza, che ddi? Io piango e concorrenti sospiri midoglio quando pervosstra misera viltà per vosstro piccholo animo per vosstra inconstantia et paura intendete per ferita ricievuta rendere bacio di bocca per la vedovata tresstitia dare prosperevole letitita eperlo sanguinoso coltello venire acconcordia colnimico e contra natura nelsangue denosstri antichi fare pacie colloro che inniquamente lanno sparto eccosi fare nasciere indi la pacie onde laguerra dovrebbe fare sua vendetta. Prudenza tu che allegghi? Nonti fo altra rispossta, non alleggo altro sennon chio mivergognio divosstra puerile eta dimosstra indiscretione laquale siritruova simatta ilchui senno è sì fanciullescho che nonna memoria del tempo passato nonsa ordinare iltempo presente e in quello che

debba venire nonna provvedimento alchuno. Enon conoscendo lutile dal disutile / (213⁵) silascia allacciare et prendere peringhanno. Ortu temperanza perche nonconsenti cheppacie sifaccia? Io tirispondo adomandatore molto siete volubili molto siete di debole animo quando pervento diparole per piacimento dilusinghe arilasciate si ilfreno ella chupidita ditanta licientia allapetito che stemperatamente senza misura alchuna vilasciate trasportare et pervenire attrissto eamiserabil fine nel quale senza dubbio incorrete strabbocchevolmente se affar pacie siconsente. A singniori, singniori, quando innun fatto tutte virtu innuna volonta concorrono, qualsara si arrogante inmente che contro alloro santa oppenione presuma dalloro incontra. Non sara etiandio senza lodevole fama, la quale rimarra di noi appo inosstri successori, la quale discorrera per la linghua diciaschuna persona virtuosa dalle vicinanze nesaremo commendati et dalli strani non riuscira ne biasimo ne rampongnia. Onde Singniori avendo udito partitamente spiacie alla Giusstizia tal pacie dicendo che chi merita vendetta non aspetti pacie, come la forteza nolconsente ranpongniandici di nosstra viltà emiseria, come laprudentia il contradicie dicendo dinosstra sciocchezza et poco senno, come latemperantia cio rifiuta alleghando dinosstra chupidita et stemperanza nella quale per lusinghe chadremmo ciaschuno dinoi senza altra diliberatione auna vocie concordatamente dovremo gridar ghuerra e exaudire ladetta virtu diloro jussto intendimento, chonsiderando che accolui sidebba chredere edar fede il quale congnoisciete che vida conforto da prendere cosa utile pero che cholui non consiglia fedelmente alchuno il quale desidera difarlo ruinare et venire amiserabile fine. Singniori oggi è di dira et dimiseria et indengnatione damaro [*sic*] et flebile nel quale essendovi rinfacciate levergongnie ellonte gia ricievute perli nosstri rubelli quanto quelle furono piu aspre tanto maggiormente dovressti infochare edexasperare vosstre braccia infare vendetta diloro lavando lanerissima benda che portiamo nel malvagio sangue dessi ribelli et per ferita ricievuta dare chrudelmente pericolo dimorte.

Per la parte di cholui che vuole pacie et non ghuerra si può dire in questa forma:

*Beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum et in via peccatorum non stetit in cathedra pestilentie non sedit.*⁵⁶ Singniori, considerando il pericoloso consiglio, le malvage et innique parole proferte nel presente luogo perlo mio antecessore, accio chel veleno duno non machuli la purita diciaschuno e per suo balenare docchi, per suo tonare dilingua, nonvi perquata [*sic*] pericolosamente di subita saetta con riverenzia intendo didare contrario consiglio aquello, prendendo quella parola del salmisstra, *Beatus vir*, etc.

Singniori, colui è beato il quale nonconsente di trovarsi inconsiglio di persone malvaggie erree; colui è perfetto il quale nonseguita la via delperigloiso consiglio et colui situova sichuro disue [*sic*] prosperita essalute il quale nonsi fa exechutore diconsiglio il quale abbia appartorire pestilentia. Acchosstui è piaciuto daviiluppare sue certe ragioni perle quali a chredenza difare venire inpericolo di guerra

⁵⁶ The passage derives, with some variants, from Psalm 1. 1: 'Beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum et in via peccatorum non stetit, in cathedra derisorum non sedit' (King James version: 'Blessed [is] the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful').

inmaginandosi che per lo faticoso sudore, per la mortale ambasciata [sic] la quale a sostenuta intronare eccolorare ledette sue ragioni che a quelle per alchuno non si possa udir il contrario. Eccosi fanciulleschamente sipensava che ciaschuno gridasse contrionfo viva lo iddio nostro. Prima fortifico sua diceria per virtù di Jusstitia, dando vochabolo diiusstitia a quello che sarebbe nostro preiuditio et grave dispendio con chrudele inumanita come sarebbe peralchuno odio gia sepolto dinon volere ricevere appacie e nostri prossimi fra quali vi sono nostri padri, nostri fratelli et figliuoli. Fe etiandio corroccio della forteza dando chappa diforteza quello che a faccia ditemerita / (213^v) et di chrudelta assai odiosa, come sarebbe infochare nostri animi contra coloro da quali pende la salute el sollazzo dimolti fedeli huommini et zelatori della Repubblica, quali sono qui raunati. Poi sopraccio indusse a parlare la prudentia chiamando prudenzia quello che era malitioso tradimento et fallacie inniquita, come sarebbe di non ricievere acconcordia coloro perli quali inperpetuo potemo essere salvi essichuri daimpedimento diciachuno nostro avversario. Fe anche sopraccio parlare la Temperanzia dando nome di Temperantia quello chera misera viltà ecchupidita assai inumana come sarebbe disciaguare lapiagha ne prossimi suoi e cchosi per parole superbe easpre aspargiere sangue del vicino tuo dimessticho, allegando poi hultimamente come non faccendo pacie colloro sarebbe chosa lodevole efamosa a quessto non contradicho perche sarebbe ben chosa famosa ecommendata dacchui? da huommini sanguinei et da huommini di mala conditione dahuommini spogliati equali per guerra per scandali et brighe si sperano schampare delle vesstimenta et del sangue altrui. Machome apo persone onesste, persone dibuona vita econditione far cio fosse cosa biasimevole, vituperevole edinfamia invoi la rimetto. Et pero singniori spenghansi ongni ruggine dodio, ciaschuna ghuerra sia morta, tutte nostre arme siano sepolte econgrande letitia e contrionfo vittorievole et con fraterale charita e amore si ricievano inosstri congiunti enosstri prossimi apacie e acconcordia, per la chui impetratione visiritruovano avvochato [= avvochati] di si fatta autorita e fama che onesstamente nonsi puo dinegare loro iusta petitione ma senza exatione [sic] alchuna fare riportare loro effetto diloro intendimento che nostri usciti siricievino charitativamente appacie. Tutte virtù auna voce laddimandano perlora alleghagione cio inpetrano, lequali virtù nonsi ritruovano qui amantellate ne chon chappe ne con chappucci, ma veramente in essentia, quel che sono conaperta faccia qui il dimostrano. Et prima la Jusstitia apertamente allegha la pacie, dicendo: non consento ne apericolo ne adisstrutione alchuna, ancho cholui che incio sitruova pecchatore damme sighasstiga eccorregisi. Et pero voglio et disidero pacie econcordia, accio che mia severita faciendosi chrudelta essuperbia non pericoli la gienerazioni humana. Poi la forteza nostra muta alleghando peressa pacie ecche dice: A singniori di grande animo da gieneroso cuore procciede il perdonare il rimettere delle colpe et venire col nimico tuo appacie econchordia, considerando chella piu prosperevole la piu famosa e pregiata vendetta chessi faccia del nimico è avendolo sottoposto dalla qual congniosci cheliberamente tipuoi vendichare et perdonili. Sussequentemente la prudentia sinpronta perla pacie ecche dicie: Opopolo nonsia ingrato nonsia indischreto che non consideri ebenifici gia antichamente fatti perlora aquesso comune. Non sara laguerra prosperevole salute diquessto comune: non pure considerare leingiurie ma bilancia econ maturita disamina lagio ella commodita lequali dicio neseguiranno che non saranno poche. La Temperanza avvochando hultimamente perla pacie dicie per

lei: Non essere irato nonti infochare sopra lengnie [=leingiurie], sia temperato essanza furore alchuno fuggi la guerra eseguita lapacie considerando che li animi irati effuriosi nonsi sentono ennonsentendo non chongnoscie la cosa che convenevole ejussta. Pero che quando simuovono affar vendetta non possono avere illoro ne modo ne ordine ne misura alchuna. Eccosi ilpiu delle volte chredendo fare onorevol vendetta ricieve vituperoso disonore et vergognia. Dunque qual sara quello che alla dimandita dicosi fatte avvochate chonpiena lingua etcon effetto diquore nonconsenta?

Onde singniori avendo voi hudito partitamente come le ragioni delmio antecessore erano fondate nonsopra virtu masopra vitioso inghanno efallacie chredendo per sue colorate parole farvi tramazare einghannare infarvi eleggiere piu avaccio il pericolo della ghuerra chella salute della pacie, eccome in far pacie co detti nostri ribelli tutte virtu scritte eccon pura fama innuna volonta concorrono, spero veramente perpiu nostro stato et ben comune che ischifando la guerra tutti consentirete alla pacie. E singniori singniori nonne la pacie di si piccholo premio et guiderdone chessia darichusare quando uomo latruova considerando che nonne niuna dengnita ditanto frutto la quale comunemente sia tanto da disiderare quanto e latranquilita la pacie erriposo delle terre perla quale il popolo navanza ellutilita diciascuno siriguarda fedelmente. Perla pacie tutte le buone arti sene rinprezano, perla pacie lumana gieneratione multiplica, perquella la ricchezza diciascuno sadanpia, peressa simantengono liuomini acchostumati et civili. Editutti quessti pretiosi effetti rimane dinudato colui il quale non sente chechosa sia daverre pacie eriposo. Et pero Singniori fuggiamo laguerra nonnosstante chel mio anteciessore chon colorate parole lei addimanda pero che quella chosa è daffuggire errechusare laqual puo piu verisimilmente partorire pericolo che cosa utile o donore.

[Now that you have given careful consideration to the material previously covered, in order to show you how to put these rules into practice in speaking, I have composed some speeches as examples, in which I shall make reference to all the above-mentioned virtues, which, as you have heard, are four in number, even though, in practice, the confirmation of your speech should comprise no more than three parts.⁵⁷ [...] In forming this example of deliberative oratory, it is first necessary to specify the policy proposal to which the speech relates, so that the prospective speaker may orient his counsel accordingly. Let the proposal in this case, then, be the following: this commune having received a request from a party of rebels now in exile that they be readmitted to the city and allowed to make peace, if this is acceptable to the commune, it is now requested on behalf of the commune, in the name of St Paul our protector and in the interest of the maintenance of the city in a secure and prosperous state, that each councillor present should offer up his sound and constant counsel on this issue of whether the said rebels should be received peaceably, as they request, or whether their overture should be met with hostility and aggression. Having considered this proposal, if you, as speaker, wish to argue that

⁵⁷ *Ad Her*, I. x. 17 ('Eam [i.e. enumerationem] plus quam trium partium numero esse non oportet').

the rebels should not be received peaceably, but rather with hostility, you can proceed in the following manner:

*Memor, memor fui dierum anticorum meditatatus sum inonibus operibus tuis et infattis manum tuarum meditabar.*⁵⁸ Gentlemen, having given due consideration to the proposal put forward in this council on behalf of our commune, I come forward to proffer my counsel as a spokesman for that commune's interests; and although it may seem presumptuous for me to take this role within such a distinguished company, I am willing in all humility to receive correction where correction is due.

Know, then, that the demand these rebels have made to our commune can be best answered with the words of the Psalmist: *Memor fui dierum anticorum* etc. 'Oh rebel, rebel!⁵⁹ Do not think I am so weak of memory and so defective of mind that I have forgotten the time that lies behind us, when you caused me to languish in widow-like grief! Can you think that I have forgotten the way in which you depopulated my estate through your actions? Can you think that I do not recall your misdeeds with bitterness, when I still bear on my face the shameful and disfiguring scars you inflicted on me? So, I reply: let the peace you seek come in the form of revenge for the injuries you have caused me; let the reconciliation you propose come in the form of a salve for the cruel infirmity with which you infected me; let the friendship you offer come in the form of a purgation of the crippling shame I have suffered through your cruelty. I shall not say what you wish to hear nor accede to your demands, for when we fail to avenge an injury we have suffered at someone's hands, the injury we have received is compounded.

Nor, Gentleman, is it the commune alone which urges a rejection of the rebels' request. Justice demands that no peace should be forthcoming, Fortitude gives us the power to refuse their request, Prudence counsels resistance to their demands and Temperance seconds her counsel. O Justice, what moves you to resist the call to peace? 'The boundless ambition of the rebels and the treachery of which they are guilty, whose effects are still apparent in the traces of the innocent blood that was shed by our forefathers. They have merited the vengeance of war through their deeds; let us not reward them with the bounty of peace'. And you, O Fortitude, what do you say? 'I weep and grieve with incessant sighs when I hear it suggested that you should repay the wounds you have received from them with a kiss, and shower them with happiness in exchange for the widow-like grieving they have inflicted on you. Will you come to terms of peace with the enemy who threatened you with his bloody sword? What

⁵⁸ This passage, the spelling of which has been retained here, provides a garbled version of Psalm 142. 5 (King James version: 'I remember the days of old, I meditate on all they works; I muse on the work of thy hands').

⁵⁹ The passage that follows is envisaged as spoken by a personified commune, employing the figure of thought termed *conformatio* in *Ad Her*, IV. liii. 66 ('*Conformatio est cum aliqua quae non adest persona confingitur quasi adsit, aut cum res muta aut informis fit eloquens, et forma ei et oratio adtribuitur ad dignitatem adcommodata aut actio quaedam*'). This device of *confinimento*, as *Avengnia Dio* translates it, is heavily used in the speeches that follow, as in other exemplificatory speeches in *Avengnia Dio*, and is implicitly presented in Chapter 63 of the treatise (222^r–224^r) as defining of the 'high' style.

miserable cowardice and pusillanimity, what inconstancy and fear! It would be contrary to nature to make peace with those who so iniquitously shed the blood of your forefathers: that would be to nurture the seeds of peace where vengeance and war should rightly grow'. And you, O Prudence, what is your word on the subject? 'What can I reply, what can I say, other than that I am ashamed of your puerility and folly? Who could be so foolish, whose wits could be so weak and childish? He who forgets all memory of past times does not know how to read the present and lacks any capacity to plan for the future. And he who is incapable of discerning what is to his own advantage is easily misled and deceived'. And Temperance, why do you not consent that peace should be made with the rebels? 'I can only reply, O questioner, that you are a strangely weak and wavering creature if you allow yourself to be swayed by a mere empty stream of flattering words to cast off all restraint and give full rein to your disordered appetite, letting yourself be carried away quite shamelessly and without any measure and to run headlong towards the vile and miserable end that will no doubt await you if you consent to this suit for peace'.

Ah, Gentlemen, when all the virtues join with one will in counselling a single policy, who can be so arrogant as to propose anything that goes counter to their revered opinion? And [our decision to deny the rebels' request] will also win us praise and acclaim, both from posterity and from our contemporaries.⁶⁰ All those in neighbouring parts who love virtue will hear of our action and commend it, nor will those further afield blame or despise us for such an action.

So, Gentleman, you have heard, in turn, that the rebels' proposal is displeasing to Justice on the grounds that they merit war rather than peace; that Fortitude resists it, berating us for our cowardice and pusillanimity; that Prudence counsels against it, criticizing us for our folly and weakness of wit; and that Temperance herself is opposed to it, claiming that to accede to it would be a victory for unbridled appetite, fuelled by flattery. We should all, then, without any need for further deliberation, with one voice concordantly cry out for war and thus meet the just demands of the virtues. For we must remember that we should place our trust and faith only in those who counsel what is of advantage to us, and that he whose advice is such as to lead to ruin and downfall cannot be counselling in good faith. Gentlemen, today we find ourselves in a state of wrath and misery and bitter indignation. Let us respond by avenging the shame and injury received from these rebels. The crueller the miseries they inflicted on us, the more stern and unrelenting your arm should be in avenging them. We must rinse out the black widows' weeds we have been wearing in the blood of these pitiless rebels and in exchange for the scars that we bear from their assault we must inflict on them an unrelenting legacy of death'.

The speaker who wishes to argue in favour of peace, rather than war, may compose his speech in the following manner:

Beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum et in via peccatorum non stetit et in

⁶⁰ Following the precepts of *Ad Her*, III. iv. 7, the speaker supplements his appeals to the topics of virtue with an appeal to the *laudabile*, defined as 'quod conficit honestam et praesentem et consequentem commemorationem'.

chattedra pesstilentie non sedit.⁶¹ Gentlemen, you have heard the dangerous counsel and the wicked and iniquitous words proffered here by the previous speaker. In order that the poison of a single individual does not corrupt the purity of all, and that you are not malignly pierced by the sharp arrow of his flashing eyes and thundering voice, I intend in all reverence to deliver a counsel quite contrary to that of my predecessor, taking as my starting point the words of the Psalmist, *Beatus vir*, etc.

Gentlemen, that man is blessed who shuns the counsel of wicked and ill-intentioned persons; that man is perfect who does not deign to follow the path of dangerous counsel; that man is assured of a prosperous and safe life who does not make himself the executor of ill advice from which only a pestilential outcome can be expected. The previous speaker has woven together a web of arguments through which he hopes to bring us to the threshold of war, imagining that all the fatigue he has endured in thundering forth and cunningly adorning his words, and the mortal terror with which he has imbued them, will be such that no man, having heard them, will suffer to give ear to an opposing argument. What childishness! He evidently thought that each would greet his words by crying out triumphantly: 'Long live this divine orator!' So first he bolstered up the arguments of his speech by calling on the virtue of Justice, using that term 'justice' to designate what would in fact be of the gravest prejudice to our interests and the gravest burden on our finances, as well as a cruel atrocity—that is, that, in the name of an ancient enmity, now long buried, we should refuse to receive in peace a band of our fellow citizens that counts among its number our own fathers and brothers and sons.⁶² He also attempted to gird his arguments with the protection of Fortitude, cloaking in the name of Fortitude what is in fact redolent rather of temerity and the most odious cruelty—that is, his attempts to stir up our minds against those men on whom depend the well-being and happiness of many of the faithful and zealous citizens of the republic gathered here today. Next, our speaker induced Prudence to take the floor, though what he invoked under the name of Prudence was malicious treachery and fallacious iniquity, in that he advocated that we should refuse to welcome in a spirit of reconciliation those who could in future help to safeguard us in perpetuity against all aggressions by potential enemies. And then Temperance was brought on to speak—or what he called Temperance, though in fact what he was speaking of was the most wretched cowardice and the most inhuman cupidity, such as would lead us to sink a knife into the wounds of our fellow men and to shed the blood of our neighbours, urged by his proud and harsh words. His final argument was that to refuse peace would be a praiseworthy and famous deed. This I shall not even expend energy on contradicting, for who would praise such a deed as something commendable? Only bloodthirsty men, desperate men, men who have been stripped of their substance and who hope through war and atrocities and conflict to reclothe themselves in their neighbours' vestments and their blood. What decent

⁶¹ The passage derives, with some variants, from Psalm 1. 1 (n. 56 above).

⁶² In accordance with the precepts of *Ad Her*, IV. iii. 6, in countering the previous speaker's arguments, the present speaker draws on the device of *paradiastole* or ethical redescription, by means of which supposed virtues are undermined by their assimilation to a proximate vice. For discussion, see Quentin Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 76 (1991), 1–61 (pp. 7–8).

men—men of good life and in good circumstances—would think of this same act I leave it to you to judge. Would they not find it shameful, blameworthy, and infamous?

So, Gentlemen, let every spark of hatred be spent, let all hostility be vanished, let our weapons be buried and with the greatest joy and triumph and the keenest brotherly love and charity let us receive our neighbours in a spirit of peace and concord. Their petition is supported by advocates whose authority and fame is such that their just request cannot decently be denied; rather, without hesitation, all must accede to their demand that the exiles be received charitably and in peace. All the virtues with one voice are calling for this and pressing their arguments on us—the virtues, I say, not dressed in false garb, not cloaked and hooded, but in their true guise and manifesting their true essence. First, Justice openly calls for peace, saying: ‘I cannot consent to any danger or destruction; rather, it is my wont to condemn and punish anyone who commits the sin of calling for such measures. And so I call for and desire peace and concord, lest my severity, translating itself into an overbearing cruelty, should threaten the whole human race.’ And then Fortune, changing her stance, comes forth to speak for peace and says: ‘Ah, Gentlemen, mercy and the forgiveness of past faults is the work of great souls and noble hearts. Come to terms with your enemy, considering that the greatest and most famous and prized form of revenge that one can have on an enemy is to know one has vanquished him and to be in a position to avenge oneself and yet to offer him pardon.’ Then Prudence speaks up for peace, saying: ‘O citizens, do not be ungrateful, do not be foolish; do not fail to consider the past benefits your commune enjoyed from these men. To embark on a war now is not in the interest of the well being and safety of this commune. Do not simply dwell on the injuries you have received, but weigh up also and maturely examine the pleasures and benefits that will derive from a policy of peace, which will be many.’ Finally, Temperance, speaking up for the cause of peace, utters the following words: ‘Do not be angry; do not become heated over past injuries; seek to be temperate and shun all uncontrolled passions; flee war and follow the ways of peace, always bearing in mind that wrathful and furious minds are incapable of feeling correctly and thus of discerning what is proper and just. So when they are moved to seek revenge, they do so in a disordered and uncontrolled manner, lacking all sense of proportion; and thus it very often happens that, thinking to carry out an honourable vendetta, they bring on themselves nothing but the vilest dishonour and shame.’

Having heard the pleading of such advocates, who would not give his most ardent consent to their arguments with both his tongue and his heart? So, Gentlemen, now that you have heard how my predecessor’s arguments were based, at each stage, not on virtue, as he said, but on vicious deceptions and tricks; now that you have realized that he was hoping through his ornate words to lead you astray and trick you into choosing the dangers of war over the safety of peace; now that you have seen that all the virtues with one voice join in urging that we make peace with the rebels, I hope, in the interest of our continued power and well being as a commune, that you will decide to shun war and agree to peace. Ah, Gentlemen, Gentlemen, peace is not something of so small a price that a man should spurn it when it is offered to him. Consider that there is nothing so fruitful and so commonly desired in life as the tranquillity, peace, and repose of our homeland, which is the best guarantee of the continuing well-being of

the populace as a whole and the advancement of each individual. In peace, all the arts of the city are free to develop; in peace, the population can multiply, the wealth of all grows, and men go about their business in a civil and mannerly way. None of these beneficial effects is felt, by contrast, by those who do not know the meaning of peace and repose. So, Gentlemen, let us choose to shun war, even though my predecessor urged it on you in such highly coloured language, for we should always shun and refuse those things that are more liable to bring us danger than advantage or honour.]

Rhetoric in the Fifteenth Century: From Manuscript to Print

JAMES J. MURPHY

Rhetoric, according to the scholar-printer Johann Koelhoff, is more powerful than armies. When armies win battles they leave behind resentment and bitterness, but when rhetorical persuasion changes the minds of men they are happy with the victory. This is a powerful testament to the discipline of rhetoric: it could have appeared in ancient Greece or Rome, or at any time after that. But in fact it did appear in Koelhoff's *Ars dicendi et perorandi* (Cologne: Johann Koelhoff the Elder, 16 April 1484),¹ and it occurred in a period usually called the 'European Renaissance'. And it occurred in a 'printed' book. Yet several terms like 'Renaissance' are as much misleading as they are vague. It is of course extremely difficult to mark off a specific date or event to separate 'medieval' from 'renaissance' even in one country, let alone for all of Western Europe.

Instead it might be useful to track the course of rhetoric during a particular time period, up to 1500. This may or may not be a pivotal time in the history of rhetoric but it does include the appearance of 'printing'—the mechanical reproduction of texts through the use of movable type. Whether this new process caused change in rhetorical theory is a moot point to be decided only after examining all the rhetorical texts of the century, both 'manuscript' and 'printed.' A brief overview of the state of

¹ All the printed works cited here are listed, with holding libraries and references, in James J. Murphy and Martin Davies, 'Rhetorical Incunabula: A Short-Title Catalogue of Texts Printed to the Year 1500', *Rhetorica*, 15 (1997), 355–470, and its supplement in Murphy, 'Trends in Rhetorical Incunabula.', *Rhetorica*, 18 (2000), 289–97. Almost all may be found as microfiche editions in *Incunabula: The Printing Revolution in Europe 1455–1500: Incunabula Units 22 and 23: Rhetoric Incunabula*. Introduction by James J. Murphy (Reading, Berkshire and Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications, 1998). Fiche editions in this set are identified by British Library Incunabula Short Title Catalogue numbers (for example, George of Trebizond, *Rhetorica*, 00157000).

rhetoric prior to printing may help set the scene for such an examination.

Rhetoric 1350–1465

Ancient and medieval rhetorical history has been well documented. Or, to put it another way, we have analyzed the genres of handwritten rhetorical texts through the Middle Ages.² The most numerous ancient texts surviving the Middle Ages are those of the Romans, especially Cicero and Quintilian. Aristotle's Greek *Rhetorica*, while translated into Latin three times by the fourteenth century, was not especially influential. The Romans had inherited from Hellenistic writers a fully standardized set of rhetorical doctrines, laying out five parts of rhetoric: Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory and Delivery. In Roman times rhetoric dominated the imperial school system; the best description of this system is found in Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* (95 CE), which also includes a lengthy statement of each of the five parts of rhetoric. The numerous medieval continuations of Cicero's rhetorical works, especially his *De inventione* and the pseudonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* long attributed to him, are evidence of school use of the texts.³

Aside from the Roman works widely copied in the Middle Ages, there were three new rhetorical genres. The *ars dictaminis* or art of letter-writing, fully developed by the early twelfth century, applied Ciceronian doctrines to set up a five-part structure for composing letters: *salutatio*, *benevolentiae*, *captatio*, *narratio*, *petitio*, *conclusio*.⁴ Dictaminal manuals were often accompanied by sets of model letters. The *ars praedicandi* or preaching manual took shape in the late twelfth century. The remarkably similar manuals lay out a sermon plan beginning with a 'theme' (usually a scriptural passage), which is then divided and sub-divided, each division being 'proved' or supported by a wide range of inventional and stylistic devices. There is

² For ancient rhetoric see the various works of George A. Kennedy and *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*, ed. by James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula, 2nd edn (Davis: Hermagoras Press, 1995). For the Middle Ages, see James J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974; repr. Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Arizona State University, 2001). There is no comprehensive history of Renaissance rhetoric, but for the early period see John Monfasani, 'Humanism and Rhetoric', in *Renaissance Humanism, Foundations, Forms, and Legacy*, ed. by Albert Rabil, III: Humanism and the Disciplines (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), pp. 171–235. Also see the essays in *Renaissance Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric*, ed. by James J. Murphy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

³ See John O. Ward, 'Renaissance Commentaries on Ciceronian Rhetoric', in *Renaissance Eloquence*, 126–87 (n. 2 above) and Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*.

⁴ Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, 194–268; Martin Camargo, *Ars dictaminis, ars dictandi*, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental, fasc. 60 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991).

no concluding section in such a sermon, which ends with a prayer rather than a recapitulation. This tree-like structure attracted numerous manuscript illustrations. More than two hundred separate medieval preaching manuals have been identified.⁵

Perhaps the most unusual of the medieval rhetorical genres was the *ars poetriae* or art of composing verse and prose.⁶ Aimed at school instruction, six of these Latin arts appeared between 1175 and 1280. The most popular of them was the *Poetria nova* (ca 1210) of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, which has survived in more than two hundred manuscripts (some with commentaries); it is organized under the five parts of Roman rhetoric, including a section on delivery to facilitate oral recitation.⁷ (There are also a number of vernacular arts, but they are written for adult writers rather than for school children and do not follow a strict Roman pattern.)

In any case there is little evidence of major new rhetorical productions in Europe in the century after 1350. Works in the prevailing genres were indeed copied and re-copied, or at best modified by some new writer. One example of this tinkering is the case of the English Benedictine Ranulf Higden, better known as the compiler of the *Polychronicon*, a world history. His *Ars praedicandi* of about 1345 is heavily indebted to the English Dominican Robert of Basevorn's *Forma componendi sermones* (1322). Similar redactions occurred in dictaminal manuals. There is no central rhetorical vision, only genres. When a Pisan professor of rhetoric and grammar, Francesco da Buti (1350–1406), looks to produce a rule of rules (about 1378), all he can manage to do is set up three different sets of rules: *Regule rhetorica*, *Regule grammaticae*, and *Tractates epistolarum*.⁸ The *Rhetorica* of Tommaso Inghirami survives in a single fifteenth-century manuscript, and there may have been others like it that had little circulation before vanishing into oblivion; Antonio da Rho, for example, is known more for his literary controversies than for any theoretical contributions to the discipline.⁹

It is true, however, that some works were in manuscript long before they reached print. Between 1392 and 1396, Antonio Loschi wrote an *Inquisitio super XI ora-*

⁵ Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, pp. 269–355, and Marianne G. Briscoe, *Artes praedicandi*, *Typologie des source du moyen âge occidental*, fasc. 61 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992).

⁶ Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, pp. 135–93. The standard treatment now is Douglas Kelly, *The Medieval Arts of Poetry and Prose*, *Typologie des source du moyen âge occidental*, fasc. 59 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991).

⁷ A useful description of the Vinsaufian manuscript tradition may be found in *An Early Commentary on the Poetria nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf*, ed. by Marjorie A. Woods, *Garland Medieval Texts*, no. 21 (New York: Garland, 1985).

⁸ Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Lat. Misc. e. 52, fols 182–98. Fourteen other manuscripts have been identified. It has never been printed.

⁹ Unless otherwise indicated, the following accounts of manuscript relationships are derived from Monfasani, 'Humanism and Rhetoric' (n. 2 above).

tionones Ciceronis, using classical rhetorical theory to analyze the speeches; the commentary was not printed until 1477, when it was joined to the ancient *Commentarii in orationes Ciceronis* of Asconius Pedianus. Likewise Sicco Polenton's 1413 *Argumenta super aliquot aestimibus et invectivis Ciceronis* remained in manuscript until it too was joined to the Asconius in 1477 (ia01154000).

It is not entirely clear why some early works were eventually printed while others remained in manuscript. The *De compositione* of Gasparino Barzizza (d. 1430) was edited only in modern times, though his *Exempla eruditione* (ib00268000) was printed in 1483. Francesco Filelfo wrote a commentary on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, never printed; on the other hand, his Latin translation of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (ip00608000) was printed in 1483–84.

One of the most interesting cases of the manuscript/print nexus is that of Antonio Haneron (ca 1400–1490), who wrote five works on rhetoric and one on syntax.¹⁰ These remain in manuscript. The syntax treatise survives only in four printed editions, no manuscripts. What factors led to these printing choices?

Also, given that some of the printed rhetorical texts are anonymous, we may never know whether these published works were composed at the time of printing or were first published decades earlier. Examples are the anonymous *Ars epistolandi* (ja01085500) printed at Paris by Antoine Callaut about 1485, or the *Ars memorativa* (ja01088000) printed by Johann Bäuler at Augsburg about 1480.¹¹ Some fifteenth-century productions had greater influence in the next century. The seminal *De inventione dialectica* of Rudolph Agricola, completed in the 1480s, was to remain in manuscript until its printing in 1515. The *Repinastrio dialecticae* of Lorenzo Valla had a similar fate. Erasmus' *Opus de conscribendis epistolis* was completed by 1498 but not printed for another two decades.

The Printing of Rhetorical Texts 1465–1500

The considerable effort expended by modern scholarship on 'incunables,' the books printed from Gutenberg to 1500, makes it easier to track rhetorical developments in the last four decades of the century.¹² The first rhetorical work to be printed—i.e.

¹⁰ For a description of his works, see Jacqueline Ijsewijn-Jacobs, 'Magistri Anthonii Haneron (ca 1400–1490) opera grammatica et rhetorica', *Humanistica Lovaniensa*, 24 (1975), 29–69.

¹¹ It is important to remember that in this period designations like 'Ars memorativa' are not 'titles' in the modern sense of the word. Rather, they are merely descriptive of the contents of the book, just as today we might use the designator term 'cookbook' to describe a book of recipes.

¹² For example, see the more than five hundred reference works listed in the Introduction to Units 22 and 23 of *Incunabula: The Printing Revolution in Europe, 1455–1500* (See note 1 above). For rhetorical incunabula, see James J. Murphy, 'Rhetoric in the Earliest Years of

using movable type—was Cicero's rhetorical dialogue *De oratore* in 1465 (ic00654000). The next was the late classical *De arte praedicandi* (ja01227000) of Aurelius Augustinus, printed not later than 1466; this work is actually Book IV of Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*. Three other titles appeared in 1469, and then beginning in 1470 there was an explosion of rhetorical printings, with thirty-five books appearing in the period 1470–75. Nearly two hundred rhetorical works were to be printed by the end of the year 1500.

No simple chronology of these works can provide a true picture of the development of rhetoric in this period. It may be more useful to discuss the books in terms of their types and genres. These can be viewed in six major groupings: ancient rhetoric, compendia, preaching, epistolography, memory, style (including both *elegantia* and figures and tropes), and some few other works which defy easy classification.

Ancient Rhetoric

This grouping requires the most detailed description, since classical rhetoric was the ultimate background source for most developments in the period. As Monfasani points out, the entirety of Roman rhetoric and oratory was available by 1430, though it took three to five decades to get them all into print. The Greek corpus became available later in the century.¹³ All seven of Cicero's rhetorical works were printed by 1492. His *De oratore* had fourteen more editions to 1500, one with a commentary by Ognibene da Lonigo published in 1485 (ic00662000). The *Brutus*, a critical history of Roman oratory, and *Orator*, a discussion of style, appeared together in 1469 (ic00643000). The *Orator* was also printed with a commentary by Victor Pisanus in 1492 (ic00653000). The *Topica*, on the invention of ideas through *loci* or 'places,' was printed in about 1472 (ic00693000), then appeared later in 1485 with a commentary by Georgio Valla (ic00563000). The early medieval commentary on the *Topica* by Anicius Manlius Boethius, *In Ciceronis Topica commentum*, was printed in 1484 (ib00829000).

The *Partitiones oratoriae*, a rapid summary of rhetorical doctrine written by Cicero for his son, appeared in 1472 (ic00666000). The preface to Cicero's (lost) translation of Demosthenes' oration 'On the Crown,' titled *De optimo genere oratorum*, appeared in 1485 (ic00662000).

The *De inventione*, on the first of the five parts of rhetoric, appeared ten times alone, and five more times with the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.

Printing, 1405–1500,' *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 70 (1984), 1–11, and 'Ciceronian Influences in Latin Rhetorical Compendia of the Fifteenth Century', in *Acta conventus Neo-Latini Guelpherbytani*, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies, Wolfenbüttel, 12 August to 16 August 1985 (Binghamton: Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1989), pp. 521–30.

¹³ Monfasani, 'Humanism and Rhetoric,' p. 177.

The commentary of the fourth-century writer Gaius Marius Victorinus frequently accompanies incunable editions of the *De inventione*. The first edition of the work itself, edited by Ognibene da Lonigo, appeared at Venice in 1470 (ic00644000). The first with the Victorinus commentary was printed 1481–82 (ic00647000).

Far and away the most popular ‘Ciceronian’ work, however, was the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which had twenty-seven Latin editions and three editions of an Italian version. Its first separate edition was in 1470 (ic00672000). By 1481–82 it had acquired an anonymous commentary when it was published with the *De inventione* and its Victorinus commentary (ic00647000). The commentary of Hieronymus Capidurus accompanied the text when it was printed in 1490 (ic00682000). Still another combination was the text with the commentaries of Francesco Maturazzo and Antonio Mancinelli; the first of its three editions appeared in 1496 (ic00683000). A medieval Italian paraphrase of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* was published about 1472–76 (ic00686000), attributed in the printed text to Galeotto of Bologna.

Commentaries on Cicero’s orations furnish another insight into fifteenth-century views of rhetoric. A notable example is a collection which joins the ancient commentary of Quintus Asconius Pedianus to three contemporary commentaries by George of Trebizond, Antonio Loschi, and Sicco Polenton, published in 1477 (ia01154000).

After Cicero, the most important ancient rhetorical figure in this period was Quintilian. His *Institutio oratoria* was edited by five different scholars, and four separate commentaries were printed as well. The first editing was that of J. A. Companus in 1470 (iq0024000), followed by that of Joannes Andreas de Bussis later the same year (iq0025000). The ubiquitous Ognibene da Lonigo added his own edition in 1471 (iq0026000). Another was by Andreas Ponticus in 1482 (iq00029500), and Raffaele Regio not only edited the text but added his own commentary in 1493 (iq00029000). Finally, the text appeared in 1494 with commentaries listed by Lorenzo Valla, Pomponio Leto, and Giovanni Sulpizio da Veroli (iq00030000), though the Sulpizio commentary does not actually appear in the text. The *Declamationes* long attributed to Quintilian appeared in print six times, beginning with an edition published in Louvain, 1477–83 (iq00018500).

Two other works by Raffaele Regio belong properly in this section. They were printed together, possibly in 1492 (ir0014000). One is *Ducenta problemata in Quintiliani depravationes*, in which Regio discusses two hundred and nine (not two hundred) issues in the text of the *Institutio oratoriae* as he prepared his edition. The other is *Quaestio utrum ars rhetorica ad Herennium falso Ciceroni ascribitur*, in which Regio refutes three commonly used arguments for Cicero’s authorship of that work. This is the first direct denial of Cicero’s authorship, which had been assumed for a millennium. (The tradition that Lorenzo Valla was the first to do so is incorrect.)¹⁴ Antonio Mancinelli responded two years later in his own commentary

¹⁴ See James J. Murphy and Michael Winterbottom, ‘Raffaele Regio’s 1492 *Quaestio*

on the *ad Herennium* (see above) with a prefatory essay titled *Rhetorica ad Herennium esse Ciceronis*.

Another major ancient text, the *Rhetorica* of Aristotle, drew less attention in this period. There were no Greek editions before 1501. There were only two Latin translations: the fifteenth-century one of George of Trebizond, printed about 1476–77 (ia01045500), and the medieval translation of William of Moerbeke, executed at Paris in the 1270s, and printed in 1481 (ia01046000). No commentaries on the *Rhetorica* were printed in this period. However, the pseudo-Aristotle *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* was translated into Latin by Francesco Filelfo, who clearly accepts Aristotle as the author. It appears in a volume headed by Filelfo's *Orationes* in 1488 (ip00608000).

The *Progymnasmata*, or rhetorical exercises, of the second-century Greek rhetorician Hermogenes appeared in Latin as *Preexercitamenta* in the translation of the sixth-century grammarian Priscian which was included in the nine editions of Priscian's *Opera* beginning in 1470 (ip00960500).

Of Plato's four dialogues relating to rhetoric, only one—the *Gorgias*—was translated in this period and published about 1475 (ip00775000). The late classical rhetorical compendium of Chirius Consultus Fortunatianus, *Artis rhetoricae libri III*, was also printed about 1493 (if00275000).

Compendia

The largest group of rhetorical incunabula is composed of works striving to summarize, abstract or otherwise survey either the whole of rhetorical doctrine or major parts of it. These compendia are mostly contemporary compositions but do include printings of two early medieval encyclopedias of the seven liberal arts that contain abstracts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic. The two encyclopedias are those of Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, printed in 1499 (ic0017000), and Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, printed in 1472 (ii00181000). Another survey appears in the *Il Tesoro* of the thirteenth-century writer Brunetto Latini, translated into Italian from the French by Bono Giamboni, printed in 1476 (i100070000).

The twenty-one rhetorical compendia written in the fifteenth century range in length from six pages (the *Ars oratoria* of Peter Luder) to nearly six hundred (Johann Koelhoff's *Ars dicendi et perorandi*). All but three are in Latin, with two in German and one in Hebrew. There are no French, Italian or English compendia from this period. The compendia tend to be resolutely Ciceronian in their rhetorical doctrine, with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* the major source. Most at least mention Quintilian, but Aristotle is seldom cited. The orations of Cicero are frequently drawn upon.

Perhaps the most influential was the *Rhetoricorum libri V* of George of Trebizond, printed not before 1472 (ig00157000); this work followed a basic Ciceronian line but introduced Greek rhetoric, especially that of Hermogenes, into Italy.¹⁵ Cardinal Bessarion published an attack on Trapezuntius for his criticisms of Plato's rhetoric in his *Rhetorica* even before it reached print; his *Adversus calumniatorem Platonis* was published in 1469 (ib00518000). A related work was the *Rhetorica* of Guillaume Fichet, the first rhetorical text printed in France, rushed into print at Paris under the personal supervision of Fichet to forestall the first edition of his rival George of Trebizond's *Rhetorica*. It was printed at the first Sorbonne press in July 1471 (if00147000).¹⁶

Fichet's successor at the University of Paris, Guillaume Tardif, published his own *Rhetoricae compendium* in eighty pages with a table of the thirty-nine rubrics under which the work is organized; it first appeared about 1475 (it000165000).

A straightforward summary based on Cicero, *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, and Quintilian, also from France, is the *Summa rhetoricae* of Pierre de la Hazardiere, published about 1475 (ih00006700).

The most extensive compendium was the *Ars dicendi et perorandi* compiled and printed by Johann Koelhoff at Cologne in 1484 (ia01085000).¹⁷ This lengthy work in sixteen sections has a twenty-page table of contents. Almost as long, at four hundred and sixty pages, is the German-language *Spiegel der waren Rhetoric* of Friedrich Riederer, printed by Riederer in 1493 (ir00197000). Riederer translates sections of Cicero, Quintilian, and Albertanus of Brescia, illustrated with examples of German law. These are the first German translations of any part of Cicero.

A similar organizational plan appears in the popular *Formulare und Tütsch rhetorica* attributed to Heinrich Gessler, who identifies himself in a *Vorrede* as a teacher of law. The first edition was published about 1476 (if00243600); there were fourteen editions before 1500, and other printings as late as 1558. Fernando Manzanares, author of the first rhetorical work printed in Spain, titles his work *Flores rhetorici* as if it were a mere florilegium, but he actually presents three substantive sections: general principles of style, then tropes and figures, and a letter-writing manual. It was printed about 1488 (im00227500).

One of the most interesting in its cultural ramifications is the Hebrew-language *Nofet zufim* (Book of the Honeycomb's Flow) of Judah Messer Leon, printed about 1475 (ihj0062000). Messer Leon was a physician and rabbi who wished to educate

¹⁵ See John Monfasani, *George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic* (Leiden: Brill, 1976).

¹⁶ Fichet's *Rhetorica* is little more than a series of short definitions and statements rather than a discursive prose treatment.

¹⁷ This work deserves more careful study. While no author or editor is named, the colophon states 'notificata per me Johann Koelhoff de Lubeck.' There is no reason to believe that Koelhoff was not the compiler as well as the printer.

his Italian Jewish colleagues in the learning necessary to succeed.

Some compendia reveal their nature by their titles. There is an anonymous *Ars rhetorica pro iuvenum informatione* (ia01139500); Conrad Wimpina's *Precepta coaugmentande rhetorice orationis commodissime* (iw000595000); Conrad Celtis' *Epitoma in Ciceronis rhetoricas* (ic00370000); and Jakob Locher's *Epitoma rhetorices in Marcum Ciceronem et Fabium Quintilianum* (i1000261000).

Some authors of compendia pride themselves on their brevity. A law student in Pavia, Joannes Baptista de Castellione, wrote his *Epilogica rethorice compilatio* to cover all parts of rhetoric in twenty-eight pages (ij00255800). The prolific Antonio Mancinelli titles one of his works *De oratore brachylogia*¹⁸ to treat rhetoric concisely (fourteen pages) and thus avoid *turba librorum* (im00127000); and Peter Luder, *Ars oratoria*, treats all three rhetorical genres in just over six pages, with sample speeches for each one (la01136500); this work is often printed as anonymous.

One treatise is in dialogue form: Hieronymus Balbus' *Dialogus de gloriose rhetore* (ib00021000). The participants are Petrus Cohardus, Carolus Phernandus, and Guillaume Tardif.

Sometimes printers put together several independent works in a single volume which thus becomes a sort of compendium. One such is the *Artes orandi, epistolandi, memorandi* of Jacobus Publicius (ip01096000); parts were published separately (ip01099000, ip01093800). Another is Conrad Celtis, *Epitoma in utramque Ciceronis rhetoricam cum arte memorativa nova et modo epistolandi* (ic00370000).

Preaching

In a Christian society, especially one with a three hundred and fifty year old tradition of *artes praedicandi* that produced more than two hundred separate medieval preaching manuals, one might expect that the revived interest in classical rhetoric in the fifteenth century would have produced an immediate application to preaching. But this is not the case. In fact only two original works on preaching were printed in this period, and only five medieval treatises, as well as Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*. The great age of Renaissance preaching theory was to be the latter part of the following century.

Augustine's *De arte praedicandi* (ia01226000) was in fact the fourth book of his *De doctrina Christiana*, completed in 426. Two of the printed medieval texts are attributed falsely to famous people. The *Ars intelligendi, docendi, et praedicandi res spirituales* attributed to the thirteenth-century theologian Albertus Magnus

¹⁸ In his opening, Mancinellus explains his unusual title this way: 'brachy quod est breve componitus et logia locution. Brachylogia autem brevilocus.'

(ia00226000) is an abbreviated version of the *De faciebus mundi* by Guillaume d'Auvergne, bishop of Paris 1228–49, while the *De arte praedicandi* attributed to Saint Thomas Aquinas (it0026300) is compiled from other works by Jacobus de Fusignano and Henry of Hesse.

The *Rhetorica divina* written by Guillaume d'Auvergne did get published (ig00713000). The *Ars praedicandi* of John of Wales (d. 1302) was also printed separately (ia01138000) and then with St Vincent Ferrer's *Sermones quadragesimales* (if00126500) which also includes another copy of the 'Albertus Magnus' tract. An *Ars praedicandi* of uncertain authorship is that attributed to Henry of Hesse (ih00036300). As many as six possible authors have been suggested, though two prime candidates are fourteenth-century figures. One of the two contemporary works on preaching, by Michael of Hungary (fl. ca 1482), is limited to amplification through rhetorical figures: *Incipit tractatus de modo predicandi et extendendi diversas materias per colores rhetoricales*.¹⁹

By far the most important original work in the preaching field was the *Margarita eloquentiae* of Lorenzo Guglielmo Traversagni (da Savona), the first rhetorical text printed in England. Printed by William Caxton at Westminster (it00427750) and then again by The Schoolmaster Printer at St Albans (it00427760), it was also apparently the first book to be produced as a 'textbook' in the sense that each student was provided a copy. Traversagni also wrote an abstract of his work, published by Caxton as *Epitome Margaritae eloquentiae* (it00427770). The *Margarita* blends Augustinian, scholastic, and Ciceronian precepts to argue for preaching as demonstrative oratory.²⁰

Epistolography

A number of fifteenth-century writers assert that letters, not orations, are the proper subject of rhetoric; others, especially in writing about style, say that their concepts are for both orations and letters. In either case, preparation for letter-writing became an important feature of fifteenth-century rhetoric, with some new aspects.

Medieval authors of the *ars dictaminis* had proposed five parts for a letter, with emphasis on careful salutations recognizing social status; elaborate rules were

¹⁹ Susan Gallick has traced thirteen medieval manuals into the print age, finding that some had no editions while the pseudo-Aquinas had thirteen: 'The *Artes praedicandi*: Early Printed Editions', *Mediaeval Studies*, 39 (1977), 477–89.

²⁰ A useful summary of the *Margarita* may be found in Lawrence A. Green, 'Classical and Medieval Rhetorical Traditions in Traversagni's *Margarita eloquentiae*', *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 72 (1986), 185–96. On its use as a textbook, see James J. Murphy, 'The Double Revolution of the First Rhetorical Textbook Published in England: The *Margarita eloquentia* of Gulielmus Traversanus (1479)', *Texte: revue de la critique et de théorie littéraire*, 8/9 (1989–90), 367–76.

devised for the *cursus*, or rhythmical prose style. Significantly, no medieval *ars dictaminis* was printed in the period.²¹ Instead, most treatises look to Cicero's letters as models, and propose direct application of Roman rhetoric to the letter-writing process. Most give examples or model letters; indeed, some—like Bartolomeo Miniatore or Franciscus Niger—consist almost entirely of models after a brief preceptive statement.

Not all discussions of letter-writing are in independent publications. A number of compendia include some notice of letters. Major grammatical works include letter-writing sections, such as Nicolaus Perottus' *Rudimenta grammatices* (ip0030000) and Bernard Perger's *Grammatica nova* (Goff P278) modeled on Perottus.

This is a field of rhetorical history which is not yet well explored. Moreover, the similarity of titles—for example, *Modus epistolandi*, *Modus conficiendi epistolas*, *De componendis epistolas*—makes it difficult to differentiate between texts without careful examination. Yet two dozen or so independent treatises were published in this period.

Under these circumstances it might be best simply to list the authors of the twenty-five letter-writing texts produced in this period: Anonymous (ia010855500), Augustinus Moravus (ia01372000), Jacobus Barynus (ib00256000), Augustino Dati (id00095800), Guarino of Verona (ig00539000), Antonio Haneron (ih0004800), Andreas Hundorn (ih00555500), Christoforo Landini (il00037500), Paulus Lescherius (il00179000), Antonio Mancinelli (im00128000), Bartolomeo Miniatore (im00580300), Carolus Maneken (im0011877000), Jacobus Mennel (imoo490000), Paulus Niavis (in00019200), Franciscus Niger (in00231000), Giovanni Mario Filelfo (ip00616000), Poggio Bracciolini (ip00876000), Poncius (ip00914000), Jacobus Publicius (ip01089800), Nicholaus Schut (is00331100), Giovanni Sulpizio da Verona (is00847000), Lorenzo Guglielmo Traversagni (da Savona) (it00427800), Johannes Ursinus (iu00071000), and Conrad Wimpina (Koch) (iw000595000).

Generally speaking, there was a movement away from the medieval five-part letter structure toward treating letters as a written form of oratory. Ciceronian precepts and Ciceronian models thus became important.

Memory

Memory is the fourth part of rhetoric in the Roman tradition. The dominant mode was a system of recall using 'images' and 'backgrounds' explicated in detail in the

²¹ This is a remarkable development, considering the large number of dictaminal treatises available in manuscript. For a discussion of the transition from the medieval *ars dictaminis* to humanist approaches to letter-writing, see Ronald Witt, 'The Medieval "Ars dictaminis" and the Beginnings of Humanism: A New Construction of the Problem', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 35 (1982), 1–35.

third book of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.²² While Quintilian preferred memorizing speeches in small pieces, he acknowledged the system in Book XI of his *Institutio oratoria*. Given the Roman rhetorical influence in general, it is not surprising that a majority of the dozen or so independently printed treatises should follow the image/background system.

These treatises are usually very short. Sometimes they include woodcuts to illustrate the use of images. A prime example is the *Ars memorativa* of Jacobus Publicius (ip01093800), whose seven pages present forty-one illustrations of commonly used objects that could be used as images: tools, utensils, lute, fish, etc; a curved fish, for example, could represent the letter 'C.' There is a chessboard with its thirty-two figures, and a diagram of the Ptolemaic system. Three are anonymous: one in Latin (ia01086900), one in Italian (ia010855500), and one in German (ia01088000). One of the most influential of these mnemotechnical treatises was the *Phoenix, sive artificiosa memoria* of Peter of Ravenna (ip00531000), which had only three incunabula editions but went on to many later editions in various countries, with several translations. Others are by Baldovinus Sabaudiensis (ib00035200), Mattheolus Perusinus (im00357500), Cato Sacchus (is00013500), and Jodocus Wetzdorf (iw00013000). Two works by Dominicus de Carpanis are outside the Roman tradition. One is *De nutrienda memoria* (ic00219000), and the other is *Expositio preceptorum Aristotelicorum de memoria et reminiscencia* (ic00219100).

Style

Style is the third part of Roman rhetoric. Most rhetorical compendia include at least some brief discussion of style, but there are few independent treatments of the whole subject in this period analogous to those handling the whole of Memory. The author of the first ancient treatise to discuss style in full detail, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, had divided it into three types: Grand, Middle, and Simple (IV. viii. 11), but had also specified three qualities for 'an appropriate and finished style' (*elocutio commoda et perfecta*) (IV. xii. 17): taste (*elegantia*), artistic composition (*compositio*), and distinction (*dignitas*) to be achieved by sixty-four tropes and 'figures.' Discussions of style in this period tended to be organized either under the category of *elegantia*, or in works providing access to the wide range of tropes and figures derived from both the grammatical and the rhetorical traditions.

²² Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) is still the best single treatment of the subject.

A. *Elegantia*

The *Ad Herennium* had declared that the two divisions of *elegantia* were correct latinity and clarity. Fifteenth-century writers pursued these in a number of popular works, rejecting medieval Latinity and seeking a purer language useful for letters, orations, and other documents. This multi-purpose aim for good style appears even in the titles of some works, like Niccolò Ferreti's *De elegantia linguae Latinae servanda in epistolis et orationibus componendis praecepta* (if00098000).

The most influential of the writers on this topic was Lorenzo Valla, whose *Elegantia linguae latinae* not only went through more than twenty editions but inspired others like Augustino Dati, whose *Elegantiolae* (id00072200) had more than forty editions in the period, and Jacob Wimpheling, whose lengthy title extols brevity: *Elegantiarum medulla oratorique precepta in ordinem inventu facilem copiose, clare, breviterque reducta* (iw00031000). Paulus Nivis ends his *Elegantia latinitatis* (in000190000) by declaring that the *Modus epistolandi* which immediately follows is actually a part of the *Elegantia*.

One interesting approach was that of Franciscus Niger, who popularized thirty 'rules' for *elegantia* he borrowed for the second book of his *De modo epistolandi* (in001000); this concept had a wide circulation, not only through the thirty-five editions of Niger's work and its incorporation into other writers' text, but through the separate circulation of the original version of 1477–83 titled *Elegantiarum viginti praecepta* (ie00029600). While this work, which had more than thirty-five editions, has sometimes been attributed to Aegidius Suchtelensis, the concept is the same.

B. *Figures and Tropes*

The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (IV. xiii. 18) declares that the third element of style, *dignitas*, 'renders it ornate, embellishing it with variety.' Its components are forty-five figures of diction and nineteen figures of thought. Without further explanation the author launches into definitions and examples of forty-five figures of diction (or speech) and nineteen figures of thought which occupy the rest of the book.

The subsequent history of the figures of speech, first called 'tropes' by Quintilian, is a tangled one. Both grammarians and rhetoricians expounded and multiplied them throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages. By the thirteenth century more than two hundred figures and tropes had been described.²³ Consequently in looking at the figures and tropes that were available to fifteenth-century readers it is necessary to identify a wide range of sources in which they appeared.

²³ See the English translation of Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*. Forword by George A. Kennedy, trans. by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, ed. by David E. Orton and R. Dean Andersen (Leiden: Brill, 1998).

The most obvious of the sources were ancient or medieval editions of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* itself as well as Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, which devotes its eighth and ninth books to them, and Cicero's *De oratore*. The ancient grammarian Aelius Donatus devoted part of the third book of his *Ars maior* to figures (id00352000); this same volume includes the *De schemate et tropis* of the Venerable Bede. The sixth-century Cassiodorus, also the author of an encyclopedia including rhetoric, composed a treatise analyzing the figures in the Psalms, *Expositio in Psalterium* (ic00236000). Probably the largest collection of mostly grammatical figures from the Middle Ages was that in the massive *Catholicon* (1286) of Johannes Balbus (ib00210000), with numerous editions. Another noteworthy reprinted medieval work was the *Graecismus* (1212) of Eberhard of Béthune (ie00011300), a grammatical text which includes discussion of one hundred and three figures under the categories of *permissiva*, *prohibitiva*, and *preceptiva*. The work takes its title from the opening word of a section on Greek terms.

Comparatively few original works on tropes and figures were published before 1500, though of course some compendia included them as part of their coverage of the Roman five parts of rhetoric. The *Ciceronis rhetorica nova figuris contracta* of Johannes Curtius (ic01008000) is clearly based on the *Ad Herennium* and might well be termed a commentary or an abstract. On the other hand Antonio Haneron is clearly aware of the conflicting grammatical/rhetorical traditions in his *Tractatus de coloribus verborum et sententiarum cum figuris grammaticalibus* (ih00004950); the grammatical figures are from the twelfth-century *Doctrinale* of Alexandre de Villedieu. Paulus Nivis includes a five-page testimonial to the value of the figures in his *Colores rhetoricae disciplinae* (in000170000), noting that they are integral to the Latin language; he treats sixty figures altogether. Engelbertus Schut adds a treatise on *colores* to his *De arte dictandi et de elegantia* (isoo3310000), defining and illustrating thirty-five figures.

Other Works

There are some items printed in the fifteenth century which do not fit readily into any of the categories discussed above. One of the most unusual—and most popular—was the *De arte loquendi et tacendi*, written in 1245 by Albertanus, communal magistrate of Brescia (ia00193000) for his son; it had more than forty editions in the period, including a Dutch edition (ia00209450) and a German synopsis (il00126000). It is organized around six terms: 'Who, What, To Whom you should speak; Why, How, When you should consider.'

Some other medieval pieces were printed. The late thirteenth-century *Labyrinthus* (or *Laborintus*) of Eberhard the German (sometimes confused with Eberhard of Béthune) was the only one of the six major medieval rhetorical *artes poetriae* to reach print in the century. Also, an important medieval scholastic treatise on rhetoric by Guido Colonna, *De differentia rhetoricae, politicae, et ethicae*, was printed as

part of his *De partibus philosophiae*. It reflects ideas developed in his 1316 commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, which was not printed until 1515.

One task of difficult classification is the extensive *Margarita poetica* of Albertus de Eyb (ie00170000). It includes not only his *Praecepta artis rhetoricae*, which was also issued separately, often with Enea Sylvio Piccolomini (Pius II) listed as author (ie00185000), but also excerpts from Stephanus Fliscus and Gasparino Barzizza.

All in all, this immense array of rhetorical precept, example, advice, and prescription indicates that readers in the latter half of the fifteenth century had a wide range of rhetorical information available to them. The rhetorical incunabula thus play an important role in the development of rhetoric itself and in the humanistic enterprise of which it was a part.

An Inference

Given that some rhetorical manuscripts may not have survived for us to study, it may be impossible to declare with certainty that printing changed rhetoric in the fifteenth century. Nevertheless the large number of printed editions suggest that printed books were not only more numerous, but different in kind as well. There are very few manuscript compendia, for example, compared to the twenty-one printed prior to 1500. This compendium tendency was to result in the *Rhetorica generalis* of the next century—a standard body of rhetoric no longer dependent on specific authors like Cicero or Quintilian. One remarkable omission from the roster of printed works is another indication of change from age of manuscript: the *Poetria nova* (1210) of Geoffrey of Vinsauf survives in more than two hundred manuscripts, but was not printed until 1713. (Ironically, manuscript copies continued to be made well into the sixteenth century.) Perhaps a new interest in Horatian criticism led to a rejection of a text that many may have seen as a Ciceronian impingement on literary training.

More than two thousand rhetorical works were to be printed in Europe and America between 1500 and 1700. It is difficult to see how this ocean of erudition would have been possible without the promising leads produced by the two hundred titles printed up to the year 1500. The infrastructure of the manuscript tradition was simply not capable of supporting such developments. The fifteenth-century manuscript-to-print nexus was thus a turning point in rhetorical history.

Political Rhetoric and Rhetorical Politics in Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540)

NANCY S. STRUEVER

1. Introduction

The history of rhetoric is an important element of the general intellectual historical project. The assumption of this paper, and I believe of John O. Ward, is that rhetorical theory and practice must be treated as of a piece, and that implicit in the long tradition of broad dissemination of manuals, pedagogical treatises, commentaries, glosses, there is a continuity of speculation on rhetoric as structure and process, considerations that substantiate the case for rhetoric's strong contribution to the history of thought.

2. Ward's Pragmatism

What is of real pertinence to a consideration of Juan Luis Vives' rhetorical program is Ward's contrast between the coherence and practicality or pragmatism of medieval rhetorical work with the fragmented, academic Renaissance approach to the classical rhetorical heritage.¹ From the opening sentences of his fascicule for the *Typologie* series, Ward insists on the richness and ingenuity of medieval rhetorical work; it does not form a 'systematic, uniform and homogeneous genre', and the reason for this is in its pragmatic, vocational orientation: 'rhetorical contexts and uses were too various, too closely knit to the varying patterns of daily life in court and church.'²

¹ John O. Ward, 'Quintilian and the Rhetorical Revolution of the Middle Ages', *Rhetorica*, 13 (1995), 231–84 (p. 232); Ward here is opposing Brian Vickers's thesis of Renaissance coherence following medieval fragmentation of the rhetorical heritage.

² Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric*, p. 51.

The 'wholeness' derives from 'actions of recovery of the classical text by adaptation to present use', a use that moves beyond the legal-political classical competence to poetry and theology.³

In contrast to this description of an energetic recuperation of classical rhetorical theory and techniques, Ward's characterization of Renaissance initiatives focuses on their classicism as perverse: thus Ward's references to the 'antiquarian and overlapping flotsam', to the 'antique bric-à-brac', that mar Renaissance scholarly performance.⁴ These opprobrious terms are meant to amplify the notion of fragmentation; the Renaissance scholar's task is merely the estimation of the 'truth' of the text; the context is merely that of academic contest and recrimination; thus, they manifest a veritable 'passion for irrelevancy'.⁵ He closes his essay on Quintilian with a citation of John Ruskin on the Renaissance desire for perfection at any cost, for 'finish' in the sense of meticulous replication of classical techniques, as destructive.⁶ Indeed, Ruskinian assumptions of the spontaneity and inventiveness of the anonymous medieval artist as opposed to the 'aristocratic follies' of Renaissance patronage furnish a gloss on Ward's invidious contrast of medieval and Renaissance cultural institutions, and, of course, on the naive triumphalism of our received notion of a Burckhardtian Renaissance.⁷

3. *Vives' Program*

Vives' rhetorical work perhaps moderates Ward's contrast of medieval coherence and utility with the determinedly impractical 'philological cults' of the Renaissance.⁸ From Ward's point of view, Vives seems to be more medieval than Renaissance. First, his program is strikingly pragmatic; from his early (1519) *In pseudodialecticos*, Vives calls for a commitment to discursive skills for use in the community.⁹ Secondly, again in the *In pseudodialecticos*, he calls for reform of the

³ Ward, 'Quintilian', p. 258.

⁴ Ward, 'Quintilian', p. 277.

⁵ Ward, 'Quintilian', p. 250.

⁶ Ward, 'Quintilian', pp. 281–82.

⁷ Both these Renaissance historians and Ward seem perversely oblivious to the sophisticated pessimism of Burckhardt's very broadly inclusive cultural historical project so brilliantly analyzed by Oswyn Murray and Lionel Gossman: see Murray's 'Introduction' to Jacob Burckhardt, *The Greeks and Greek Civilization*, ed. by Oswyn Murray (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), and Gossman, *Basel in the Age of Burckhardt: A Study in Unseasonable Ideas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

⁸ Ward, 'Quintilian', p. 277.

⁹ Vives, *In pseudodialecticos*, ed. by Charles Fantazzi (Leiden: Brill, 1979), pp. 84–85: the dialecticians, by contrast, 'have had no contact with the arts through which such abilities are

systematic, scholastic formation that Ward describes as the degenerate end of the 'revolutionary' recuperation of the classical rhetorical tradition from the early twelfth century on, a degeneration to 'a forbidding rigour and a frightening systematic pattern and terminology of commentation.'¹⁰ It is a medieval scholasticism that is, precisely, non-utilitarian that Vives attacks with holistic medieval vigour. In this respect, he follows Ward's revolutionary, practical medieval rhetoricians.¹¹

Yet, Vives' pragmatism is not itself simply utilitarian; for all his investment in educational reform, in a very strong sense Vives' program is not set by educational priorities; rhetorical manuals, rhetorical pedagogy are not tails wagging the dog. With Vives, theory is first; he exemplifies rhetorical initiatives that discredit the notion that the roots of serious, fundamental shifts in inquiry can be found in pedagogical changes in method. Vives writes manuals, but the manuals do not set the parameters of his program. The very wide range of investigational interests of Vives' program suggests the need for revisiting the prominent questions of the historiography of rhetoric raised by Ward in his 'Rhetorical Theory and the Decline of *dictamen*': to what extent is rhetoric simply, primarily rhetorical education? What is the relation of pedagogy to rhetorical theory?¹² Most certainly the massive tradition of pedagogical texts studied by Ward serves to justify our historical assumption of the widespread availability of rhetorical techniques, issues, premises, and values. But they cannot explain, or even furnish the direct sources for, the sophisticated use in investigative programs of texts such as the *Brutus*, *Orator*, *De oratore*, Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, or Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Vives, indeed, writes manuals; obviously dissemination is an important issue for him. But, even inside his school protocols, there are initiatives of intrinsic theoretical interest: the works on logic or dialectic present rhetoric as including dialectic; the *De conscribendis epistolis* (1536) is rich in pragmatic considerations, fine-grained descriptions of audiences, and intrusive references to the historical context of social practices; as well, of course, the *De anima et vita* (1538) articulates a psychology remarkably hospitable to rhetorical interests.

Indeed, the values of rhetorical pragmatism invest his account of the procedures and values of inquiry in general. Unlike Edward George, who maintains that Vives'

learned'—in particular, 'Oratoria, quae vitam sensumque communem et docet et moderatur'.

¹⁰ Ward, 'Quintilian', pp. 233, 276, 277.

¹¹ See Edward George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', *Opera omnia Joannis Lodovici Vivis Valentini*, vol. 1 (Valencia, 1992), pp. 115–77; I have profited greatly from this excellent study; on p. 138 he speaks of intelligibility and accessibility as the two virtues for Vives.

¹² Ward, 'Rhetorical Theory and the Rise and Decline of *dictamen* in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', *Rhetorica*, 19 (2001), 175–223; Ward's claim that the texts of classical rhetorical theory, *dictamen*, and epistolography are all responses to 'new market niches' is a tad reductive.

rhetorical interests are detached from his investigational ones, I would argue that Vivesian inquiry is, rather, persevering in its evocation of rhetorical canons and tactics in speculation on problems and solutions in general inquiry.¹³ Thus, where Ward sees in Renaissance academicism the 'dethronement of classical rhetorical theory as a whole', and sees the success in the Renaissance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as resulting in an unfortunate suppression of Latin rhetorical accomplishment, Vives offers not simply a superb reading of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but a series of critiques and corrections of classical rhetorical initiatives, very much in line with Ward's claim that a primary medieval assumption was that classical theory 'could be used in contexts that diverged markedly from the classical patterns'.¹⁴

For example, a basic, if not completely articulated, assumption of Vives is the inescapability of the necessity of dealing with rhetorical capacities and actions in discussions of civic action and individual capacity. From this follows Vives' fascination with Roman law. He is perfectly aware that the Roman orator engages both public and private issues in a seamless career, and that civil and criminal issues are inextricably entangled. Rhetorical analysis, the invention of the topics, is a primary legal skill; Cicero's *Topica* becomes an important legal text.¹⁵ And in perhaps the most innovative of his texts, the revisionary *De anima*, an ingenious account of the passions, Vives takes up issues in Aristotle's *Rhetoric II* as well as in the *De anima*.

4. *Vives' Diversions*

The specific tactics are of intrinsic interest; Vives' divergences may seem slight, but they confront philosophical topoi, reframe issues, and recast problems.

4.1 *Rhetorical pragmatism*

When Noreña attributes to Vives a 'rhetorical conception of logic as a dialectic of persuasion', he is asserting Vives' thoroughly 'pragmatic' perspective, and clarifying

¹³ George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', p. 173 (n. 11 above), claims Vives' rhetorical speculation deals with communication only, not inquiry.

¹⁴ Ward, 'Quintilian', pp. 280, 234 (n. 1 above).

¹⁵ See, in particular, *De causis corruptarum artium*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. by G. Majansius (Valencia, 1782; repr. London: Gregg, 1964), vol. 6, Book VII, *De jure civili corrupto*, pp. 222–42 (henceforth cited as M., vol. number, page number). C. Vasoli, 'Giovanni Ludovico Vives e la logica come strumento delle "art"', in *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo: 'Invenzione' e 'Metodo' nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1968), pp. 214–46; on p. 233 he notes the importance of Cicero for Vives' notion of Roman law.

his refusal to follow the program of Rudolph Agricola, who severs dialectic from rhetoric.¹⁶ It is certainly the case that Vives engages an entire phenomenal range of senses of 'practice': talk and action as products, *pragmata*; civil, political practice as context and task; the need to redefine disciplinary practices and exercises; and, especially, the consideration of diverse genres as idiosyncratic discursive practices. Further, a wide range of issues and topics furnish hints, cues, to Vives for the intrusion of invocations of the pragmatic canons of rhetoric, primarily the necessity for decorum, appropriateness to time and place and person of one's discursive interventions. Indeed, I shall argue that his reliance on aptness and appropriateness to characterize proper decisions, almost constitutes a moral and political program in itself.¹⁷

Vives' *In pseudodialecticis* most certainly affirms pragmatic values, but since he concentrates on the discursively pragmatic, he gives us an unpretentious, clear opening to the issues of effective action. The very specificity of his discursive definition is a strength. Here also, Vives theorizes pragmatism by theorizing education. But this is not the effort of a school teacher whipping up new courses; this is a critical response to a general intellectual failure. The *rigor*, which turns into *frigor*, of the dialectics taught suggests the reverse of the motion, interaction of civil practice, and dilutes the values which obtain in the '*conventu prudentiorum hominum*.'¹⁸

4.2 A 'Rhetorized' Psychology

Noreña regards Vives as a good reader of Aristotle's Rhetoric, and notes his appreciation of Aristotle's systematization of rhetoric, which is, of course, nothing less than the full integration of the rhetoric with his psychological, ethical and political texts.¹⁹ When Pierre Aubenque attributes to the Rhetoric II of Aristotle a 'fully rhetorized psychology', he focuses on the powerful connections Aristotle establishes between his systemic account of psychological capacities, and particularly of passionate capacity, and rhetorical competence and discursive

¹⁶ Carlos G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives*, Archives Internationales d'histoire des idées (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970), p. 281; see pp. 277–83 on 'Rhetoric and the Logic of Persuasion.'

¹⁷ George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', p. 163 (n. 11 above), cites the *De ratione dicendi*, M. 2, 173: 'Caput artis dicunt esse: dicere quod facias'; and also *De tradendis disciplinis*, M. 6, 263 on rhetoric as '*accommodatio*', and as '*aptatio*', M. 6, 265.

¹⁸ *In pseudodialecticis*, pp. 54–55, 60–61, 72–73; see George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', p. 145; Vasoli, 'G. L. Vives', pp. 244–46 (n. 15 above).

¹⁹ Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives*, p. 167 (n. 16 above), cites *De causis corruptarum artium*, III, 'De dialectica corrupta', M. 6, 114.

efficacy.²⁰ This same connection is manifest not simply in the rhetorical treatises, but also in the the *De anima* of Vives; indeed, the section on the passions, with its pragmatic emphasis on passions and their role in effective action, is, almost, a 'rhetorized psychology', an account organized for civil use, and, most particularly, for discursive action.²¹ *De anima* III recasts the philosophical qualifications of emotional effect from the basically pejorative to the neutral: thus emotions are simply both spur and rein, provoking to action and inaction. And, equally, a basic rhetorical competence is analysis of the passions in regard to both the speaker, in particular, the speaker's presentation of his character, ethos, and to the audience.²² Just so, Vives' dialecticians must be incompetent in analysis, as being most inept in moving the souls of people, 'tractandis populorum animis ineptissimi sunt.'²³

When Dilthey, in his *Weltanschauung und Analyse*, argues that we must regard the humanists not as primarily philosophers, in our standard disciplinary sense of metaphysicians or logicians, but as psychologists and anthropologists, he proceeds to claim Lorenzo Valla and Vives as exemplary in their psychological interests and accomplishments.²⁴ What is remarkable, I am arguing, is the specificity and precision of Vives' psychological account; Vasoli phrases this a trifle differently when he notes the strong empirical bent in Vivesian psychology.²⁵ And, further, Vives' Christian piety, his religious affirmation of our flawed nature, only reinforces his rhetorical sophistication in the empirical description of our capacities of production and reception of signs. There is no simple-minded rationalist optimism; the need for the art of moving the passions is proportional to human depravity; religious assumptions only enhance rhetorical acuteness in theorizing discursive effect.²⁶

²⁰ P. Aubenque, 'Logos et pathos', in *Corps et âme: sur le De anima d'Aristote* (Paris: Vrin, 1996), pp. 38–49.

²¹ Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1989), see esp. Chapters 15 and 19.

²² Noreña insists on a strong relation between the *De anima* and the *De disciplinis*, p. 177; see also p. 296 (n. 20 above).

²³ Vives, *In pseudodialecticos*, p. 85.

²⁴ Wilhelm Dilthey, 'Die Funktion der Anthropologie in der Kultur des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts', in *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation, Gesammelte Schriften* II (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1960), pp. 422–29.

²⁵ Vasoli, 'Giovanni Ludovico Vives', p. 226 (n. 15 above).

²⁶ George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', see esp. pp. 123, 161, 180 (n. 11 above).

4.3 Existential Authenticity

This rather pretentious construct at least conveys something of the theoretical zeal that drives Vives' educational program. There is a critical edge to Vives' account of the contemporaneous state of rhetoric. It is doubly critical: first, of the use of rhetoric he observes, the inadequacies of speaking, listening, or writing and reading practices; and second, in its use of rhetorical critique, of rhetorical beliefs and habits of action in inquiry as the source of censure and correction of not only the faults of rhetorical education, but of the faults of education, inquiry, and moral-political practice in general. Rhetorical performance is strenuously and necessarily involved with the assertion and alteration of shared beliefs, the *sensus communis*; but, Vives describes the academic dialecticians as ignorant, inexperienced in regard to *sensus communis*; they know practically nothing of the modes of impelling or restraining affects which may confirm or change beliefs. They use leaden, frigid, and limp *sententiae*, which deject rather than excite; they are totally lacking in competence in *gestus* and *actio*, that is to say, in use of their bodies; similarly their audience, the audience created by them, is itself lifeless—'socordes, segnes, peregrinates animo, rudes atque imperitos', that is, lacking in listening skills, not acute, and not attuned to persuasive change.²⁷

This is not strikingly original; but his critique of the use of specific rhetorical techniques goes beyond a simple recommendation of the mastery of rhetorical techniques. Vives's critique of rhetoric is not from outside, from a 'philosophical' view, but from within; it is a further step beyond a rhetorical critique of dialectic, and it amounts to a reconsideration of rhetorical theory. Thus, in his account of imitation in the *De causis corruptarum artium*, *imitatio* is a part of practice, and without practice, *exercitatio*, precepts are of no use; we require practice because arts and disciplines do not come from nature; it is *our* experience that verifies.²⁸ Impatient of the trivial speeches, *oratiunculae*, invectives, which constitute exercise in the schools, he goes on to give an account of *imitatio* that becomes a psychological narrative; initially only a 'following' of a model, it becomes a contest, not simply as an emulation, but for victory over and supercession of the model text. Yet the actual practice of imitation Vives observes can be simple theft, 'nam suppire putant esse imitari.' It is often a petty theft of details, a patchwork of elements—mere excerpting, pilfering, pillaging. In the use of the classics they do not contest, but play: 'ludit potius quam pugnat.'²⁹

²⁷ *De causis corruptarum artium*, III, 'De dialectica corrupta', M. 6.170.

²⁸ *De causis corruptarum artium*, IV, 'De corrupta rhetorica', M. 6., 171–72; see Noreña, Juan Luis Vives, pp. 294f (n. 16 above).

²⁹ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6, 172, 173, 174; see also a comment on oratory (p. 179): 'genus quoddam est pugnae, et ad persuasionem quasi victoriam pertinet.'

The account thus becomes an extended meditation on the values of decorum, the necessity of plotting a unity of purpose and presentation, adapted to the author-imitator's peculiar task.³⁰ He resorts to the figure Cortesius (and Petrarch) employed: we should be similar to Cicero, not as apes, '*simias*' but as '*filios parentum*', again emphasizing both the author's, and his imitator's, unique identity.³¹ A focus on '*verba*' alone leads to inappropriateness; our own competence, *cognitio*, is what is at stake; true rhetorical virtue, strength, lies in mastery of issues, topics, not mere words.³² Thus Vives' confrontation with Ciceronianism becomes a discussion of what is living and what is dead in Cicero: what are the valuable, useful strategies *for us* in the texts? The 'Ciceroniani' do not recognize that all has changed; one cannot, as Erasmus recognized, speak aptly by hewing closely to Cicero's text.³³

There is, in short, a great deal at stake in imitation; Cicero's integrity, as well as the imitator's, is on the line. To imitate properly, one must consider first one's rationale of imitation; Vives straightforwardly claims the importance of theorizing imitation: 'quomodo poterunt recte imitari, qui, et quid sit imitari, atque ratione imitandum sit, penitus ignorant.'³⁴ Thus Vives distinguishes between the texts of Cicero, finding some imitable, usable, others inimitable; he marks as exemplary the special talents and achievements of Cicero in public and private interventions, talents that 'arm' the orator for contest.³⁵

In sum, decorum as canon controls the achievement of authenticity, and requires close regard to one's own personal qualifications and setting of time and place—authenticity is personal or non-existent. Decorum is a conditional, qualified value most particularly to be considered by the speaker/author, and an imperative that must shape the narrative of his career and accomplishment.

4.4 Political Pragmatism

At the conclusion of his account of imitation, Vives invokes decorum as a collective, civic, as well as personal canon. Should rhetoricians be at home in Roman affairs, strangers to our own age? The point of eloquence, as Quintilian saw it, is to deliver to your own audience, thus not to the Romans, not to the Greeks. It does not follow

³⁰ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6, 179.

³¹ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6, 176.

³² *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6, 175.

³³ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6, 176: 'quid loquentur de nostro foro, de nostris legibus, institutis, moribus, de pietate nostra, per omnia Ciceroniani? Res omnes, sicut praeclare Erasmus colligit, sunt mutatae, ut apte loqui de rebus praesentibus nequeat, quae a Cicerone *latum unquam* deflectere non audent.'

³⁴ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6., 177.

³⁵ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6., 175, 179.

that the Romans and Greeks are as erudite or as eloquent in barbaric languages. Livy, not a Roman, was more eloquent than native Romans.³⁶ Eloquence is as eloquence does.

Vives' program, diffused in a range of texts of critique and instruction, gloss and treatise, is a shrewd, elegant program, focusing on basic capacities, very often closely allied with specific civic activities. Of course, he distinguishes rhetoric as civic art: 'grammatica caedat ligna, dialectica domum erigat, Rhetorica condit civitatem.'³⁷ In his account of imitation as practice he notes rhetoric as '*potissimus*' in civic and public affairs. Rhetoric specifies, indeed, the 'vincular' power of words. The basic elements that unite and chain the participants of a community are, on the one hand, *iustitia*, a preconditional value of communal interaction, and, on the other, *sermo*, the primary instrumentality of interaction.³⁸

Thus a motive of Vives' refusal of Agricola's reduction of rhetoric to style, to eloquential embroidery, is his notion of rhetoric as political. In Vives' reading of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which Noreña commends, Vives comes close to the important contention of Martin Heidegger's brilliant reading of the *Rhetoric* in 1924, the lectures *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*; rhetoric, Heidegger claims, functions entirely inside politics; it is not an autonomous linguistic *technē*, but is embedded in civil practice.³⁹ Note, for example Vives' rejection of Quintilian's attempt to make rhetoric omniscient, thus perhaps hegemonous, with a hegemonous autonomy.⁴⁰ The basic value of *sermo* is linkage, and the basic rhetorical skills are political. On the other hand, the schools' dialectic, not rhetoric, is 'sophistic' and dissociating.⁴¹

Vives' *De consultatione* (1523) exemplifies his instruction in political rhetoric, rhetoric functioning inside politics. The treatise claims, of course, consultation as part of Aristotle's 'deliberative' genre, dealing with policy, and the goal of utility.⁴² And the organization of the tract on the action of advising illustrates rhetoric's simplicity: rhetoric can be perfunctory about elaborate rationalizations of problems and claims of solution. Far from the philosopher's search, then and now, for unexpected complexity, contradictions, in analysis, the tract consists almost entirely

³⁶ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6., pp. 179–80.

³⁷ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6., p. 111.

³⁸ 'Praellectio', *De ratione dicendi*, M. 2., p. 89: 'humanae consociationis vinculum dixerunt esse iustitiam et sermonem'; compare *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6., p. 152; *De tradendis disciplinis*, M. 6., p. 245, '*sermo*' as '*vinculum*'; p. 262, '*bonitas*' as '*vinculum*'.

³⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, from the notes of Walter Bröcker for Sommersemester 1924, Herbert-Marcuse-Archiv, p. 51.

⁴⁰ Vasoli, 'Juan Luis Vives', pp. 240–41 (n. 15 above), on *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6., p. 155.

⁴¹ *In pseudodialecticos*, pp. 50–51.

⁴² *De consultatione*, M. 2., p. 238.

of lists of potentially pertinent descriptions of persons, places, and times. Every factor affecting the act of advising—the person addressed, the other persons advising as context, of course the topics at issue—calls for a long list of considerations.

Thus, the text invokes decorum as a civic as well as an individualist canon; consultation is primarily a talent for finding the appropriate tactic.⁴³ Appropriateness dictates both the perception and presentation of *ethos*, the securing for the speaker of an *opinio probitatis, prudentiae*; nothing more suits the counsellor than modesty and weight, 'deceat consultentes quam modestia et gravitas'.⁴⁴ Appropriateness as canon is, in short, a strategy for political engagement. Rhetorical decorum simply works with considerations, embraces a radical specificity that is, perhaps, open-ended. Decorum requires specificity in deliberative consulting if it is to be persuasive and convincing, while it eschews broad, general problem-setting in the scholastic form of thesis, objection, reply. Advice considers only possibilities for the advisee's will: the list of factors of person, place, time, etc. supplants mind-numbing 'philosophical' conundrums, such as 'Is this choice exclusively rational or emotional?'

The strategy then of asserting justice and speech as comparable and intricately related, not only politicizes rhetoric, but rhetoricizes politics. Vives has described the structure of *imitatio* as an exercise in competition and contest; certainly the structure of rhetorical argument is contest and conflict. Conflict is elemental, basic in politics; conflict precedes consensus, develops it, and, in a way, devalues it, since consensus is not the persevering political process, but the product, and, at times, a receding, remote product of this process. Vives' pessimistic psychological assumptions, reinforced by his Christian assumptions about sin, interestingly enough underwrite a robust account of politics as conflict. Vives notes that the modalities of the free republic promote open contradiction, and thus specifies rhetorical competence as indispensable.⁴⁵ Politics requires, rather than suppresses contest and antagonism; yet contest, conflict as the fact of political life, is to be distinguished from addiction to unnecessary argument in law, where dialectical follies only obscure to political-moral values at stake.⁴⁶ George points to Vives' claim that rhetoric flourishes in conflict, not consensus, and that Vives stigmatizes the contemporary Renaissance restorers of classical texts because they lack contest and do not have adversaries.⁴⁷ Thus, in a very neat contrast to the frivolous academic contests of the scholastics, Vives sees humanist academic politics as fundamentally defective because the humanists are not engaged in a debate on the relevant use of texts—a point to Ward!

⁴³ George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', pp.138f., on the *De consultatione*.

⁴⁴ *De consultatione*, M. 2., 245, 249.

⁴⁵ *De consultatione*, M. 2., 249.

⁴⁶ *De causis corruptarum artium*, VII, M. 6., 238f.

⁴⁷ George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', pp. 146, 150; *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6, 154, 171.

Therefore, one could argue that the *Declamationes sullanae* (1520) and the *De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico* (1526) are key texts in Vives' program. The *Declamationes* are exercises, in essence, in the tactics of verbal conflict and confrontation. Certainly they follow the model of the classical *suasoria*, as an invented advice to a famous (or mythical) person on a possible course in a famous action, but Vives' specific accounts of tyrannous choices have suspiciously current relevance, obvious pertinence. The *Dissidio* is a kind of extrapolation from the genre of *suasoria*, a dialogue where the pseudo-classical protagonists give voice to Vives' sense of the contemporary resonance of classical conflicts. This sense is reinforced by the breadth and depth of Vives' classicism, in the large number of references to Roman political and legal contests, and by his fascination with the mechanics of Roman civil agonistic practices as appropriate to the discussion.⁴⁸ The *De consultatione* is, of course, another text in the practice of dealing with conflicting judgements and actions, and even the *De conscribendis epistolis* contains instruction in negotiations and deal-making.

Moreover, when rhetoric functions entirely inside politics, politics radicalizes rhetoric. Purely stylistic interests, or purely intellectualist issues—such as the place of rhetoric in a philosophical frame—will shift the focus away from problems of contingency, and from responses to political contingencies in urgent situations. Vives is aware both that free republics require debate and negotiation, and that rhetoric does not flourish in too well-ordered republics, in consensus.⁴⁹ The academic genre—both medieval and Renaissance—of defining an ideal polity represses and effaces conflict; theological and poetic duties also, perhaps, derail rhetoric from considerations of its basic civic competence of conflict. And Ward, as well, claims rhetoric's disjunction from large intellectual historical concerns: the vocationally oriented pragmatism of medieval rhetoric does not have anything to do with a 'general expansion of intellectual horizons at the time.'⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *De europae dissidiis, et bello turcico*, M. 6., pp. 452–81. A. Fontà, 'La politica europea en la perspectiva de Vives', in *Erasmus in Hispania, Vives in Belgio*, ed. by J. Ijsewijn (Louvain: Peeters, 1986), p. 72, perhaps is arguing that Vives reads the classical political texts in a mode that encapsulates them in Vives' own experience of current political affairs; 'encapsulate', of course, recalls Vives' imitation theory.

⁴⁹ *De causis corruptarum artium*, M. 6., p. 154; compare George, 'Rhetoric in Vives', p. 146.

⁵⁰ Ward, 'Quintilian', p. 272.

5 Pragmatisms: Vives, Ward, Rorty

'Pragmatism' is a vague, ambiguous, overworked word.

—Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 160

5.1 Vives' Renaissance Rhetoric, Ward's Medieval Rhetoric

What Vives does in his reforming strategies, and what Ward describes in the medieval appropriation of classical rhetoric, is a rhetorical pragmatism. Ward claims that medieval rhetoricians' work is coherent and utilitarian. But, more specifically, this appropriation is decorous, itself rhetorically attuned: the texts and instruction practices have themselves rhetorical tact. He describes an ad hoc program, or series of programs, which present rhetorical techniques and assumptions, always in relation to specific goals of practice in court or chancery, in school instruction or legal advocacy. Even the most sophisticated commentary Ward deals with (Oxford, Bodl. Library, CCC 250) has a basic pragmatic structure and pragmatic values and goals.⁵¹

Vives, in contrast, engages in a strong critique of the rhetorical-dialectical academicism, the school program in large part a degenerate stage of the medieval innovations, the work of Ward's 'revolutionaries.' But again, the instruments are rhetorical: the leading edge of his critique is furnished by his persevering allegiance to the rhetorical canon of decorum. Paradoxically, what is universally valid and valuable is his focus on the particular, and his engagement with contingencies of person, time, and place. His pragmatism is a kind of applied decorum. Thus as pragmatic, it is critical of initiatives that disregard contingency.

5.2 Parallel quarrels

For the historian of rhetoric who attempts to place rhetorical initiatives in general intellectual history, it is useful to connect rhetorical pragmatism with pragmatism *tout court*. A possible strategy for specifying the peculiarities of rhetorical modes is to compare pragmatism's quarrels. Reading Richard Rorty's strong critique of the dominant post-Cartesian, post-Kantian philosophical 'foundationalism', a critique he claims as American pragmatism, gives us a perspective on the contributions of medieval and Vivesian pragmatic modalities to intellectual history.⁵² For it could be

⁵¹ Ward, 'Quintilian', pp. 264–69.

⁵² Richard Rorty sets out his argument against foundationalism in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Jaime Nubiola, 'Juan Luis Vives y Charles S. Peirce', *Anuario filosófico*, 26 (1993), 155–64, has already argued a connection between Vives and American pragmatism.

argued that the classical quarrel of rhetoric and philosophy is essentially a conflict between pragmatism and foundationalism, defined as intellectualist, with the goal of erecting systemic structures certifying 'truth' by means of logical inference, a goal of pure structure, abstract, transparent.

A central characteristic of Vives' particular version of the pre-modern quarrel of rhetoric and philosophy employs rhetorical beliefs and habits of inquiry to critique philosophizing as practising a colonized dialectic, the scholastic '*frigor*' that rigidifies terms into essences, vacant, impractical, remote. Both philosophers, speaking in a rather loose fashion, quarrel with roughly similar crankinesses of philosophizing. Rorty also reacts to *frigor* in his hostility to hypostatization: 'pragmatism is simply an attempt to get us not to hypostatize the adjective "true."' ⁵³ Vives uses rhetorical modes—perhaps the only pragmatic tools available—to criticize these versions; Rorty, I am sorry to say, has the usual, thin philosophical notion of rhetoric as 'mere' rhetoric, bare presentation tactics. Both use pragmatic modes, but only Vives uses rhetorical pragmatism, and thus the comparison can only help us distinguish rhetorical capacity.

The truly useful comparison, however, hinges on the issues raised by Jürgen Habermas in his contribution to Robert Brandom's *Rorty and his Critics*, 'Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn'. ⁵⁴ The effort of Rorty, according to Habermas, depends for its innovatory strengths on his choice of contexts to work in and on. Rorty claims the 'life-world', as opposed to the domain of 'reflexive intellectual activity', a choice motivated by his dominating interests in philosophy: what good does it do? What purpose does it serve? Habermas' opposition juxtaposes the life-world, with its beliefs guaranteed by common sense, to the isolation of the context of reflexive intellectual activity, where the only guarantee is reason, the use of argumentative skills. And, indeed, history of philosophy, Rorty claims, should be re-oriented to describe, as Dewey insisted, philosophy as responses to a series of events that transpire outside of philosophy. ⁵⁵ Rorty, often to the dismay of his philosopher-critics, employs not simply Dewey, but the more 'poetic' later stages of Heidegger's thought, Freud, Marx, Castoriadis, and the deconstructionist strategies of Derrida—although he draws the line at the literary deconstructionism of Paul De Man. Habermas, of course, approves of Rorty's refusal to function in the isolate context of philosophical foundationalism and his preoccupation with the context of the life-world. Habermas disapproves of Rorty's re-description of philosophy as not inquiry, but, simply, an 'ongoing conversation' on an open-ended series of issues of the life-world, rather on the issues of metaphysics and epistemology of the current reflexive

⁵³ Rorty, 'Reply to Bilgrami', in *Rorty and his Critics*, ed. by Robert B. Brandom (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 266; this admirable collection not only assembles a fruitful philosophical discussion on Rorty's pragmatism, but, remarkably, gives Rorty's replies to the discussants.

⁵⁴ Habermas, in *Rorty and his Critics*, pp. 31–55; Rorty's reply, pp. 56–64.

⁵⁵ Rorty, 'Reply to Michael Williams', *Rorty and his Critics*, p. 214.

intellectual activity of the philosophers; epistemology, Rorty claims, should soon appear as a 'quaint antique'.⁵⁶ He wants philosophy to shift from issues of truth as correspondence of representation to reality, to the 'contemplation of organisms coping with the environment by using language to develop projects of social cooperation'; Rorty as well insists on inquiry as 'a thoroughly social phenomenon'.⁵⁷ Philosophy must translate its concern with tidiness of definitions of the truth to the problems of justification, the justification of our beliefs which is always addressed to an audience.⁵⁸ And if inquiry is 'social', it is not 'professional' or anti-social; at times Rorty seems to address Stanley Cavell as Vives would address a brilliant but foolishly professional member of the College of Montaigu.⁵⁹ For Vives manifests the same exasperation when he disavows the professional scholastic problematic, produced in the isolated environment of the disputes and genres of the schools, for the task of developing civic capacities for use in the negotiation of utility and justice, in the 'life-world.'

By focusing on preoccupations with the life-world, one specifies the parallel strengths of medieval rhetorical practice and Vivesian rhetorical theory. Rhetoric furnishes an armamentarium of diverse tactics to assert the value of the quotidian claims of the life-world, over against the abstract scholastic structures of the domain of reflexive intellectual activity. Basically, their rhetorical activity is autochthonous, self-motivated, self-ordered. Pragmatic motives at every turn require practical discursive analysis and production. Vives' pragmatism as applied decorum takes '*quod decet*' as a slogan for an inquiry critical of inattention to contingencies, critical of ineffective address as failure to contextualize. As a political analytic initiative it is a talent for estimating the distance between the protagonists' programs and the contingent surround. Decorum is a technique for political theorizing as political engagement, a rejection of tactics that rest in distancing generalizations. Further, rhetorical strategies are devoted to, indeed conjoined to, the beliefs of 'common sense'; its primary commitment to discursive effect requires the eschewal of tactics evading common sense.⁶⁰ Vives' rhetorical pragmatism can be both destabilizing of standard 'philosophical' restatements of principles, and supportive of the most hoary

⁵⁶ Rorty, 'Reply to Bilgrami', *Rorty and his Critics*, p. 266.

⁵⁷ Rorty, 'Reply to Bilgrami', *Rorty and his Critics*, pp. 263, 264.

⁵⁸ On the 'scandalous' substitution by Rorty of justification for truth, see A. Bilgrami, 'Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry?', *Rorty and his Critics*, pp. 254–61, and Rorty's reply, pp. 262–67.

⁵⁹ Rorty, 'Cavell on Skepticism', in *Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972–80)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 176–190. Rorty comments on Cavell's teaching practice that Cavell feels that 'to set the freshmen up for epistemology, we have to generalize our way out of common sense' (p. 182), a most unrhetorical sentiment.

⁶⁰ Klaus Döckhorn, 'Review of H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*', *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 218 (1966), 169–206 makes the point that the two rhetorical *pisteis*, *ethos*, and *pathos*, exhaust the topic of common sense.

moralisms as 'commonsensical', often in the same text. The perfunctory rhetorical way with ideas, mentioned above in connection with the use of long lists of considerations, obvious as well in the embrace of moralism, seems to be a pragmatic strategy of avoiding problems created by systemic structures, with their rigidities.

Rhetoric's sharp focus on discursive effect, regarded as a weakness, condemned as moral relativism by the philosophers, must be re-described as a strength. Discursive pragmatism founds political definition. Ward describes in the large quantity of rhetorical commentaries, glosses, and manuals, a series of highly specific re-descriptions of the potential or actual discursive negotiating strengths of the community. The general rhetorical refusal to stigmatize decorum as philosophically relativist, as well as a constant and insistent invocation to decorum, is instead a vital tactic in developing political capacity, an expressed allegiance to the life-world.

Vives' pragmatism is austere rhetorical; the general problems are very often stated in terms of discursive effect; his solutions are very often solutions of discursive formation and practice. Like Rorty's, Vivesian inquiry is social activity. Every theorization requires a sense of address and of beliefs and issues shared.⁶¹ The pragmatism simply underlines the rhetorical nature of inquiry: there is no initiative—recall Rorty's 'justification'—that does not require persuasion, no value that does not require community assent. What Rorty's pragmatism attacks, and what Vives criticizes, is unresponsive intellectualism, an intellectualism that turns its back on the life-world. Habermas is careful to emphasize that Rorty's pragmatism is more than a set of traditional philosophical gambits labelled 'pragmatism.' Perhaps it is 'rhetorical', and the important contrast between the pragmatic programs of Rorty and Vives is between Rorty's implicit and Vives' explicit rhetorical commitment. Rorty's attempt to redefine philosophy as edifying conversation, with the philosopher's task as continuing and expanding the conversation, is certainly a strong critique of the present structure of the discussion, and may well be an attempt to change in some bold fashion the rhetoric of philosophy.

Certainly, Vives' program places theory first, but the theory upholds that discursive practice precedes and develops moral (political) competence and moral theory. In his program, a sophisticated sense of 'sermonal' capacity both strengthens his anti-dogmatic proclivities, and, contrarily to be sure, his taste for delivering moralisms at every turn. In one instance, his argument turns, interestingly enough, on adolescent capacity. The school youth, he claims, do not constitute a good audience for moral instruction. Adolescents can't read ethics; they must learn not by reading *sententiae*, but, eventually, by making *sententiae*, that is, assuming that they have survived the bad preparation of the schools. With age comes freedom and facility in moral discourse, while the youth lack, not words, but *sensus animi*, and valid arguments; they are incapable of confecting appropriate justifications.⁶²

⁶¹ Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p. 373.

⁶² The passage from the 'Epistola nuncupatoria', *De ratione dicendi*, M. 2., p. 91, which I have just paraphrased is worth quoting at length: 'Nam, quemadmodum sapienter inquit

In this account of discursive effect, or lack of it, Vives emphasizes that a theory of morality must be supported by an understanding of the capacities of speaking and listening. While the source is philosophical, as Aristotle originally stated, the strategies he proceeds to describe are rhetorical; indeed, once again decorum is raised to programmatic status. Vives' rhetoric is most certainly parasitic on philosophy for its opening definitions and arguments; Rorty's pragmatism very often, it seems, simply restates rhetorical strategies. Vives' rhetorical habits of action in inquiry organize a different, serious, but also more accessible discussion on issues defined in a philosophical discourse. To be sure, a discordant, pessimistic (Christian) sense of capacity glosses the banal moralisms Vives is so fond of, the standard utterances of moral discipline that Vives seems quite unable, or unwilling, to eradicate. Yet in this period, neither Vives nor Machiavelli nor More proffer political simplicity, a civic humanism that is an easy, accessible program of virtuous republican action. Quite bluntly, they write too well to support simplicity. Vives' rhetorical innovations are reciprocally defined by and simultaneously expressed with, his sophisticated political pessimism. In particular, Vives' investments in inclusive, and often unpalatable, definitions of psychological capacities drive his political interests and justify the importance of rhetorical competencies; his discussion of the passions is simultaneously a refinement of the definition of politics as basic and natural. And any definition of a natural politics requires rhetorical pragmatism, dealing with the passions that cause the differences that inevitably construe the necessity of political action. One might well ponder the disjunction: Rorty's very large, very ambitious pragmatism, delivered in a philosophical discussion, is unable to produce political theory that engages even Rorty himself. The master rhetoricians of the early sixteenth century—and here, perhaps, Vives' played only a journeyman's role—produced compelling political theory, theory that still flourishes in contemporary discussion.

Aristotelis, adolescentem non esse moralis disciplinae auditorem idoneum, quod ignarus sit eorum quae geruntur in vita, de quibus est speculatio moralis; ita nec est aptus facultatis hujus auditor, quod ea nesciat, sine quorum peritia intelligi, quae hic tradantur, non queunt. Hujusce rei documento sit, quod senes et viri medium aetatem praetergressi, ii demum facundi sunt, et ad dicendum liberi ac soluti; juvenes autem impediti in loquendo ingrediuntur, plura sentiunt quam promant, loquaces magis interdum quam eloquentes, et quibus verba non desint, desunt utique sensus animi, desunt argumenta valida, robur in sententiis, nec est unum quicquam, ubi, et quando convenit, collacatum, ex quibus artificium ipsum sedula est animadversione confectum et constitutum.'

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